Matrix Games Forums

Forums Register Login Photo Gallery Member List Search Calendars FAQ

My Profile Inbox Address Book My Subscription My Forums Log Out

View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest

Users viewing this topic: none

Printable Version

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Steel Panthers World At War & Mega Campaigns >>

Page: << < prev 1 [2]

Message

<< Older Topic Newer Topic >>

- 7/14/2001 4:01:00 AM

CaptainBrian

Posts: 59
Joined: 12/27/2000
From: California
Status: offline

Kursk Sources Lot of good Kursk info [ July 13, 2001: Message edited by: CaptainBrian ]

_____________________________

CaptainBrian

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 31

- 7/14/2001 7:13:00 AM

Nikademus

Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Tombstone: Nikademas: You claim that the Germans had an edge in tanks in 1943 is innacurate. Kursk happened to involve a lot of tank losses but that didn't change things much other than make the fact clear to anyone who was watching. The soviets had tanks enough to lose like a thousand tanks or something in 5 days and be in good enough condition to execute a major offensive. The Germans did a really good job at Kursk and tank losses were much lower than was previously thought. Tomo

When i said the Germans retained the "edge" I was reffering primarily to the proficiency of their tank crews and commanders. The Kursk battle was a disaster not only due to the heavy tank losses but also due to the loss of so many of these skilled men, along with the well trained panzergrenadier that were to escort them. As for numbers, the Russians had more, but the disperity was not as great as some apolegists would have one believe. Again, it was the Russian tactic of tenacious defence with limited resources while hoarding a signifigant reserve to unleash on the unsuspecting enemy after they'd bled themselves white against the defenders that was just as important as numbers. It was not simply a matter of endless steams of Russian tanks attacking the germans in waves. As for the German losses not being that severe. Well all i can say for that my friend is that i'd very much like to see the source that makes that claim. I dont think it's a coincidence that after the Kursk offensive was called off that the Germans were never able to again regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. That strikes me as more than a "check" as you seem to be implying. Why did'nt the Russians steamroll straight to Berlin? Because they suffered a serious check of their own outside of Karkov a short period after the Kursk battle. Here the situation got reversed and this time it was a ill-concieved Soviet tank offensive into an area heavily defended by German AFV's and high velocity weapons. More tragically the Russians behaved exactly as the Germans did at Kursk and instead of cutting their losses threw themselves back into the frey again and again until finally the mounting losses put the entire Fifth Guards tank army out of commission for the forseeable future. (it may have been the Third guards....dont have the source in front of me) The Russians had more tanks no question, but they were'nt inexhaustible, and to this day i still find it puzzleing that this is held as point of negation against them. The fact that the Russians were able to build such numbers while large preportions of their country were under enemy occupation speaks to the dedication of the Russian people in resisting and eventually ejecting their "superior" enemy from their homeland. Steven Zaloga in his book on Soviet AFV's commented on this, stating that the "actual" number of tanks available to both the Germans and Soviets at the Front during most periods of the war was not all that disperate. The key difference was that the Russians had greater reserves so that they could replace their losses more quickly after a heavy battle than the Germans could. After the Kursk battle and after the Allies invaded Italy and then France this siutation only got worse [ July 13, 2001: Message edited by: Nikademus ]

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 32

- 7/14/2001 2:48:00 PM

Tombstone

Posts: 764
Joined: 6/1/2000
From: Los Angeles, California
Status: offline

Nik: The German's lost the initiative in the east before Kursk. Just cause they were still kicking doesn't mean they weren't doomed. About German and Soviet performance at Kursk tho, here's an article that roughly covers what I'm getting at, [Article about Kursk] I think you're misunderstanding me, I'm not trying to knock the Soviets... quite the contrary I believe that they had their **** together way better than most people believe. In the 6 to 8-ish days of Zitadelle the Germans just didn't lose that many tanks (well they lost a lot, but not compared to other major offensives) After Zitadelle was called off the Soviets kicked off Rumianstev and started the 2 year period of war were they pounded on Germans bad. I think you're mistaken about a Soviet failure at Kharkov in 1943. Kharkov in 1942 was super painful for the Soviets after the glorious Stalingrad encirclement... but in 1943 the Soviets did alright, sure they were stopped, but it did a lot of damage, and took back Kharkov (forever). When it comes to actual tank figures, drawing from vol 2 of "Panzer Truppen", "Kursk:A Soviet General Staff Study", and "The Battle of Kursk" the Soviet and German tank forces were relatively even. The germans had a minor advantage in tanks in the south and a pretty significant one in the north. In the north the Germans were stopped COLD by mines, guys, and artillery... in the south were the tank ratio was more favorable for the Soviets the germans made much more progress. Southern side: 1st Tank Army was at like 800 tanks, with like 400 more in 2GTC and 5GTC. 4th Pz Army and Army Det. Kempf added up to like 1500 (200 or so being Panthers who are destined to be at like 30% of their numbers early in the offensive) so the ratio wasn't so bad... Southern attack units withdrew with like 1000 tanks, that does not constitute a serious strategic loss of tanks... not to mention 1st Pz Army didnt even get wet(yet). This is despite the fact that starting 11th June 1943 5th Guards Tank army got involved in the action adding another 600 tanks to the situation. Aside from all these numbers the Soviets ended with 1st Tank Army and 5th Gds Tank Army all but husks after Rumiyanstev. The real error is in thinking that tank losses were as critical as everyone says they are in a war like the one fought between USSR and Germany.... Tomo

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 33

- 7/16/2001 2:53:00 AM

rcread

Posts: 14
Joined: 7/13/2001
From: Shilo, Manitoba, Canada
Status: offline

The Germans were so successful in the first year of the war because of their operational and tactical doctrine and training. In most countries (including Britain, France, and the US), officers learned tactics in a classroom, and were given lots of time to think through their solutions to every problem. In Germany, officers were marched out into the training area in full battle order, halted, told where the enemy positions were and how they were equipped. Then a student was told to give a solution, on the spot. After he did, the students were requirred to carry it out. So, the Germans were taught that immediate action was more important than the perfect solution. Also, the Russian Army was headless. Stalin had disposed of all the formally trained and intelligent officers during the purge. Then, like Hitler, he thought himself a military genius, and only the '41 disaster convinced him otherwise. The Russian Army improved largely because the officers around Stalin improved, learned from their mistakes, and were heeded by Stalin (unlike Hitler, he realised he wasn't as smart as he thought). The best book on the subject is Hitler's Panzers East, which makes a very good case for the idea that the germans could have won the war in '41, and in failing that had no further hope. The Russian spy was Borgman (I think that was his name), Hitler's personal secretary, according to the Eastern Front's senior intelligence officer (I can't recall his name right now, either). This is backed up by the fact that whenever Hitler went into one of his funks and ignored the war, the Russians were caught by surprise. Refernce Kursk, the Germans have long claimed that Manstein had defeated the last Russian reserves and was through all the Russain defenses. Several German sources claim the offensive was called off not because it failed, but because the Allies invaded Sicily JULY 12TH, and Hitler panicked. This arguement is backed up now that the REAL, as opposed to the OFFICIAL, Russian histories of WWII are being brought to light. The best book on Kursk is Scorched Earth. One last remark: take everything you see on TV and most books about the Eastern Front with a truckload of salt. History is written by the winner, and the Supreme Soviet never held much stock by the truth.

_____________________________

Cracker "Artillery is the God of Battle"

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 34

- 7/16/2001 3:23:00 AM

gators

Posts: 106
Joined: 5/16/2001
Status: offline

one of the keys to Kursk was not just the depth of Soviet defenses but two other keys. One the Russian separated German armor and infantry, second the Russian practice of using batteries of ATGs sited on a single target. It is true that the Panther and Ferdinand vehicles suffered teething problems, but that doesn't seem to be a crucial reason for the German defeat. Another point about the supposed queasiness of Hitler about the Kursk attack is the only source I'm aware of for that anecdote is Guderian, and memoirs always have an element of subjectivity.

_____________________________

"It ain't the gun, Sonny. It's the operator" Bob the Nailer

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 35

- 7/16/2001 4:58:00 AM

achappelle

Posts: 150
Joined: 5/11/2001
From: Vancouver, BC
Status: offline

I've read in several books about Kursk that a great proportion of the German AFV losses were due no to Tank v Tank fire, but mechanical failure and minefield attrition. This was particularily true with the Panther "D"s, there were alot of engine fires, because they had designed the engine compartments to be water tight for amphib ops. The engine compartment overheats and whoosh. Defense in depth helps too.

_____________________________

"Molon Labe" - Leonidas @ Thermopylae (Come Get Them!!)

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 36

- 7/16/2001 6:33:00 PM

gators

Posts: 106
Joined: 5/16/2001
Status: offline

I knew the Panthers had the disconceting habit of lighting up when just idling. I didn't know the specific design flaw. thanks Alex. The Ferdinand's problem was simpler no mg!

_____________________________

"It ain't the gun, Sonny. It's the operator" Bob the Nailer

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 37

- 7/16/2001 7:43:00 PM

Paul Goodman

Posts: 198
Joined: 7/5/2000
From: Portsmouth, VA, USA
Status: offline

Actually, although the Soviets did, indeed, have a very effective source of information at this time, the German attack at Kursk was obvious to anyone. The real discussion at Stavka was whether to attack first, or wait. It was resolved to wait. However, as the German attack was postponed one more time (to get the Panthers), the Soviet argument was renewed, as many thought the German attack had been cancelled. The wait for the Panthers is ironic. There were 200 of them, all in one brigade (10th Panzer Brigade, I think). These tanks immediately drove into a low area, which was a high density anti-tank minefield, commanded by Soviet artillery and anti-tank guns in the hills beyond (a designated kill zone). It took a couple of days to get the cats out of there (Engineers clearing mines under murderous artillery fire). They lost about 25% of the Brigades strength there. The Panther was ineffective during the battle. Paul

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 38

- 7/17/2001 5:42:00 AM

Tombstone

Posts: 764
Joined: 6/1/2000
From: Los Angeles, California
Status: offline

Hey, who knows details about Bagration? That operation was gigantic, and very successful. A friend of mine whos in the army lost a great uncle at the Vitebsk encirclement in '44. I know that the Soviets had everything planned super well and conducted the dynamic aspects (when to commit who and where, etc.) properly as well... Did the Germans screw that up? Or were they really just being outfought, outplanned, and outproduced... ?? Tomo

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 39

- 7/18/2001 3:20:00 AM

Nikademus

Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline

Tombstone: Very interesting article. Thanks for posting the link. Whether or not i agree with it though remains to be seen. I found what the article 'didnt' say to be of as much interest as what it was saying. It does at least paint a clearer picture of why Manstein disented the way he did. The Prokanovka battle was interesting but gives the reader the idea that the Russians were facing nothing but Tiger and Panther tanks which was not the case. All in all i do get the impression that the article seeks to downplay German losses. No question they were less than the Soviets but had the loss been so disportionate i cannot see how they could have conducted a counteroffensive so quickly. Soviet AFV resources were not infinate after all. Manpower and airpower losses would have to factor in as well. It may well have been a potential lost 'victory' but if so would have been a minor one at best. On the initiative question. True, the Germans lost the initiative at Stalingrad but this was in the typcial flip-flop vein as seen in 41. Summer = German initiative Winter = Russian initiatve. However by spring of 43 the Germans had recovered yet again and regained the initiative for their 43 summer offensive. The only difference was that the Soviets were also in a position to contest this had they chosen but they did the smart thing and let the Germans come to them. ********* Batragon. The Russian Military zone has a good article on Batragon. I recall a few general details off the top of my head. Correct, the battle was minutely planned. This was necessary due to the tactical limitations of the Soviet tank forces. Coordination and communications were still being perfected at this point forcing the Russians to rely on set-piece battle plans with limited objectives (to start), backed up by overwhelming firepower on a wide front to limit the German response. Lack of AFV and more importantly manpower reserves further exaserbated the problem but this does'nt take away from the success of the Soviet offensive, given the result, the shattering of an entire Army group, a good part of which had been entrenched in solid well developed fortifications

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 40

- 7/18/2001 5:40:00 AM

Tombstone

Posts: 764
Joined: 6/1/2000
From: Los Angeles, California
Status: offline

This is some data from an in depth US study of the battle of Kursk: THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS of the KOSAVE II Study are: (1) Soviet initial personnel in theater were 66 percent higher than German, and initial Soviet tanks in theater were double the German level. A considerably larger fraction of the German units in the Kursk campaign was engaged in combat and incurring casualties for a longer time than was the case for Soviet units. The majority of German units were continually attacking from 5 July through 12 July 1943, but all had ceased attacking by 17 July. The Soviets defended until they counter-attacked on 12 July. German progress peaked on 16 July at 46 kilometers (km) northern advance from initial 4 July positions. (2) Daily Soviet personnel casualties and casualty rates were much higher than German. The Germans also consistently destroyed tanks and heavy antitank (AT) weapons in the Soviet force at a much higher rate than the Soviets achieved against them. However, for both personnel and tank/ heavy AT weapons, high fractional exchange ratios in favor of the Germans were sporadic and not sustained during the campaign. (3) Over the entire KDB campaign, the Soviets consumed 44 percent more tank/AT ammunition that the Germans. The Germans expended three times the Soviet artillery tonnage, two times the Soviet rocket tonnage, and tree times the Soviet small arms/AA tonnage expenditure. (4) The Germans generated more tactical aircraft sorties than the Soviets. The roles with the most sorties were ground attack for the Germans and air-to-air for the Soviets. (5) The Soviets always had unengaged reserves, while the Germans were always fully committed and engaged. Only 2/3 of Soviet personnel, tanks, and heavy AT weapons were, on average, in contact with the enemy, compared with averages of 92-97 percent for the Germans. This suggests that the German force was subjected to more wear and tear from the effects of nearly constant combat than was its opponent. Also, since rest and replenishment are minimal in a heavily committed force, the effectiveness and efficiency of German combat elements probably deteriorated over time relative to the Soviet force. As far as regaining the initiative after a Soviet offensive is concerned, you just can't compare the '41 winter offensive with Uranus. What the Soviets did in 42 was MUCH uglier to the Germans than what happened in 41. The German's lost the strategic initiative once the Soviets went over to offensive at Stalingrad and never regained it... they never even really got close. That's not to say that the Germans couldn't really take it to the Soviets once in awhile. You can't compare the strategic situation of such a significant theatre of war from one year to the next. The world was different in 1942 than it was in 1941. There's nothing to measure the concept of 'typical' with on the strategic scale. Bagration: I see the 44 Belorussian offensive as the Soviet masterpiece of the war. They pulled off some serious strategic surprise on the Germans and were able to dynamically modify operational plans and get troops moving super well. So much went so right for them... Tomo

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 41

- 7/18/2001 6:47:00 AM

Nikademus

Posts: 25684
Joined: 5/27/2000
From: Alien spacecraft
Status: offline

I've seen the US Study. I got the distinct impression that it was not an objective analysis. Why? perhaps because the SU was our most likely opponent post war. The Soviets did little clear up the situation, preffering to cloak their abilities in secrecy. Soviet cababilities have been continually underestimated by US studies, even in recent times If all these things had happened as described in the analysis, the Soviets should not have won. Given the slugfest nature of the offensive and the actual German progress vs their projected progress it seems hard to believe that the defender could be consistantly suffering higher casualties than the attacker. The Soviet practice of holding back reserves only works if a very *finite* level of troops and weapons fights tenaciously to bleed white the attacker. They did not have an endless supply of reinforcments at Kursk or in any other battle for that matter Had all these things taken place then yes, Kursk might be considered a minor "setback" for the Wehrmacht instead of the defeat that it was. There was indeed a general 'pattern' to the offensive/defensive operations between the seasons. I did'nt say that the scale of the defeats/victories were the same. In 41, the Germans were savaged but not to the same degree as in 42 when in addition to the large scale equipment losses they also lost a entire large Army's worth of combat troops to boot. The "Pattern" was i was reffering to was that the German war machine generally operated with it's best efficiency during the summer season while the opposite was true during the harsh winters. All this debate has certainly rekindled my interest. I'll see if i can dig up some of the old sources. [ July 17, 2001: Message edited by: Nikademus ]

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 42

- 7/18/2001 6:50:00 AM

rcread

Posts: 14
Joined: 7/13/2001
From: Shilo, Manitoba, Canada
Status: offline

Tombstone, you're entirely correct that everything was completely different between '41 & '42. The Russains were in the middle of modernizing their miltary in '41. The new equipment had all been designed and accepted, but issue to line units was only beginning. Also, the Soviets had completely overestimated the capabilities of their air force. They thought that, sinply because their fighters were the fastest and their bombers were the heaviest, that they were best. And they also had to contend with several senior officers, who had Stalin's ear, who had no concepts of modern war and felt they should revert to WWI style divisions and artillery methods. More reasons why they got their butts kicked in the beginning.

_____________________________

Cracker "Artillery is the God of Battle"

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 43

- 7/18/2001 8:23:00 AM

CaptainBrian

Posts: 59
Joined: 12/27/2000
From: California
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Tombstone: Bagration: I see the 44 Belorussian offensive as the Soviet masterpiece of the war. They pulled off some serious strategic surprise on the Germans and were able to dynamically modify operational plans and get troops moving super well. So much went so right for them...Tomo

Bagration was certainly the most effective offensive the USSR conducted vs. Germany. One book I read refered to it as "Barbarosa in reverse." In fact, based on numbers alone, it was the most catastophic German defeat of the war. 17 Divisions utterly destroyed and 50 more rendered combat ineffective. More men and material were lost during the course of Bagration than was lost at Stalingrad. In the western world Bagration, coming on the heels of Normandy, (combined with our tendency to disparage Soviet military accomplishments) has been all but ignored. IMHO the crown jewel of Red Army performance in WWII was Operation August Storm, the August 1945 offensive vs. the Japanese in Manchuria. Although the Kwangtung Army were hardly the equals of Army Group Center, the scale of victory achieved in the Far East surpasses Bagration. Many of the tactics, techniques and procedures used in Manchuria were first employed in Bagration. Also, 2 Combined Arms Armies (5th & 39th) that played key roles in Manchuria were veterans of Bagration.

_____________________________

CaptainBrian

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 44

- 7/18/2001 9:49:00 AM

Tombstone

Posts: 764
Joined: 6/1/2000
From: Los Angeles, California
Status: offline

1945 in Manchuria does have the Soviet war machine running in nearly perfect order. It indicated a honing of the operational skills of the Soviet military. Kursk: Kursk was no 'minor setback' just cause Germany didn't take heinous losses doesn't mean that resources weren't used.. It cost Germany time and equipment and just went further toward the German army slipping down the slope. What's to disbelieve in a study made in 1998 conducted by our own US Army Concepts Analysis Agency? Well a translated Soviet General Staff Study of the Battle of Kursk states that they lost 47% of their tank strength from 6-14 July, and in "The Battle of Kursk", by David Glantz (who has been studying the Soviet Military for like 20 years or something) puts the 5th Guards Tank Army's losses at 374 out of 615, this information quoted from a source published in Moscow(M. Kolomiets and M. Spirin, Kurskaia duga -Moscow:EksPrinte NB, 1998). Another source in his book (which is too long to type, and is in russian) states that the Voronezh front lost from 4 July to 22 July, 1204 tanks irrevocably, and 655 more that were repairable. 4th Pz Army started with about a 1000 tanks and had near 500 by the 14th, but that actually went up over time (minus the withdrawl of 2nd SS Pz Corps) until Rumianstev when the losses kicked up again. The reality of Kursk is that the Soviets could afford the losses, personally don't think that they were all necessary, a lot of units were mismanaged from an operational standpoint. I agree that wehrmacht was at its best in summer, but after 42 they never had the initiative strategically. Just cause they planned an offensive doesn't mean they had strategic control over the situation. Tomo

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 45

- 7/18/2001 10:59:00 AM

tracer

Posts: 1865
Joined: 11/22/2000
From: New Smyrna Beach, FL USA
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Tombstone: I heard somewhere that "Lucy" was Brit feeding Enigma info to the Soviets.... Tomo

In 'Barbarossa' (Alan Clark, 1965) it says 'Lucy' was Stavka's Swiss agent. And as someone mentioned earlier the info was *so* good that at first the Soviets thought Lucy was actually an Abwehr agent on a mission of disinformation. (Barbarossa, pg 151): "In what remains an astonishing performance, and one finally accepted by Moscow as genuine, 'Lucy' supplied up to date data on the German order of battle, with day-to-day changes, as well as being able to answer inquiries about high level matters dealing with the German army. Such was Lucy's role that one highly valued Soviet agent considered that '...in the end Moscow very largely fought the war on Lucy's messages' "

_____________________________

Jim NSB

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 46

- 7/18/2001 4:09:00 PM

Darrin

Posts: 16
Joined: 9/10/2000
From: Canadian in Sweden
Status: offline

Kursk Look at the article someone else posted about Kursk. The article has 2-3 references including one by glantz already mentioned. After sicily was invaded only 1 of the three divs in II SS Pz corps was transfered out. This corps which lead the offensive in the south had three SS Pzgren divs. With a total of 300 tanks just before the offensive statred. No Panthers, only 15 tigers and most of these tanks were PZIIIs and older PzIVs. 2 sov tank armies were cut to 200 tanks total. On the 12th they were joined by a fresh tank army with 650 tanks making 850 tanks total 500 of which were T-34s. The ger corps from above had just over 200 tanks at this point. The sov lost 650+ tanks this day and the gers lost 48. This was the last sov reserve meant for the south. It was suppoosed to be saved for evental counter attacking. Within a couple of days 2 (of 5) sov armies in the salient had been encircled from the south. The gers had a corps of 3 fresh, experianced Panzer divs in the south. The off should never had been launched because the gers were ready to go two months earlier but had to wait for Hitlars untried superwaepons, 200 panthers. Two months of preparation helped the sov far more then the germans. That germany was able to achieve the success they did is reamarkable. That the offensive would be cancelled after barely a week was stupid. The germans had almost achieved a desicieve victory in the south. A victory in the south might have lead to a bigger overall victory. The sovs claimed a much higher number of ger tanks present and killed then had a relation to reality. They were just trying to cover up why they had almost lost. Despite 2 months prep and higher numbers of tanks. This is the impression you get reading the article. There just might be some truth behind it. The kursk story, up until now, may be just as much myth as pol cav charging ger tanks.

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 47

- 7/19/2001 12:13:00 AM

Tombstone

Posts: 764
Joined: 6/1/2000
From: Los Angeles, California
Status: offline

The 'other' person referring to Glantz was me...lol! I don't think the Germans were close to 'winning', just that the 'terrible defeat' aspect of the operation was more a sign of the times rather than a Soviet beat down Germans... Tomo

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 48

- 7/19/2001 3:13:00 AM

Belisarius

Posts: 4041
Joined: 5/26/2001
From: Gothenburg, Sweden
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Cracker: Tombstone, you're entirely correct that everything was completely different between '41 & '42. The Russains were in the middle of modernizing their miltary in '41. The new equipment had all been designed and accepted, but issue to line units was only beginning. Also, the Soviets had completely overestimated the capabilities of their air force. They thought that, sinply because their fighters were the fastest and their bombers were the heaviest, that they were best. And they also had to contend with several senior officers, who had Stalin's ear, who had no concepts of modern war and felt they should revert to WWI style divisions and artillery methods. More reasons why they got their butts kicked in the beginning.

....aaand the fact that most the majority of the (quite competent) officer corps were terminated during Stalin's cleansings in the 30's. Well, as you all know, that went on throughout the war. I guess he (stalin) was glad in the end that he didn't put Zhukov away permanently :rolleyes:

_____________________________

Got StuG?

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 49

- 7/19/2001 3:33:00 AM

Fabs

Posts: 444
Joined: 6/5/2000
From: London, U.K.
Status: offline

Germany needed to land a knock-out punch against the Soviet Union no later than 1942. Its state of readiness was never good for a protracted conflict, its early victories the product of initiative, surprise and temporary tactical and strategic advantages that were lost as early as 1942, never to be re-gained. In both world wars Germany was doomed to defeat because of the personalities of their supreme leaders, and the unthinking obedience of the General Staffs and other authorities in the land. Their poor choice of allies, the belief that they could do anything and better than anybody else, their tendency to fight too many enemies on too many fronts and their failure to accept that their goals would not be achieved until it was way to late counted for much more than the superiority of tactics, soldiers and equipment. Their relative geographical position has always been a major strategic weakness. The Soviets may have expended many lives and much equipment in defeating them, but they could afford to do so. Time was on their side. After 1942, the outcome was never in doubt. The battle at kursk resulted in a German strategic defeat for a simple reason: at that point in the war, attacking was no longer a sensible option, as they no longer had the resources necessary to claim, let alone maintain the initiative for long enough. [ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Fabs ]

_____________________________

Fabs

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 50

- 7/19/2001 5:11:00 AM

Easy8

Posts: 324
Joined: 6/10/2001
From: Austin, Tx
Status: offline

I dusted off my copy of the old SPI board game Kursk by Jim Dunnagin (circa 1970) (Anyone else remember Father Dunnagin of the Simulation Priesthood Incarnate ? :) Replaying the historical July scenario and the What-if scenarios for May and June shows that a Ger attack in May with only 1 defensive belt in place along the salient should result in Germany snipping off the salient and pocketing the front line troops. A June assault against a 2 hex fortified belt resulted in draw. The July historical scenario mirrors reality. The addition of the Tiger brigade, Panthers, and Elefants is not enough to overcome the 3 hex deep fortifications and massive reserves the Soviets were able to buildup. based on this. Germany's best option was mount an assault in May, after the mud from the Spring thaw had dried. The overall effect would have straightened their lines, but by '43 the Ger mans had lost initiative and the inevitable strategic outcome was no longer in doubt. [ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Easy8 ]

_____________________________

"The problem with the future is that it keeps turning into the present" -Hobbes

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 51

- 7/21/2001 2:18:00 AM

rcread

Posts: 14
Joined: 7/13/2001
From: Shilo, Manitoba, Canada
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Belisarius: ....aaand the fact that most the majority of the (quite competent) officer corps were terminated during Stalin's cleansings in the 30's. Well, as you all know, that went on throughout the war. I guess he (stalin) was glad in the end that he didn't put Zhukov away permanently :rolleyes:

An excellent book on this is "Stalin and HIs Generals". I don't recall the editor/publisher, but its a compilation of articles written by Russian officers and senior officials about their experiences with Stalin during the war.

_____________________________

Cracker "Artillery is the God of Battle"

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 52

- 7/21/2001 9:17:00 AM

Belisarius

Posts: 4041
Joined: 5/26/2001
From: Gothenburg, Sweden
Status: offline

quote:

Originally posted by Cracker: An excellent book on this is "Stalin and HIs Generals". I don't recall the editor/publisher, but its a compilation of articles written by Russian officers and senior officials about their experiences with Stalin during the war.

ouch...it would help a lot if you'd remember the title... that'd be a most interesting book to read..

_____________________________

Got StuG?

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 53

- 7/21/2001 10:24:00 PM

Charles2222

Posts: 3993
Joined: 3/12/2001
Status: offline

I have Stalin and His General and also Hitler and His Generals, along with Churchill and His Generals. I'm wondering if the same people will come out with a Roosevelt and His Generals.

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 54

- 7/22/2001 8:31:00 AM

Charles2222

Posts: 3993
Joined: 3/12/2001
Status: offline

I stand self-corrected. Those books are not 'XXXX and His Generals', but 'XXXX's Generals'. They're all done in the same cover style, however the authors are different. Here's Stalin's Generals (I notice the book cover is different now, assuming Amazon has the cover in it's present state): http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0753800020/qid=9957661 41/sr=1-12/ref=sr_sp_re_1_12/202-5990680-2651058 Here's a review of Hitler's Generals: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v10/v10p248_Clive.html And here is Churchill's Generals: http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exchange-glance/Y03Y5429902Y9518416/qid=995766426/sr=1-1/ref=aps_sr_z_2_1/107-4642052-4322113 [ July 21, 2001: Message edited by: Charles_22 ]

_____________________________

(in reply to Tombstone)

Post #: 55