Nikel
Posts: 355
Joined: 3/24/2009 Status: offline
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Is a good thing to have options available, even those that did not happen historically, but that could have happen. Lets call it "room to manoeuvre". But they have to be credible in context. So you may invade Siria to pincer Egypt. But not without adequate preparations and supplies, in this case you should hold Cyprus before. Van Creveld is no fan of Rommel when he writes: "Although brought to a stop at Alamein, Rommel had by no means given up. He still intended to resume the attack after a few days’ recuperation. However, the full impact of his long communications line now made itself felt. Of the 100,000 tons needed each month, Tobruk — itself hundreds of miles behind the front - could handle barely 20,000. Lorries were in as short a supply as always, and attempts to use the British railway from Sollum resulted in only 300 tons per day being transported instead of 1,500 as planned. What was worse, the port and the sea-routes leading to it were hopelessly exposed to the attacks of the Egypt-based RAF. Sending supply ships straight to Tobruk (or to the even smaller and more vulnerable ports of Bardia and Mersa Matruh) was difficult. On the other hand, unloading them at Benghazi or Tripoli, 800 and 1,300 miles behind the front respectively, involved impossible wastage and delay. Faced with this dilemma, Commando Supremo hesitated. In July, disregarding a storm of protest from Panzerarmee, the Italians opted to unload at Benghazi and Tripoli, with the result that although only 5 per cent of the shipping was lost and 91,000 tons put across, it took weeks for the supplies to reach the front. Rommel himself saw the dilemma clearly enough, but, he insisted that the Italians send their ships directly into Tobruk, with the result that in August losses rose fourfold and the quantity of supplies put across dropped to 51,000 tons."
< Message edited by Nikel -- 12/11/2021 4:23:12 PM >
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