Edorf
Posts: 121
Joined: 5/14/2013 Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Thorgrimm Acceptance of Japan's emperor was the main sticking point for Japan's War Council, the six-person decision-making body over which Emperor Hirohito nominally presided. The council members were cognizant of Japan's dire predicament, but not necessarily ready to surrender unconditionally. They were split, three to three, between hawkish members seeking to get the most out of a peace agreement, to the point of maintaining Japanese control over parts of China, and dovish members inclined to give way on every condition but one, the preservation of the emperor. In point of fact, seven out of eight top US military commanders believed that it was unnecessary to use atomic bombs against Japan from a military-strategic vantage point, including Admirals Chester Nimitz, Ernest King, William Halsey, and William Leahy, and Generals Henry Arnold and Douglas MacArthur. Moreover, they believed that Japan would have surrendered as early as May 1945 if the US had not insisted upon "unconditional surrender." As it was, the final Potsdam Declaration demanded that there "must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, and that a government must be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Japan’s War Council saw no accommodating language in this declaration and thus rejected surrender. Truman subsequently gave the go-ahead for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He then approved a second atomic bombing that obliterated Nagasaki on 9 August. Japan’s War Council met on the evening of the 9th and agreed to surrender but with one condition: the emperor must be retained. Upon receiving Japan's response, Secretary of State Byrnes was instructed to modify the original language to accommodate the Japanese condition. The document thus read: "the authority of the Emperor ... shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." The emperor, as such, would retain his symbolic authority under U.S. rule. This simple change made the proposal acceptable to both sides. On 15 August, Emperor Hirohito gave his "endure the unendurable" radio address to the Japanese people announcing that Japan would "effect a settlement of the present situation," accepting defeat. Japan's surrender could likely have been achieved without the atomic bombings, given that the US allowed the emperor to remain in the end. Cheers, Thorgrimm This doesn’t rule out that it’s still debatable if the only reason the Japanese surrendered to the US was because they could retain their emperor. I’m sure they had some concerns surrendering to a communist state ruled by one of the most notorious dictators in history. Or shouldn’t they? As everyone knows Japan was very anti-communist, to say the least, and in my opinion it can be ruled out that they would surrender to the Soviets, their traditional long time enemy. Japan knew they had two options; either surrender to the US or total destruction.
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