Von Rom
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Please find below the details surrounding three major operations during WW2 in Europe. These operations turned out to be mistakes.
Of the leading high ranking officers at that time, historians have named Ike, Montgomery and Bradley has having made crucial errors that not only delayed the war and allowed thousands of the enemy to escape, but also led to even more Allied soldiers being killed.
The one leading officer who shines during this period is General Patton.
All of the information is based on widely known facts, and most historians acknowledge the circumstances in all cases.
Taken from the book:
The Unknown Patton
by
Charles M. Province
CHAPTER SIX
SHAEF'S THREE MAJOR ERRORS
I - The Falaise Pocket
On June 6th, 1944, the Allied Forces launched "Overlord". The invasion of Normandy. This force, consisting of the First Army (American) and the Second Army (British) was commanded by General Montgomery.
On August 1st, 1944, D-Day+55, Patton's Third Army became officially operational.
Between July 5th, when Third Army had actually landed on French soil, and July 31, Third Army had advanced inland to the town of Avranches. The advance was a total of about 50 miles in 26 days.
In a comparison, Montgomery and his Second British Army had, since D-Day, advanced to the town of Caen, about 10 miles inland. A total of ten miles in 55 days. Montgomery's explanation for his slowness was that he was "re-grouping" in order to pivot at Caen and attack the Germans in force. . . .
By August 11, D-Day+66, Patton and his Third Army had broken completely out of the Cherbourg peninsula. He had advanced south, west, east, and north. Third Army had ripped a hole through the German Seventh Army and had roared "hell for leather" through the towns of Avranches, Mortain, Fougeres, Vitre, Mayenne, and Laval. They had made a sharp 90 degree turn at Le Mans and attacked north to the town of Alecon. They had gone a total of 200 miles in 10 days. . . .
By August 15th, D-Day+70, Third Army units (the Second French Armored Division and the 90th American Infantry Division) had reached Argentan, a town about 12 miles from Falaise. Canadian troops under Montgomery had reached the outskirts of Falaise. August 17th, D-Day+72, saw Patton's 90th Division and Second French Division joined by the 80th Infantry Division at Argentan. Montgomery's Second Army was still about 10 miles from Falaise.
At this point, there was a gap of 12 miles between Falaise to Argentan through which the German Seventh Army was escaping. Patton and his Third Army had moved 250 miles in 17 days. They had completely encircled the German Seventh Army, and were now ready to advance directly to Falaise. Blocking their escape and destroying them would be like shooting fish in a barrel. . . .
Third Army was poised and ready for one of the swiftest, greatest victories in all of history. Closing the gap between the two towns was a matter of hours. The 15th Corps had the tanks and troops necessary to put up a solid wall of men and armor. The Germans were completely confused and running for their lives. Then, the order arrived from SHAEF. HALT!
Patton and his Third Army were ordered NOT to seize Falaise.
What the Germans were powerless to do, SHAEF did for them.
There were later two explanations given for the order to stop Patton. First, SHAEF claimed that the British had "heavily sewn the Falaise area with time bombs." Secondly, Bradley claimed that he not only feared a head on collision of the British and Americans, he also was worried that the fleeing Germans might "trample" the Third Army in it's rush to escape.
The first claim was an outright lie to cover political chicanery.
The second claim by Bradley made no sense at all. They were noises made by a subordinate to obfuscate and condone an error by his superiors. Had the proper order been issued, the British could have held their position and there would have been no possibility of a "collision" of British and American forces.
Regarding Bradley's anxiety about Third Army being "trampled", it is incredible and difficult to imagine two Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division being "trampled" by a thoroughly routed enemy. Evidently, the thought never occurred to Bradley that the enemy might consider surrendering.
The real reason behind the halting of Third Army was Montgomery. He insisted, or rather, demanded that he be allowed to close the gap. He did not want Patton to spring the trap that Third Army had set. Monty wanted the glory and the credit for the "ripe plum" situation which was created by Patton's brilliant leadership and Third Army's speed and daring execution. He received neither. He did not close the gap in time, and he allowed a great number of Germans to live to fight another day.
Montgomery failed to reach Falaise until the 19th of August, D-Day+74. During that time, with Patton halted at Argentan, the great bulk of the German Army managed to escape through the 12 mile gap. What would have been one of the great and memorable victories of all time was lost due to one of SHAEF's oleaginous political schemes.
After this major blunder had been accomplished and became part of history, Patton wrote in his diary, "The 15th Corps could have easily entered the town of Falaise and completely closed the gap to Argentan. This halt was a great mistake as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town when we were ordered to pull back." Patton was correct, yet his advice went unheeded.
II - Market-Garden and Out of Gas
What was probably the greatest error made in WWII by Eisenhower and the SHAEF planners was actually two directly related occurrences, one which greatly affected the other.
To quote General Patton, "The 29th of August, 1944 was, in my opinion, one of the critical days of the war. Hereafter pages will be written on it, or rather on the events which produced it. It was evident that then there was no real threat against us as long as we did not stop ourselves or allow ourselves to be stopped by imaginary enemies. Everything seemed rosy when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gasoline which we were supposed to get for that day did not arrive. I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. It was my opinion that this was the momentous error of the war."
Patton thought that German resistance had collapsed and that nothing could stop the Third Army and the Allies if they proceeded with speed. What did stop him was once again the high command. Now, 35 years later, there is massive evidence to prove conclusively that Patton was correct. Eisenhower and SHAEF were wrong, again. One of Eisenhower's problems was that his SHAEF headquarters was located at Granville, near Cherbourg, a distance of 400 miles from the battle front.
The reason for Patton's halt was explained away as "lack of supplies". Another great lie. There was no lack of supplies. There was, however, a "diversion of supplies".
One thorn in Patton's side was the person of General John C.H. Lee, the commander of COMZ. COMZ was the supply command. With Patton in dire need of gasoline and other imperative supplies, Lee decided that the end of August was the perfect time to move his non-combatant headquarters to greener pastures. What proved to be "just the ticket" was a move to newly liberated Paris. This, of course, meant newly liberated wine, newly liberated women, and newly liberated song. During the move, Lee used hundreds of trucks, tons of supplies, and thousands of gallons of gasoline that were desperately needed by the Third Army's thirsty tanks. Eisenhower, of course and as usual, remained silent. Bradley quietly remarked, "No one can compute the cost of that move in lost truck tonnage on the front."
It is interesting to consult a map of the European Theater of Operations during the end of August, 1944. In northern France, from Dieppe to Mantes (north to south) were Crerar and the Canadian Army; Dempsey and the British Second Army; and Hodges and the First American Army. These three Armies constituting Montgomery's 21st Army Group occupied a front of about 150 linear miles. Contiguous to them on the south was Patton and Third Army. First Army received ample supplies. The boundary between First and Third Armies apparently was an insurmountable obstacle making utterly impossible any transportation of any supplies, especially gasoline.
It was evident to all commanders that what was actually needed was to discontinue Eisenhower's "Broad front" strategy (which he continually and pontifically quoted from Clauswitz). Reassessment of the situation demanded a "single thrust" strategy. There were monumental reasons why this thrust should have been headed by Patton. He, above all others, was capable of the direct, simple, and ruthless drive which would be required to accomplish the task. He was also the most adept at exploiting success.
Actually, Patton could have been supplied more easily than might be imagined. Had 21st Army group been halted instead of Third Army, supplies could have been sent directly behind and through 21st Army Group territory. When Third Army had advanced to the forefront, 21st Army Group could have then followed up Third Army's advancing rear to the south. They could then pivot to the north when Third Army had taken the northern position previously held by 21st Army Group. In other words, they could have switched places by means of a "pinwheel" maneuver.
The great need therefore was for Patton to orchestrate a single concentrated thrust so deep into Germany's heart that the enemy would have no chance of recovery. The timing was perfect, the day of August 29 was the day. It should have been ordered by SHAEF. Instead, Bradley, reluctantly following orders from above, cut Patton's gasoline supply from 400,000 gallons a day to almost nothing.
Fate had given Eisenhower the greatest Cavalry leader and as great an Army as his nation had ever produced. He failed at the decisive moment to use them. Why? The reason was not the supply situation. The reason was Field-Marshal Montgomery.
Eisenhower once again sided with Montgomery and the British so that Montgomery could attempt the "single thrust" attack, but not into Germany. The attack was to be in Holland. Montgomery used the term "dagger-like" thrust. Bradley remarked that it probably would be more like a "butter-knife" thrust.
Patton had often claimed that Eisenhower was more British than American and that he (Eisenhower) allowed the British to influence him too extensively. This is certainly true. One cannot fault the British nor even Montgomery for this. People and nations have since the dawn of time striven for themselves and this is understandable. The British were not at fault. Montgomery was not at fault. The entire blame lies squarely and solely upon Eisenhower. He was a straw man who had never experienced the necessary command of troops. He utterly lacked "command presence" and personal confidence in his own decisions. According to General Patton, Eisenhower was always attempting to be popular, always wanting to be "one of the boys". He was, for his entire Army career, a staff officer. As General MacArthur had once said of him, "He was the best clerk I ever had." Had he been a better, more capable commander; had he some combat experience and more backbone, he might have been able to stand his ground and make the correct and necessary decision. Instead, he replaced pragmatism with politics. One of the influences that effected him greatly was his romantic involvement with a British woman; his driver, Kay Summersby.
Eisenhower had decided to go along with Montgomery and his plan code-named, "Operation Market-Garden". Montgomery demanded, and got, absolute priority for ETO supplies. He was assured by Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, that not only would he receive a thousand tons of supplies per day plus transport, he was additionally promised that Patton's drive to the Saar would be completely halted. Montgomery was elated.
Shortly after 10 a.m. on Sunday, September 17, 1944, from airfields all over southern England the greatest armada of troop-carrying aircraft ever assembled for a single operation took to the air. MARKET, which was the airborne phase of the operation, was monumental; it involved almost 5,000 fighters, bombers, transports and more than 2500 gliders. That Sunday afternoon, at 1:30 p.m. an entire Allied airborne army, complete with vehicles and equipment, began dropping behind the German lines. The target for this historic and tragic invasion from the sky was Nazi occupied Holland.
On the ground, ready along the Dutch-Belgian border, were the GARDEN forces, massed tank columns of the British Second Army. At 2:35 p.m., preceded by artillery and led by swarms of rocket firing fighters, the tanks began their dash into Holland along a strategic route that the paratroopers were already fighting to capture and hold open.
It staggers the imagination when considering what Patton could have accomplished with this massive force and number one priority.
On September 24, 1944, Operation Market-Garden was officially over. Here is what had happened:
Allied forces suffered more casualties in Market-Garden than in the mammoth invasion of Normandy. Most historians agree that in the twenty-four hour period of D-Day, total Allied losses reached an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 men. In the nine days of Market-Garden, combined losses amounted to MORE THAN 17,000 men.
British casualties were the highest; a total of 13,226. General Urquhart's entire division was almost destroyed to a man. In the 10,005 Arnhem force, which included a Polish division and glider pilots, casualties totaled 7,578. In addition to this figure RAF pilot and crew losses came to another 294, making a total of 7,872. General Horrocks 30th Corps lost 1,480 and the British 8th and 12th Corps another 3,874.
American losses, including glider pilots and the 9th Troop Carrier Command, are put at 3,974. General Gavin's 82nd Airborne Division had suffered a loss of 1,432. General Taylor's 101st Airborne lost 2,118. Air crew losses were 424.
Complete German figures are unknown. In Arnhem and Oosterbeek admitted casualties came to 3,300 including 1,300 dead. After interviewing German commanders a conservative estimate was that Army Group B lost at least 7,500 to 10,000 men of which perhaps a quarter were killed. A total of 12,000 to 15,000 men. Less than the Allies.
What about Dutch civilian casualties? No one can say. Deaths in Arnhem and Oosterbeek are said to have been low, less than 500, but no one knows with any certainty. there have been casualty figures given as high as 10,000 in the entire Operation Market-Garden campaign and as a result of the forcible evacuation of the Arnhem sector together with deprivation and starvation in the terrible winter that followed the attack.
Had it been worth it? NO. Operation Market-Garden was a prime example of a "Pyrrhic" victory.
After Market-Garden was over, Montgomery said, "In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from it's inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd and SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market-Garden's unrepentant advocate."
It seems incredible that with Patton stopped, with absolute priority in supplies and weapons, and with over 30,000 troops, Montgomery still claims that his plan was "improperly backed". What more could he have asked for and gotten. . . .?
Had Patton been given this type of support, supplies, and equipment. . . .
Perhaps Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands summed it up most succinctly when he stated, "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."
III - Ardennes Offensive / Battle of the Bulge
The "Battle of the Bulge" at Bastogne, Belgium was not initiated completely by the Germans. They had a healthy assist from their enemy, the Allies. It is another case of one thing affecting another. There were two occurrences which helped the Germans to launch their offensive on December 16, 1944.
The first was recorded by General Patton in his diary, "The 1st Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the 8th Corps area static, as it is probable that the Germans are building up to the east of them."
What prompted Patton to this judgement were reports from his G-2 (Intelligence) officer, Colonel Oscar Koch. Ignoring daily intelligence reports from SHAEF, which was hundreds of miles behind the front lines, and who claimed that everything was fine and dandy, Koch had his own intelligence teams at work. One of these was nicknamed "Patton's Household Cavalry".
As early as December 12, 1944, Koch had begun preparing and transmitting reports to SHAEF regarding what he considered to be a dangerous buildup of Germans east of the 1st Army's 8th Corps. Eisenhower was very busy, occupied with major decisions such as who should be the head nurse of SHAEF. Therefore, he ignored the warnings from those two upstarts, Koch and Patton. He mistakenly allowed Bradley to turn the 8th Corps area into a "rest station", thereby reducing both their discipline and fighting spirit.
The second occurrence was Bradley's breaking of a promise that he had made to Patton. Patton explains, "Bradley called up at 1710 hours and, in my opinion, crawfished quite blatantly, in his forbidding me to use the 83rd Division. I believe that he had been "overtalked" by either Middleton or Hodges, or by both. I was very sore at the time and I still regard it as a great mistake. If I had been able to use the two combat teams of the 83rd to attack Saarburg, that town would have fallen on the 12th or 13th and we probably would have captured the city of Trier. With Trier in our hands, Von Rundstedt's breakthrough could not have occurred. This is probably a case of, "because of a nail, a shoe was lost, etc..."
In other words, had Patton been allowed to use the 83rd Division, as he had been promised, the Germans would not have had the ability to stage their offensive, let alone break through to Bastogne. Knowing Patton's perceptiveness, his intuitiveness, and above all, his track record, it is next to impossible not to believe him. Yet, he was once again ignored and put in his place by his "superiors", to use the word in a military sense only.
Patton being the commander he was, envisioned what could and might happen if the Germans did decide to attack. He called his staff together for a meeting. By the time that Patton was called to attend the Allied meeting at Verdun, to discuss the "Bulge" situation, Patton was already prepared with two completely separate and distinct plans of action. All that was needed was for him to phone his Chief of Staff, utter one of two code words, and within a matter of minutes Third Army would be headed north toward Bastogne to, "... rip out their living guts and grease the treads of our tanks with them."
This was the type of planning that Patton and his staff did so well. This same staff that Bradley had termed "mediocre". Truthfully, it was the best and most loyal staff in the entire European Theater of Operations.
At one point, Patton proposed that the Germans be allowed to advance even further. Then he could attack their rear, cut off the salient at the base, and annihilate them. He was turned down.
Within less than 48 hours after that meeting, Third Army had 2 divisions attacking toward Bastogne, hitting them in the flank and abruptly stopping their offensive. Within a week he had moved the bulk of his Army, a quarter of a million strong, and including 133,000 tanks and trucks, between 50 and 70 miles to the north in the worst possible weather conditions over icy roads. It is little wonder that the Germans had such a healthy respect for and a powerful fear of Patton. It is a wonder, though, how SHAEF could continually ignore him and his ideas.
By January 23, the Ardennes Offensive was Kaput. The German had lost not only the battle, but also the war. The Germans knew it and Patton knew it. The only ones who did not know it were the masterminds at SHAEF.
After Patton had been called in to save the day, he was put back in his place. Though he had saved the Bastogne operations, he was informed that the major push would now be north of the Ruhr, meaning Montgomery.
In the aftermath of Bastogne, Patton continued to follow orders and to fight Germans. Montgomery made some noisy statements about how he had come to the rescue and saved the day for the unfortunate Americans. During his speech, one would almost get the impression that he could use the term "colonists" in lieu of "Americans". This was too much even for some of the British. Winston Churchill, speaking before the House of Commons, publicly repudiated Montgomery and his statements. It might be mentioned that had Patton acted and spoken the way Montgomery did, he would have been immediately relieved of duty by Eisenhower, castigated (or castrated) by the press, and sent home in shame. Churchill not only repudiated Montgomery, he reminded him and the British population that during the Bulge, that for every British soldier in the line, there were 35 to 40 Americans; for every British casualty, there were 55 to 60 American casualties. . . .
These, then, are the three MAJOR errors made by Eisenhower and SHAEF during WWII in the European Theater of Operations. There were others, but none which had such a wide spread effect on the possible end of the war itself. Had Patton's advice and counsel been heeded, it is very probable that the war would have been concluded by the end of 1944, instead of in 1945.
http://www.pattonhq.com/unknown/chap06.html
< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/11/2004 5:27:02 AM >
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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 
. Either way, we agree
). One of the reasons I like Slim is that his account of the campaign in India and Burma (Defeat Into Victory - a fine book!) is refreshingly honest with him being candid regarding his own shortcomings and the mistakes he made. 
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