Slitherine

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not the entire air wing of the Hiryu and not the CAP Zeros of all four IJN CVs.

-Which are less than 50%

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Aircrew skill really didn't count for much in the final result of the battle??? You must be looking at another battle of Midway then the one I know. Aircrew skill determined the outcome of every single carrier battle, ever. even Midway.

-Wrong. Three quarters of IJN torpedo bomber were destroyed before they could have contacted the enemy, as it happened with 3/4 of Vals pilots, so their skills had no influence in the battle. Performance of IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply werenīt where they were needed. The same thing happened with USA escorts, as the dive bombers were unescorted. USA dive bombers did well in very favorable conditions. IJN bomber crews did well in unfavorable conditions, but they were too few to make difference. USA TBDīs crews had such a crappy aircraft (and torpedo) that their skills didnīt make too much difference, they would have been decimated anyway. I cannot talk about A6Mīs role as escorts.

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When the USN Strike groups arrived the Japanese had over 40! Zeros on CAP Japanese lost 11 Zeros in air to air combat in the defense of their fleet. The largest such lost suffered by naval Zeros until then.
The USN lost 1 Wildcat in that action

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-Sources? This of course points to a superiority of USA fighter aircrews if correct. Thatīs a conclusion we can reach. However, what about those data that IJN lost only 14 A6Mīs in A/A combat in CS PLUS MIDWAY? There seems to be a contradiction here.

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I think when you look at the data as an overview you will see that the USN and IJN skill was about equal. Both were the elite airmen of their respective nations, the best of the best.

-Already agreed on this. Iīm simply saying that Midway final results doesnīt reflect this equality. I think youīre misunderstanding me.

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All in all,looks like we all agree,their IS a reason the U.S. carrier pilots have a good rating!!!
Seriously folks,please do at least look at those other threads I gave you,they might shed some light on other grey areas as well,P-40 info,etc.....

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What does 50% have to do with it? It was still more then in any other CV battle in '42. The Attacking USN airstrike was no larger then the attacks in Santa Cruz or Solomons. Sounds like it is valid to me.

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Ok, why do you shrug off the fact that "IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply werenīt where they were needed." couldn't you make the same arguement for the Wildcat's defending the Hornet and Lexington! They weren't were they were needed.. maybe we shouldn't evaulate that data either? It was the Zero pilots themselves that were at fault for not covering the high altitudes over the Japanese Carriers.. Not the strategy of the battle or Nagumo at fault for that.

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Would it make you feel better to just evaulate the Hiryu vs. Yorktown? It was pretty one on one. Or symetrical if you will.

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The Strike that put the Hiryu down wasn't even a single full carriers stike force.

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If we both agree on this then why are we still posting on this topic?

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Again and again, I never said the USN had luck in Midway. Quite the opposite, I put all the blame on bad decisions took by IJN. To say that Midway was not symetric I use the following arguments. 1-USN were fighting under LBA umbrella and IJN was not
2-USN had intelligence information on IJN ships location and IJN didnīt have. 3-USN attacked IJN CVīs before they couldnīt mount an attack by themselves UNLIKE ANY OTHER of the three battles.

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Ok, why do you shrug off the fact that "IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply werenīt where they were needed." couldn't you make the same arguement for the Wildcat's defending the Hornet and Lexington! They weren't were they were needed.. maybe we shouldn't evaulate that data either? It was the Zero pilots themselves that were at fault for not covering the high altitudes over the Japanese Carriers.. Not the strategy of the battle or Nagumo at fault for that.

-I think that the F4Fīs actually fought to defend Hornet and Lexington. Am I wrong? On the lack of adequate aircover at higher attitude, I think this is the result of confusion caused by repetitive attacks, fatigue due to continued combat and lack of coordination. However, I must consider that I donīt know if there was some kind of "land control" over CAP (radio communication between CVīs and figthers, I think the USN had something like that to guide radar oriented interceptors). If the IJN didnīt had something like that, it was poor doctrine and not lack of individual pilot skill. If they had, it would be interesting to know whay they allowed all the pilots to go after the TBDīs.

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Would it make you feel better to just evaulate the Hiryu vs. Yorktown? It was pretty one on one. Or symetrical if you will.

-Yes, and the results were the expected draw, however, it must be noticed that the Hiryu was attacked by planes coming from more than one carrier.

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The Strike that put the Hiryu down wasn't even a single full carriers stike force

Right, but at this time the Hiryu had virtually no CAP left

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3-There are so many factors involved that itīs difficult to calculate whose side had the best aircrews. I actually think WiTP scores are pretty accurate.

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You're being a bit sneaky here you start out claiming that the P40's outclassed the me 109 at low altitudes I point out that RAF operational data suggests that more tomahawks were shot down than otherwise. you retreat to claiming USAF P40N's had a better combat history in early 43 then point out that operational sources ( the basis of your claim) are a bit dodgy.

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I am trying to make the point that the P40 as a fighter was not in the first class of land based fighters. My point about height limits was that Height = Energy = Speed and that the 109's were more than capable of performing slashing attacks then vanishing

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Now if we are trying to create combat models for WITP or its counterpart "WITM" looking at loss rates and saying that one aircraft is better than another is a bit tricky if we dont try to isolate as many elements as possible.

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Dragging ourselves back to the PTO The Hurricanes in Java were had a very high loss rate to japanese attacks, however the the circumstances were, that there was no effective air raid warning apparatus so combats tended to occur in disadvantageous circumstances for the RAF

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Over Rangoon in contrast there was an efficient radar set up which helped the AVG to perform well against opposing Nates & Oscars, and I discount tales of AVG pilots buying kills from the RAF as Sour Grapes ! but do suspect that the AVG's renumeration system may have encouraged inflated claims

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in truth I suspect that there is no way to isolate all the elements so we should go back to absolute performance figures now the only way to represent the P40 as a decent fighter is to use range bands rather than overall maneuver and maximum speed figures which seem to have been chosen to flatter US fighters !

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ZYes but what is the Airspeed velocity of a Laden and unladened European and African Sparrow, and could they concievably carry the Long Lance coconut?

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ORIGINAL: Jon_Hal

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This is from my other message in this same thread (i.e. this is what I meant):

Japanese did well in general because they were able to penetrate defense and execute attack (and sink USN CVs for example).

Japanese strike packages escorted by Zero's were thus successfully and, in that respect, they did what they were supposed to (and in my book that means that they overall "did quite well")...


Leo "Apollo11"

Leo, I assume by you saying that that the Japanese "did quite well" must then mean the USN did even better. :-) Those sucessful strike package suffered worse losses then the USN in every carrier battle and collectively sank less Carriers then their USN counterparts and shot down less opposing fighters then the USN did.
I hope you don't get the impression I'm arguing that the USN pilots were superior in skill. I'm still talking about the basis of this whole thread that I feel the Exp. Ratings for USN and IJN carrier pilots seem correct to me. The USN carriers that fought in '42 faced the IJN air corp at the peak of it's ability and won(at a terrible cost), destroying Japanese naval superiority in the process. The Skill on both sides was exceptional and not to be seen again in World War 2, for by the time the carrier battles of 44 roll around the USN pilots were well trained but not up to the level of the elite pre-war corp. And the Japanese naval pilots were but a shadow of their former selves.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

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I agree but my question to you regarding this is how many of all available USN F4F squadrons used this advanced tactics from the beginning of war?

I'm not willing to call it an "advanced tactic." IMO there was a tendency for USN pilots to not engage in turning fights from the outset. I think the answer has to do with training as I mentioned in my reply to Hipper above.

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Were they all immediately knowledgeable of advanced ways to beat the enemy (IMHO not because I remember reading that the "Thach Weave was introduced to all units only after several months of war)?

The beam defense was first used in combat at Midway. Boom and Zoom used before that. Apparently enough pilots were versed in the basic tactics that in its first use, a rookie pilot who'd lost his section buddy attached himself to Thach's (or was it Flatley's I forget) section and at Thach/Flatley's command was able to immediately and successfully employ it based solely on theories discussed at the table and not practiced in drills. In that instance it was a 3-plane beam defense.

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As for circling dogfight I still firmly believe that old habits die hard and fact is that fast monocock fighters were very very new inventory for all warring sides (very late 1930's). Pilots who learned their ways in old "cloth and wire" biplanes had certain habits that date from WWI...

Not really. That is, tactical fighter pilot theory was not the least bit stagnant in the USN in the interwar years.

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Do you know if all pilots (in all squadron) were trained in deflection hooting or just some?

All USN/USMC pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting get this, according to Lundstrom, as a result of doctrinal changes made around 1925.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I'm not sure what "RAF Operational Data" you are using as source material. I do know that the RAF had harsh words about early lend-lease a/c sent to the UK in 1940.

Since the USAAF seems to have had different results, on the whole US operational studies showing that the P40 was better than the ME109 (which is, to no one's surprise, consistent with the technical merits of the aircraft), the UK studies are either wrong or UK pilots weren't as skilled as USAAF pilots.

Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

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Not engaging on rest of this BUT... yes of course because in late 1940 RAF pilots are deeply inexperienced, lack skill and have no understanding and experience of the relative capabilities of the Me109...... Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

3. If you want ONE single technological event that made deflection shooting skill valuable, look to the synchronized forward firing MGs introduced in 1916. Even in those WW1 biplanes, a good deflectin shooter would, by 1917, have been a real standout, had any of the powers immediately grasped the implications of forward firing guns. What is wierd to me is that *no one* outside of the USN seemed to recognize the value of defelction shooting during the interwar period.

Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

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Again, it is an error to argue that the battles OTHER than Midway make the IJN aircrews look better than USN ones.

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(1) USN CVs were not operating under any air umbrella other than their own CAP.

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(2) The USN did not know the position of the Japanese ships via intel, they knew it as a consequence of tactical scouting on the day of the battle.

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(3) The USN's attack was time to nail the IJN CVs when they weren't ready. Even if you assume that the Japanese suspected that the USN might be in the area, the quandry faced by Nagumo is "Do I really hit Midway or do I lurk around waiting for the enemy CVs?" Either way you lose.

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(4) Coral Sea was every bit as assymetrical although in that battle circumstances were almost wholly reversed. The US CVs were located from IJN seaplane tenders operating in forward positions, IIRC one was stationed in the d'Entrecasteaux chain, and they had Rabaul as a back up for long range recon. Despite all that, and having fortuitous luck with cloud cover, the tactical outcome of the engagement was so close that all you have to do is posit that one guy on Lexington does not throw an electrical switch and Lexington lives. All you have to do is posit that Sho's crew fails to get progressive flooding under control on her journey home and she founders.

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And again - the RAF. What do you think Spitfire pilots were looking through when they engaged Luftwaffe in 1940? A pair of toilet rolls? No it was a deflection sight. Yes RAF still liked to get behind and put bomber in the MG battery cone but they could deflection shoot. And deployed pre-war. eg 1937ish - Galland (or similar) was on a 'courtesy' visit to RAF station. He expressed interest in an unusual fighter sight. The local CO went cagey as it was new and secret, but some WingCo @rse gave Galland the full demo.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

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Not engaging on rest of this BUT... yes of course because in late 1940 RAF pilots are deeply inexperienced, lack skill and have no understanding and experience of the relative capabilities of the Me109...... Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

You are, indeed, silly and also incorrect. RAF pilots knew ALOT about Me109s by late 1940, having shot down droves of them from July 1940-September 1940. RAF pilots were experienced enough to win the BoB. The problem with their early P40 deliveries was that these were unfamiliar a/c, a little undergunned, and all of the parts did not arrive with them (vis oxy systems, microphone systems, fuel tank liners, and so forth).

The USAAF did lots of things right by December 1941 thanks, to a great extent, by paying attention to the lessons taught to the USAAF by the RAF. Your remark has nothing, however, to do with any of the subjects at hand.

Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

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But they knew where to search due to intelligence and they detected the enemy fleet one day before, didnīt them?

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Look to the last of the references I posted. The author argues that actually the enemy fleet was detected at 7:45 and what delayed the launching of IJN attack was the exchange of antiship ordnance ordered by Nagumo, and its further reversion. In that case, you cannot say that the USN attack was deliberately timed to catch IJN planes in the deck, as they had no means to know that Nagumo took this fatal decision.

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It wasnīt as asymetrical as Midway

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I do hope you just missed the mild sarcasm in my original post - cause you just agreed with me??? I'll make point more clearly relevant (and I do generally agree with thrust of posts but..)- what may stack up technically as a 'better' plane is neither here nor there if local pilots feel it is not right for their role in their theatre and vice versa. May I quote P39s in USSR hands as mediocre plane that found its niche somehow? (that's a rhetorical 'may I'). P40s just 'felt not right'* for those RAF types who flew them (and many interchanged between Spits and Hurris so new aircraft aclimitisation not much on issue for decent pilots).

*apologies for lack of data on the level of 'not rightness' but views from couple of pilot autobios I 've read.

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ORIGINAL: m10bob

Hi guys...I love this forum and the fact it does attract a bunch of fine folks and good thinkers..
A couple of you have made me do some "refresher reading" today as I hate imparting *opinions* w/o saying it's opinion,and so far I have not expressed an opinion in this thread yet.I have provided my sources and several websites.
I re-read Matuo Fuchida's book a while ago and both Jon_Hal and mdiehl have been correct on their statements ref Midway,(according to Mr Fuchida..)
The Japanese did not have radar yet but they did have a CIC(combat information center) on the ships and while it is true,early morning attacks from land did bring the CAP down,more than 2 hours passed before Torpedo 8 showed up.The CIC *radioed* the CAP leader and ALL FIFTY of the CAP planes went to the deck for those reported 14 planes skimming in.(The CIC did NOT tell them to do so in reporting the 14 skimmers).
These CAP aircraft had been in the air since approx 0545 and had been rotating at times to refuel and get back to altitude,but they ALL went after those 14 torpedo planes,thousands of feet below their normal CAP height..
Fuchida was sick that day but dragged himself to the deck of the Akagi and watched the entire battle lying on the deckhis book "MIDWAY" is not ghost-written,but is his recollection of the battle taken from the notes he was required to transcribe as soon as he returned to Japan.
IMHO(opinion),the rating of a pilot must somehow be represented not just by how well he flies a plane,but by where he flies it and when(especially in this case).
Historical records show the F4F scored 1.5 to 1 over A6M2's,and a total of 7 to 1 over aircraft of all kinds..(See my prior threads for those websites).
The facts I have seen bear out the Japanese had good pilots,but their best by far were Tainan Daitai,(with Ota,Sakai,Nichazawa,etc).This was a land-based A6M2 unit which had been in China..
Those guys were HOT and as feared as Richtofen's "Circus" of a prior war..
The Thach "weave" was not the first "defense by offense formation.It was somewhat of a variation of the Lufbery Circle,(where all planes go into a circle and everybody who maintains speed has a target).First to approach stall out is forced to leave the circle and becomes a shot down plane..

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Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

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The USN strike was already in the air by the time the IJN located the Yorktown. The decision was made to launch the US aircraft at long range because, based on the (known) timing of the IJN airstrikes on Midway, it was assumed that the IJN TF would be bound up in plane handling operations when the US strike arrived at the target.

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In that event, the US strikes arrive coordinated, in their entirety, over minum CAP, with 4 CVs in the process of landing and refueling planes.

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This assumption would be wrong if Nagumo didnīt order the ordnance exchange. In that case the IJN could have launched an attack before the SBDīs arrived and their decks would be empty.

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Btw, I donīt want to delete the harassing effects of Midway. I think this is one of the variables that made the battle asymetric.

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And in the event of Nagumo didnīt ordered the ordnance exchange, the result would be a mutual destruction battle....

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American pride, however, should also be tempered by the realization that sheer luck had much to do with the outcome.

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Without some incredibly good fortune for the Americans, and some equally bad luck for the Japanese—most notably, the cloud cover that obscured Task Force 17 when Chikuma 5 flew almost right over it at 0630—Nagumo would have gotten his strike force off his carriers.

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The American carrier force most likely would have been destroyed.

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The remarkable decoding work that had uncovered the Midway operation and set the stage for an ambush would have been seen, instead, as having led the American carriers into a trap.

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Had that happened, the course of the war in the Pacific would have been unimaginably different. Such are the fortunes of war.

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ORIGINAL: Bombur

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ORIGINAL: m10bob

Hi guys...I love this forum and the fact it does attract a bunch of fine folks and good thinkers..
A couple of you have made me do some "refresher reading" today as I hate imparting *opinions* w/o saying it's opinion,and so far I have not expressed an opinion in this thread yet.I have provided my sources and several websites.
I re-read Matuo Fuchida's book a while ago and both Jon_Hal and mdiehl have been correct on their statements ref Midway,(according to Mr Fuchida..)
The Japanese did not have radar yet but they did have a CIC(combat information center) on the ships and while it is true,early morning attacks from land did bring the CAP down,more than 2 hours passed before Torpedo 8 showed up.The CIC *radioed* the CAP leader and ALL FIFTY of the CAP planes went to the deck for those reported 14 planes skimming in.(The CIC did NOT tell them to do so in reporting the 14 skimmers).
These CAP aircraft had been in the air since approx 0545 and had been rotating at times to refuel and get back to altitude,but they ALL went after those 14 torpedo planes,thousands of feet below their normal CAP height..
Fuchida was sick that day but dragged himself to the deck of the Akagi and watched the entire battle lying on the deckhis book "MIDWAY" is not ghost-written,but is his recollection of the battle taken from the notes he was required to transcribe as soon as he returned to Japan.
IMHO(opinion),the rating of a pilot must somehow be represented not just by how well he flies a plane,but by where he flies it and when(especially in this case).
Historical records show the F4F scored 1.5 to 1 over A6M2's,and a total of 7 to 1 over aircraft of all kinds..(See my prior threads for those websites).
The facts I have seen bear out the Japanese had good pilots,but their best by far were Tainan Daitai,(with Ota,Sakai,Nichazawa,etc).This was a land-based A6M2 unit which had been in China..
Those guys were HOT and as feared as Richtofen's "Circus" of a prior war..
The Thach "weave" was not the first "defense by offense formation.It was somewhat of a variation of the Lufbery Circle,(where all planes go into a circle and everybody who maintains speed has a target).First to approach stall out is forced to leave the circle and becomes a shot down plane..

-A small question. The IJN had around 80 A6Mīs at Midway. 36 Were used in the Midway attack, and some others were being reserved to escort a naval attack, so I found hard to have the Japanese keeping a 50 A6M2 CAP over their fleet from 7:00 to 10:20. Furthermore, fighters need to land to refuel and rearm, particularly after a battle. A6Mīs started to fight at 8:00 and many of them were damaged (assuming a loss of 6 A6Mīs due to combat before Tatch arrived and shot down another 4). Itīs also necessary to rotate CAP. You cannot land all those planes at the same time because you cannot left you planes withouth CAP. So I find unlikely that the IJN had more than 30 Zeroes in combat at the same time. The article from Dallas Woodbury argues that the A6M2īs that fought VT-8 attacked one hour before the SBDīs arrived and they were short on anmo when the second wave arrived. It was the second wave of TBDīs that lured the A6M2īs to low flight combat, so itīs possible that, when the SBDīs arrived, there were a substantially smaller number of A6Mīs in the air than what would be expected. My question here is not who was better or who commited more mistakes, but how continuous waves of attacks can wear down a CAP by attrition, even more than coordinated attacks.

"Though these planes—like the previous two waves—scored no torpedo hits, the Yorktown torpedo bombers lured down to sea level the high-altitude combat air patrol. The Zeros previously on low-level patrol had run out of cannon ammunition while fending off the prior two waves of torpedo bombers. When Commander Clarence W. McClusky’s two squadrons of dive-bombers from Enterprise, along with Lieutenant Commander Maxwell F. Leslie’s squadron from Yorktown, showed up and began their dives shortly after 1020, there were no Zeros to oppose them. Nagumo had run out of time."