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All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Lock ‘n Load: Heroes of Stalingrad >> The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod

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The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 8/18/2021 5:42:37 PM

asl3d

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Deutsches Afrikakorps is coming

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 9/13/2021 10:14:41 PM

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Looking forward to your further work for HOS, thank you so much for your efforts.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 9/14/2021 5:50:32 PM

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Monkie

Looking forward to your further work for HOS, thank you so much for your efforts.

Hello Monkie. I appreciate your kind words. Hope you enjoy the new Heroes and Leaders mod Expansion: Desert Warriors.

By the way, as I usually say to new friends who participate in this forum, "welcome to the ruins of Stalingrad."

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 9/14/2021 8:27:44 PM

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Thanks for that, I have been messing with the scenario editor myself and figuring things out that are different than the LNL Digital edition. I've really been enjoying the Eastern Front scenarios, especially the Stalingrad maps, thanks again for the efforts in bringing to to the community.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/16/2021 6:26:09 PM

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North Africa

As Generaloberst Franz Halder states: “The impossibility of securing a supply line across a body of water dominated by the enemy, the numerical and material inadequacies held by the Germans-and even more their allies-and the increasing lack of Luftwaffe fighting and transport units, these are all negative aspects of the campaign. On the positive side belongs the tempo and performance of field forces under the leadership of Rommel, forces which were without a doubt far above the average in initiative, spontaneity, and soldierly zeal.
The German experiences in African desert warfare are made unique by the fact that the command and the troops were faced with a mission in no way either planned or prepared, and they entered into it completely without prior prejudices. The experience gained, therefore, is free from outside theories and opinions and was only achieved by their struggling with an entirely new military situation; it thus has the value of originality.”
Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/17/2021 8:47:48 PM

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Desert Terrain and Climate

When the first German units were shipped to Africa in February 1941, the officers responsible for the operational planning had no data of any kind on the nature of the terrain and circumstances in the desert. The intelligence data furnished by the Italians was extremely meager, and the Italian maps were so inaccurate and so incomplete that they were used only for lack of something better. For this reason, the German command had to obtain all necessary information itself through reconnaissance.
The British Long Range Desert Group, apart from its intelligence and sabotage missions, carried out reconnaissance far behind the Italo-German fronts in Libya. The English maps captured by the German troops proved an excellent help. The results obtained in this reconnaissance work formed the basis for the British maps on the Italian colony of Libya, which were incomparably better, so far as quality, accuracy, and detail were concerned, than the Italian maps. The British maps were considered a particularly valuable prize when captured. The results of the methodical reconnaissance were consolidated in what might be called a traversability map and in reports, and these were made available to the command. These maps contained the following details:
• Terrain that could be traversed by any type of vehicle in all parts and in all directions.
• Terrain outside the tracks that was moderately or poorly suited for vehicular traffic.
• Terrain with many steep cliffs.
• Salty swamps and depressions that were impassable after rain.
• Sand dunes that were difficult for vehicular traffic.
• Information on plant growth.
• Broken terrain.
• Impassable cliffs.
• Cliffs that were less steep and that could be traversed in numerous places.
• Passes over the cliffs, with information as to whether they could be used by wheeled or only track laying vehicles.
• Trails, with information as to their usability for wheeled or track laying vehicles.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/18/2021 6:09:00 PM

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3. Motorization

Prior to World War II, not a soul in the German armed forces imagined the possibility of it becoming necessary in any future war to conduct land warfare outside of Europe. This is why no particular attention was paid in the army to the military experiences of this type gained during World War I, particularly in the former German colony, German East Africa. It was only in 1935 that a subsection for colonial affairs was created in the Foreign Affairs Branch of the Reich Ministry of War. This subsection was staffed with only one officer who had fought in German Southwest Africa.
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, no preparations of any sort had been made in the German Army for any desert warfare that might possibly become necessary in the future. All preparatory work in the operational, organizational, and training fields had been restricted exclusively to preparations for the conduct of war on the continent of Europe. This was why a suggestion submitted by the Mapping and Survey Branch of the German Army General Staff in 1938 that the maps to be issued in the eventuality of mobilization should include maps of Denmark, Norway, and North Africa was disapproved as entirely unnecessary by the appropriate representative of the Operational Branch under instructions from the chief of that branch.
With the exception of the experience gained by General Graziani's army during its advance on Egypt in the winter of 1940, no information taken from military history was used in planning the campaign. It is an actual fact that early in 1941, the German troops reached the African theater of operations almost entirely unprepared for their new missions. One lesson that this experience pointed out is that troops that are not motorized are valueless in desert warfare and can do nothing whatever against a motorized enemy. General Graziani's army consisted almost exclusively of infantry units, and it was tied down, enveloped, and destroyed by the well-motorized British forces because it was unable to conduct mobile operations.
The African campaign took on such entirely new forms owing to the almost exclusive use of mobile troops by both sides in the desert. It was not possible in planning to make use of any examples taken from military history. Indeed, the methods of modern desert warfare were created by Field Marshal Rommel.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/19/2021 6:21:19 PM

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4. Deutsches Afrikakorps

Up to the summer of 1940, the information available to the German Army General Staff on North Africa was restricted to the reports furnished by the German military attached in Rome and reports from agents of the German counterintelligence service. At the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in October 1940, the dispatch of a German panzer corps to Libya was discussed, but no decision was reached. The 3d Panzer Division, which in peacetime was garrisoned in the Berlin area, had been reorganized in all haste for employment in the tropics as a precautionary measure; it was now available for other employment. So far as ground forces were concerned, the original plan was to send only a defense unit of brigade strength that was to be specially organized for the purpose, but it soon became evident that such a weak unit would not be able to give Germany's ally any really effective support. In January 1941, Hitler therefore decided to make a special corps of two divisions available, the German Africa Corps.
The march of events was too fast so that the first units of the German Africa Corps landed in Africa when the staff had just commenced its work in Libya. The German Army High Command was taken almost completely by surprise when the necessity arose to dispatch troops for warfare in the desert. Initially only one military-geographical bulletin was available. It had been prepared in a hurry and was not accurate in all points. A manual of instructions for the tropics was being drafted in the summer of 1942. It was not possible within Germany to accustom the troops to the intense heat to which they would be exposed, particularly at that time of the year, the winter of 1940. To a certain extent, the troops that had to wait any length of time in Italy for transportation to North Africa adapted themselves automatically to the heat.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/20/2021 6:05:24 PM

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5. Organization

The composition of the units employed in Africa was the same as those in Europe. The pressure of time alone made any reorganization impossible in 1941, and later experience showed that no specialized organization is necessary for divisions and other units that are to be employed in desert warfare. However, it is necessary to have a far higher ratio of tanks and antitank weapons, since these are the two decisive weapons in the desert. It goes without saying that all units employed in desert warfare must be motorized.
It was necessary to implement a set of changes necessary so far as equipment was concerned: long-range artillery, long-range antitank guns, and tank guns decisively influenced the course of battle in desert warfare, and it was therefore necessary to employ more long-range weapons. No alterations of the weapons themselves were necessary.
In their 87.6-mm guns, the British had a light artillery piece with a longer range than the Germans' guns, but the German forces in Africa soon received 100-mm and 170-mm guns that had a longer range than any of the British guns. In 1941, the guns of the German Type III tanks had a longer range than the guns of the British tanks, and this was the reason for the success of the German tanks in that year, but from May 1942 on, the British employed American tanks of the Grant, Lee, and Sherman types that mounted guns with a considerably superior range of fire. In the Battle of Gazala, these guns came as a disconcerting surprise for the German tank units, and in the first phase of the battle, the British were able to gain considerable successes.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/21/2021 6:10:35 PM

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6. Clothing and uniforms

The German army uniform was made from a watertight linen, cut in a style approximating the traditional uniforms of the former German colonial defense forces. These uniforms proved unsuitable both in style and material. The material was too stiff and did not give adequate protection against heat or cold. In the early mornings, the material absorbed moisture from the dew so that it became intolerable to wear the uniforms. The British tropical uniforms, in contrast, were made of pure wool and were excellent. Large quantities of the British uniforms were captured and worn by the troops of the German Africa Corps. The Germans especially liked the British trousers.
High boots were unsuitable in every respect, since in hot climates, everything must be done to prevent soldiers wearing any apparel on the legs that restricts the circulation of the blood. In this matter, the troops helped themselves by wearing only slacks, most of which came from captured British depots and which the troops wore over their boots. The German shoe with laces and a cloth tongue proved suitable. The shorts issued to the troops could not be worn during combat, since they left bare legs exposed to injury by thorns and stones.
The olive-drab caps with wide visors were excellent; the visor, in particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and for the gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The German troops wore no steel helmets, in contrast to the British troops, whose steel helmets were more appropriate both in shape and weight, being lighter than the German helmets. The tropical coats issued, which were made from a thick woolen material, were good, but the English ones, which were fur-lined and reached only to the knees, were better. Owing to the stiff material from which it was made, the German tropical shirts were inferior to the British ones, which were made of so-called "Tropic" material.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/22/2021 6:35:10 PM

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7 Logistical

Between February and May 1941, German transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned without interruption. The convoys reached Tripoli regularly and almost without losses. Immediately after its capture, Benghasi was used as a port of debarkation. At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at Derna.
Between June and December 1941, British surface and submarine craft interfered with the transportation of German troops and supplies. The losses in shipping space and in materiel were considerable. To relieve the situation, air transportation groups were employed to move troops and materiel, while naval barges transported tanks and important spare parts. The use of Bardia as a port of debarkation close to the front was prevented by the British Air Force.
Between January and June 1942, transportation was favored by German superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second Air Force and also by the fact that Malta was suppressed. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned smoothly and with few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive with limited objectives that advanced as far as the borders of Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta.
Between July 1942 and May 1943, and as a result of Rommel's advance into Egyptian territory after the capture of Tobruk, the supplies deposited in the Benghasi and Tripoli areas for the front were practically useless, since the distances were too great for transportation of supplies on land and coastal shipping was prevented by the British. The British forces on Malta regained their strength and employed new types of bombers that were equipped with radar and had a wider radius of action. The British succeeded in bringing German convoy traffic to an almost complete standstill. Losses in materiel and fuel were so heavy that it was barely possible to obtain adequate supplies from Germany. The sea routes to Tripoli and Benghasi were completely severed.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/23/2021 6:39:25 PM

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8 Zone of Operations

The zone of operations in the North African campaign in Libya and Egypt consisted of a strip of land, sometimes as much as sixty kilometres wide, bounded on one side by the coast and on the other by the desert interior.
The ground surface was either firm gravel, sand-covered gravel, or mixed sand and gravel. Within this entire zone, large parts of which were level plain, the desert could be traversed by all types of vehicles. The only exceptions were patches of deep sand, steep wadis and salty swamps, such as those at Marada. Natural sinuous defiles were formed at Derna and the Halfaya Pass at the border between Libya and Egypt.
Undulating, steppe-like terrain predominated, which consisted of low mounds and long ridges, whose average height above the surrounding terrain was from four to twenty meters. At times, these ridges had gentle slopes, and at other times, they rose steeply from broad, level valleys in which there were no watercourses. The summits were naked rock covered with loose rocks of varying size, which made motor traffic difficult but not impossible. In the valleys, the rocky bottom was covered by a layer of dust or clay of varying thickness. In dry weather, this ground could be traversed without difficulty by vehicles with four-wheel drive that were capable of cross-country travel. The terrain had patches of camel's thorn shrubs, around which the dust had blown to form small dunes. Traffic followed the broad paths, called Trighs or Pistes, which connected the few settlements and water holes. The coast itself was fringed by a belt of dunes behind which was a zone of salt swamps, called Sebchen, which were usually dry. The only parts of the coast where there were no dunes were the cliff sections at Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. There, the coastal sector was often inter• sected by deep wadis and was difficult to penetrate.
Toward the interior, the steppe-like zone gradually merged with the desert proper, which is practically devoid of any type of vegetation. On the whole, motoring was easier in the desert proper than in the steppe-like zone, although movement was rendered difficult in rugged areas.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/24/2021 8:43:18 PM

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9 Mountain Ranges

The Cyrenaica Mountains, at points, reach a height of 875 meters above sea level. The mountains rise in two, high, steep terraces that can be traversed at only a few points and are intersected by numerous deep valleys, which make it impossible to conduct sizable operations except along roads. South of the topmost ridges, the mountains slope down gradually to the desert terrain, which is good for vehicular traffic. The Cyrenaica region was vulnerable to attack from the south-a fact that Rommel recognized at once during his attack in the spring of 1941. He delivered his main attack against Mechili, a desert fort designed to protect the southern approaches to the Cyrenaica. During every retreat, every effort was made to pass through this region as rapidly as possible to avoid being intercepted.
The Gebel Nefusa Mountains protruded like a barrier between the coastal plains of Tripoli and those of Misurata. South of Tripoli, they rose to a height of 700 meters above sea level. In the southeast, they descended in a gradual slope. At Homs, in the northeast toward the sea, their height was less than 200 meters above sea level. In the central part, this mountain range was extremely rugged, and motorized troops could only pass along the roads. From the north, this mountain range formed an impregnable fortress. From the southeast, however, it was vulnerable to attack in spite of the mountainous and intersected nature of its approaches. Possibilities for bypassing the area existed and were taken advantage of by the British in the attack in January 1943.
The Matmata Mountains, a range in south Tunisia, had a steep drop of 100 to 200 meters in the east. In the west, they sloped down gradually to a high plateau, which was sandy in parts, while in other areas, the ground was good for motor traffic so that it could be crossed by motorized columns. The steep, clifflike wall in the east and north was interrupted by numerous wadis, through some of which an ascent to the high plateau was possible. The Matmata Mountains narrowed down the size of the coastal plains of southern Tunisia considerably so that it was possible to organize a defense line at the narrowest point, at Mareth. However, the steep mountainside was only a weak protection against flanking attacks, since it could be bypassed with little difficulty.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/25/2021 5:30:05 PM

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10 Steep Terraces

Most of the steep terraces in the steppe-like terrain were not high and followed a course parallel with the coast. Thus, they hardly interfered with troop movements. In the numerous caves, overhanging cliffs, and gorges, good opportunities could be found for troop shelters.
The Northern Rim of the Qattara Depression, on Which the Southern Flank of the El Alamein Line Was Based rim towered about 300 meters above the floor of the depression, which was 80 meters below sea level. Within the sectors held by the German-Italian forces, there were only three points at which motor traffic was possible, and even there, difficulties were encountered because of the deep sand. Throughout the entire campaign, no better protection for a flank was ever found than in the El Alamein line.
At the Steep Terrace at Sollum Between the BardiaCapuzzo High Plateau and the Sollum Coastal Plain there were two roads with numerous serpentine curves across the terrace, one from the Via Balbia-the tarred coastal road-the other from the Halfaya Pass road.
The large-size Wadis were found in the Cyrenaica region and in the eastern approaches to the Tripolitanian Mountain and extended as far as the Bay of Sirte. Usually the bed of a wadi consisted of a layer of soft sand; less frequently. On the whole, wadis could be considered as terrain obstacles-but as obstacles that could be overcome without difficulty unless obstinately defended. During the German-Italian retreat from El Alamein to Tunis, only one defense position was based on a wadi, namely the Buerat line, which extended along the Zem-Zem wadi south of the Via Balbia.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/26/2021 6:52:01 PM

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11 Dune Terrain

Large sandy areas were found close to the coast, near larger wadis, and in the desert proper, where the Ergs (large areas of shifting sand dunes) present barriers that were impenetrable for traffic.
The dunes along the coast that interfered with traffic were found around Agedabia, on the shores of the Bay of Sirte south of Misurata, and in the neighborhood of Tripoli, in western Libya. These dunes impeded traffic off the roads, and even the roads were affected, since the dunes shifted constantly. After severe storms, the roads became so deeply covered with sand that they had to be cleared.
A large area of dunes was also found north of the EI Fareh wadi, between El Agheila and Marada along the shores of the Bay of Sirte. These dunes protected the German Marsa el Brega position against flanking attacks and forced the British to make a wide detour through the region south of the El Fareh wadi, where vehicular traffic was possible.
The big dunes of the desert proper were all south of the zone of operations, and only a section of them along the border between Libya and Egypt played a role of some tactical importance, since they afforded protection for the south flank of the German Alamein positions. The dunes in the desert proper were formed continuous ridges between four and fifty meters high that usually extended from north to south. A number of these ridges, driven by the wind, formed a labyrinthian confusion of dune ridges with completely encircled hollows in which the firm ground could be seen. To cross them, it was necessary to have the best cross-country vehicles available and to drive at top speed at the first dune, breaking through its crest, and on driving down the opposite slope, to gather speed for the next dune. In this way, one to two kilometers might be covered per day. Serious losses in personnel and materiel were unavoidable.
The Great Eastern Erg, a large dune area, extended from south Tunisia to south Algeria, close to the western border of Libya.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/27/2021 5:34:39 PM

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12 Salt Swamps

These swamps developed at those points where the water in the subsoil of the desert rose to the surface. Owing to the constant evaporation that takes place in the desert, the salts carried by the water were deposited, and the resultant brine formed either a lake or, when mixed with sand and clay, a patch of thick, tough mud on which salt-marsh vegetation could take root. Once a person was caught in a salt swamp, it was impossible for him to escape without help. Vehicles sunk in salt marshes could be recovered but only on terrain that was not too swampy. In really soft, swampy ground, the vehicle had to be pulled out by another vehicle, which was often extremely difficult and could only be done if the latter was on firm ground and had a strong engine.
The biggest salt marsh in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts was the Qattara Depression, the surface of which was eighty meters below sea level. This depression and its northern rim protected the flank of the El Alamein line. The swamp itself was skirted by a zone of soft sand varying between one and two kilometers in width, on which a few vehicles could travel with some difficulty. The salt marsh that was within the German zone of operations in the Marsa el Brega line was considerably smaller. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the sandy patches and dune areas, it provided good protection against a frontal attack, in spite of the fact that it had numerous fords. The salt marshes of southern Tunisia, called Schotts, were of more importance. The Schott el Djerid was the terrain feature that led to the decision to construct the Gabes line, which served as a rear line for the Mareth line. In most parts, the Schott el Djerid was considered an impassable obstacle, but its eastern part, the so-called El Fedjad Schott, had numerous good fords that could be crossed without difficulty by vehicles.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/28/2021 9:14:29 PM

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13 Communications system

Both Benghasi and Tripoli had good ports with ample capacities for shipping and landing, for which reason the former the German Army used as the main supply base. The capacities in the ports of Derna and Bardia, as well as the naval port of Tobruk, were much smaller.
There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania and in the Cyrenaica were of no military importance.
The only permanent signal communications system consisted of an open-wire telephone line, on poles, from Tripoli to Bardia. The distances spanned were extremely great, and the line made only limited communication traffic possible.
The water-supply facilities along the Via Balbia were adequate. The water holes in the desert, usually with a small supply of brackish water, were generally known only to the natives and were not indicated on maps.
Rain fell only in winter but was then sometimes very heavy, starting suddenly and swamping extensive areas, sometimes stopping all traffic, even on roads, for protracted periods. The only other moisture was the heavy dew at daybreak and in the evenings.
The outstanding weather feature was the sandstorms, which are called ghiblis. These sandstorms recurred pretty regularly every four weeks in all seasons of the year. They usually lasted three days, and since they reduced visibility to nothing, they brought all operations by ground and air forces to a standstill. During these sandstorms, the range of vision was often reduced to less than three meters so that orientation was impossible.
Owing to the wind from the sea, the climate in the coastal regions was almost always healthy.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/29/2021 5:50:14 PM

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14 Order of Battle

The first units to be transferred to Africa between February and May 1941 were the corps headquarters of the Africa Corps and headquarters units together with the 5th Light Division, which was later reorganized to form the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions.
During the summer months, a number of so-called oasis companies, a few battalions, and some coastal batteries were moved in, with an Africa Division Headquarters to control them. In the autumn of 1941, these units were consolidated to form a division, later designated the 90th Light Africa Division.
The German combat troops in Africa at the end of 1941 consisted of two armored and one light division. The two armored divisions remained under the command of the German Africa Corps. In the summer of 1941, this corps and the other army units in Africa were placed under the command of the newly created Panzergruppe Afrika. On 21 January 1942, this headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, Panzer Army of Africa, which designation was changed again in the autumn of 1942 to Headquarters, German-Italian Panzer Army.
In the summer of 1942, the 164th Light Africa Division and the Parachute Instruction Brigade were transferred to Africa. In 1942, about eighteen batteries were consolidated as Army Headquarters Artillery. This artillery was organized in two regiments and was placed under the command of the commander of artillery in Africa. In addition, the reconnaissance battalions of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion were consolidated to form a reconnaissance brigade under the immediate control of the Army Headquarters. The army also had the 900th Engineer Battalion, formerly a GHQ unit, available as a headquarters unit.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/30/2021 6:00:00 PM

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15 Organization and Equipment

Initially, the German units were transferred to Africa with their normal tables of organization and equipment. The main changes that were effected immediately were that all vehicles were immediately fitted with new special dust filters; special units (water supply companies, water transportation columns, and geological teams), were organized immediately to take care of water supply and transportation problems; all vehicles were camouflaged by a coat of desert-colored paint and the troops were issued tropical clothes.
In 1941 additional changes became necessary. The antitank battalions arrived in Africa with 37-mm antitank guns. In the summer of 1941, these were exchanged for 50-mm guns, which were exchanged again in early 1942 for captured Russian 76.2-mm antitank guns. This was necessary because of the increased effectiveness of weapons used on both sides.
From early 1942 on, all infantry units were also assigned antitank guns, since tank warfare is the deciding factor in desert warfare, where the antitank gun becomes of even greater importance to the infantry than the machine gun. The aim of furnishing each battalion with eighteen 76.2-mm antitank guns was never achieved.
Types I and II tanks, some of which were armed with machine guns and some with 20-mm guns, were withdrawn after the summer of 1941 and replaced by Type III tanks, which had 50-mm guns. These, again, were replaced after the winter of 1941-42 by Type IV tanks, which had 75-mm guns.
All motorcycles were replaced by Volkswagens. Even the half-track motorcycles that were used for a while proved unsatisfactory.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 10/31/2021 6:53:54 PM

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16. Dust

Men in the desert are constantly exposed to the effects of dust. This bothers the fighting man all the more because he has to endure it in conjunction with heat and the lack of water. There is no universal remedy against dust in the desert. Dust is a betrayer that enables observers, both from the ground and the air, to perceive every movement for great distances, even by individual vehicles. Every footstep on the surface of the desert throws up dust and sand. Moreover, the almost perpetual winds carry along dust with them, generally in the form of dust columns as high as a house, which form themselves into whirlwinds and dust devils.
The effects of dust on weapons and equipment, including motor vehicles, was considerable in the desert. Dust had the greatest effect on motor vehicles, because the dusty air that was sucked into the cylinders attacked the cylinders and pistons and caused these parts to wear out quickly. In tanks, the air was sucked out of the battle compartment. The average lifetime of engine in the desert was only 12,000-14,000 kilometers in comparison with 50,000-70,000 kilometers in other theaters of war. In the desert, it was necessary to change tank engines after about 3,500 kilometers, while they would last for 7,000-8,000 kilometers in Europe.
The barrels of guns, as well as all unprotected moving parts, were especially affected by dust. Machine guns, submachine guns, and other small arms were the weapons most endangered, because inasmuch as they were used on the surface of the ground, they were especially exposed to the effects of dust. It was necessary to protect all the movable parts of guns and equipment. The barrels of artillery pieces and rifles had to be provided with muzzle protectors whenever they were not being fired.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/1/2021 7:29:20 PM

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17. Terrain

With the exception of places with deep sand and rugged valleys, the desert in the combat zone of the German troops was, in general, passable for both wheeled and tracklaying vehicles. The influence of terrain on tactical operations is just as decisive in the desert as in other theaters of war. It is more difficult, however, to take advantage of the peculiarities of the terrain for one's intentions, since due to the lack of forests, cultivated areas, villages, etc., it is seldom possible for troops to approach and assemble under cover. Nonetheless, even in the desert, there are widely different opportunities to take advantage of the terrain. For example, troop assemblies can be concealed in ravines and valleys from ground observation and-to a limited extent-even from air observation.
In both attack and defense, the important thing was always to have reconnoitred the terrain carefully in advance. In attack, importance was attached to choosing ground that could be easily traversed by motor vehicles and, especially, which offered a covered approach, at least in part, through the utilization of terrain contours. The fact that the desert surface was easily traversed by motor vehicles made it easy to advance in light formations with few casualties, as well as to make all kinds of enveloping movements. In actual practice, few limitations existed on freedom of movement. Thus, it was also easily possible to shift the direction of an attack. During an attack, the tank battle always occupied the foreground. Attempts were made to compensate for the lack of good observation posts by sending out forward observers. Difficulties arose for attackers if they were compelled to use the southern portion of the desert proper, which in places was covered with soft soil.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/2/2021 7:01:45 PM

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18. Field Fortifications

The fact that for a distance of 3,800 kilometers, there would only be five natural defense positions of any use shows the great superiority of the attacker in desert warfare.
The German troops constructed only field-type fortifications in the desert. In building them, an effort was made to keep the upper slope at ground level to prevent the enemy from recogniz• ing them too soon. Special difficulties arose in constructing positions for antitank guns and heavy antiaircraft guns (high superstructures). These positions had to be emplaced on the reverse slope. In places where this was not possible, the expedient was adopted of keeping these weapons in readiness in some place in the rear and not bringing them up to the position until they were urgently needed. It should be pointed out that the Italians laid out the fortifications of Tobruk so cleverly that they met with Rommel's unqualified appreciation. The Italian emplacements, which were level with the ground, were later introduced into the German Army as "Tobruk positions" and used both in Italy and on the Western Front.
From a purely technical point of view, it is extremely difficult to prepare field fortifications in the North African steppes and desert. Wherever the ground in the steppes is stony, it is very hard, because there is a layer of so-called surface chalk on the surface. This layer is formed when the rain water absorbed during the winter rises to the surface again during the summer and evaporates. During this process, the dissolved matter, such as chalk, silicic acid, etc., is separated again and cements the top layers into a firm crust having a thickness of from fifty centimeters to two meters. Under this surface chalk layer, there is a so-called lixiviation stratum that is especially soft and therefore easier to work. In constructing field fortifications, it is first necessary to laboriously blast away the surface chalk layer. Work of this kind can only be done if sufficient time is available. If a temporary defense system is being established, one has to be content with erecting positions built out of such stones as may be laying around or else use steep slopes or ravines and fissures to get at the lixiviation stratum quickly.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/3/2021 6:39:46 PM

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19. Fortresses

The most important fortresses of the North African desert were Tobruk, Bardia, and Mersa Matruh-as well as the Alamein position, which was constructed like a fortress. The three former fortresses served to protect coastal harbors; the latter was a barrier erected at the gateway to Egypt. All desert fortresses were built in such a way that their works cannot be seen from the ground; that is, they were built level with the ground, had low-wire obstacles, communication trenches that were mostly of concrete, and strong antitank ditches. At the fortress of Tobruk, the outer ring consisted of two lines of strong positions that were not built like bunkers with embrasures but were completely sunk in the ground. In some places, the works in the outer line were surrounded by an antitank ditch. This antitank ditch was partly covered with light boards and a thin layer of sand and stones so that its outline could not be perceived even at close distances. The average length of one work was eighty meters. The work itself consisted of several shelters, well protected with concrete, that together could accommodate a crew of thirty to forty men. The different shelters were connected by a communication trench with combat positions for machine guns, antitank guns, and mortars at their points of intersection. Like the antitank ditch, the communication trench, which was about two and a half meters deep, was also covered over with boards and a thin layer of earth, which could be easily opened at any desired point. The works were surrounded with strong wire obstacles, and the individual positions were connected by barbed-wire obstacles. The second line, which was about 200-300 meters behind the first, was of similar design.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/4/2021 7:13:05 PM

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20. Mines

The desert terrain had a great influence on the selection and use of the various weapons. It was found that one cannot have too many tanks in the desert, for because of the almost unlimited possibilities for using and deploying tanks, they bear the brunt of desert warfare. An abundant supply of antitank guns is necessary, since in view of the almost endless distances, reconnaissance naturally assumes special importance.All guns should have the longest possible range, since the enemy can be seen even at a great distance, and it is necessary to get him accurately within your sights before he has you covered. Since there is very little cover and only a few reverseslope positions in the desert, it is advisable, for the most part, to use only weapons and vehicles (including tanks) with a low superstructure. With tanks, it is especially important to have one that is fast, maneuverable, and equipped with a long-range gun. Then, the question of whether the armor plate is of greater or lesser thickness is of no vital importance.
In the course of time, mines acquired tremendous importance in the desert. They were generally used for furnishing un-obstructed terrain with artificial obstacles. All fortresses, strongpoints, and fortifications were protected by minefields. In the course of the fighting, the employment of mines in the desert developed into a real art on both sides.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/5/2021 7:23:05 PM

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21. Desert warfare

The only track vehicles used in the desert were tanks, guns mounted on tank chassis, and antitank guns. The armored personnel carriers and artillery prime movers were half-track vehicles. Wheeled vehicles, the same types as were also used in Europe, were employed for all other purposes, especially to transport troops, equipment, and supply goods, as well as to tow guns in an emergency. Whereas track and half-track vehicles were able to traverse all kinds of desert terrain, wheeled vehicles frequently had difficulties, especially in getting over sand dunes or steep slopes. It would be desirable to use only track laying or halftrack vehicles in desert operations. There would be no difficulties whatsoever in moving troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies-except in getting over salt marshes.
Since desert warfare is determined by the terrain and has to be carried out on a mobile basis, mobile engagements will be decided almost exclusively by motorized units. Open country permits a rapid concentration of forces at the decisive point and the long-range weapons of all types are of decisive importance. Combat in this open, unobstructed terrain must be carried on after the manner of a naval battle. The commanders must be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or right among, the combat troops and should not be hampered in their decisions by orders from headquarters that are far from the front. In desert warfare, a unit commanded from a rear headquarters runs the risk of being encircled and annihilated. To a large extent, Rommel's victories were based on the fact that he realized these tactical necessities of desert warfare and consistently acted accordingly, while the British adhered strictly to orders that they had received a long time previously and were no longer applicable to the existing situation.
As the Field Marshal Rommel said "The North African desert was probably the theater where war was waged in its roost modern form. On both sides the brunt of the fighting was borne by completely motorized units, for use of which there were highly favourable opportunities in this level, unobstructed terrain."

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/6/2021 6:33:40 PM

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22. Tank warfare

In North Africa was possible to really apply the basic principles for the conduct of tank warfare as had been taught in theory before the war. Here, out-and out tank battles were fought between division-size armored units. Although the war slowed down into infantry and position warfare from time to time, its most important phases-the British winter offensive of 1941-42 and the German summer offensive of 1942-demonstrated the principles of full mobility. In desert warfare, against a motorized or armored opponent, no motorized troops can only hold their own in elaborately prepared positions. If such a position is breached or outflanked, a retreat means delivering up such troops to the enemy. During the withdrawal from Cyrenaica in the winter of 1941-42, practically all the Italian infantry and many German infantry units had to be moved out by shuttle traffic of a few truck columns or else march on foot. Only sacrifices by the motorized units made it possible to cover the retreat of the German and Italian infantry units. Moreover, Field Marshal Graziani's failures in the winter of 1941-42 were largely due to the fact that a large part of the no motorized Italian Army was helplessly exposed in the open desert to attacks by inferior numbers of completely motorized British troops.
The armored troops are the backbone of the motorized army. Everything depends on the tank; the other units are there merely to support it. Therefore, the battle of attrition against the enemy armored units must be fought as much as possible by one's own tank-destroyer units. It is the speed of one's own movements and the organizational unity of the troops that decides the battle and deserves special attention, since desert terrain places hardly any obstacles in the way of swift movements.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/7/2021 5:31:55 PM

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23. Camouflage

Camouflage is very difficult in the desert and, in many cases, impossible. During the day, it was impossible to camouflage the movements of troops and columns from air observation. In the neighbourhood of the front, the troops could only with difficulty be camouflaged from ground observation. The unavoidable dust clouds they raised betrayed any movement.
Nevertheless, troop concentrations can be camouflaged, if great care is used. Depressions in the terrain will have to be exploited for this purpose. All vehicles will have to be covered with camouflage nets and vegetation (camel's thorn) attached to the nets. Another means of camouflage, although on a small scale, is to seek out shifting shadows. In the open desert, all vehicles will have to be dug in as deep as possible. It goes without saying that the vehicles will have to be placed at as great a distance from each other as possible.
Although in most cases it will not be possible to camouflage the presence of vehicles and weapons, skilful camouflage can conceal the type of these vehicles (the arm of the service). It would be altogether wrong to resign oneself to the viewpoint that camouflage in the desert is useless. What has been said above is also valid for the troops in position.
In the attack, the German Army preferred easily passable, open desert for a battle site, because it made it possible for the armored forces to exploit their mobility and combat tactics, which were superior to those of the British.
In defense, the positions selected depended to a large extent on the terrain. Positions had to be difficult of access and provide flank protection; otherwise, on the whole, they were useless for defense.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/8/2021 5:42:40 PM

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24. Night combat

Field Marshal Rommel preferred to start fighting on moonlit nights or at dawn. The fighting often lasted until dark, unless it was broken off sooner for tactical reasons. There were no lulls in combat, even during the great heat prevailing around noon.
In general, the Germans carried out no night attacks. On the other hand, at the end of October 1942, the British carried out their large-scale attacks on the German positions at Alamein exclusively at night. They used parachute flares to illuminate the battlefield and tracer ammunition to show their troops the direction of the attack and sector boundaries. The British commander in chief, Montgomery, preferred night combat. The German and Italian troops used the night for marches into their assembly areas, for large-scale shifts of forces, and for surprise. These night regroupings could almost always be carried out unnoticed by the enemy and, especially during the winter battles of 1941-42, came as a big surprise to the British.
The daily routine in the desert did not substantially differ from that in other theaters of war. When not in combat, the troops were, as far as possible, given a lengthy rest period during the great heat around noon. The maintenance troops (workshop companies) were also given a noon rest period. Supply traffic could not afford to take these rests.
The generation of dust through the recoil of the powder gases in artillery firing was of no special importance for the detection of artillery positions, because the combat zone was always enveloped in dust clouds anyhow. The discharges of guns of especially flat trajectory with a low-barrel elevation-antitank guns-could be observed and recognized with particular ease by the enemy because of their characteristic dust clouds. Naturally, they also prevented the gun crews from observing the effects of their own fire.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/9/2021 6:16:01 PM

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25. Troop Welfare

In the African desert, as in no other theater of war, life was hard for officers and men alike. Life in the rear areas, as it is known in Europe, was possible only in the few supply centers in the rear, and then it was only a weak imitation of that elsewhere. Because of the close contact of the troops with each other, all officers had to give an example of soldierly bearing and good moral living. Any extravagance on the part of an officer is noticed by the men and scrutinized with a magnifying glass. On the other hand, life in the desert offers an excellent opportunity to create a high level of community spirit. This brings about a feeling of solidarity in all ranks and prompts them to do their utmost. Especially in the desert, where no diversions exist, superiors must be carefully concerned about the welfare of their personnel. The fact that there are no outside attractions makes it easier for leaders to provide that attention.
An oppressive feeling of immense loneliness overcomes every-one more or less frequently in the desert-a feeling that one is cut off from everything that one holds dear. Commanders must recognize such moods and depressions and offer sincere encouragement so that such pressures will disappear.
Even more important than rations for the well-being of soldiers in the desert is the maintenance of regular communications with the zone of the interior. The word "mail" occupies a place of high priority in desert warfare. All officers and agencies must be concerned, therefore, with assuring a rapid distribution of mail to the front lines.
A good newspaper that carries up-to-the-minute news and gives space to the problems that absorb the soldiers at the front is also indispensable. Movies and theatrical performances at the front can relieve the monotony of the soldiers' lives, even in the desert.
The normal service time in the desert for a German soldier was six months. Regular rotation could, however, often not be provided in Africa between 1941 and 1943, with the result that many soldiers had to serve in the desert for twelve and even eighteen months.

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RE: The Deutsches Afrikakorps in Heroes and Leaders mod - 11/10/2021 5:33:50 PM

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Afrikakorps Schützen

The units that fought in the North African theater usually started out as regular organized units, but were modified to suit the situation. Some of the units had a so-called "Tropisch" tables of organization, meaning for use in the desert. This usually meant more transport for the logistics/service units than normal tables of organization.
The Deutsche Afrikakorps was Germany’s first truly motorised corps, taking up an unprecedented percentage of the motor transport of the German Army. The Schützen companies were smaller in manpower to a standard German infantry platoon, but could match or outweigh their comrades in firepower. They were typically transported in the Horch built Kfz 70, although, as the campaign progressed more and more captured British vehicles, which were better suited to the desert conditions, were used.
The Schützen regiments, the motorized artillery regiments, and the motorized engineer battalions of both Panzer divisions had only a very few armored vehicles, and that the two reconnaissance battalions were unarmored with the exception of one armored reconnaissance company each.
Throughout 1941, Schützen (or riflemen) regiments 104 and 155 supported the panzers of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. Forerunners of the famous panzergrenadier their role was to be mobile light infantry and in North Africa they fought not only the enemy but also the desert’s sun and sand.
The 1st Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 was captured during the Battle of Halfaya Pass on 17 Jan 1942. To replace it, the 8th Machine-Gun Battalion was renamed as the new 1st Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 on 17 Apr 1942. (The 15th Motorcycle battalion was renamed as 3rd Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 on the same day.)
The 21st Panzer Division (the former 5th Light Division) was changed into a normal armored division with a view to giving the Afrika Korps the full striking power of a Panzer corps. For this purpose, certain units were exchanged with the 15th Panzer Division. The 15th Panzer Division transferred Schützen Regiment 104 to the 21st Panzer Division and received instead Regimental headquarters 200 and Machine Gun Battalion 2. Out of those, and by absorbing Motorcycle Battalion 15, the 15th Panzer Division established Regiment z.b.V. 200 as its second Schützen regiment. The 15th Panzer Division had four Schützen battalions and the 21st Panzer Division only three.
The companies in the Schützen-Regiment 155 are very well equipped for firepower, especially by the standards of the typical German infantry company at the time. With heavy mortars, a lot of machine guns, and two light infantry guns, any strongpoint defended by such a company would have been a serious obstacle to an attack.
In terms of gameplay in Heroes and Leaders mod, Afrikakorps Schützen units have the same characteristics as Schützen units of Wehrmacht except that Africakorps' Schützen soldiers have the extra property of Extended Range (1/2 FP).

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