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Kitikami and Oi - 9/22/2004 9:09:35 PM   
Oznoyng

 

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I just noticed last night that these have radar. Did Japan have radar equipped ships on 12/7/41? Is there some coded limit in the game with respect to when Japanese ships get radar?
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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/22/2004 9:59:08 PM   
Oznoyng

 

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Here I go, answering my own questions: http://www.star-games.com/exhibits/japaneseradar/japaneseradar.html

It appears that they did, in fact, have radar. This makes for a nasty problem though, as I now have to decide whether to sacrifice the GTS's for radar early warning for my carrier groups. I think the carrier groups will win out, but it pains me to think of the Great Torpecker Slingers being used for their radar only.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/22/2004 10:59:25 PM   
mogami


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Hi, They were the only ships in the entire IJN with radar on Dec 7 1941. Use them wisely.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 12:20:30 AM   
Oznoyng

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, They were the only ships in the entire IJN with radar on Dec 7 1941. Use them wisely.

I intend to. I did not realize that the IJN had any radar-equipped ships that early, so I never even looked. Last night (while planning some naval deployments in our game ) I decided to see how soon I would get a ship with radar... I was pretty happy about the results of my search. Unfortunately, Oi and Kitakami are out of position in terms of trying to link them up to my carrier forces and it will take me no small amount of effort to link them up now.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 4:06:58 PM   
SpitfireIX


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Exactly how effective is this radar at air search and surface search, in game terms? Also, the link states that this deployment was "experimental"--is it realistic to allow the IJN to use these ships operationally in 1941-42?

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"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 4:36:34 PM   
Feinder


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Taken from the cruiser section of CombinedFleet.Com

Tabular record of movement for Kitakami. She seems pretty operational to me in 1941... :^) Shall I pull the records for Oi...? He's quite thorough!






HIJMS KITAKAMI: Tabular Record of Movement


© 1997-2003 Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 July 1920:
Sasebo Navy Yard. The KITAKAMI is completed and commissioned in the IJN.

1934:
The IJN’s development of long-range oxygen-propelled Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedoes causes a revision of their Night Battle Tactics. The Naval General Staff now plans to commence battle with the presumed enemy - the American fleet - by launching night torpedo attacks followed by a decisive daylight gunnery action by the IJN’s main battle line.

To whittle down the opposing American fleet’s numbers, the NGS plans for a special Night Battle Force to carry out these attacks. This force is to be made up by destroyer squadrons, heavy cruiser squadrons, a torpedo-cruiser squadron, and a battle-cruiser squadron. The Night Battle Force will have the fire power of several hundred Type 93 torpedoes that outrange the American battleships' main guns. The next day, after the previous night's attacks have delivered crippling blows, the IJN’s battleships will attack the remnants of the American fleet.

25 August 1941:
The KITAKAMI is ordered to Sasebo for conversion to a "torpedo cruiser" with eleven Type 92 quadruple 61-cm torpedo tube (TT) mounts, a total of 44 tubes.

1 September 1941:
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Araki Tsutau (former CO of OBORO) assumes command.

30 September 1941:
Sasebo. The modifications are completed, but only ten sets of TT were available for installation, a total of 40 tubes.

20 November 1941:
Assigned to Rear Admiral Kishi Fukuji's (former CO of FUSO) CruDiv 9 attached to the First Fleet.

28 November 1941:
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Norimitsu Saiji (former XO of YAKUMO) assumes command from Captain Araki who is reassigned as the CO of the FURUTAKA.

December 1941:
Western Inland Sea. Guard ship for the battleship force.

8 December 1941: Operation "Z" - The Attack on Pearl Harbor:
The First Fleet's BatDiv 1's NAGATO, MUTSU and the light carrier HOSHO sortie from Hashirajima to the Bonin Islands with BatDiv 2's ISE, FUSO, YAMASHIRO and the HYUGA. They are escorted by CruDiv 9's KITAKAMI and the OI and eight destroyers.

13 December 1941:
Returns to Hashirajima.

16 January 1942:
Departs Kure escorting transports.

22 January 1942:
Arrives at Mako, Pescadores.

1 February 1942:
Departs Mako.

4 February 1942:
Arrives at Hashirajima. Remains in training for the next two months.

22 March 1942:
At Kure. Refit.

27 March 1942:
Refit completed.

14 April 1942:
Departs Hashirajima.

16 April 1942:
Arrives at Sasebo.

20 April 1942:
Drydocked at Sasebo.

3 May 1942:
Undocked.

11 May 1942: Operation "MI":
CruDiv 9 is assigned to the Guard Force of the Main Body.

29 May 1942: Operation "MI" - The Battle of Midway:
CruDiv 9's KITAKAMI and the OI sortie with Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Takasu Shiro's (former CO of ISUZU) Aleutian Screening Force: BatDiv 2's HYUGA, ISE, FUSO and the YAMASHIRO, DesDiv 20's AMAGIRI, ASAGIRI, YUGIRI and the SHIRAKUMO, DesDiv 24's KAWAKAZE, YAMAKAZE, SUZUKAZE and the UMIKAZE, DesDiv 27's ARIAKE, YUGURE, SHIGURE and the SHIRATSUYU and the 2nd Supply Unit's oilers SAN CLEMENTE MARU and the TOA MARU.

17 June 1942:
Arrives at Yokosuka.

22 June 1942:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Yokosuka.

24 June 1942:
Arrives at Hashirajima.

9 July 1942:
At Kure Navy Yard for work.

24 July 1942:
Yard work is completed.

August - September 1942:
Kure and Yokosuka. The KITAKAMI and the OI are converted to fast transports. Their ten quadruple TT are reduced to six, for a total of 24 tubes. They are equipped with two Daihatsu barges and fitted with two triple mount Type 96 25-mm AA guns. Depth charge launching rails are also installed.

5 September 1942:
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Tsuruoka Nobumichi (former CO of ISUZU) assumes command. Captain Norimitsu later becomes CO of the CHIKUMA.

9 September 1942:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Kure.

10 September 1942:
Arrive at Yokosuka. The KITAKAMI and the OI embark the No. 4 Maizuiru Special Naval Landing Force.

12 September 1942:
Depart Yokosuka.

17 September 1942:
Arrive at Truk.

4 October 1942:
The KITAKAMI departs Truk.

6 October 1942:
Arrives at Shortland. Disembarks troops and departs.

9 October 1942:
Arrives at Truk.

21 November 1942:
CruDiv 9 is disbanded. The KITAKAMI and the OI are assigned directly to the Combined Fleet. That day they depart Truk.

26 November 1942:
Arrive at Manila. Embarks troops.

27 November 1942:
Depart Manila.

3 December 1942:
Arrive at Rabaul. Disembarks some of the troops.

4 December 1942:
Depart Rabaul.

6 December 1942:
The KITAKAMI and the OI are sighted enroute to Truk by LtCdr Lucius H. Chappell's USS SCULPIN (SS-191), but Chappell is unable to gain an attack position. The fast moving cruisers arrive safely at Truk.

19 December 1942:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Truk.

24 December 1942:
The KITAKAMI arrives at Sasebo.

28 December 1942:
Drydocked at Sasebo.

2 January 1943:
Undocked.

4 January 1943:
Departs Sasebo. Arrives the same day at Chinkai, China.

5 January 1943:
The OI joins the KITAKAMI at Chinkai.

7 January 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI arrive at Pusan, Korea.

12 January 1943: Operation "C" (HEI-GO) - The Reinforcement of New Guinea:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Pusan on a troop transport mission with the auxiliary cruisers AIKOKU MARU and the GOKOKU MARU, submarine tender YASUKUNI MARU, ex-seaplane tenders SANUKI MARU and the SAGARA MARU, ex-auxiliary HAKOZAKI MARU, ex-gunboats SHINKYO MARU and the JUSAN MARU, transport ARATAMA MARU and the destroyers HATSUYUKI and the SHIKANAMI. The transport group "HEI No. 1" embarks the IJA's 20th Infantry division.

14 January 1943:
Arrives at Palau.

16 January 1943:
Departs Palau.

19 January 1943:
Arrives at Wewak, New Guinea. Disembarks troops.

20 January 1943:
The KITAKAMI, OI and the convoy depart Wewak.

22 January 1943:
Arrives at Palau.

24 January 1943:
Departs Palau.

31 January 1943:
Arrives at Tsingtao, China. Embarks the IJA's 41st Infantry Division.

4 February 1943:
Departs Tsingtao with transport group "HEI No. 3".

10 February 1943:
Arrives at Palau.

17 February 1943:
Departs Palau.

20 February 1943:
Arrives at Wewak. Disembarks troops.

21 February 1943:
Departs Wewak.

24 February 1943:
Arrives at Palau.

28 February 1943:
Departs Palau.

3 March 1943:
Arrives at Truk.

15 March 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI are attached to Admiral Takasu's Southwest Area Fleet.

20 March 1943:
Depart Truk.

29 March 1943:
Arrive at Surabaya.

3 April 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Surabaya on a troop transport run.

7 April 1943:
Arrive at Kaimana, New Guinea. Disembark troops and supplies.

12 April 1943:
Arrive at Surabaya.

19 April 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Surabaya on a second transport run.

20 April 1943:
Arrive at Makassar, Celebes (modern Sulawesi).Refuels.

24 April 1943:
Depart Makassar.

27 April 1943:
Arrive at Kaimana, New Guinea. Disembarks troops and supplies.

2 May 1943:
Arrive at Surabaya.

7 May 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Surabaya on a third transport run.

11 May 1943:
Arrive at Ambon. Disembarks troops and supplies and departs.

12 May 1943:
Arrive at Kaimana, New Guinea. Disembarks troops and supplies.

15 May 1943:
Arrive at Makassar.

16 May 1944:
The KITAKAMI departs Makassar.

17 May 1943:
Arrives at Surabaya. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Nomura Tomekichi (former Communications Div Chief, NGS) assumes command. Captain Tsuruoka is reassigned as CO of the FUSO.

21 May 1943:
The KITAKAMI departs Surabaya.

22 May 1943:
Arrives at Makassar.

23 June 1943:
Makassar. The KITAKAMI, OI, KINU and the KUMA are bombed by Consolidated B-24 "Liberators" of the 5th Air Force's 319th Bomb Squadron. None of the cruisers is hit, but some sustain slight damage from near-misses. The KITAKAMI and the OI depart that day.

30 June 1943:
Arrive at Balikpapan, Borneo.

1 July 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI are assigned to CruDiv 16, Southwest Area Fleet.

4 July 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Balikpapan.

5 July 1943:
Arrive at Surabaya, Java. Remain as guardships.

30 July 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Surabaya.

1 August 1943:
Arrive at Singapore.

10 August 1943:
Refit. Drydocked at the Seletar Naval Base.

24 August 1943:
Undocked.

30 August 1943:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Singapore on a troop transport run.

2 September 1943:
Arrive at the Nicobar Islands. Disembark troops.

3 September 1943:
Depart the Nicobar Islands.

4 September 1943:
Arrive at Penang, Malaya and refuel.

6 September 1943:
Depart Penang.

7 September 1943:
Arrive at Singapore.

11 September 1943:
Depart Singapore. Arrive at Lingga.

10 October 1943:
Depart Singapore.

20 October 1943:
Depart Penang. Embark troops.

22 October 1943:
Indian Ocean. Arrive at Port Blair, Andaman Islands. Disembark troops.

22 October 1943:
Depart Port Blair.

25 October 1943:
Arrive at Singapore.

29 October 1943:
Embarks troops. Depart Singapore.

31 October 1943:
Indian Ocean. Arrive at Port Blair. Disembarks troops.

2 November 1943:
Arrives at Penang. Loads supplies.

3 November 1943:
Depart Penang.

4 November 1943:
Arrive at Singapore. Unload supplies.

7 November 1943:
Departs Singapore. Arrive at Lingga for training.

21 November 1943:
Captain Tanaka Jo (former CO of AF MAMIYA) assumes command. Captain Nomura later becomes CO of the HYUGA. In 1945, as a Rear Admiral, he returns to the NGS.

26 November 1943:
Depart Lingga. Arrive at Singapore.

16 December 1943:
Refit. Drydocked at the Seletar Naval Base.

23 December 1943:
Undocked.

4 January 1944:
Departs Singapore. Arrive at Lingga for training with the OI.

21 January 1944:
The KITAKAMI and the OI depart Lingga. Arrive at Singapore.

23 January 1944:
Embark troops. The KITAKAMI and the OI accompany the AOBA and the light cruiser KINU escorted by the destroyer SHIKANAMI on a troop transport run to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean.

25 January 1944:
Arrive at Port Blair. Disembarks troops.

27 January 1944:
Malacca Strait, SW of Penang, Malaya. The KITAKAMI is hit aft by two torpedoes fired by Royal Navy Lt D. J. B. Beckley's submarine HMS TEMPLAR based at Trincomalee, Ceylon. Captain (later Rear Admiral) Uehara Yoshio's (former CO of AO ERIMO) KINU then takes the KITAKAMI in tow, escorted by the SHIKANAMI.

30 January 1944:
The KITAKAMI puts into Angsa Bay, Malaya for emergency repairs.

31 January 1944:
The destroyer URANAMI arrives from Singapore to to help escorting the KINU that is towing the KITAKAMI.

1 February 1944:
The KITAKAMI is towed into Seletar Naval Base, Singapore. Begins extensive emergency repairs at the No. 101 Repair Facility.

10 June 1944:
Captain Kase Saburo (former XO of KITAKAMI) assumes command. Captain (Rear Admiral, posthumously) Tanaka is reassigned as the CO of the CHOKAI and is KIA aboard her on 25 Oct '44 off Samar.

21 June 1944:
Repairs are completed.

2 July 1944:
Departs Singapore escorting the repaired tanker KYOKUTO MARU. Enroute the KITAKAMI begins to take on water in the area of her repairs.
9 July 1944:
Arrives at Manila.

12 July 1944:
Arrives at Cavite Navy Yard. Drydocked. Begins repairs by the No. 103 Repair Facility.

26 July 1944:
Undocked, but starts to flood again.

30 July 1944:
Drydocked again.

6 August 1944:
Undocked.

8 August 1944:
Departs Manila.

14 August 1944:
Arrives at Sasebo. Begins repairs and modification as a "kaiten" (human-torpedo) carrier with a capacity of eight kaitens. A 30-ton crane, removed from the seaplane tender CHITOSE during her conversion to a carrier, is fitted to handle the kaitens. All of the KITAKAMI's armament is removed and replaced by two Type 89 127-mm AA guns and 67 Type 96 25-mm (12x3 and 31x1) AA barrels. Two Type 13 air-search and a Type 22 surface-search radars are fitted. Two depth charge launching rails are installed at the stern and two depth charge throwers are also installed.

29 August 1944:
Captain Shimizu Masamoto assumes command. Captain (Rear Admiral, posthumously) Kase is reassigned as the CO of the AF MAMIYA and is KIA aboard her on 4 Dec '44.

15 November 1944:
Assigned directly to the Combined Fleet.

1 December 1944:
Captain Kanaoka Kokuzo assumes command.

20 January 1945:
Repairs and modifications are completed. Departs Sasebo.

21 January 1945:
Arrives at Kure. Later, operates in the Western Inland Sea training kaiten units but fuel shortages limit her sorties.

19 March 1945:
Vice Admiral (later Admiral) Marc A. Mitscher's (former CO of HORNET, CV-8) Task Force 58 carriers USS ESSEX (CV-9), INTREPID (CV-11), HORNET (CV-12), WASP (CV-18), HANCOCK (CV-19), BENNINGTON (CV-20) and the BELLEAU WOOD (CVL-24) make the first carrier attack on the Kure Naval Arsenal. More than 240 aircraft (SB2C "Helldivers", F4U "Corsairs" and F6F "Hellcats") attack the battleships HYUGA, ISE, YAMATO, HARUNA, the carriers AMAGI, KATSURAGI, RYUHO, KAIYO and other ships. The KITAKAMI, moored in the Hayase Passage, sustains no damage.

July 1945:
Kurahashi-jima. The KITAKAMI is moored near Kure. Twenty seven additional single mount Type 96 25-mm AA are fitted.

24 July 1945: The Final Destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy:
Kurahashi-jima. From 0915 to 1630, about 200 aircraft of Vice Admiral (later Admiral) John S. McCain's (former CO of RANGER, CV-4) Task Force 38's USS ESSEX (CV-9), TICONDEROGA (CV-14), RANDOLPH (CV-15), HANCOCK (CV-19), MONTEREY (CVL-26) and BATAAN (CVL-29) attack the Kure area. The KITAKAMI is damaged by strafing and near misses. Thirty-two crewmen are killed.

2 September 1945: The Surrender of Japan:
Kagoshima. After the war, the KITAKAMI is assigned to the Repatriation Service. She is used as a repair tender for ships on repatriation duties.

30 November 1945:
Removed from the Navy List.

10 August 1946 - 31 March 1947:
Nanao. Scrapped.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authors' Note:
Special thanks for assistance in researching the IJN officers mentioned in this TROM go to Mr. Jean-François Masson of Canada. Thanks for assistance also goes to Aldert Gritter/"Adm. Gurita" of the Netherlands.

- Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp.

_____________________________

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Post #: 6
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 10:22:58 PM   
ancient doctor

 

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I also think that Japs fitted with radars 2 of their BBs early on.They had them in the Midway operation but instead of sending them with the CV TF they kept them with the rest of BB fleet as a 2nd force behind.Since these 2 BBs were of the same class they put them in the same BB division but i cant remember the names of ships.
In any case radar so early for Japs was rather an experimental stage of naval doctinal development instead of a accepted practise.After all Japs are a very good example of how difficult the changed their prewar doctrines when things didnt go their way.This atherosclerosis costed them a lot.

(in reply to Feinder)
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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 10:55:04 PM   
Oznoyng

 

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Feinder, the term operational here is not referring to the cruisers themselves, but to the radar. No one disputes that those two cruisers were operational. The question is how effective was the radar and how effectively was it used? In game terms, when was the radar training/doctrine/equipment effective enough that we should see the benefits of having the radar in terms of increased CAP over a carrier task force?

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/23/2004 11:58:19 PM   
Twotribes


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Well one response to that question would be, it is my game, if they have the asset and it works, I will decide how to use it, doesnt matter what the Japanese did historicly.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 10:41:38 AM   
V2


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Also, gents, the Natsushio (DD Kagero Class) has radar. I discovered this in Feb 1942 in Scenario 16. Don't know if she began the scenario with it. After an exhaustive search, I found that no other DD's have radar as of Feb '42.

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Post #: 10
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 2:31:52 PM   
tsimmonds


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She starts with radar. That is surely an OOB error.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 3:40:29 PM   
Feinder


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Ozn,

Silly me. Apologies. I was thinking you were wondering if the ship was not operational (in 1941). My thot was, "Of course it was, it was built in the 20s!" But I see what you were talking about the actual radar set itself. Well, from this site:

Japanese Radar in WW2

Kit and Oi both had it in use at the start of the war. But it does ask your question if they were doing much with it. Consider the fact that Kit and Oi were -not- included in the TF that attacked PH. Maybe it's just me, but if you've got most of your CVs in one basket, and you're about to demonstrate the importance of CV based aircraft and how they can utterly destroy naval assets (and you're concerned about the threat of enemy carriers); the prudent thing would have been to put at least one of your only radar equipped vessels in the TF.

So it seems that the fact that they were -not- included in the PH TF, that IJN didn't put much emphasis on radar's importance, considering the task at hand.

But that's just me.
-F-

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Post #: 12
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 4:39:36 PM   
tsimmonds


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The thing is, in IJNs grand vision of decisive battle, the Oi and Kitikami's place was with the battle fleet. Their job was to participate in the massive torpedo attacks that would reduce the USN battle line by 40% prior to the big artillery duel. And according to their thinking at the time, even if KB might find these radar sets useful--and how radars on CLs could be used in a carrier action in 1941-42 is unclear--the battle fleet still had first claim to them.

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Post #: 13
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 4:54:03 PM   
Feinder


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Irrelevant...

Ok, so here's an interesting point of debate...

I understand the IJN naval strategy about using a massive torp attack by cruiser/destroyer forces at night, then following up with BBs/BCs to make the coup-de-gras on the "crippled" US battle fleet.

So here's the question. Why put an air-search radar set, on a platform that was -not- intended to perform any sort of anti-air role? If the plan for Kit and Oi were night surface combatents (which it was, we agree), why bother putting Type 13 on them to begin with? Why not put it on something where it would be more useful (like a CV?).

True, it does give a surface combat TF (with Kit or Oi) the ability to say, "Oh sh1t. Here comes a 150 bombers that are going to kill us." But that's about it. If you were going to use it only as a warning device, you might as well put it on a more valuable asset, say like, a BB.

I'm asking because you spurred the question in my head, why even put it on Kit and Oi in the first place?

-F-

_____________________________

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Post #: 14
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 5:15:54 PM   
tsimmonds


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It was probably a "right place, right time" thing. The ships were in hand, the radar sets were available, voila.

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Post #: 15
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 8:48:31 PM   
Ron Saueracker


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Interesting that the refits gradually reduce the torp battery to zero. Who will allow this refit??? Especially as the second converts it into a kaiten hen. No kaitens in the game.

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RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/24/2004 11:30:22 PM   
anarchyintheuk

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Feinder

Irrelevant...

Ok, so here's an interesting point of debate...

I understand the IJN naval strategy about using a massive torp attack by cruiser/destroyer forces at night, then following up with BBs/BCs to make the coup-de-gras on the "crippled" US battle fleet.

So here's the question. Why put an air-search radar set, on a platform that was -not- intended to perform any sort of anti-air role? If the plan for Kit and Oi were night surface combatents (which it was, we agree), why bother putting Type 13 on them to begin with? Why not put it on something where it would be more useful (like a CV?).

True, it does give a surface combat TF (with Kit or Oi) the ability to say, "Oh sh1t. Here comes a 150 bombers that are going to kill us." But that's about it. If you were going to use it only as a warning device, you might as well put it on a more valuable asset, say like, a BB.

I'm asking because you spurred the question in my head, why even put it on Kit and Oi in the first place?

-F-


Good question. Only thing i can think of is considering the range of IJN carrier aviation it's reasonable to assume that the carriers are behind the bb/ca surface combat tf. If the Oi/Kitakami are with that surface tf they can vector CAP or provide early raid warning. How that would have worked in practice is another matter.

(in reply to Feinder)
Post #: 17
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 1:00:20 AM   
Oznoyng

 

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I had similar questions about Kitikami and Oi since I read that they were with the heavies at Midway. It seemed odd to say the least. Imo, the best place for a radar is on a DD away from your carriers along the threat axis, not on the carriers themselves.

(in reply to anarchyintheuk)
Post #: 18
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 10:45:53 AM   
SpitfireIX


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Oznoyng

Feinder, the term operational here is not referring to the cruisers themselves, but to the radar. No one disputes that those two cruisers were operational. The question is how effective was the radar and how effectively was it used? In game terms, when was the radar training/doctrine/equipment effective enough that we should see the benefits of having the radar in terms of increased CAP over a carrier task force?


Let me clarify what I meant. I asked if it was realistic to allow the IJN to use these ships operationally with radar capability. Was their radar really effective? I seriously doubt it was, at least early on--I'm sure it was down for "tinkering" a lot, plus I imagine that some time was required for the operators to develop techniques for using radar effectively.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Oznoyng)
Post #: 19
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 2:49:40 PM   
String


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What benefits does the radar give ingame anyway?

(in reply to SpitfireIX)
Post #: 20
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 8:52:39 PM   
Feinder


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Radar that detects aircraft, allows you to scramble a higher percentage of fighters that might be at the base, or on the ship. If you CAP is 30%, you'll generally have about 25 - 35% of your fighters up, as ordered. But with radar (and to much less effective extent, sound detection devices) you can "roll" to try and scramble the other 70% of your fighters before the enemy strike gets there. They have to "climb to alititude", so it might not make a lot of difference in your ability to KILL enemy aircraft, but the other positivie is that, at least they're not stuck on the ground (getting bombed).

Surface radar helps you to detect ships. It generally affects who spots who in surface combat, and who is surprised etc. It's no guarentee (evidence historically Savo Island), but it helps.

-F-

_____________________________

"It is obvious that you have greatly over-estimated my regard for your opinion." - Me


(in reply to Oznoyng)
Post #: 21
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 9:12:14 PM   
SpitfireIX


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Well one response to that question would be, it is my game, if they have the asset and it works, I will decide how to use it, doesnt matter what the Japanese did historicly.



Two points--first, we haven't established that the radar did work historically. Second, that atitiude is fine if you are playing Japan against the AI, or a human who agrees to let you use the ships as you will, but if I'm playing the AI or a human as the Allies, I don't want Japan to have an ahistorical capability.

On a related subject, even if the radar sets were operational, it is exceedingly doubtful that the Japanese admirals would have had the foresight to attach these ships to their carrier groups. Neither the US nor Japan fully grasped the possibilities of radar until the middle of the war, and even to the end of the war there were hidebound officers on both sides who didn't trust the new technology.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Twotribes)
Post #: 22
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 9:39:13 PM   
SpitfireIX


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Feinder

Radar that detects aircraft, allows you to scramble a higher percentage of fighters that might be at the base, or on the ship. If you CAP is 30%, you'll generally have about 25 - 35% of your fighters up, as ordered. But with radar (and to much less effective extent, sound detection devices) you can "roll" to try and scramble the other 70% of your fighters before the enemy strike gets there. They have to "climb to alititude", so it might not make a lot of difference in your ability to KILL enemy aircraft, but the other positivie is that, at least they're not stuck on the ground (getting bombed).



The Chinese were able to achieve a similar effect with a primitive yet elaborate network of spotters.

< Message edited by SpitfireIX -- 9/26/2004 11:45:30 AM >


_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Feinder)
Post #: 23
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/25/2004 11:11:24 PM   
pry


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quote:

ORIGINAL: V2

Also, gents, the Natsushio (DD Kagero Class) has radar. I discovered this in Feb 1942 in Scenario 16. Don't know if she began the scenario with it. After an exhaustive search, I found that no other DD's have radar as of Feb '42.



Not anymore as of 1.3

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(in reply to V2)
Post #: 24
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/26/2004 12:25:03 AM   
Twotribes


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So Spitfire.... I assume when you play the Japanese you dont send troops to other bases to invade on the first turn, you dont use the 1st turn "cheat" to land troops in Borneo or else where that historicly didnt and wouldnt have happened.

(in reply to pry)
Post #: 25
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/26/2004 6:12:28 AM   
SpitfireIX


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Oznoyng

I had similar questions about Kitikami and Oi since I read that they were with the heavies at Midway. It seemed odd to say the least. Imo, the best place for a radar is on a DD away from your carriers along the threat axis, not on the carriers themselves.


Possibly you are thinking in modern terms about maintaining EMCON (Emission control, or keeping active sensors turned off). This was not necessary during WWII--detection systems weren't sophisticated enough to provide precise targeting information. That is, there was no advantage to having one ship turn off its radar if there was another ship in the TF with radar on (except in rare cases where one set was known to be harder to detect.

Or perhaps your idea is to have the radar closer to the threat for earlier warning--the problem with that theory is that any advantage of being closer to the enemy will be more than canceled by the DD's shorter radar horizon, unless you form a separate picket task force and put it way out--but the game doesn't model situations like this very well.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Oznoyng)
Post #: 26
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/26/2004 6:26:44 AM   
SpitfireIX


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

So Spitfire.... I assume when you play the Japanese you dont send troops to other bases to invade on the first turn, you dont use the 1st turn "cheat" to land troops in Borneo or else where that historicly didnt and wouldnt have happened.


First of all, I hardly ever play the Japanese (in fact I haven't played them yet in WitP--sadly, I've hardly had time to play at all as I'm so busy with school and work ) Whichever side I'm playing, I try insofar as possible to play "realistically"--not taking advantage of rules loopholes or the computer's ineptitude. The one exception is when I want to try something totally ahistorical simply as a "what if." And when I do do that, it's usually one ahistorical thing at a time that I try, and not a bunch all at once.

As I said, it's fine if you want to play that way--if it floats your boat, next time you play the Japanese, use the editor to add 10 Shokakus to the Japanese OOB. My point was that the database should reflect historical reality as far as reasonably possible--if anyone wants to alter it from there, that's fine, but the "base" database (no pun intended) should be as realistic as possible. And if Kitakami's and Oi's radar sets were hardly operational during the first year of the war, then they should not have radar capability to start with in the official, historical database.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Twotribes)
Post #: 27
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/26/2004 6:37:24 AM   
Twotribes


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Well I strongly advice you not to plat PBEM with most of the people on this board that play Japanese, as they definetely stretch the reality factor,using the excuse, that since they arent playing a historic recreation it is their choice how to use that first turn, most strike at bases deep in allied territory that no sane Japanese commander would have been able to get to on December 7 by using the first turn ( cheat) and justify with the excuse that they arent constrained to historicly movements.

At the same time most of them make restrictive house rules on what the allied player CANT do on the first turn, to more easily get that "suprise" they want.

But back to the point. If the cruisers had operational Radar and it appears they did, just because the Japanese leadership didnt understand its importance, doesnt mean that you as the player cant take advantage of its importance. That is no where near as "gamey" as some peoples first turn moves.

I havent played the Japanese yet either by the way.

(in reply to SpitfireIX)
Post #: 28
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/26/2004 7:51:11 PM   
SpitfireIX


Posts: 264
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From: Fort Wayne IN USA
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Well I strongly advice you not to plat PBEM with most of the people on this board that play Japanese, as they definetely stretch the reality factor,using the excuse, that since they arent playing a historic recreation it is their choice how to use that first turn, most strike at bases deep in allied territory that no sane Japanese commander would have been able to get to on December 7 by using the first turn ( cheat) and justify with the excuse that they arent constrained to historicly movements.


I'll take that under advisement; sadly, I doubt I'll have the time to commit to a PBEM game anytime soon [possibly next summer], so for the time being, when I do have time to play, it will have to be against the computer.
quote:


At the same time most of them make restrictive house rules on what the allied player CANT do on the first turn, to more easily get that "suprise" they want.

Thanks--I'll be sure to discuss that with any potential opponents. BTW, every game I've started so far (two or three, then started over--still learning), I've just used "historical first turn." I take it from your comment that there's no way in a two-player game to constrain the Allies to a "historical" first turn while providing the Japanese with the opportunity to change their orders. I might just offer my opponent a simple choice--either use "historical first turn" or else anything is fair game.

I do have to concede, however, that I'm more inclined to allow semi-historical actions that tend to favor the Japanese, as they are so tremendously disadvantaged in the scenarios that go past 1942. My friends and I used to play VG's Pacific War, and we always used the optional rule that the Japanese receive the Tirpitz as a reinforcement in January 1944 if they hold the strategic initiative. I always explained this to anyone who objected, "No, we don't think it's particularly realistic, but the Japanese need all the help they can get."

quote:


But back to the point. If the cruisers had operational Radar and it appears they did, just because the Japanese leadership didnt understand its importance, doesnt mean that you as the player cant take advantage of its importance. That is no where near as "gamey" as some peoples first turn moves.

First of all, I haven't seen any evidence that the radar was operational any significant portion of the time--as I mentioned, it could have been down for modification or repairs a lot, and operators might have needed a lot of on-the-job training. In fact, the one source we've seen so far states that it was "experimental." But even if it does turn out that the radar was operationally effective by the end of 1941, this still goes to the issue of whether the Japanese high command could realistically have assigned these units to escort the carriers. Surely the battleship faction would have been up in arms over this. But there's no provision for modeling such political cost in the game. As an analogy, as the Allies, I'd love to have a lot of the ships that were historically in the Atlantic during all or part of 1942 available at the start of that year. But there's no provision for making the Allies pay the political and economic cost of this decision. So I'm not going to edit the database to add all the ships I'd like to have.

_____________________________

"I know Japanese. He is very bad. And tricky. But we Americans too smart. We catch him and give him hell."

--Benny Sablan, crewman, USS Enterprise 12/7/41

(in reply to Twotribes)
Post #: 29
RE: Kitikami and Oi - 9/28/2004 3:49:57 AM   
grumbler

 

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From: Falls Church VA USA
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Twotribes

Well I strongly advice you not to plat PBEM with most of the people on this board that play Japanese, as they definetely stretch the reality factor,using the excuse, that since they arent playing a historic recreation it is their choice how to use that first turn, most strike at bases deep in allied territory that no sane Japanese commander would have been able to get to on December 7 by using the first turn ( cheat) and justify with the excuse that they arent constrained to historicly movements.

At the same time most of them make restrictive house rules on what the allied player CANT do on the first turn, to more easily get that "suprise" they want.
Come on, Twotribes, you can do a better rant than this!

quote:

But back to the point. If the cruisers had operational Radar and it appears they did, just because the Japanese leadership didnt understand its importance, doesnt mean that you as the player cant take advantage of its importance. That is no where near as "gamey" as some peoples first turn moves.
that seems to me to be quite reasonable. The US did not use BBs as bombardment ships for quite a while in the real war, but in the game the OBBs are used for nothing but. Starightjacketing players to historical decisions is a non-starter for both sides. Should the Allied player be forced to wait until December 21st to order the retreat to Bataan, because the then-current doctrine was to fight the Japanese on the beaches (much like the Jpananese doctrine to deploy their radars with the Battle Force?)

quote:

I havent played the Japanese yet either by the way.
Then do so, and experience the exquisite pain of knowing that you are gonna lose, and the only question is how badly. The Allied player can afford to be generous - he knows he will win no matter what (auto-victories are only possible for the Japanese against the AI). My view as Allies or Japanese is really pretty simple - I think it is only fair that each player have an equal amount of fun. If the Japanese player insists that the Asiatic Fleet stays around as long as they did historically, then I am okay with that, in spite of losing auxilliaries that historicaly DID stick around.

You have to play both sides to understand either one.

(in reply to Twotribes)
Post #: 30
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