Slitherine

quote:

Blumenson writes that Patton's referring to "John" in the letter to his wife was SHORTHAND. "Patton could hardly tell her about Hammelburg because of censorship" issues (p. 665). So he mentioned "John" so they both knew what they were referring to.

This did NOT mean he KNEW John was in the POW camp.

quote:

"We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved".

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This did NOT mean he KNEW John was in the POW camp.

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"Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diaries in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until nine days after the raid. "

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So it is more than likely that Patton did not know for sure that John was in that POW camp.

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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Incorrect.

The 352nd Infantry Division was formed in the summer of 1943. Officially the unit was created on November 14th from various units from the Eastern Front involved in the Kursk Offensive. The end of the summer of 1943 saw the close of the Kursk Offensive on the Eastern Front. The losses during this operation added to the vast loss of men that year. As a result, a new wave of divisions were ordered to be raised for deployment by the spring of 1944. Infantrie Division 352 was to be among this number. The early fall of 1943 saw the formation of the nucleus of this division in the area surrounding St. Lo, occupied France.

Therefore, it was made up of experienced infantry who had served in Russia.

I'm not getting back in, I just wanted to smile at this, when you keep talking of stacking up evidence.

No sources listed: (I used Zetterling, Nafziger and Mitcham). No mention of which units were used to create it. (I mentioned the 321st). You say the division was formed in the summer, then say it was ordered to be formed after the losses of the summer. Then say formed in early fall of 1943.
Although it was only officially created on November 14th. By and large in my experience, units are usually officially created before they are actually created if anything, as the official creation might mean the assigning of a number, a Commander, a barracks and training area, and weapon transfers. The actual receipt of men into the unit happens afterwards, as they are received into the existing set up. This entire paragraph is self contradicting.

You call it a member of a "new wave" of divisions (ie newly formed), point out it was raised because of losses in Russia (lots of veterans killed), then say this new division was full of experienced infantry from Russia.

So, You eventually say:

quote:

Therefore, it was made up of experienced infantry who had served in Russia.

without telling us where these men had come from. I've pointed out where the experienced infantry came from and how few of them there were. The crazy thing is you seem to genuinely believe this makes sense, and that people can't see through this sort of reasoning and argument.

It's the real reason why I'm bailing out, your definition of evidence and the rules you use when gathering and presenting it are not ones I'm familiar with. We have no common definition of what evidence is or how it can be used. I am withdrawing, and others can decide (as they did in the Patton thread) which of us makes more sense. The above statement doesn't make internal sense, much less external. I present lots of facts, then get contradicted by a fact-less argument, then get called incorrect?
Which units did these infantry come from? What is your source for this claim?

There will be no answer, as there is no answer. I withdraw, because as RiverBravo said on page one

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Good riddons to the patton thread.It was going in circles.

At least the Bismarck thread kept evolving.

I don't believe this thread should be spoiled for the others by us rehashing the same material from the other thread. Anyone who wants to know what evidence we have can re-read that thread if they wish, and judge which of us is correct. As I said, the above is the reason I will not debate with you. It isn't fair of you to simply say "You are incorrect" without proving why, or presenting something which does not address the point. In these circumstances, it is pointless to continue. Say what you will, I'm happy to allow others to judge.

IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

if you're gonna kill this thread, at least kill it quickly
no need for 20 pages of long one-sided debate...

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Incorrect.

The 352nd Infantry Division was formed in the summer of 1943. Officially the unit was created on November 14th from various units from the Eastern Front involved in the Kursk Offensive. The end of the summer of 1943 saw the close of the Kursk Offensive on the Eastern Front. The losses during this operation added to the vast loss of men that year. As a result, a new wave of divisions were ordered to be raised for deployment by the spring of 1944. Infantrie Division 352 was to be among this number. The early fall of 1943 saw the formation of the nucleus of this division in the area surrounding St. Lo, occupied France.

Therefore, it was made up of experienced infantry who had served in Russia.

I'm not getting back in, I just wanted to smile at this, when you keep talking of stacking up evidence.

No sources listed: (I used Zetterling, Nafziger and Mitcham). No mention of which units were used to create it. (I mentioned the 321st). You say the division was formed in the summer, then say it was ordered to be formed after the losses of the summer. Then say formed in early fall of 1943.
Although it was only officially created on November 14th. By and large in my experience, units are usually officially created before they are actually created if anything, as the official creation might mean the assigning of a number, a Commander, a barracks and training area, and weapon transfers. The actual receipt of men into the unit happens afterwards, as they are received into the existing set up. This entire paragraph is self contradicting.

You call it a member of a "new wave" of divisions (ie newly formed), point out it was raised because of losses in Russia (lots of veterans killed), then say this new division was full of experienced infantry from Russia.

So, You eventually say:

quote:

Therefore, it was made up of experienced infantry who had served in Russia.

without telling us where these men had come from. I've pointed out where the experienced infantry came from and how few of them there were. The crazy thing is you seem to genuinely believe this makes sense, and that people can't see through this sort of reasoning and argument.

It's the real reason why I'm bailing out, your definition of evidence and the rules you use when gathering and presenting it are not ones I'm familiar with. We have no common definition of what evidence is or how it can be used. I am withdrawing, and others can decide (as they did in the Patton thread) which of us makes more sense. The above statement doesn't make internal sense, much less external. I present lots of facts, then get contradicted by a fact-less argument, then get called incorrect?
Which units did these infantry come from? What is your source for this claim?

There will be no answer, as there is no answer. I withdraw, because as RiverBravo said on page one

quote:

Good riddons to the patton thread.It was going in circles.

At least the Bismarck thread kept evolving.

I don't believe this thread should be spoiled for the others by us rehashing the same material from the other thread. Anyone who wants to know what evidence we have can re-read that thread if they wish, and judge which of us is correct. As I said, the above is the reason I will not debate with you. It isn't fair of you to simply say "You are incorrect" without proving why, or presenting something which does not address the point. In these circumstances, it is pointless to continue. Say what you will, I'm happy to allow others to judge.

IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Blumenson writes that Patton's referring to "John" in the letter to his wife was SHORTHAND. "Patton could hardly tell her about Hammelburg because of censorship" issues (p. 665). So he mentioned "John" so they both knew what they were referring to.

This did NOT mean he KNEW John was in the POW camp.

Where does this come from?

Paton writes:

quote:

"We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved".

You're telling us that because of censorship issues, Patton is using the word "John" as shorthand. Okay, then what Patton would have written but for censorship is:

"We are headed right for John Water's place (he's our son in law), and may get there before he is moved".

Then you say:

quote:

This did NOT mean he KNEW John was in the POW camp.

What on earth does it mean, then? As D'Este says,

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"Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diaries in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until nine days after the raid. "

Even assuming this of yours is true:

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So it is more than likely that Patton did not know for sure that John was in that POW camp.

He specifically mentions Waters (via shorthand) before the raid, then denies knowing anything about his presence after the raid. If he felt Waters might be in the camp, then he was clearly lying afterwards when claiming he knew nothing whatsoever about him being there.

I am tired of picking this sort of stuff apart. You jump through hoops attempting to defend the indefensible. As I said, let others judge.

Ironduke

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ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

if you're gonna kill this thread, at least kill it quickly
no need for 20 pages of long one-sided debate...

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ORIGINAL: Sarge

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jane Doe

if you're gonna kill this thread, at least kill it quickly
no need for 20 pages of long one-sided debate...

quote:

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

I totally agree I can bee rude. This can happen if I get too excited (and I am always sorry for this), or if someone is rude towards me first. The latter fits you from the Patton thread, and it fits in this thread as well. But I do apologize if you were offended by my reference to "fanatics". I used an to indicate to readers not to take it too seriously. Also, I explained to you in the Patton thread why I used this phrase. And I find you to be rude against pretty much anyone who challenge your arguments, which is sad. And I cannot for these reasons treat you with respect. It is comments like "Understand?" (you answering me), and "LOL" etc (Iron Duke) that may be found unessecary aggressive and rude (in that order) by some. Atleast to me.

As to the Extra manpower, I dont know what you mean. Do you believe all soldiers are sorted under a division? If so, you are mistaken, and very much so as I have pointed out. You have your divisions and then you have your independent battalions/brigades/other sized units that, I guess, provied flexibility to an army. And of cource some would be just natural to deploy independently like heavy AA etc.

quote:

I totally agree I can bee rude. This can happen if I get too excited (and I am always sorry for this), or if someone is rude towards me first. The latter fits you from the Patton thread, and it fits in this thread as well. But I do apologize if you were offended by my reference to "fanatics". I used an to indicate to readers not to take it too seriously. Also, I explained to you in the Patton thread why I used this phrase. And I find you to be rude against pretty much anyone who challenge your arguments, which is sad. And I cannot for these reasons treat you with respect. It is comments like "Understand?" (you answering me), and "LOL" etc (Iron Duke) that may be found unessecary aggressive and rude (in that order) by some. Atleast to me.

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As to the Extra manpower, I dont know what you mean. Do you believe all soldiers are sorted under a division? If so, you are mistaken, and very much so as I have pointed out. You have your divisions and then you have your independent battalions/brigades/other sized units that, I guess, provied flexibility to an army. And of cource some would be just natural to deploy independently like heavy AA etc.

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after...

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after...

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius

The paratrooper landings had a good impact on German confusion. First there were reports on major air landings and scattered firefights, then reports started coming in that the "paratroopers" were just dummies. I wonder if they considered it could be both?

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

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ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

My reading is they 'lucked out'. Rommel wasn't the 'bogey man' he'd become in the Western Desert by 1944.

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after...

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

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ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

quote:

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after...

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

I doubt that 12SS would have been attacing any US beachead if they were released. The germans believed the US beacheads to be stuck (for a while at least), and the GB and Canadian beaches was far more pressing issues for them. This is illustrated by the fact that 915. regiment of the 352 div. was during night sent towards carentan, but was later ordered to go back towards the GB beacheads. I believe 12SS would have attacked west of Orne river while the 21Pz attacking paratroopers east of Orne, securing the brigdes.

As it turned out, the 21Pz were splitted into 2 groups, and the main groupe set out of action for most of the day as gen. Marcks ordered them towards the beaches (back to Caen, and then west of Orne). The panzers of 21pz reached Périer area (how close to the beach is that?), while a battallion of 192. pz.grenadier managed to reach Lion-sur-Mer (they joined the 21. in their attack), to relieve 736. regiment. However, that would not last for long..

The 21Pz did not do well that day. The force east of Orne was too small to manage to take the brigdes, and the main force west of Orne met much stronger forces, and Feuchtinger (commander 21.) was severly questioned by the SS officers for his performance.

As to making up minds. Imagine how difficult it was for them to do so. Most believed this to be a false manouvre, and the real attack would come at Calaise (Was it only vonRundstedt of the higher commands who immidiatelyt understood this was the real thing?). Then there were reports from all over Normandie of enemy activity as the allied Paratroopers were scattered around along with the dolls that were dropped. Then the Partisan activity breaking up communications. The the surprise of the attack in the first place as the weather was considered too bad for an invasion. If only the germans had better spies in england...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

The paratrooper landings had a good impact on German confusion. First there were reports on major air landings and scattered firefights, then reports started coming in that the "paratroopers" were just dummies. I wonder if they considered it could be both?

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

quote:

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

quote:

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

The paratrooper landings had a good impact on German confusion. First there were reports on major air landings and scattered firefights, then reports started coming in that the "paratroopers" were just dummies. I wonder if they considered it could be both?

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

Incidentally, I believe general Marcks had his birthday this day as well :)

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius
We're getting a bit offtopic here ...

I doubt that 12SS would have been ...

Agreed re the 12th. The advance recon element of the 12th SS arrived and watched the action on Gold Beach unfold. It was always going to secure Caen upon arrival.

I agree re the 21st. Von Luck criticised everyone after the war because he was held back from attacking the paras in the Orne bridgehead, but as events proved, the Commander of the 21st could not afford to commit his men until he knew exactly what was happening. Had he gone all out for the paras, he would never have been able to stop any of the beach landings, and when he decided the beaches were the more pressing target, it took time to concentrate his troops under allied air interdiction. There wasn't an easy or correct option for him in the circumstances.

Regards,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

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ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

My reading is they 'lucked out'. Rommel wasn't the 'bogey man' he'd become in the Western Desert by 1944.

Did the allies fear any specific ger commander on the western front? Or was it more a general consern about the german fighting ability? Im sure they were conserned prior to D-Day, although they believed they would pull it off.

Rommel was away from the front for 2 reasons: visit his wife and also to speak to Hitler in person. I believe it was another attempt to get approval for his idea of moving panzers closer to the coast, but maybe someone can fill me inn. He was apparently very sad for not being there when the s*** hit the fan, so to speak, and he believed the defense would have been better if he were present (of course).

Having the Panzers closer to the beach would make it possible for an early beachhead attack, but I think it was Duke who pointed out that Rommel did not appreciate the power of naval fire. I may be mistaken, but was not Rommel present at the italy landings? He had a short commission in Italy at least. However, the Italy landings showed that naval bombarbment made it next to impossible for tanks to get to the actual beach head (they never did make it in Italy), and I believe this to be especially true for Normandy. Maybe any landing were doomed to success unless the germans could participate in a naval combat (which they of course could not)? How sure was Rommel that an immediate counterattack at the beaches was going to be a success?

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ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

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ORIGINAL: Belisarius
We're getting a bit offtopic here ...

I doubt that 12SS would have been ...

Agreed re the 12th. The advance recon element of the 12th SS arrived and watched the action on Gold Beach unfold. It was always going to secure Caen upon arrival.

I agree re the 21st. Von Luck criticised everyone after the war because he was held back from attacking the paras in the Orne bridgehead, but as events proved, the Commander of the 21st could not afford to commit his men until he knew exactly what was happening. Had he gone all out for the paras, he would never have been able to stop any of the beach landings, and when he decided the beaches were the more pressing target, it took time to concentrate his troops under allied air interdiction. There wasn't an easy or correct option for him in the circumstances.

Regards,
IronDuke

It was my understanding that the decision to go for the beaches was Gen Marcks, not Feuchtinger's.

Does anyone have a web site over the OOB's in Normandie?

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ORIGINAL: mbMike

We forget one thing.

"Haha! Rommel, you son of a bitch!!! .............I read your book!" - Patton