Slitherine

quote:

Von Rom

1) Palermo:

Patton's original intention was to land at Palermo, capture it as a base for supplies, and then push to Messina, capture it, and bag ALL the Axis forces on Sicily.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Von Rom

1) Palermo:

Patton's original intention was to land at Palermo, capture it as a base for supplies, and then push to Messina, capture it, and bag ALL the Axis forces on Sicily.

We've been through all this, but this new section is simply incorrect. The original plan for Husky was drafted by Force 141 under a British Officer named Gairdner. Montgomery and Patton at this time (Feb 1943) were heavily engaged in Africa and knew nothing of the plan until a draft was issued. It was these early Force 141 plans which emphasised an assault on the north western coast against Palermo. Patton did not belong to this Task Force, and would only have received copies of it's thoughts once he was designated Commander of US Land Forces for the invasion.

It was Montgomery who caused all the problems, writing and then re-writing the plan, and the root of the problems lay in each service arm requiring something different. The Navy wanted the airfields in the southeast destroying, the air force wanted them too, Monty wanted ports for supply etc.

As D'Este writes, Patton had little or nothing to do with the planning of the operation, and merely raged at Eisenhower because he realised the plan relegated American troops to a subsidiary role. However, as Patton records in his diary "The new operation, from every standpoint except supply, is easier than the old plan." D'este doesn't put Palermo and Patton in the same sentence at any point. I would be grateful if you could tell us your source for this assertion? Where does Patton say he wanted his task force's initial landings to be at Palermo?

IronDuke

quote:

Charles Whiting in "The battle of the Bulge".

"Indeed, Patton with three full divisions, one of them armoured, plus overwhelming air and artillery support at his disposal, was stopped by three inferior German divisions, one of which its commander (as we have seen) didn't even wish to take beyond the German border. He wasted his men's lives because he threw them into battle hastily and without enough planning, making up his strategy from day to day. Most important was that Patton, the armoured Commander, who should have known much better attacked on a 25 mile front across countryside that favoured defending infantry on account of its many natural defensive spots. Instead of a massed armour-infantry attack on some concentrated, ole blood and guts , the supposed dashing cavalry General, slogged away like some long in the tooth hidebound first world war infantry commander."

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


Hopefully, you won't be out to destroy Monty's good name, as you were trying to do with Patton. . .

Despite bailing out in utter frustration it's been an experience reading through this.

Von Rom, if you read this, nobody has tried to destroy Patton's 'good name'. Everyone believes that Patton was a good general but some doubt he qualifies for greatness, it's a question of degrees and perspective that's all. I feel that your 'love' for Patton borders on the religious and this zeal seems to blind you to what the likes of Iron Duke, Kevinugly and Golf actually say.

Heheh

Not out to destroy Patton's name?

Heheh

A question of degrees?

Heheh

That's right - attack MY character now.

Heheh

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


Hopefully, you won't be out to destroy Monty's good name, as you were trying to do with Patton. . .

Despite bailing out in utter frustration it's been an experience reading through this.

Von Rom, if you read this, nobody has tried to destroy Patton's 'good name'. Everyone believes that Patton was a good general but some doubt he qualifies for greatness, it's a question of degrees and perspective that's all. I feel that your 'love' for Patton borders on the religious and this zeal seems to blind you to what the likes of Iron Duke, Kevinugly and Golf actually say.

Heheh

Not out to destroy Patton's name?

Heheh

A question of degrees?

Heheh

That's right - attack MY character now.

Heheh

I try to be conciliatory and balanced and this is what I get! No wonder you feel under siege if this is the way you treat people

quote:

I feel that your 'love' for Patton borders on the religious and this zeal seems to blind you

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

How dare you make such comments on a public forum! Who the hell do you think you are?

David, time to lock up I feel.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

kevinugly:

Were you refering to these two posts:

The two posts below were prompted by the statements made by Ironduke that Patton fought inferior forces.

In return, I posted this information for Ironduke to show him that both attacks by the Germans on Poland and France indicated that the Germans were attacking countries with inferior forces, and that these early German blitzkrieg victories are not really that great.



How did Germany achieve such an overwhelming victory over Poland in 1939?

While the German Army had been developing new tactics and building new fighting vehicles to implement these tactics, the Polish Army, like many others in Europe, had stayed with a World War One mentality.

A comparison of both armed forces clearly indicates the problems faced by Poland.

Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1;

Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30;

Germany four motorised divisions compared to none in Poland;

Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven, some of who can be seen below.


In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers (the JU-87) and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.

The Polish Navy consisted of four destroyers, five submarines, two gunboats, a mine-layer and six mine sweepers – which meant that any German attack from the sea could not be repulsed. Despite the terms of Versailles, Germany had built a modern navy that totally outclassed the Polish Navy.

Such a massive superiority of modern weaponry could only lead to one result – a swift and decisive victory for the Germans.

When the Russians invaded eastern Poland on September 17th, the defeat of Poland was sealed. On September 24th, Warsaw was bombed by 1,150 German aircraft, killing thousands of Polish civilians. On September 27th, Warsaw surrendered. The last Polish troops to surrender did so on October 6th.

Quite the BIG victory over Poland


Even with those lop-sided forces, here are the results of the battle for Poland:

The Polish campaign cost the Germans 8,082 men killed, 27,279 wounded and 5,029 missing in action. German tank losses included 217 destroyed and the Luftwaffe lost 285 planes destroyed and 279 damaged beyond repair - about 25% of all German planes in September 1939. In total, 90,000 Polish military personnel escaped to either Hungary or Rumania and a number of Polish airman fought with distinction in the Battle of Britain.



**********************************

German Blitzkrieg against inferior and ill-prepared French forces in 1940


You state and accuse Patton of having fought against inferior forces, yet clearly, early German victories were against inferior forces.

You are too simplistic in believing that just comparing numbers between opposing forces is enough to define the extent of fighting, especially in the Battle of France in 1940, between French and German forces.

When an old house is given a fresh coat of paint, it may look new, but it is still an old, ramshackle house. This is the state the French army was in when Germany attacked in 1940.

Because of France's "Maginot" mentality, its poor leadership, its out-moded tactics, its "defeatist/defensive" mindset, its poorly trained troops, its lack of aircraft pilots, etc, France was defeated before the Germans even attacked in 1940. It was a modern, well-trained army (Germany) pitted against a less modern, less trained army (France).

Here are just a few thoughts:

* In France, most of the Allied armies were never engaged against the Germans. While there was some fighting, essentially German armoured speaheads merely bypassed most resistence and raced for the channel to trap the Allied Armies. With the bulk of Allied forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.

* In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.

* For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed. Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.

Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 1922 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.

* France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience. In short, the French military in 1940 was organized, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the hectic and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the Germans unleashed upon them in 1940.

* An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units. There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility. Therefore, the French military leaders were simply too slow to respond to "Lightning" warfare.

* After siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering feat of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly HALF of the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. Therefore, the German forces never engaged HALF of the French troops that were available.

* Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops.

* The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. Although, France recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The first two French armoured divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training. Not only were these tanks dispersed in "Penny Packets", but they also lacked radios and co-ordination.

* As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.

* While France had a large number of aircraft, there were not enough aircrews or ground crews to man them. Thus the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.

* As a consequence of the political struggles between the officer corps and the political left, between the army and the air force, and between the air force and the government, the French Air Force entered combat with an incomplete ground infrastructure, insufficient personnel to man its aircraft, and a doctrine so completely at variance with the army's doctrine that the two services were destined to fight largely independent wars.

* Finally, the French leadership was horribly demoralized. For example, in the book, "The Collapse of the Third Republic", the author notes that the top two leaders of France were convinced of the ultimate defeat of France by Germany long before it became feasible for Germany. And of course civilian leadership was completely lacking both during Hilter's move into the Rhineland, and later during the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 30's, both far left and far right forces were convinced that the Third Republic had to be taken down and were actively undermining it. Finally, there were many French (in positions of power) who welcomed the German occupation. Apparently it was widely thought that rule under a German tyranny was better than under the old Republic.

Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

kevinugly:

Were you refering to these two posts:

The two posts below were prompted by the statements made by Ironduke that Patton fought inferior forces.

In return, I posted this information for Ironduke to show him that both attacks by the Germans on Poland and France indicated that the Germans were attacking countries with inferior forces, and that these early German blitzkrieg victories are not really that great.



How did Germany achieve such an overwhelming victory over Poland in 1939?

While the German Army had been developing new tactics and building new fighting vehicles to implement these tactics, the Polish Army, like many others in Europe, had stayed with a World War One mentality.

A comparison of both armed forces clearly indicates the problems faced by Poland.

Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1;

Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30;

Germany four motorised divisions compared to none in Poland;

Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven, some of who can be seen below.


In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers (the JU-87) and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.

The Polish Navy consisted of four destroyers, five submarines, two gunboats, a mine-layer and six mine sweepers – which meant that any German attack from the sea could not be repulsed. Despite the terms of Versailles, Germany had built a modern navy that totally outclassed the Polish Navy.

Such a massive superiority of modern weaponry could only lead to one result – a swift and decisive victory for the Germans.

When the Russians invaded eastern Poland on September 17th, the defeat of Poland was sealed. On September 24th, Warsaw was bombed by 1,150 German aircraft, killing thousands of Polish civilians. On September 27th, Warsaw surrendered. The last Polish troops to surrender did so on October 6th.

Quite the BIG victory over Poland


Even with those lop-sided forces, here are the results of the battle for Poland:

The Polish campaign cost the Germans 8,082 men killed, 27,279 wounded and 5,029 missing in action. German tank losses included 217 destroyed and the Luftwaffe lost 285 planes destroyed and 279 damaged beyond repair - about 25% of all German planes in September 1939. In total, 90,000 Polish military personnel escaped to either Hungary or Rumania and a number of Polish airman fought with distinction in the Battle of Britain.



**********************************

German Blitzkrieg against inferior and ill-prepared French forces in 1940


You state and accuse Patton of having fought against inferior forces, yet clearly, early German victories were against inferior forces.

You are too simplistic in believing that just comparing numbers between opposing forces is enough to define the extent of fighting, especially in the Battle of France in 1940, between French and German forces.

When an old house is given a fresh coat of paint, it may look new, but it is still an old, ramshackle house. This is the state the French army was in when Germany attacked in 1940.

Because of France's "Maginot" mentality, its poor leadership, its out-moded tactics, its "defeatist/defensive" mindset, its poorly trained troops, its lack of aircraft pilots, etc, France was defeated before the Germans even attacked in 1940. It was a modern, well-trained army (Germany) pitted against a less modern, less trained army (France).

Here are just a few thoughts:

* In France, most of the Allied armies were never engaged against the Germans. While there was some fighting, essentially German armoured speaheads merely bypassed most resistence and raced for the channel to trap the Allied Armies. With the bulk of Allied forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.

* In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.

* For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed. Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.

Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 1922 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.

* France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience. In short, the French military in 1940 was organized, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the hectic and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the Germans unleashed upon them in 1940.

* An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units. There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility. Therefore, the French military leaders were simply too slow to respond to "Lightning" warfare.

* After siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering feat of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly HALF of the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. Therefore, the German forces never engaged HALF of the French troops that were available.

* Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops.

* The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. Although, France recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The first two French armoured divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training. Not only were these tanks dispersed in "Penny Packets", but they also lacked radios and co-ordination.

* As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.

* While France had a large number of aircraft, there were not enough aircrews or ground crews to man them. Thus the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.

* As a consequence of the political struggles between the officer corps and the political left, between the army and the air force, and between the air force and the government, the French Air Force entered combat with an incomplete ground infrastructure, insufficient personnel to man its aircraft, and a doctrine so completely at variance with the army's doctrine that the two services were destined to fight largely independent wars.

* Finally, the French leadership was horribly demoralized. For example, in the book, "The Collapse of the Third Republic", the author notes that the top two leaders of France were convinced of the ultimate defeat of France by Germany long before it became feasible for Germany. And of course civilian leadership was completely lacking both during Hilter's move into the Rhineland, and later during the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 30's, both far left and far right forces were convinced that the Third Republic had to be taken down and were actively undermining it. Finally, there were many French (in positions of power) who welcomed the German occupation. Apparently it was widely thought that rule under a German tyranny was better than under the old Republic.

Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond.

Ironduke

quote:

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

quote:

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

quote:

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

kevinugly:

Were you refering to these two posts:

The two posts below were prompted by the statements made by Ironduke that Patton fought inferior forces.

In return, I posted this information for Ironduke to show him that both attacks by the Germans on Poland and France indicated that the Germans were attacking countries with inferior forces, and that these early German blitzkrieg victories are not really that great.



How did Germany achieve such an overwhelming victory over Poland in 1939?

While the German Army had been developing new tactics and building new fighting vehicles to implement these tactics, the Polish Army, like many others in Europe, had stayed with a World War One mentality.

A comparison of both armed forces clearly indicates the problems faced by Poland.

Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1;

Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30;

Germany four motorised divisions compared to none in Poland;

Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven, some of who can be seen below.


In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers (the JU-87) and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.

The Polish Navy consisted of four destroyers, five submarines, two gunboats, a mine-layer and six mine sweepers – which meant that any German attack from the sea could not be repulsed. Despite the terms of Versailles, Germany had built a modern navy that totally outclassed the Polish Navy.

Such a massive superiority of modern weaponry could only lead to one result – a swift and decisive victory for the Germans.

When the Russians invaded eastern Poland on September 17th, the defeat of Poland was sealed. On September 24th, Warsaw was bombed by 1,150 German aircraft, killing thousands of Polish civilians. On September 27th, Warsaw surrendered. The last Polish troops to surrender did so on October 6th.

Quite the BIG victory over Poland


Even with those lop-sided forces, here are the results of the battle for Poland:

The Polish campaign cost the Germans 8,082 men killed, 27,279 wounded and 5,029 missing in action. German tank losses included 217 destroyed and the Luftwaffe lost 285 planes destroyed and 279 damaged beyond repair - about 25% of all German planes in September 1939. In total, 90,000 Polish military personnel escaped to either Hungary or Rumania and a number of Polish airman fought with distinction in the Battle of Britain.



**********************************

German Blitzkrieg against inferior and ill-prepared French forces in 1940


You state and accuse Patton of having fought against inferior forces, yet clearly, early German victories were against inferior forces.

You are too simplistic in believing that just comparing numbers between opposing forces is enough to define the extent of fighting, especially in the Battle of France in 1940, between French and German forces.

When an old house is given a fresh coat of paint, it may look new, but it is still an old, ramshackle house. This is the state the French army was in when Germany attacked in 1940.

Because of France's "Maginot" mentality, its poor leadership, its out-moded tactics, its "defeatist/defensive" mindset, its poorly trained troops, its lack of aircraft pilots, etc, France was defeated before the Germans even attacked in 1940. It was a modern, well-trained army (Germany) pitted against a less modern, less trained army (France).

Here are just a few thoughts:

* In France, most of the Allied armies were never engaged against the Germans. While there was some fighting, essentially German armoured speaheads merely bypassed most resistence and raced for the channel to trap the Allied Armies. With the bulk of Allied forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.

* In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.

* For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed. Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.

Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 1922 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.

* France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience. In short, the French military in 1940 was organized, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the hectic and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the Germans unleashed upon them in 1940.

* An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units. There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility. Therefore, the French military leaders were simply too slow to respond to "Lightning" warfare.

* After siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering feat of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly HALF of the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. Therefore, the German forces never engaged HALF of the French troops that were available.

* Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops.

* The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. Although, France recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The first two French armoured divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training. Not only were these tanks dispersed in "Penny Packets", but they also lacked radios and co-ordination.

* As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.

* While France had a large number of aircraft, there were not enough aircrews or ground crews to man them. Thus the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.

* As a consequence of the political struggles between the officer corps and the political left, between the army and the air force, and between the air force and the government, the French Air Force entered combat with an incomplete ground infrastructure, insufficient personnel to man its aircraft, and a doctrine so completely at variance with the army's doctrine that the two services were destined to fight largely independent wars.

* Finally, the French leadership was horribly demoralized. For example, in the book, "The Collapse of the Third Republic", the author notes that the top two leaders of France were convinced of the ultimate defeat of France by Germany long before it became feasible for Germany. And of course civilian leadership was completely lacking both during Hilter's move into the Rhineland, and later during the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 30's, both far left and far right forces were convinced that the Third Republic had to be taken down and were actively undermining it. Finally, there were many French (in positions of power) who welcomed the German occupation. Apparently it was widely thought that rule under a German tyranny was better than under the old Republic.

Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond.

Ironduke

Ironduke

quote:

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

Yes, yes, let's be civil. . .

Although, I think you should inform your little cabal about this too. . .

No, I'm not saying Patton faced inferior forces, you were.

To show your double-standard towards Patton, I posted this info about Poland and France, to show that those early German victories everyone raves about, were against inferior forces.

I tried to show you that ANY person can attack anything if they are determined to find errors or mistakes.

quote:

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

My, you have a short memory.

As I recall you PROMISED to do an analysis of early German victories between Sept/39 to Jan/42.

I'm STILL waiting to see it. . .

Should I post that statement you made about it to refresh your memory?

quote:

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond

See my statements above in answer to this.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, for your clarification.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=648334&mpage=21&key=

kevinugly:

Were you refering to these two posts:

The two posts below were prompted by the statements made by Ironduke that Patton fought inferior forces.

In return, I posted this information for Ironduke to show him that both attacks by the Germans on Poland and France indicated that the Germans were attacking countries with inferior forces, and that these early German blitzkrieg victories are not really that great.



How did Germany achieve such an overwhelming victory over Poland in 1939?

While the German Army had been developing new tactics and building new fighting vehicles to implement these tactics, the Polish Army, like many others in Europe, had stayed with a World War One mentality.

A comparison of both armed forces clearly indicates the problems faced by Poland.

Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1;

Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30;

Germany four motorised divisions compared to none in Poland;

Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven, some of who can be seen below.


In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers (the JU-87) and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.

The Polish Navy consisted of four destroyers, five submarines, two gunboats, a mine-layer and six mine sweepers – which meant that any German attack from the sea could not be repulsed. Despite the terms of Versailles, Germany had built a modern navy that totally outclassed the Polish Navy.

Such a massive superiority of modern weaponry could only lead to one result – a swift and decisive victory for the Germans.

When the Russians invaded eastern Poland on September 17th, the defeat of Poland was sealed. On September 24th, Warsaw was bombed by 1,150 German aircraft, killing thousands of Polish civilians. On September 27th, Warsaw surrendered. The last Polish troops to surrender did so on October 6th.

Quite the BIG victory over Poland


Even with those lop-sided forces, here are the results of the battle for Poland:

The Polish campaign cost the Germans 8,082 men killed, 27,279 wounded and 5,029 missing in action. German tank losses included 217 destroyed and the Luftwaffe lost 285 planes destroyed and 279 damaged beyond repair - about 25% of all German planes in September 1939. In total, 90,000 Polish military personnel escaped to either Hungary or Rumania and a number of Polish airman fought with distinction in the Battle of Britain.



**********************************

German Blitzkrieg against inferior and ill-prepared French forces in 1940


You state and accuse Patton of having fought against inferior forces, yet clearly, early German victories were against inferior forces.

You are too simplistic in believing that just comparing numbers between opposing forces is enough to define the extent of fighting, especially in the Battle of France in 1940, between French and German forces.

When an old house is given a fresh coat of paint, it may look new, but it is still an old, ramshackle house. This is the state the French army was in when Germany attacked in 1940.

Because of France's "Maginot" mentality, its poor leadership, its out-moded tactics, its "defeatist/defensive" mindset, its poorly trained troops, its lack of aircraft pilots, etc, France was defeated before the Germans even attacked in 1940. It was a modern, well-trained army (Germany) pitted against a less modern, less trained army (France).

Here are just a few thoughts:

* In France, most of the Allied armies were never engaged against the Germans. While there was some fighting, essentially German armoured speaheads merely bypassed most resistence and raced for the channel to trap the Allied Armies. With the bulk of Allied forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.

* In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.

* For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed. Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.

Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 1922 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.

* France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience. In short, the French military in 1940 was organized, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the hectic and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the Germans unleashed upon them in 1940.

* An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units. There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility. Therefore, the French military leaders were simply too slow to respond to "Lightning" warfare.

* After siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering feat of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly HALF of the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. Therefore, the German forces never engaged HALF of the French troops that were available.

* Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops.

* The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. Although, France recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The first two French armoured divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training. Not only were these tanks dispersed in "Penny Packets", but they also lacked radios and co-ordination.

* As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.

* While France had a large number of aircraft, there were not enough aircrews or ground crews to man them. Thus the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.

* As a consequence of the political struggles between the officer corps and the political left, between the army and the air force, and between the air force and the government, the French Air Force entered combat with an incomplete ground infrastructure, insufficient personnel to man its aircraft, and a doctrine so completely at variance with the army's doctrine that the two services were destined to fight largely independent wars.

* Finally, the French leadership was horribly demoralized. For example, in the book, "The Collapse of the Third Republic", the author notes that the top two leaders of France were convinced of the ultimate defeat of France by Germany long before it became feasible for Germany. And of course civilian leadership was completely lacking both during Hilter's move into the Rhineland, and later during the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 30's, both far left and far right forces were convinced that the Third Republic had to be taken down and were actively undermining it. Finally, there were many French (in positions of power) who welcomed the German occupation. Apparently it was widely thought that rule under a German tyranny was better than under the old Republic.

Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond.

Ironduke

Ironduke

quote:

In the spirit of David's request we keep this civil, I will ask this: Are you saying here that you agree Patton's victories were against inferior forces, but that you believe early German victories were also against inferior forces?

Yes, yes, let's be civil. . .

Although, I think you should inform your little cabal about this too. . .

No, I'm not saying Patton faced inferior forces, you were.

To show your double-standard towards Patton, I posted this info about Poland and France, to show that those early German victories everyone raves about, were against inferior forces.

I tried to show you that ANY person can attack anything if they are determined to find errors or mistakes.

quote:

If not, can you clarify why early German victories are relevant to a discussion on Patton? My understanding is that Patton was not in the European Theatre of Operations in 1939-1941, so I'm unsure why this is relevant.

My, you have a short memory.

As I recall you PROMISED to do an analysis of early German victories between Sept/39 to Jan/42.

I'm STILL waiting to see it. . .

Should I post that statement you made about it to refresh your memory?

quote:

If you can clarify this, it will prevent people jumping to erroneous conclusions as to why you have taken this track. This is particularly important because if you can confirm it is option one, then what you are posting is of some (albeit limited) relevance to the thread, and perhaps I can respond

See my statements above in answer to this.

Von Rom,
With respect you are confusing me here.

Can you explain how you attempting to show that the german forces in 1941 fought inferior foes, proves Patton did not fight inferior foes five years later? Is it not necessary for you to illustrate the German Army weren't inferior in 1944, rather than illustrate that another army five years earlier were inferior to the Germans?

As for reposting, you are of course free to repost anything, although I of course would be grateful if you could repost at the same time the list of questions I raised for you. This would illustrate to other Forum users your even handedness. That aside, I would prefer you to not continually repost stuff we have covered before, because I think it is unfair to anyone reading the thread who may conclude that this is new material rather than merely the old material reposted that it is. If you do repost, perhaps you could include the replies from myself and Kevinugly (I would request you cease using the word Cabal, as it is not true, and therefore unfair and offensive) so that other forum readers do not not have to wade back three or four pages looking for our responses each time. This too would illustrate your committment to this debate.

Respect and regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Where he was good (able to wage a war of maneouvre) he was very good

Steve Golf33 Long

quote:

ORIGINAL: diesel7013

Just a simple former military officer here to offer his humble opinion...
...
Patton may not have been the best general of all time or even the best general of WWII - but we certianly deserves to be the considered one of the greatest of all time

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Since Von Rom seems unable to discuss Patton's tactics in the Lorraine campaign I can only presume he's folded on the issue. The two studies that I quoted from - one from the Combined Arms Research Library in Ft. Leavenworth, Texas ( http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp ) and the other from the US Army Quatermaster Museum ( http://www.qmfound.com/pol.htm ) concluded that Patton allowed his logistical problems in late August/early September to deteriorate to a much higher degree than a commander of his experience should. By focussing on fuel to the detriment of his ammunition stocks, particularly medium and heavy artillery shells, when forced into a more defensive mode Third Army could not supply the kind of artillery support necessary and so incurred heavier casualties than would otherwise have been the case. Despite the defeat of the German Panzers (or what was left of them) at Arracourt and the capture of Nancy it is difficult to see the first phase of the Lorraine campaign as anything but a setback in the overall campaign in the ETO. However the failures here pale into insignificance compared to what happened at and around Metz. Resupplied with fuel and ammunition Patton decided to take Metz by storm in early November 1944 (his motives are questionable but I will deal with that shortly) using XX Corps. But instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive breakthrough, as he had done at St. Lo according to his orders, he instead dispersed his troops across the battlezone seemingly attempting to be strong everywhere but obviously ending up strong nowhere. The German command in the region were much relieved as they were able to inflict heavy casualties on the attackers before withdrawing in reasonable order back to the Siegfried Line. But why take Metz by storm anyway? Von Rom suggests that Metz was an important transport hub yet with Nancy in American hands, there was no reason why supplies could not have been brought up by various alternative and none too torturous routes. Patton had an emotional link with Metz having been awarded a 'Liberation Medallion' in 1918 for his part in the freeing of the city from German rule. However, there is a a clue an article dealing with the oral history of Bill Breckinridge. Whilst supportive of Patton he is more critical of the commander of XX Corps, especially over his desire to take Metz.

From - http://www.wood.army.mil/2-10IN/History/10th%20infantry/Chapter%206%20-%20The_Crossing%20and%20the%20Bridgehead.htm (I know this one works, apologies for the 'internal' one that didn't)

"Asked "Why did you attack Metz? Why didn't you by-pass it?" Bill first hesitated, saying he probably shouldn't say exactly what he thought. Then he said ".. We had the Second Coming of Napoleon as our Corps Commander, and he had already decided that he might be the first man in history to capture Metz by force. . We could have by-passed it very easily and it would have been very much better because it would drop like . . . eventually it would just have starved to death. But, no, we had to attack it." Bill felt that more divisions ought to have been available for such-an assault, when "all we had were five divisions, and this was the most strongly fortified city in the world, and recognized as such. You can't count on bombing or anything like that because the damn forts had walls that were ten feet thick, concrete. . . reinforced concrete completely covered for years with turf and grass and what have you. . I've seen a pretty good sized bomb hit that stuff and just bounce. And it wouldn't penetrate. The only way you can get into those forts was to get up to the firing slits. . aside from that they were surrounded by an iron picket fence. . you can shell an iron picket fence until hell will have it, but how in the hell can you make a hole in it? . . . when the damn shells explode it shakes a little but that's all. They were solid steel. So when your riflemen get up to the fort they got to go through that picket fence, which was a little difficult." He said the l0th was "a 'little down in strength," after fighting across France and then losses crossing the Moselle. It would have been "a much, much better thing to bypass it."149 But it was clear that the 5th Division was pointed to that objective."

So here we have an alternative, that it was Major-General Walker (XX Corps commander) who developed an unhealthy and ultimately costly obsession to take Metz. Even so, Patton was in charge at the operational level and so was responsible for the command decisions.

In conclusion, the Lorraine campaign reveals Pattons weaknesses as a General. Unable or unwilling to use his preferred battle tactics he lacked the capacity to come up with an alternative plan and so resorted to the kind of trench warfare he was familier with from WW1. He knew that any casualties incurred by Third Army could be replaced far more easily than those suffered by the Germans and so could afford to wage a battle of attrition. It's the failure to adapt to the demands of a changing battlefield that mean that Patton can not be given the epithet 'great'. Where he was good (able to wage a war of maneouvre) he was very good but outside of this he was found wanting.

quote:

Since Von Rom seems unable to discuss Patton's tactics in the Lorraine campaign I can only presume he's folded on the issue.

quote:

On 25 September, Third Army operations came to an abrupt halt. Even with the Red Ball Express running at full capacity, logistical support was inadequate to sustain operations by all of the Allied forces on the Continent. Accordingly, GEN Eisenhower decreed that the main Allied effort would come from the British 21st Army Group, which received transportation priority. The 12th Army Group, including Third Army, was to bold its present positions until the logistical crisis receded.

quote:

the Germans were about to obtain a valuable ally in the form of the weather. Seven inches of rain fell in November, about twice the normal amount. Twenty days that month had rain. Lorraine suffered from its worst floods in 35 years. On two different occasions, floodwaters washed out the Moselle bridges behind the Third Army in the midst of heavy fighting. Almost all operations were limited to the hard roads, a circumstance that the Germans exploited through the maximum use of demolitions. Third Army engineers built over 130 bridges during November.

The weather virtually negated American air superiority. The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew only 3,500 in November. There was no air activity at all for 12 days out of the month.

quote:

on 8 November in weather so bad that MG Eddy, XII Corps commander, asked Patton to postpone the attack. Patton told Eddy to attack as scheduled or else name his successor. Despite the total lack of air support, Eddy attacked on the 8th and throughly surprised the defending Germans, who believed that the weather was too bad to allow offensive operations. The most massive artillery preparation in Third Army history preceded XII Corps' attack. All of XII Corps' artillery plus 5 battalions borrowed from XX Corps--for a total of 42 battalions and 540 guns--poured 22,000 rounds on the stunned Germans. At 0600, XII Corps jumped off with three infantry divisions abreast and two armored divisions in corps reserve.

quote:

General Walker's XX Corps made its main attack across the Moselle in the Metz sector on 9 November, one day after XII Corps. It, too, achieved surprise. The 90th Division and 10th Armored Division had shifted to assembly areas north of Thionville in great secrecy. A detachment of special troops maintained radio traffic and manned dummy guns in the vacated zone. There was no artillery preparation so as not to disclose the imminent attack. The Moselle flooded out of its banks, which complicated the crossing operation but had the side benefit of inundating the German minefields on the east bank and lulling the defenders into a false sense of security. Finally, 95th Division staged a demonstration south of Thionville that involved crossing a battalion to the east bank, thus drawing attention away from the main effort farther north.

quote:

Then, XX Corps created another threat by converting 95th Division's demonstration at Uckange into a major effort and reinforcing it with armor. Given the designation Task Force Bacon, this battle group fought its way toward Metz in mobile columns led by tanks and tank destroyers that shot up all possible centers of resistance, to the extent of using 3-inch antitank guns to knock out individual snipers. All of the forces closing on Metz employed new techniques in dealing with fortified areas. Frontal assaults were avoided. Instead, strongpoints and forts were surrounded, bypassed, and systematically reduced with high explosives and gasoline. Task Force Bacon entered Metz from the north on 17 November, the same day 5th Division reached the city from the south and 95th Division neared the Moselle bridges to the west. As street fighting ensued in Metz itself, XX Corps' artillery laid interdiction fire on all German escape routes east of the city.

quote:

On 19 November, 90th Division and 5th Division linked up east of Metz, completing the encirclement of the city. Although some of the forts held out for two more weeks, the commander of the German garrison in Metz surrendered on 21 November. Thus, XX Corps was the first military force to capture Metz by storm since 451 A.D.

quote:

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank

von Rom,
Would you please be so kind as to explain me why an point gets better and better if you make it several times?

I only wonder why you tell the same stuff over and over and over again.

As a conclusion of all the hick hack in this thread I found that Patton did not invent anything new. He hadn´t any new ideas about strategy. He hadn´t any new ideas about logistics.
He only managed to win battles in which his forces were very very much stronger than his enemie´s.

He was a competent worker given the resources he had. He had his off days and he had his good days. So why do you try to lift him on a podest? Yes, he was the best Allied general. No he wasn´t THAT great compared to other generals of his time.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that

quote:

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site. Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Given that I apologised for the lousy link, calling me 'lazy' (didn't David Heath warn us about 'name calling'? Don't be silly and get yourself banned on my account) isn't going to get you very far.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

1) Third Army 'claimed' 180,000 casualties. It also 'claimed' nearly 700 tanks destroyed. Given that the Germans never had that many men or tanks in Lorraine then it is obvious these figures are grossly inflated. Yet again you are taking unverified figures and presenting them as concrete facts.

2) According to the logistics reports by the time the attack on Metz was launched Third Army was back to a state of full supply so your claim that

quote:

despite being low on gas and supplies throughout the campaign

is yet another of your blatent falsehoods.

3) Claiming the PoL site 'plagierised' (check the spelling) the other site. Attack the facts not the sources.

4) I offered up Bill Breckinridge as a 'possible clue', a speculation. I was very clear about that so attacking that source is a waste of your time.

5) I was also pretty clear that I concurred with the findings of the two sites, I didn't claim much to be my analysis. Therefore we have two major studies, one by the CGSC - that are heavily critical of Pattons conduct in Lorraine vs you, Von Rom, a Patton 'fanboy' who thinks that 'Patton Uncovered' is a fair and balanced piece of 'work'. Any right minded individual will have to side with those sites and me, there is simply no other possible result.

1) All info I gave is from that article you, yourself posted! It is from the Command and General Staff College. What is YOUR source for the 700 tanks?

2) The sheer shoddiness of those articles you posted is again indictative of your very poor analysis. So you own a dictionary. Next time spend more time on doing research, and less time on playing with your dictionary.

3) All quotes for my analysis above is from the article YOU posted. It's YOUR source. Heheheh It alone completely demolishes your argument. Completely!

4) A person would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe most of what you try to pass off as analysis.

5) Contrary to you and most of the other critics who try their best to trash Patton at Metz and in the Lorraine Campaign, your so-called analysis simply CANNOT hold water.

THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

In just NINE days, from the start of the offensive on November 10, until November 19th, and in spite of poor weather, flooding, rain, bad roads, river flooding, and attacking the most heaviliy fortified place in Europe, Metz fell to Third Army.

It achieved victory.

Your argument has been demolished.