Slitherine

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....and they were still not capable of inflicting defeat on China and people still want to be able to "play" japan 1936-41. Why?

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We will just pretend the US does nothing, when Japan attacks in the Southern Resource Area except issue 'stern' warnings and protests.
I think the Japanese players would find their position even more hopeless when at long last the US does enter the war. Things that might have been possible in 41/42 will be impossible in 43 (the US had moblized in 1940, time was an issue-the more time allowed the more prepared the US Pacific bases will be. How many B-17's will Mac have in 43?)

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
You don't need to run into 1946-48 to get into the jet age. US P80 wings were operationally deployed in Italy in early '45 and UK Gloster Meteors in Britain in 1944. The late 1945 blocks of the P80 were as fast as the ME262 but had more reliable engines, better acceleration and greater range. I think allowing the Japanese to start in 1936 is a fair idea. I also think that if you give the Japanese that kind of flexibility, then the UK should be allowed to upgrade Singapore's landward defenses, and the Allies should be allowed to invoke the oil embargo whenever they want. Of course doing all of that complicates the reseach considerably. The US' F2As and and biplane F3s would be hell on those Japanese CV-based biplanes.

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
Another point. The super experienced IJN aviators of 1941-1942 fought the highly trained USN aviators of 1941 and 1942 to a nearly dead-even draw in turns of combat a/c lost. By 1943, Kido Butai would have had several additional problems: 1. The overwhelming superiority of US a/c technical capability. 2. American aviators that would have both outnumbered them and, quite likely, had more training. 3. American aviators whom, it is a documented fact, had superior tactical training. In particular the use of a 4-plane 2-element section that was closely coordinated by radio, rather than a 3-element section (Japanese) that tended to come apart in combat. So any late start to the war probaly sees the USN being superior in training, tactics, a/c technology, and numbers.

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1. The "disillusionment" of the American public with protracted wars is rather mythical and largely a consequence of the results of Viet Nam. The only salient examples prior to WW2 is the War of the Rebellion. The Federal forces and the northern public endured 1861-mid-1863 a string of rather humiliating and in some cases obviously un-necessary defeats without significant public opposition. Indeed, public sentiment survived pretty much in favor of the war until mid-1864, when the constant-siege and constant-casualty elements of combat began to weight heavily on the northern public's mind in the final Peninsula Campaign. In the South, where things "began well," the serious state of economic deprivation that occurred from early 1863 onward did not have the desired effect of breaking the Confederacy's will to fight. And s string of increasingly frequent battlefied disasters staring in 1863 did not result in the abndonment of the war. Indeed, the Confederate administration fled Richmoind in 1865 with the intention of carrying on the war, even though Lee's army was shattered. It was only the terms of surrender and the agreement among the combatants that led to a decisive and complete end to the war.

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3. In the 1930's, American public sentiment towards the Chinese was highly favorable, and the Panay Incident darned near started the war very early for Japan. Many American newspapers had an editorial policy that looked away from the Germans but pretty much hammered the Japanese. In short, Japan's reputation in the US public eye was pretty brutal by 1939. A move against "white" people in Singapore, Hong Kong, Australie or the Dutch East Indies would probably have been almost as good at unifying the US populace as the Pearl Harbor attack.

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Also, by the mid 1930s there was radio. If Japan is not at war with the US in 1941, radio broadcasts and also newsreels from overrun nations would have provided a more stark picture of Japanese intentions and occupation policies than any newspaper editorial.

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
Another point. The super experienced IJN aviators of 1941-1942 fought the highly trained USN aviators of 1941 and 1942 to a nearly dead-even draw in turns of combat a/c lost. By 1943, Kido Butai would have had several additional problems: 1. The overwhelming superiority of US a/c technical capability. 2. American aviators that would have both outnumbered them and, quite likely, had more training. 3. American aviators whom, it is a documented fact, had superior tactical training. In particular the use of a 4-plane 2-element section that was closely coordinated by radio, rather than a 3-element section (Japanese) that tended to come apart in combat. So any late start to the war probaly sees the USN being superior in training, tactics, a/c technology, and numbers.

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
re: The P80 Two a/c were operational in Italy by April 1945. One fighter group by the end of the year. My bad on the design specs. They were issued in 1943. The other US jet aicraft in development prior to the P80 apparently never made it past the X-craft stage. At 967 k/h, its top speed was 604 mph by mid 1946. Faster than the ME 262. By the Korean war it was already obsolete.

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
TIMJOT Next comes your commenst about public attitude and perception in the US. This stuff is all hard to measure and definitely not my strong suit. But for what its worth: US anti-colonialism (which you mentioned) was strong, and one of the principle reasons why Japan and the US were so irritated with each other to begin with. The issue is not whether or not the US would have helped a European colonial power under attack by Japan. Instead the issue is whether the US would have been unmoved if a rapidly rising brutal colonial power would be allowed to continue its growth unchecked, to the point where it would dominate the markets and strategic facilities of southeast Asia. You underestimate the degree of popular sympathy in the US for China. Beyond that, US public sentiment in favor of Great Britain was extremely strong, and it would not have been in America's strategic interest in any case to let the UK and Commonwealth states be crushed by simultaneous wars with Germany and Japan (who were, as everyone was aware, allies). US public sentiment about the Japanese did not in particular dismiss Japanese abilities. Sure there was quite a bit of racist propaganda about squinting, talentless primates, but virtually everyone recognized that as propaganda. *No one* was chanting "home in 90 days" as they were during the War of the Rebellion. US WPO envisioned a 2 year fight back across the Pacific, and that was *before* Pearl Harbor. Finally, there was racism. The only thing likely to piss of an American anticolonialist more than British colonialism was Japanese colonialism. So the US probably would have, for reasons of simply keeping Japan in check, come to the aid of the UK/Australia or Netherlands East Indies in the event of a Japanese move in those areas.

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As to carrier coordination. There is no basis for your claim. IJN tended to launch large strikes, in the early war. So their offensive punch was very good and well-coordinated. Part of their mystique comes, however, from largely not having any counterstrike to worry about (for example at Pearl, at Darwin, and, so they thought, at Midway). More interesting to me is how quickly Japanese coordination fell apart at Midway when it became apparent that there was a US threat. There was no effective command and control over the Japanese CAP, and the plane handling was magnificently bungled.

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Originally posted by mdiehl:
"Can you name any major wars the US got involved in without being attacked in some way first." The War of the American Revolution. Then there are the manufactured or allegedly manufactured wars, where a rather insignificant pretext in reality or in fact was used to whip up support. The Mexican War (in which a small Mexican incursion in disputed territory along an ill-defined border led to the successful invasion of Mexico). The Spanish American War. The Maine explosion was trumped up by the press to be perceived as an attack. The war was *highly* popular among the public. This is a particularly suitable point of comparison because the vilification of Spain and the fabricated tales of sorded conduct by Spanish soldiers in Cuba, and the perception that the US would free "oppressed" folks from a brutal Colonial tyrant were all used to good effect to whip up public sentiment. Very similar circumstances to WW2 vis a vis Japan. The US could have used or manufactured any pretext to get a hot war with Japan, any time the Roosevelt admin felt inclinded to do so. The Viet Nam war. The "Gulf War." And as to minor wars: The post 1865 US Army Plains Indian campaigns.
The Pershing campaigns in Mexico in 1916.
The US/UK invasion of the USSR in, uh, 1920 IIRC.
The Guatemalan War of 1950.
The Grenada invasion of, uh, 1984 was it not?

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