Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Bombur

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The USN strike was already in the air by the time the IJN located the Yorktown. The decision was made to launch the US aircraft at long range because, based on the (known) timing of the IJN airstrikes on Midway, it was assumed that the IJN TF would be bound up in plane handling operations when the US strike arrived at the target.

-This assumption would be wrong if Nagumo didn´t order the ordnance exchange. In that case the IJN could have launched an attack before the SBD´s arrived and their decks would be empty.

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ORIGINAL: strawbuk

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I'm not sure what "RAF Operational Data" you are using as source material. I do know that the RAF had harsh words about early lend-lease a/c sent to the UK in 1940.

Since the USAAF seems to have had different results, on the whole US operational studies showing that the P40 was better than the ME109 (which is, to no one's surprise, consistent with the technical merits of the aircraft), the UK studies are either wrong or UK pilots weren't as skilled as USAAF pilots.

Not engaging on rest of this BUT... yes of course because in late 1940 RAF pilots are deeply inexperienced, lack skill and have no understanding and experience of the relative capabilities of the Me109...... Only the USAAF ever get it right, silly me.

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Great efforts were made to reduce weight and improve performance, because the whole family was fundamentally outclassed by the other front-line fighters on both sides; but, predictably, weight kept rising.

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And his assumption was based on an incorrect position report for the U.S. Fleet. Based on the spot report Nagumo believed the U.S. could not launch until about an hour after they did, which led Nagumo to believe he had time to re-arm.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, 50xA6M2 on CAP is much too high. (There were only 90 total. 1/3 were in reserve to escort strike if carriers found. And each CV sent 9 with the Midway strike. (30 as escort and 36 to Midway=66 90-66=24 max for CAP and my sources (Prange state 18 A6M2 were launched as CAP. ) (most likely each CV sent 9 to Midway and held 9 in reserve.
Kaga 6 left Agaki 6 left Hiryu 3 left Soryu 3 left = 18 total A6M2 for CAp and of this 18 they would need to be landing and refueling a few at a time during the day.
When the USN F4F show up the Japanese CAP is out of ammo and low on fuel and sitting ducks.

The Midway strike was composed of the newer pilots with the old veterans held in reserve for the counter CV strike. The best IJN pilots saw no action at battle of Midway . Of course Hiryu had all her reserve (good) pilots for her strike and they scored hits

What ever the number assigned to CAP it has to be a multiple of 3 because Japanese fighters flew in 3 man formations. (I think their bomb/torpedo attacks should be in groups of 3 not 4. The USN flew in 4 plane groups)

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I have said in many instances that the chief failure of the Japanese was to have a complex plan that depended on Kido Butai to simultask too many jobs at the same time (although I've not said that in this thread). That is a major reason why I think any Midway engagement comes out usually with a US win. It's a consequence of underlying factors that don't change no matter how much you cherry pick everything else. It's like the patient that complains: "Dr. Every time I hit myself in the skull with this hammer, my head hurts."

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I don't agree.

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American pride does not enter into the logic. Nor does luck. Stuff happens in combat. Any good military planner has to account for the fact that plans will almost never be implemented with perfection. The US plan was solid, simple, and well within the capability of the forces deployed against the Japanese. The IJN plan was complex, depended on perfect implementation of the attacks, perfect scouting and perfect timing, and attempted with insufficient assets for the job. The Japanese knew this even before the battle began, as was indicated by their own pre-operation games. The Japanese did not assume "mutual destruction" in their simulation. They assumed that ONE US CV could ruin their day. Then they ignored their findings.

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The war would not have been terribly different. There is a good analysis of the "What if Japan had won at Midway" scenario available at www.combinedfleet.com.

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Considering the early intell and knowledge of where the IJN CV would be and when The USN CV should have been able to launch a single 200 plane strike and catch the IJN in the process of landing the Midway strike force. The USN should have wiped out the IJN in a first strike with no response and with much less loss to USN aircrew.
The battle was badly handled and almost allowed certain victory to slip away. It was by the narrowest margin that the USN pilots saved the day. I would never have used Fletcher to command a CV TF after Midway had I been Nimitz.
I think had Fletcher been in sole command of all 3 USN CV the USN would have lost the battle.
Fletcher today would be remembered as the US Navy's McClellan (failing to destroy an enemy force even though he had the enemy plan well in advance)

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ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, 50xA6M2 on CAP is much too high. (There were only 90 total. 1/3 were in reserve to escort strike if carriers found. And each CV sent 9 with the Midway strike. (30 as escort and 36 to Midway=66 90-66=24 max for CAP and my sources (Prange state 18 A6M2 were launched as CAP. ) (most likely each CV sent 9 to Midway and held 9 in reserve.
Kaga 6 left Agaki 6 left Hiryu 3 left Soryu 3 left = 18 total A6M2 for CAp and of this 18 they would need to be landing and refueling a few at a time during the day.

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When the USN F4F show up the Japanese CAP is out of ammo and low on fuel and sitting ducks.

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IMO the Kate was a better plane. Both the TBF and Kate were extremely vulnerable to CAP, but the Kate was a good deal faster. The TBF flew like it was towing the carrier behind it on a cable.

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I would never have used Fletcher to command a CV TF after Midway had I been Nimitz.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl
About 50 mph in comparing year-contemporary models between the P40 below 17K and the ME109 at the same altitude.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I had a thoughtful post worked out and the frakin page logged me out for reasons that I do not understand.

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Leo -

Beam defense:
1. Developed in 1941 by Thach and Flatley in response to strategic assessments that asserted that the IJN had an aircraft faster and more maneuverable than the USN types.
2. Tested in aerial games in 1941 and demonstrated to be effective.
3. By implication known to anyone assigned at least to Thach or Flatley's squadrons (although not necessarily flown) because pilots do not hesitate to talk about theory and tactics.
4. Possibly spread to other units not in direct contact with Thach or Flatley owing to personnel transfers to and from their units.
5. First employed at Midway in a 3-plane formation. One of the pilots had never flown it even as a training maneuver, and yet successfully implemented it.

Conclusion:

1. It was known by some to be useful prior to WW2.
2. It was heavily discussed in units assigned to Thach & Flatley.
3. It was easy to learn, solely on the basis of round table talk.
4. It was easy to implement in combat, even by people who'd not even tried to fly it in training.
5. Because of 1-4, its use would have spread in ways more or less similar to a virus. If you can imagine how quickly, for example, influenza would spread throughout, for example, the National Football League, that'd be a reasonable model for simulating the transmission of knowledge (and implementation because it was so easy to learn) of the beam defense.

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OK, now, as to a/c technology.

1. USN first deployed 1-wing aircraft to CVs in late 1939 (Brewster F2). The F4F immediately identified as the successor (pending revisions) because it was a better plane and because Brewster was a real fubar company.

2. The number of wings has little to do with it, especially since the USN doctrinal emphasis on deflection shooting, beginning in the early 1920s, meant that in every instance of adding a new plane the only "barrier" was basic familiarization with the a/c. This sort of barrier would exist with any pilot of any nation transitioning to any plane.

3. If you want ONE single technological event that made deflection shooting skill valuable, look to the synchronized forward firing MGs introduced in 1916. Even in those WW1 biplanes, a good deflectin shooter would, by 1917, have been a real standout, had any of the powers immediately grasped the implications of forward firing guns. What is wierd to me is that *no one* outside of the USN seemed to recognize the value of defelction shooting during the interwar period.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE

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ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

Here are links for two _EXTREMELY_ interesting articles from Naval War College Review about Midway:


#1
The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost
By Dallas Woodbury Isom

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/summer/art3-Su0.htm


#1
Doctrine Matters: Why The Japanese Lost At Midway
By Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, and Anthony P. Tully

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Summer/sd1-su1.htm



They should be read and discussed (IMHO they both gave unique insight into what might have happened at Midway - because even now we don't know for sure what exactly did happen on Japanese side)...


Leo "Apollo11"

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I think you´re mentioning the TBD,

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Er... No The P40n had a slight speed advantage over the 109f at @ 10000 ft about 10 mph at best, but no other P40 had any other speed advantage over contempary 109's.

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OK... so basically only Thach's and Flatley's squadrons effectively used it though others might have know it.

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I understand what you saying but my point of view in this is that, although things could have been trained in old biplanes, the sheer speed advantage of new monocock full metal fighters with single wing (compared to old biplanes) brought so many new factors in equation that training had to be done all over because closure speeds and feel would be 100% different...

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl
P40D/E/F/L Max speed 360-362 mph. vs the E model she's got 17 mph.

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At 15000 feet. Below 10K the ME109E model's airspeed degrades to < 300 but the P40E sticks to 335.

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The F variant retained top performance up to 20K feet. This a/c used through 1942.

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Vs the Me109F the P40E/F was a couple mph faster at statrt, faster up to about 15K feet, slower above that altitude.

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mdiehl you need ta read more about the ME109 from the german{ info} side not US if you can hold back your BIAS for wile.

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So if you base it on data from Green's book, it appears there is no speed advantage (in fact, often the opposite) for the P-40D/E/F/L below 15,000 ft vs the comparable 109 models of '41 to '42. Only the earlier 109E-4 is inferior in speed.

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ORIGINAL: mdiehl

It is not as though pilots trained in 1939+ in the USN trained in biplanes beyond elementary flight. Advanced training featured the At6, which was fast enough to put a premium on pilots who were good at deflection shooting. And also, the last sentence is really not very germane because by definition deflection shooting rarely occurs with aircraft head to head or making a stern approach. These are low deflection shots. Many of the high deflection shots occurred when the Japanese pilots would use their old favorite tactic from China. A section leader and his wingmates would attempt to make a passing run, low delfection, on an enemy (front or stern approach), dive under, zoom up, and turn round for another run. Unfortunately for many veteran Japanese pilots, zooming up in front of an F4F gave the Wildcat driver an excellent deflection shot.

Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!

A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE