Larry Holt
Posts: 1969
Joined: 3/31/2000
From: Atlanta, GA 30068
Status: offline
|
I posted this a long time ago but it has relevance to this thread:
A Brief summary of Soviet Operational Art
by Larry Holt (lholt@atl.sita.int)
Since Matrix is working on operational level games, I thought that an article on this area would be of interest and use.
While the US military only acknowledged a level of war between tactical and strategic in the 1980's, the Soviet Union has studied the conduct of operations by large formations of the Armed Forces since before WWII. Briefly warfare can be divided into three levels:
Strategic: wars waged on a global scale by nations using all national means; military, economic, political and social.
Operational: campaigns waged in a theater of operations (e.g. Western Europe, Pacific) scale fought by theater military forces only; fronts, numbered armies and army groups, numbered or named fleets.
Tactical: battles and engagements fought by corps and below.
WWI showed the Soviet General Staff the need to wage combat with multiple armies and to conduct campaigns versus single battles. They saw that strategic warfare was broken into a series of operations by time and area objectives. This was the start of an operational art intermediate between tactics and strategy. It has sometimes also been called grand-tactical.
Operational maneuver was seen as the key to victory at the operational level. This is maneuver to the full depth and width of the operational area. This was a change from the previous doctrine of battles along a front with rear areas left unassailed until the front was pushed back. Now, the battle was to be waged simultaneously at the front and also in the enemy's rear area without waiting for the battle at the front to be decided. This was to be accomplished by inserting groups into the enemy rear area from the air, from naval landings and by pushing groups through a ruptured front. These latter groups would not be bothered with attacking defenders along the front but rather would push up to 100 Km into the enemy rear attacking soft targets and generally disrupting the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations.
The Soviet 1920's doctrine for operational maneuver called for shock armies to penetrate to operational depths with cavalry and reserves but it failed because the forces available were too fragile. 1929 regulations called for deep battle by combined arms forces to penetrate past tactical defenses but they still did not have the forces to carry out this doctrine.
The deep battle concept called for employing forces up to 100 Km deep in exploitation of tactical success. These forces were to use tanks and aircraft to obtain the desired speed and shock. To this end the force structure was expanded to create tank corps, airborne forces, mobile groups. The designations of corps with subordinate brigades were used for these deep battle forces while division and regiment were used for conventional forces that were to conduct conventional tactical operations. While this was all well and good doctrine, Stalin's purges disrupted this process.
The experience of the Spanish Civil war demonstrated major shortcomings of the Soviet deep battle doctrine such as the vulnerability of armor and the unwieldiness of some formations. In response the Soviets slowed the pace of change and broke up some larger formations. However the 1940 German success in France showed the Soviets that they had learned incorrect lessons from the Spanish Civil war. In response to this they tried to reconstruct their deep operations forces and realized that the Germans could attack them next. The Soviets stripped armor from their armies to reconstitute their forces but they could not synchronize all the various forces (e.g. logistics, communications, training, weapons modernization) needed to make this a success.
In June, 1941 the Soviets were in the process of creating a second defensive echelon and a defense in depth when the Germans rendered their efforts moot by invading. Within two weeks the Soviet armor force was destroyed and 60% of all starting forces were combat ineffective. Only massive mobilization saved them.
The Soviets rose to the challenge and adjusted. They reconstituted their operational forces but this time with smaller units that were easier to control and synchronize and further stripped armor from the general forces. While this gave them a force in being, it had poor penetrating power and could not achieve operational level encirclements.
Partisan forces could be used to some extent to conduct deep operations. While they were not capable of operational maneuver and could not move into the German rear areas, conventionally the German rear area moved to them. The Soviets had trained for partisan warfare prior to WWII in some areas that the Germans now found to be infested with irregular and regular forces.
In 1942 the Soviets had redeveloped their armored forces while again massive reserves saved the day. They tested theories of force structure and employment. They had to determine a balance of armor, cavalry and infantry and decide where and when to commit their preciously rebuilt and hoarded mobile forces.
By 1943 the Soviets were starting to get it right. They had developed both the structure and doctrine to penetrate and exploit deep. The battles of Belgrod and Karkov saw the first use of forward detachments to clear the way for operational maneuver groups. They still had problems coordinating forward and main forces however.
In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets achieved successes that are models for current doctrine. The Vistula-Oder operations against a prepared defense and the scope of the Manchuria campaign are models of operational success. Operations in Berlin showed the need for more infantry and a more balanced, less tank heavy force.
In the 1950's and 1960's the development of nuclear weapons were determined to be an influence on the battlefield. It was thought that large infantry formations could not survive. What was needed were more agile units which lead to the development of the motor rifle divisions. Of note is that the U.S. take on nuclear operations was the opposite of the Soviet view. The US Army introduced the pentathional (?) division with a base of five units to bulk up divisions with extra troops to compensate for increased casualties during nuclear war.
In the 1960's nuclear weapons were determined to dominate the battlefield. The inferiority of the Soviet nuclear forces implied that NATO would use its advantage over them. The increased role of nuclear forces reduced the role of ground operational maneuver forces. The Soviets organized their Groups of Forces in Europe (organizations destined to become Fronts in wartime) with more tanks in the first echelon (as opposed to holding them back for exploitation) and no special purpose organized exploitation group. Exploitation to the operational depths was to be by follow on Front echelons, Warsaw pact forces and Fronts mobilized from the Western Military Districts in the USSR.
Growing Soviet nuclear parity with NATO in the 1970's caused them to reconsider the dominate role of battlefield nuclear weapons, that they might not be used at all. Without nuclear weapons to cause destruction in the operational depths of NATO, operational maneuver groups (or OMGs) made their reappearance. Soviet echelons were to be shallower to hug close to NATO forces and avoid nuclear targeting.
At this time the role of spetznatz reappeared. This term, meaning special purpose or designation forces, was first applied to units in WWII that were trained to infiltrate or insert bend enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance or sabotage and controlled by high level (army and front) commands. Spetznatz units, operating in 10 man teams would gather information at operational depths needed to conduct operational maneuver. They could also be used to conduct strikes against high payoff targets. They were covertly inserted and used during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan to disrupt command and control (Indeed in Afghanistan they shot everyone at the presidential palace.) Spetznatz are subordinated to the intelligence staff of ground and naval forces at the army/fleet and front level. They train on mockups of NATO equipment and conduct very realistic and physically demanding exercises. However, there are no special purpose insertion aircraft similar to the US Combat Talon. Spetznatz teams must infiltrate covertly before the start of hostilities or count on slipping in through the confusion of a general invasion. During peacetime they may recon their combat targets under the guise of being tourists or international transportation crews. The average Spetznatz trooper is a two year conscript which does not provide much time to gain difficult technical skills. Spetznatz officers speak target languages fluently while enlisted are expected to speak common phrases.
The 1980's brought much change to Europe. New technology, neutron weapons (no they were artillery shells, not bombs), precision munitions, NATO force modernization (the deployment of improved armor tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as well as the urbanization of the terrain meant that changes were needed. Emphasis was placed on maneuver and balanced forces. The old critique of Berlin operations during WWII was pulled out and dusted off. They began deploying a fourth generation of motor transport vehicles able to keep up with tanks for logistical support during combat. Upgraded HIP, HOOK and HALO heavy lift helicopters were introduced for rapid, heavy logistical support at the Front level. Army Aviation branch was created to provide support for rapid advances by ground maneuver forces. Attack helicopter regiments were resubordinated from Front to Army level to provide more responsive support to ground troops.
It is ironic that this modernization of Soviet forces depended upon the development of ideas that were only available through perestroika. This very contact with the West that lead to an increase in Soviet military capabilities also lead to reigning it in.
Lessons from the Soviet experience:
Military efficiency dictated organization (do what is possible)
Morale is supported by ideals (nationalism, communism, etc.)
Tactical deficiencies can be overcome by mass, discipline and acceptance of losses
Necessity of building up forces quickly
Deep operations are key to success at the operational level
Conduct operations (deception, economy of force, etc.) over a broad front rather than attacking across a broad front
At the operational level, the Soviets recognized two types of maneuver:
Encirclement; used against a prepared defense and with a low correlation of forces
Broad front attack: used against a partially prepared defense or with a high correlation of forces.
Trends from the Soviet experience:
Non-linear war
Blurred distinction between offense and defense
Combined arms tailoring of forces
Increased engineering and logistical support of deep forces to maintain independence of action
New forms of fire; recon/strike groups
New forms of maneuver; BMPs maneuvering while troops are dismounted
And finally the principles of Soviet Operational Art:
Mobility:
capability for full use of combat power for quick accomplishment of the mission
ensure superiority on important axes
disperse to avoid attack by weapons of mass destruction
mass secretly and quickly to create striking power
shift effort quickly when needed
Tempo:
maintain average rates of advance (up to 40 Km per day)
surmount defensive zones quickly after defensive fires have lifted and before defenders can recover
keep the enemy from maneuvering from operational depths and laterally
keep the enemy from withdrawing to regroup
avoid or move quickly though contaminated areas
shift efforts to the operational depths after insertion of operational forces
Concentration of main effort/superior combat power at the decisive place and time:
use massed fires from dispersed weapons to avoid targeting by weapons of mass destruction
balance principles of mass and economy of force
Surprise:
Unexpected action which leads to the achievement of success in battle, operations and war.
Achieved by surprise use of all types of weapons (OK this is circular logic but its what is in the Soviet Military encyclopedia, 1976)
Combat Activeness:
bold, decisive, energetic decision making
a bold attack raises troop morale and multiplies troop effectiveness
Preserve combat effectiveness:
In so far as is needed to accomplish the mission retain/preserve a capability to conduct decisive combat operations
(Note that it is OK to destroy all the combat effectiveness of a unit as long as the mission is accomplished. Subsequent missions will be taken up by follow on echelons)
Conformity of the goal to actual conditions:
maintain flexibility
don't under estimate the enemy
Coordination
skillful use of each component's capabilities
provide for continual, mutual assistance an interworking of units
Depth:
Gain an advantageous position
(How deep is deep?)
Sources:
Notes from class A352, Principles of Operational Art, US Army Command and General Staff college (USCGSC)
Selected Readings in Soviet Army Operations, USCGSC text, 1990
_____________________________
Never take counsel of your fears.
|
Printable Version
Soviet military development throughout WW2 and how its ... - 
- 
New Messages
No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages
Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages
Locked w/o New Messages
Post New Thread