Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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Original: KG Erwin

To Iron Duke: A further part of my argument is based on the Marines' opponents, arguably the toughest we faced during WWII. The casualty ratio alone doesn't tell the story, because in many of the island assaults, the Japanese fought literally to the last man. Every amphib invasion was another D-Day, and we were never defeated. While technologically, the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, they never surrendered en mass, and in contrast to our German opponents, only defended more fanatically and constructed even more formidable defenses as the war went on.

KG,

I think none of the Amphib operations the Marines ever launched were tougher than what the Allies faced on D-Day, I really don't. You can argue the one that was tough - Tarawa - nearly ended in disaster. If memory serves, at Iwo and Okinawa, the Marines got ashore without a shot being fired. The week long bombardments meant beach defences weren't the issue, it was what you did when you got ashore that mattered.

At that point, firepower meant the Japs were finished, it was just a question of time and attrition. I'd argue that after months or years of fighting in the atolls, your average Marine would have suffered badly at the hands of the Wehrmacht because they would never have fought an enemy so tactically adept, or well equipped. They simply weren't trained for it.
I've no doubt they would have adapted eventually, but only for the same cost in casualties most other american units did.

As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear.

Regards,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

I'm here for you buddy, only if you're lookin' for a corpsman!

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ORIGINAL: SemperAugustus

What about the Soviet forces from 1943 and onwards? Once they got rolling they did quite well against the German forces, not to mention the Japanese in Manchuria.

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ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II. Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces. At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes. You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations.

2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong.

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke


As for toughness, you could argue the Japs were tougher because of what they suffered, and their willingness to fight to the very last man, but in no way did their tactical skills match those of the Wehrmacht. They were poorly equipped, often starving, and their method of counterattack was simply fixing bayonets and charging. Their toughness didn't prevent them dying in droves, because they could not withstand the firepower being brought to bear.

Are you generalising here or refering specifically to the battles that took place in the Pacific?

In your opinion did the japanese conduct their offensive operations in south east asia, particularly burma in a tactically inept fashion? Do you consider it to be the case that the Japanese army only managed to advance against the British as a direct result of having caught the British off balance and constantly on the back foot, but as soon as the British managed to secure an entrenched position closer to their lines of supply they did not have the skill to break through? I have read very little on the subject but that is the overall impression that i get.

(in reply to IronDuke_slith)

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ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II.
Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces..

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At the operational level, they may have been on top early in the war, but the US Army's division & corps commanders & their staffs were doing outstanding work by 44-45. No other army could've sustained the deep armored thrusts across France, or pulled off victory in the Ardennes.

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You can't chalk that up to our supposed "material superiority." There's no doubt the German emphasis on mission focused tactics was effective, but they NEVER had a logistical tail that would sustain their operations.

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2. The American fighting man beat the enemy in the man to man battle. When the chips were down at Omaha, in the Gothic Line & the Bulge, our Soldiers beat the Germans man to man. Anybody who thinks our soldiers hunkered down in their holes waiting for the supporting arms & tanks just hasn't studied the tactical employment of our forces. This line of thinking is absolutely wrong.

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THE MARINE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC

1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing. No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause. Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II.

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1. There was a learning curve in the initial employment of our amphibious forces in the Pacific. Well, yeah, when is there not in combat? That doesn't mean our Marines didn't know what they were doing.

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No Marine unit in World War II was ever defeated by the Japanese, except when the American forces surrendered in the Phillipines, & at Wake Island, which was a hopeless cause.

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Before the Marine Corps developed the concept of modern amphibious assualt, this form of warfare was dismissed as undoable. (i. e., Gallipoli) The officers who wrote the Tenative Manual for Landing Operations in '34 at MCB, Quantico were the very same men who went on to lead our amphibious forces into combat in World War II.

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2. Marine units in combat during World War II absorbed casualty levels that, by the book, should have made them combat ineffective. You don't have to take my word, find the casualty statistics for yourself. On Iwo Jima, there were approx. 48,000 casualties on 8 square miles of ground during the 30-some days of combat. No other battlefield anywhere in World War II reached that level of concentrated violence, not even on the eastern front.

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3. The Vth Amphibious Corps had a ONE HOUR respite before the Japanese opened up on the from Suribachi, from the defensive forts on the left flank and from the prepared defenses on Motoyama #1. I wouldn't call that an 'easy landing', but maybe you were there? The first platoon to make it across the narrow strip to the west coast of the island had 5 men left in it. 13 battalion commanders were killed or wounded on Iwo.

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4. There were no great sweeping drives in the Pacific campaigns the Marine Corps fought in. The Japanese did not surrender, so the Marines had to destroy every shread of resistance before an island was secured. And in many campaigns, they fought shoulder to shoulder with Soldiers. The only time the Japanese surrendered in significant numbers was on Okinawa, and that didn't occur until after our forces broke through the Shuri Line. Okinawa was a blood bath. No campaign in World War Ii even came close, except on the eastern front.

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5. No other military force in the 20th century was able to maintain a uniformly high standard during expansion as the US Marine Corps. The German army defeated itseef through its haphazard growth. The Waffen SS ceased to be a elite organization because it grew too large, too fast with no sustainment base. The Germans did not grasp the logisitical realities of fighting a mechanized army. They never had one anyway, only armored and mechanized units embedded in an essentially 19th Century army.

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The Marine Corps's expansion (and for that matter, the US Army's) was controlled, logical, and most importantly SUSTAINABLE. The American armed forces did not expand beyond our industrial capacity due to centralized planning. The most damning evidence against supposed German military superiority was their drive to have as many little armies as possible, instead of one powerful & combined military force.

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Original: Dragoon 45

Iron Duke.

You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings.

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Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific.

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What advantages and disadvantages did the German Infantry Squad have over the Allied Infantry Squad? We have all danced around the subject but have not actually stated them.

1. The most important advantage the German Infantry Squad had was the deployment at squad level of the MG-34/42. The firepower represented by the use of a squad MG was not matched by Allied formations.

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2. The K-98 was a bolt-action rifle which did not have the firepower of the M-1.

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3. By June 1944, most German Squad Leaders were veteran combat experienced leaders. The German practice was to take combat experienced troops and send them to either NCO or Officer schools for promotion.

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4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units.

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5. The Germans probably had more realistic training. Although Live Fire Training in and of itself is not the end all and do all of training. Much was made about the extensive use of Live Fire Training by the Soviets prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They suffered losses through training accidents that would be unacceptable to Western Armies. But I think we can safely say the Soviets never equalled the Western Armies in the level of training. The type of training is not near as important as how the training is conducted.

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6. The German Infantry never enjoyed the logistical support that the Allies had.

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7. Also German doctrine for small units has not been addressed. It was SOP for the Germans to immediately conduct a counterattack anytime they were forced out of a position. Yes it was also the doctrine of the other armies, but was never adhered to like the Germans.

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8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were.

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Yes I have read Mosier and I do agree with some of his points. I do not believe the British performance was better in the later stages of the War than the Americans.

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The British to the best of my knowledge never used infiltration tactics in conducting large scale attacks in World War I. If the British and French troops had so much better experience than the Americans had at this stage in the War how do you explain casaulity rates. The American casaulities generally matched the Germans when committed to action.

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In every case except Cambrai British and French Forces suffered much more casualities than the Germans did. Also Pershing would not let the French or British control the AEF for one important reason: He didn't trust them. The British wanted to break down the Americans and use them for replacements for their units and the French wanted them to use to reinforce their units. Nether case was politically reasonable.

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Prior to the commitment of the Americans there was a very grave danger of the Allies losing the War. Imperial Russia, Italy, Romania, and Serbia were all defeated by the Central Powers. By late 1917 the Germans were only fighting a one front war. And no I am not maintaining that the Americans were super soldiers either. You cite one instance of a German After Action Report about American performance, I can cite others were the Germans could not explain why they lost a position to them, with many references to the excellent troops used. Also please remember the French had a large hand in training the AEF prior to its commitment to battle.

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ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames


Re. 1) Well the deep armoured thrusts into France weren't sustained and we could debate the Ardennes into eternity - I disagree fundamentally on whether only the American army could have won there. However, I don't want to hijack this excellent thread so maybe another time. (-;

Re. 2) I think if we look at Hurtgen Forest, Salerno, Kasserine Pass it is easily possible to make a case for the superiority of the German soldier, 'man to man'. The 'Bulge is a strange case since it would depend on which sector of the front and what period of the battle you wish to cite. The panic that went through the American army in the first few days of the German offensive somewhat colours the view of the individual soldier. Certainly no-one in the higher command echelons emerges with much credit, Hodges 'bugged out' and Bradley came close to a nervous breakdown!

Please don't misunderstand me here, I'm not trying to say that the average GI was a poor soldier, I'm attempting to backup my point about the difficulty of proving he was the best.

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ORIGINAL: KGV

Are you generalising here or refering specifically to the battles that took place in the Pacific?

In your opinion did the japanese conduct their offensive operations in south east asia, particularly burma in a tactically inept fashion? Do you consider it to be the case that the Japanese army only managed to advance against the British as a direct result of having caught the British off balance and constantly on the back foot, but as soon as the British managed to secure an entrenched position closer to their lines of supply they did not have the skill to break through? I have read very little on the subject but that is the overall impression that i get.

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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Original: Dragoon 45

Iron Duke.

You raise some points here I would like to address. You disregard the Japanese tactical skill in some very important areas. The Japanese were past masters at camoflauge and very adept at setting up a defense in depth. Yes they did commit some serious mistakes in their counterattacks against U.S. Forces. The Japanese just like every other army had their strong points and their weak points. Omaha Beach is mentioned as a case for the Germans being superior in defense of a beach area. I would first say that the Germans never achieved the concentration of firepower in a small area that the Japanese did. And I would also counter that Omaha Beach was an example of very poor planning and execution. None of the bombs dropped by allied bombers hit their targets on Omaha, the Naval Gunfire Barrage lasted less than three hours. The German defenses were essentially untouched when the Americans hit the beach. What is to me more important about Omaha is how the troops overcame all these problems and still succeeded. There is a book out (Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory) that should be required reading for any serious student of the D-Day landings. SHAEF decided to forego a long bombardment of the beaches in the hope of achieving tactical surprise. This action by SHAEF almost cost the Allies the D-Day landings.

(quote) Is it Lewis's book? It's a good study. Ultimately, though, many of the problems the Americans faed were of their own making. They re-organised the assault divisions in the days leading up to the assault creating assault teams which lost the attacking units all sense of cohesion. Each Man was no longer fighting next to the man he trained with or was buddies with. This mulitplied the confusion as man after man went down, and people got lost. In addition, One of the DUKW battalions was sunk en route, although this was not due to any major error on their part. For an hour, there was some inertia on the beach, even in relatively quiet areas (Omaha was by no means uniformly nasty). There seemed to be some genuine shock amongst the green 29th as it hit them.

Yes it is the Lewis book I refer to. He makes great pains about the lack of coordinated Naval Bambardment prior to the invasion. He maintains that the Americans had a much superior doctrine for amphibious operations in the Pacific than in Europe.

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Comparing the Japanese vs the Germans to me is like comparing apples to oranges. How do you compare two armies that never fought against each other? The Germans would never have taken the kind of losses that the Japanese did in the Pacific. On Tarawa there was only three Japanese POW's out of a force of over 5,000 defenders in an action that lasted a little less than three days. The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific.

(quote) This isn't correct. The problem with basic statistics is that they are meaningless without context. Something you seem to allude to yourself when (correctly IMHO) suggesting it is difficult to compare the Germans and Japanese. The thing about defences packed into three acres, is that they are an easy target. The one advantage the Marines had was that whenever they went into battle in the Pacific the battle area had been sealed off and defined. The Japs never received reinforcements, there was never any chance of unexpected units taking Marine units in flank, counter attacks were clumsy and usually good news, because it brought the Japs out of their holes and into the open to be killed. Only at Okinawa (if memory serves, but take with a grain of salt) were relatively serious concentrations of artillery used by the Japanese. The Japs rarely had tanks, and when they did, they were tin cans. The Americans sealed off the battlefield, then applied overwhelming firepower, then overwhelming force.

Yes the Japanese defenses were packed into a smaller area. Yes they were easier targets to hit. But they were not easy target to destroy. By the later stages of the war in the Pacific standard Naval Gunfire doctrine was for at least three days of bombardment; the first day to strip the camo from the positions so they could be accurately targeted, then days two and three the bombardardment would be fired to try to destroy these positions. All throughout this process breaks in the gunfire would occur to allow airstrikes to occur and also to allow the smoke and dust to settle to assess the effects of the fire. The Japanese dug in deep and there are many verified instances of Japanese positions surviving direct hits from 14-16" shells with no damage. The one major advantage naval gunfire provided to the attacker was the disruption of communications of the Japanese. Also the craters from the shellfire provided some shelter for the assault troops.

(Quote) What made amphibious landings in North West Europe and Italy so much more difficult was that you couldn't guarantee to achieve this overwhelming force, and couldn't cut off the battlefield, because behind the beach lay not a few miles of atoll, but a thousand miles of Europe, rail lines and roads etc. Some attempt was made in Normandy to temporarily isolate the battlefield by dropping Airborne units into the Cotentin peninsula, but that proved costly as well. At Salerno and Anzio, things were very hairy more than once. The success of landings were usually in doubt.

(Quote) As for defences, the defences on the Cassino line were nightmarish. Mountaeous terrain, with pill boxes, dug in tanks, reverse slope mortars etc. What about Normandy? Collins lost a man per yard driving on St Lo, as he pushed through the Bocage. The bocage was a defender's dream, and as hard to fight through as anything the Japs produced. Remember, when the Japs opened fire, they were fixed, and could be destroyed with firepower, either tanks, artillery or aircraft. You would usually have 14 inch guns on hand as well, as effective and terrifying an infantry support weapon as was ever invented. It is simply not true that German defences were easier than Japanese. They were simply different, and usually defended by a better equipped, tactically adept opponent, who would have artillery support and occasionally superior armour in support.


Regards,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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Original: Dragoon 45

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4. German Infantry Units were normally formed from the same small geographical area, Berlin, Saxony, Baden, etc.. So unit coehesion was probably a little bit better in most cases with the exception of the British county regiments and most National Guard units.

Agreed, although this was less the case in 1944, and even less the case (ironically enough) in those formations that performed esxceptionally well (Liebstandarte, Hitlerjugend, Panzer Lehr).

Its interesting to note that towards the very end Upper Echelon paranoia had become so extreme that soldiers from the same regions in the same companies were split up because it was believed that men from the same area were less likely to stop a camarade deserting.

Also one of the most determined defenders was SS Nordland, due in the main to the fact that their countries were lost to them and now their ideological structure was about to collapse. Factor in their hatred for the Bolsheviks and you get some extremely stubbord defenders.

In fact the units which coped best against the soviet onslaught across the Oder were the SS units attached to the 9th Army (XI SS Pz and V SS Mountain if memory serves)

I'll work out how to use this quote system if it drives me insane!

< Message edited by KGV -- 1/29/2005 11:34:00 AM >

(in reply to IronDuke_slith)

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ORIGINAL: KGV

I don't think you can call the M4 an excelllent tank. it was by all means a reliable gun platform that proved to be efficient in design whilst more easily upgraded than most other conteprary armoured units. I believe I am right in stating that more Tigers were lost to mechanical failure, predominantly of the gearbox, than to enemy action.

IMHO the early M4 designs head to head with the Panther or late mark 4's bear direct comparison in terms of armour and armament to the mark 2 and 3 head to head against the tanks of the French armies in 1940. It was the tactical use of the weapon which made the difference. Operation Goodwood being a demonstration of the inferiority of the tank and the manner of its use.

I agree, however, that the firefly and easy 8 were far more robust and effective designs.

Does anybody have any idea how successfull the US tank killers were? I thought the German experience of the concept had proved that the best tank killer is another tank.

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II.
Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces..

The Germans performed very poorly with regards to logistics. It was a significant contributory factor to defeat in the east and in the mediterranean. However, they lacked the resources to have a good "tail". Particularly since operational doctrine called for fast mobile forces, who inevitably sucked up a large percentage of the available vehicles. I don't dispute this. My concern is with relative combat efficiency. Who were the more effective killers? (to be rather unpleasantly blunt about it).


Regards,
IronDuke

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Original: Dragoon 45

If the allies had been willing to wait overwhelming combat power would have been possible at any point of the French coast. The bottleneck was not in assault troops but in landing craft. Anzio is not a good example of an amphibious operation in that the landings were unopposed but the timidity of the Commander ruined the gains from the unopposed landing. The Allies could have captured Rome in Jan 1944 had a more aggressive commander been in command at Anzio. Salerno was the third amphibious landing made in the ETO, i.e. NA, Sicily then Salerno. The North Africa landings were a farce, literally anything that could go wrong did. Sicily was better but still there were problems, i.e. cargo ships not combat loaded, trigger happy gunners on the Allied shipping etc. Salerno had again its unique problems, heavy losses of the 82d ABN due to Allied AA gunners, etc. In the Normandy landings I would argue that the Allies were very successful in isolating the area to German reinforcements. The 1st SS Pzr Div took almost two months to get all its equipment and men to the combat zone due to the very effective interdiction of the rail and road net by allied air power. There are other examples of this as well. Naval Gunfire provided invaluable support for at least a month after the initial landings. Both 14" and 15" guns were available.

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You mention the defenses set up at Cassino and in the bocage country as an examples of the conditions that the Allied Infantry faced. Let's look at the Cassino defenses first. Combat in mountainous areas present unique challenges to both the attacker and defender. The attacker is almost always attacking uphill under continous observation. Due to the severity of the grades involved armor support is limited. The Armor cannot accompany the infantry in the assault. Smoke screens are rarely effective due to the generally very windy conditions in the mountains. Resupply and evacuation of wounded are major operations due to the nature of the terrain also. The presence of caves and over rock formations provide the defender with hardened positions for little or no effort. Clearly almost all the advantages lie with the defender in a campaign in mountainous terrain. Only in a couple of instances were forces in the Pacific to run into conditions that approximated those the allies faced in Italy, i.e. Okinawa and Peilielu.

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Original: Dragoon 45
The Germans never set up the kind of defenses that the Japanese did. How do you compare the defenses manned by 5000 men on a three acre piece of ground, a small Pacific Atoll, to the type of defenses set up in Europe. I know of no area in the European Theater that compared to the types of defenses set up by the Japanese. No defensive area ever set up by the Germans ever achieved the concentration of firepower that the Marines faced in the Pacific.

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The Bocage country is probably the closest that Europe could come to with terrain similiar to what the forces in the Pacific faced. Limited observation, limited fields of fire, the hedgerows themselves provided obstacles to both movement and observation, indirect fires were not as effective as in open country, and most importantly armor could not operate effectively at first in this terrain. Once again the attacker is confronted with terrain which provides the defenders with almost all the advantages. But what kind of defenses did the Germans set up vs what type of defenses did the japanese use. The Germans would generally dig fighting positions in the hedgerows with interlocking fields of fire. Anti-armor assets would be deployed to cover armor avenues of approach. limited fire support available would be given preplanned targets on likely avenues of approach also. The Japanese on the other hand would did in deeply. MG positions would have overhead cover made up of alternating layers of logs, coral, and sand. These positions could and did on a number of occasions survive direct hits from heavy caliber shell fire. The Japanese set up interlocking fields of fire in all directions due partly to the problem of not knowing exactly which direction the assault would come from. This had the effect of having some positions that could only engage the attacker after he had advanced past it.

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Although I was unable to find Dupuys original tables, I found an example in a book by Martin Van Crevald, "Fighting Power". In the Table that Crevald attributes to Dupuy in the book only five of the engagements involve normal German Infantry Divisions. To me the work is very suspect due to the prevelance of PzGdr and Pzr Divisions in the engagements cited. I notice also that no engagement are used where Volksgrenadier Divisions are involved.

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BTW, this has been quite enjoyable!

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ORIGINAL: KGV

Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles.

I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

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ORIGINAL: KGV

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: Devil Doc

GENERAL THOUGHTS

I. In terms of a rational approach to the conduct of warfighting, the US armed forces did the best job in World War II.
Yes, the Germans did some good staff work, but they were all over the place on their approach to sustaining their forces..

The Germans performed very poorly with regards to logistics. It was a significant contributory factor to defeat in the east and in the mediterranean. However, they lacked the resources to have a good "tail". Particularly since operational doctrine called for fast mobile forces, who inevitably sucked up a large percentage of the available vehicles. I don't dispute this. My concern is with relative combat efficiency. Who were the more effective killers? (to be rather unpleasantly blunt about it).


Regards,
IronDuke

German resupply in the North African theatre was always going to be perilous as long as
a) the Italian fleet didn't have enough fuel to mount any kind of sustained operations
b) the Royal Navy's Eastern Mediteranean Fleet was strong enough to contend the battle

After Taranto and the battle of Mattapan the Afrika Corps was really left out on a limb, only the loss of several capital ships to Italian special forces and the Luftwaffe's effective anti-shipping sorties troubled the RN. ( My grandad served in the eastern med and the look of hate and fear when anyone mention the stuka was pretty intense fifty years after the event).

I would suggest that Admiral Cunningham was the biggest reason for the germans failure to properly resupply North Africa, but I am a RN Fanboy.

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ORIGINAL: KGV


German resupply in the North African theatre was always going to be perilous as long as
a) the Italian fleet didn't have enough fuel to mount any kind of sustained operations
b) the Royal Navy's Eastern Mediteranean Fleet was strong enough to contend the battle

After Taranto and the battle of Mattapan the Afrika Corps was really left out on a limb, only the loss of several capital ships to Italian special forces and the Luftwaffe's effective anti-shipping sorties troubled the RN. ( My grandad served in the eastern med and the look of hate and fear when anyone mention the stuka was pretty intense fifty years after the event).

I would suggest that Admiral Cunningham was the biggest reason for the germans failure to properly resupply North Africa, but I am a RN Fanboy.

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ORIGINAL: KGV

8. Another area that I do not believed has been touched upon is in the matter of ruthlessness. I do not refer to this concept in a derogatory sense, but in the sense of doing what ever needs to be done no matter what the cost. Lets face it the Allied armies were acutely aware of casaulities throughout the war, for a number of reasons. The Germans throughout the war were more willing to do what ever it took to achieve their objectives than the Allies were.


The degree of horror that the german high command expressed at the level of losses that the Waffen SS were willing to sustain in their fanatacism lends weight to that argument. Apparently even Hitler was concerned.

The argument kind of falls down though unless you are refering to the western allies exclusively. Marshall Zhukov in particular had no regard for his soldiers if the Stavka was breathing down his neck.