Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom,

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In this thread, I, and I alone, have attempted to represent and defend the memory of General George S. Patton, one of the most maligned, yet misunderstood men, of the past century. A man who is truly worthy of our respect and admiration.

Question of point of view I guess. It simply turned that most others posters dont share your views about Patton which were, for me, execessively good for him. Patton was probably not as good you depict him while Bradley and Ike probably better (without speaking of Collins who was likely as good than Patton altough he was never given an army.)

LC

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There are over 10,000 members on this forum, yet only 4 or 5 have stated they were against Patton. I don't think the numbers justify your conclusion.

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Have a nice day

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ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom,

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There are over 10,000 members on this forum, yet only 4 or 5 have stated they were against Patton. I don't think the numbers justify your conclusion.

Obviously my conclusion were not that others poster (i.e those who posted in *this* thread) are right or false but that, as you pointed out, you were alone (posting) on *your* side.

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Have a nice day

Thanks, you too

LC

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ORIGINAL: paspunxra

I tend to argue with youre opinion of Patton. Compared to Montgomery the panzy, Patton was the greatest thing since sliced bread. Montgomery tended to quibble about his name getting in the paper and how prestigious he and his army were. Patton did not care at all about the politics and red tape. He wanted to end Nazi Germany as quickly as possible and his tactics, while unorthodox and dangerous, saved ultimately a lot of lives by doing just as the Germans had done, advance quickly and smash the opposition into the ground. He was certainly no amateur and he didnt care whether or not his men hated him, he just wanted them to fight. At that time, there was no other general that could have, or even attempted to drive the Germans back after their attacks during the Battle of the Bulge, he moved swiftly and decisively. Thats a lot better than Montgomery, who was winning against the Germans, but if he had been in overall command, the war would not have ended until 1960 (save the Russians)

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Ironduke:

You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:

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Von Rom

With all due respect, but by including that entire quote (most of which does not belong to Whiting) you are giving the reader (who does not own D'Este's book) the FALSE impression that the entire quote belongs to Whiting. If you intented to refer to only the BOLD portion of that quote, you should have informed the reader that that portion, and that portion only, belongs to Whiting.

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For those without access to this work, Mr Whiting's words (which Mr D'Este does not contradict but rather presents as evidence), are in bold in the following section quoted verbatim from pg 634 (Harper Collins 1996 paperback edition):

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It also shows he agreed with it.

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No, it does not mean D'Este agreed with Whiting's quote. It means he has presented Patton's critics' point of view.

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I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.

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That is because you and others have been doing a fine job doing that all on your own. And at times unfairly.

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How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?

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You have Whiting's book "Battle of the Bulge". Post some quotes from that book where Whiting praises Patton.

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Do I have to find everything for you?

Do some reading. . .

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And no I am not doing any investigation.

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While you're at it, could you post the reference Whiting uses for that quote you posted a while back about Patton encountering only 3 poor German units when he attacked at the Bulge?

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My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.

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As to the 352nd debate:

If you become frustrated when someone else does not share your point of view, then I think you may need to step back for a few minutes and take a few deep breaths. Not everyone in life is going to agree with your opinions.

I did not pursue the 352nd debate simply because I felt it to be an unfair line of debate.

Why?

Because you latch onto things; often small things, which really do not matter in the larger picture.

In other words: You fail to place things into perspective.

Understand?

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Anyone, if they have made up their mind to do so, can easily rip apart ANY action or any general, if they choose to do so.

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It is clearly evident that this is what you have chosen to do with Patton.

However, I try to balance that view by considering ALL the evidence.

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You, however, have chosen to destroy Patton by focusing ONLY on the critics' points while totally ignoring the valid explanations, or even bothering to understand Patton.

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It's called having perspective.

The debate over the 352nd is just one example of that approach of yours.

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Let's look at the Ardennes for a moment:

The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions. It had the benefit of the knowledge of 5 years' of proven German fighting experience; it was led by experienced officers; it still had good morale. Finally, it had the benefit of the surprise attack. Granted, it wasn't the best German unit. But it certainly wasn't a rag-tag bunch of misfits, either.

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The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions.

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Formed as part of the 32nd wave on 21 September 1944. from the 581st Volksgrenadier Division (32nd wave).

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It was reconstituted as a separate division in August [1944] and was rebuilt as a Volksgrenadier unit in the Schleswig-Holstein area of Germany"

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Cadres from the veteran 328th Infantry division were used to form this division in October 1943.

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Created in the 32nd mobilisation wave, the 581st Grenadier was not allowed to complete it's training.

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Hitler committed a large proportion of all the tank, aircraft and weapon production from 1944 to this Ardennes Offensive. There were 250,000 Germans attacking, by surprise, an ill-prepared American position.

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In contrast, the Americans, whom they were attacking, were there resting, and were relatively inexperienced and unprepared.

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The three divisions from Third Army (many men had some experience, but many were also inexperienced)

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had to disengage from the enemy, turn 90 degrees north, travel 100 miles in 48 hours in terrible winter weather and on icy roads and, without the benefit of sleep, hot food or rest, they had to fight an enemy that was prepared to fight, and knew how to fight.

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I think this tends to even things out a bit.

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Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties in some tough fighting during the Battle of the Bulge. Clearly, someone was firing back at them

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As I previously mentioned, you present only one tiny side of the picture - with the 352nd being only one example of this - and then twist it into some sort of conclusion as to Patton's command abilities.

You will search high and low to find one little speck that you will twist to suit your conclusions, yet ignore a mountain of evidence that gives you a more balanced view of an action or an event.

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Metz is another excellent example:

You, along with most of the critics jump on Patton's bloody battles here to show he was a poor general.

What you and Whiting conveniently leave out of the picture, is the fact that Patton was stopped outside of Metz because he ran out of gas. He was then denied gas and proper supplies for THREE MONTHS, so he was unable to maneuver around Metz.

His limited supplies meant severely restricting Third Army's use of ammo, artillery shells, food, gas, etc, which all had a detrimental effect on his performance at Metz. In addition, the weather was lousy. This lousy weather meant limited air support. This lousy weather also caused 18,000 cases of trench foot, flu, etc which helped to reduce Third Army's effectiveness.

The fact that he was denied gas meant that the Germans could then re-group and then man positions in the heavily fortified Metz fortifications.

Denying gas to Third Army was almost bordering on the criminal, since what Patton could have captured at little cost (Metz), he now had to take by assault (with infantry), costing soldiers their lives.

So you see, when placed in perspective, the situation at Metz, rather than indicating poor generalship on Patton's part, instead indicates poor generalship and decision-making on the part of the Allied High Command.

But most critics, such as yourself, leave this type of explanation out when looking at Metz.

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Patton's years of study ought to have convinced him of the folly of siege warfare in the hostile environment of a place like Lorraine, which he knew well from first hand experience in 1918. Between his frustration at third army's dilemma and his insistence that he could win the war single handed if given the means, the attacks on Fortress Metz went forward. Yet he seemed reluctant to accept the fact that the great pursuit had ended and he now faced circumstances of "Too little gas and too many Germans, not enough ammo and more than enough rain." Patton's later claims that in Lorraine he had held them by the nose and kicked them in the rear end rang hollow.

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Patton wanted to present Metz to Marshall as a trophy during his impending visit to third army.

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I could go on and on about example after example. But I fear it would be of no use, since you are absolutely determined to drive a stake into Patton's memory.

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Regarding The Battle of Metz

When Patton died, an “official history” was agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part "fudged the truth" about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 German divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve Third Army of supplies, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

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paspunxra:

So true.

Patton saw first-hand the horrors of trench warfare in WW1.

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That is why he vowed that an army must always be on the attack. Once you have your enemy off-balance, you must keep attacking him so he can't re-group.

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Many of Patton's problems occurred when higher Allied Commanders interferred with his operations. Denying Third Army gas and supplies when he reached Metz is just one example.

This is also hard to fathom especially when you consider the astonishing record of success Patton and Third Army had achieved previous to this.

Both the Germans and Patton criticized the Allied Commanders for their timidity. By being cautious; by trying to prevent high Allied casualties; these same commanders caused high casualties.

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Again, the example of Metz, where Patton could have easily secured it with few casualties if he had been given the fuel he requested. As a result of NOT getting the proper supplies, Third Army suffered terribly, especially in the very bad weather. According to Patton, Trenchfoot alone was causing more casualties among his men than the Germans. He cursed the boots the GIs were given and tried on numerous occasions to get proper foot wear for his men.

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Ironduke:

I am also looking forward to seeing your indepth analysis and explanations about the so-called "brilliant" German BlitzKrieg victories against their inferior opponents between Sept 1939 to Jan 1942.

Cheers!

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I tell people Whiting's words are in bold

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The other occasion is when they use someone else's words to describe or highlight something, because they agree with it, and know that the point has been made elsewhere, and by quoting rather than just restating the point, they give it extra weight because they prove other historians agree with them. Alternatively, it may be something outside their sphere of influence and they quote it because the historian is a recognised leader in that field. Did you not know this?

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Tell us what you feel, it will improve your impact in this thread if you show your view is balanced. I've tried as the list above shows.

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Why would he reference it?

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Patton said of the three units he took: "Bradley, my best three divisions are 4th Armoured, the 80th and the 26th." Patton's own words.

The units in 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions Corp were 5th Parachute (which wasn't actually a parachute division anymore as it had been destroyed in Normandy and rebuilt from surplus Luftwaffe ground crew) and 79th Volksgrenadier which certainly wasn't rebuilt from veterans because the previous 79th was destroyed (1 man living to tell the tale). It was formed from the 586th Volksgrenadiers. The sources are Nafziger and Mitcham. The same people I used to illustrate the 352nd contained no combat veterans.

Some of these units actually performed creditably despite their various deficiencies.

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This is just frustration for me. Unable to admit you are wrong, you decide instead to change the whole line of argument

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. Some campaigns stand the test of time. While you're at it, (because it will be relevant later) try finding someone who criticises the German victory in the west in 1940.

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I can't force you to admit you are wrong

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Some of the men facing Patton didn't know how to fight

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Patton thought them his best. 4th Armoured and 80th Inf arrived in Normandy in early August and fought across France, into Lorraine etc. 26th arrived in Early Sept and went into action in early October fighting in october and November before joining the battle in the Ardennes. You can say replacements may have been inexperienced, but the majority had seen combat, in some cases a good deal of combat.

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In terms of the Bulge, less so for Patton, because some of the things you cite didn't apply to him, but to elsewhere in the Bulge.

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What the Patton homepage ignores about this battle is that it was completely unnecessary. Think of this. You're facing tough fortified positions, you've limited ammo and gas, the weather is so poor, your soldiers have trenchfoot in massive numbers. The weather is so poor, it's hard for your infantry to move, much less vehicles, and air cover is restricted.

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If your examples are all like this, then I would not post them either, as it does your case no good.

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Regarding The Battle of Metz

When Patton died, an “official history” was agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part "fudged the truth" about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 German divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve Third Army of supplies, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

I've seen this about three times before in this thread. I'll say what I said the last time. It is fantasy to suggest that Monty and Ike and Bradley made a pact in this way. Monty resented Ike, Ike was infuriated by Monty, Bradley felt betrayed by Ike and detested Monty. Monty blamed everone else for everything, he would never have made any kind of pact. Ike became President of the US, yet here is decried as a man hiding his mistakes in a seedy way.

This is from the Pattonhomepage, and yet you present it as some sort of unbiased comment. Where is the evidence? Where were the meetings? Where is the correspondence to show this? The fact is there isn't any, so overactive imaginations seeking to glorify Patton at everybody else's expense make stuff up like this knowing that it is as hard to prove a conspiracy wrong as it is to prove a conspiracy right. You can say what you like, tag it with the word conspiracy, and sit back smugly knowing that people might swallow it because "It's a conspiracy".

Regards in exasperation,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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paspunxra:

So true.

Patton saw first-hand the horrors of trench warfare in WW1.

Recreating them in Lorraine.

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That is why he vowed that an army must always be on the attack. Once you have your enemy off-balance, you must keep attacking him so he can't re-group.

What do you do if he isn't off balance? This is the lesson of Patton's career. Off balance, he could perform notable feats against a fleeing, beaten, disorganised enemy. He could do these feats better than any other Allied Commander. When the enemy was not off balance, he had the same problems everyone else had.

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Many of Patton's problems occurred when higher Allied Commanders interferred with his operations. Denying Third Army gas and supplies when he reached Metz is just one example.

This is also hard to fathom especially when you consider the astonishing record of success Patton and Third Army had achieved previous to this.

Both the Germans and Patton criticized the Allied Commanders for their timidity. By being cautious; by trying to prevent high Allied casualties; these same commanders caused high casualties.

We've been through all this.

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Again, the example of Metz, where Patton could have easily secured it with few casualties if he had been given the fuel he requested. As a result of NOT getting the proper supplies, Third Army suffered terribly, especially in the very bad weather. According to Patton, Trenchfoot alone was causing more casualties among his men than the Germans. He cursed the boots the GIs were given and tried on numerous occasions to get proper foot wear for his men.

All very true, except that after not getting the fuel, he should have stopped. Bradley eventually ordered him to stop attacking to save the lives of the men of third army being needlessly squandered.

regards,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Ironduke:

I am also looking forward to seeing your indepth analysis and explanations about the so-called "brilliant" German BlitzKrieg victories against their inferior opponents between Sept 1939 to Jan 1942.

Cheers!

Do not wish so hard, for you shall receive..

The weight of history, fact, informed opinion and common sense lines up behind me on that one even more than it does over Patton.

Regards,
IronDuke

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Charles Whiting in "The battle of the Bulge".

"Indeed, Patton with three full divisions, one of them armoured, plus overwhelming air and artillery support at his disposal, was stopped by three inferior German divisions, one of which its commander (as we have seen) didn't even wish to take beyond the German border. He wasted his men's lives because he threw them into battle hastily and without enough planning, making up his strategy from day to day. Most important was that Patton, the armoured Commander, who should have known much better attacked on a 25 mile front across countryside that favoured defending infantry on account of its many natural defensive spots. Instead of a massed armour-infantry attack on some concentrated, ole blood and guts , the supposed dashing cavalry General, slogged away like some long in the tooth hidebound first world war infantry commander."

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Well, it's mostly been Ironduke who has been posting for the opposing side, so it looks as though he is also all alone.

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Usually, when a thread hits page 5 new-comers, etc hate to jump into an on-going debate

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ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval
Never went to, now defunct, AOW forum ?

LC

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom


Not every battle goes according to plan.

Every general in every army has been through it.

Yet, Patton gets nailed for it.

As I mentioned, Metz is a series of fortifications, and given Patton's track record, he should have been given the fuel to get through these and move on. They were open to him.

The fault lies with Allied High Command.

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Rickard, John Nelson. Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999
ISBN 0-275-96354-3
295 pages

Foreword (by Carlo D'Este); Preface; Map symbols; maps; photos; charts; tables; Selected Bibliography; Index
Appendices: Third Army Order of Battle; German Order of Battle; Casualties and Replacements; Material Losses; Third Army Operational Directives

For most students of World War II, General George S. Patton, Jr. holds a special place among US Army generals as the master of the American version of blitzkrieg. This reputation -- earned largely by his conduct of operations on Sicily in 1943 and in the pursuit from Normandy in 1944 -- was popularized in the mass market with the eponymously titled, and not always wholly accurate, film of the 1970's (starring George C. Scott) and solidified in more scholarly fashion by Carlo D'Este's 1995 biography.
Author John Nelson Rickard points out in his new book that previous treatments of Patton's military career have tended to ignore or minimize Third Army's bloody head-butting campaign in Lorraine from September to December 1944. In those months, after Patton's headlong pursuit of shattered German formations had outrun the Allied supply pipeline -- and the critical gasoline spigot in particular -- and reached a halt at Metz and Nancy, the series of frontal assaults and battles of attrition no more resembled Patton's preferred strategy of mobile warfare than the Battle of Stalingrad resembled the classic German blitz.
The book commences with a review of Patton's philosophy of battle, notes about his tactics in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941, a brief comparison of the opposing armies of 1944, and a synopsis of the events leading up to the Lorraine campaign, notably the "cavalry-like" exploitation of Patton's Third Army following the breakout at St. Lo which Rickard praises but places in perspective.
It has also been suggested that Patton's opportunistic operational method did not prevent him from "meticulously" planning anticipated campaigns. Yet there was nothing "meticulous" about Patton's preparations for operations in Lorraine. In the fall of 1944 he was exuberant about his August successes where his tactical formula had worked to perfection. He would never cease in his attempt to impose the notions of the old cavalryman on the battlefield in Lorraine even when the circumstances demanded new methods.
Rickard examines with heavily footnoted detail the action in Lorraine mostly from the perspective of Patton's conduct of operations and carefully analyzes -- within the framework of friendly forces and capabilities, enemy forces and capabilities, terrain, weather conditions, logistics, and orders and limitations imposed by higher headquarters -- how Patton performed in an unfamiliar environment.
Indeed, the book is less an account of what happened, and more an analysis of Patton's role in making it happen, with an emphasis on evaluating -- almost second-guessing -- his options and decisions. Readers looking for a comprehensive account of the campaign itself might be somewhat disappointed as Rickard seems to assume that his audience will be familiar with earlier works (such as Hugh Cole's The Lorraine Campaign from the US Army official history series) which focus on the nitty-gritty of maneuver and combat.
Rickard quotes Cole liberally as well as presenting information and opinion from authors (such as Kemp, D'Este, Wilmot, Blumenson, Gabel, Nye, Weigley, and others) who have plowed the same ground, even if not so deeply or carefully. In that respect, Patton at Bay, in its attention to previous works and its constant measuring and weighing of the opinions and conclusions of other writers, sometimes seems more like a doctoral thesis (or even a "compare and contrast" assignment) than a piece of original scholarship. In the end, though, Rickard's approach proves thorough and satisfactory and he is not shy about offering his own point of view.
On the 17th, Patton sent his Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh J. Gaffey, to hurry Eddy in his preparations. Though Gaffey was a highly capable officer and enjoyed the full confidence of the army commander, it was Patton who needed to be at the front with Eddy, pushing him to make sure that XII Corps attacked on schedule. Patton justified his decision to send Gaffey by stating "I have been going to the front so much and kicking so much about delay that I have the generals jittery so I am spending a Sunday in the truck with Willie." This may not have been the best time to play with his pet dog.
Although this might sound a little catty, Rickard's thoroughness pays off with, for example, tables listing all visits by Patton and his senior staff officers to subordinate headquarters.
Rickard acknowledges Patton's strengths and often highlights occasions on which Patton's perception of the larger campaign -- and his plans for exploiting the situation -- made more sense than the plans of superiors. Still, in what is mostly a fair and balanced analysis, Patton receives considerable criticism for his handling of the Lorraine campaign and the costly, clumsy initial attacks against Metz in particular. Among Rickard's verdicts:
· Patton failed to heed intelligence warnings of enemy capabilities
· He continued to rely on failed plans after they had proved unworkable
· On a number of occasions he failed to clearly state his intentions and coordinate his subordinates
· He neglected to take into account his own shortages of manpower, equipment, and air support
· He incorrectly maintained his focus on assaulting Metz rather than masking it
In summary:
Patton was still on probation [after the slapping incidents in Sicily] when he entered Lorraine... Eisenhower still deemed it essential that he be kept under control. Bradley was Patton's greatest restraint....
The result was caution on Patton's part....
Although he regained some of his swagger after the success of the Normandy campaign, Patton certainly never brought his full improvisational style to bear in Lorraine. But excuses cannot be made for his failure to make sound tactical decisions. His difficulties were produced by a failure to sometimes face the obvious but also due to the incompatibility of his established battle philosophy with battle conditions in Lorraine, particularly his concepts of minimal interference and utilization of speed. However, had he not abandoned his most cherished concept, that of avoiding the enemy's main strength, his operations might have been far more successful.
Rickard's is a very analytical, somewhat dry account of Patton's decision-making in Lorraine. Some readers who consider Patton a genius and a hero might feel he is unfairly tarnished here, but most students of the war will welcome this detailed re-evaluation of a less spectacular aspect of the general's career. Also features some very comprehensive order of battle information plus data on casualties, replacements, and equipment losses in the appendices.
Recommended.

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ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom,

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Well, it's mostly been Ironduke who has been posting for the opposing side, so it looks as though he is also all alone.

Well, I share Iron Duke position about Patton, that make him less alone no ? At least we agree that Patton did not won Bulge

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Usually, when a thread hits page 5 new-comers, etc hate to jump into an on-going debate

Never went to, now defunct, AOW forum ?

LC

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ORIGINAL: max_h

the "Kriegstagebuch des OKW", Originalausgabe IV/1, 1944/45, clearly states the composition of the 352nd VG division. it was composed out of "Marschbbattalion", "Gneisenauverbänden", "Festungsbattalionen". The Staff of the OB West reports, that the level of training and unit cohesion was very bad, there was also a lack of officers.

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ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Thanks Max, I'd been searching for that info but couldn't find a rock-solid source.

Especially for Von Rom (and my final word on Whiting), from - http://www.insidetrackaz.com/general.html

"Whiting, Charles - PATTON'S LAST BATTLE. Stein and Day, 1987. Paperbacks
available. Whiting is a distinguished military historian who has produced many
fine books. This is not one of the more favorable Patton books."

Note the use of the word 'distinguished'

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, I'd been searching for that info but couldn't find a rock-solid source.

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No, the fault lies with Patton. His 'one-dimensional' style of warfare just couldn't cope with this kind of battle.

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BTW, the website you chose for this is a SHOWBIZ website, called "Inside Track", and has links to this:

Sexy Male Journalists? Check Out "Buffooneries"

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I doubt the fellas that run that website have even opened a book - heheh

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So?

Heheh

You fellas make the 352nd appear as though they couldn't even get outta bed, much less carry a rifle. - heheh

They were placed on the flank to cover the south.

Clearly, NO ONE, especially the Germans, expected Patton to be able to attack from the south

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When elements of Third Army (which had many GREEN troops, and had been travelling non-stop for 2 days and nights in severe winter weather, without proper sleep, food or rest) attacked to relieve Bastogne, they were attacked by the 352nd (in concealment), the 5th parachute Division, and the elite 1SS Panzer Division.

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ORIGINAL: Von Rom

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No, the fault lies with Patton. His 'one-dimensional' style of warfare just couldn't cope with this kind of battle.

Oh, OK.

If you say so. . .

If people are out to nail Patton - to destroy his reputation - they will only center on every little fault and mistake - whether those faults were initiated by others or not.

Patton could no more have sat still, than Rommel could have. Trench Foot and the terrible weather were causing MORE casualties at Metz than the Germans! Why don't these authors mention this? Patton knew he had to get his men outta there. He called for supplies, but Third Army had to ration ammo, artillery shells, gas, etc. . .

The Allied High Command made the mistakes. By adopting the "Broad Front Strategy", Ike was doing exactly what German leaders wanted him to do - dissipate Allied strength. By withholding supplies from Patton and giving them to Monty, Ike caused two bad situations: Market Garden and Metz.

Why don't you do a detailed search for all of Rommel's mistakes?

Or of the mistakes committed by Paulus at Stalingrad?

Or the terrible blunders of Goering?

Or the ineffectiveness of the Germans at Kursk?

Well, I could go and on. . .

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ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

So, 'Why was Patton so great?'. In a nutshell, he wasn't! In the right circumstances (an enemy weakspot discovered, massive air superiority, etc.) he could perform very well - the breakout from Normandy illustrates this very well. However, when faced with the necessity to fight any other sort of battle - the mark of a true 'Genius for War' - he was found wanting. This doesn't make him a 'bad' general, just means that he shouldn't be elevated to the position of 'greatness'.