Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: KGV

Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles.

I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: KGV

Do you not think the sherman suffered from the same kind of doctrinal emphasis as the british cruiser and infantry tanks? Would the US army not have been better served if they had a MBT that could go head to head with other tanks and use the lighter armoured vehicles in the infantry support role. The Germans employed this kind of thinking well (when they could get their designs to work) with the Panther, STuG, STuH and Marder series of vehicles.

I have yet to have my doubts about the M 36 and wolverine dispelled

I think you're right. If the Americans struggled tank to tank, it was because they had no weapon to do the job. The Tank destroyers are fine defensively. High calibres, long combat ranges, better manouevrability than the towed platforms. However, they are not offensive weapons, The Germans realised this and optimised their Tank destroyers for the defence, removing the turret to reduce visibility (although the Stug tank killers were more by necessity than design) and giving them the armour necessary to survive. Say the Hetzer or Jagdpanther.

The Americans gave their Tank destroyers the more useful turret (easier traverse etc) but it wasn't more useful on the defence, because defenders usually get the first shot and prepared fields of fire to use. Giving them turrets, but open roofs and armour not up to the job made them more vulnerabl;e and easier to see. How anyone would have seen a camouflaged Hetzer, or penetrated the thick frontal slope of the Jagdpanther is hard to imagine.

I think what the Americans missed as that they would encounter most German armour requiring killing whilst they on the offensive. This meant a heavy MBT was a minimum requirement to cope. Defensive Tank destroyers could not survive on the attack at the speahead of the assault, and the Sherman was too underpowered and underarmoured to take on any of the best German designs of either Tanks of Tank Destroyers.

The contrary was also true. The combat performance of the best German Tank destroyers on the attack in the Ardennes was not all that good. Heavily armed and armoured, their lack of turret was hugely debilitating when on the attack.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers... [snip]

...As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Keke

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

This is a welcome change from some of the attitudes I see on forums relating to the German forces. Some of the more serious researchers are doing their best to dash the long-held notions of the Germans as being inherently superior soldiers... [snip]

...As for the alleged German combat superiority, this image was greatly influenced by the studies of the late Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, most notably in his book "A Genius for War". The statistical studies he based his opinions on were flawed, and he picked the examples that best supported his viewpoint. Unfortunately, many subsequent historians (and wargame designers) took this as gospel, and it has taken years to re-evaluate and refute these assumptions.

Sorry KG, no serious researcher have been able to refute Dupuy's work so far, only fiction writers like Ambrose, Mansoore and J.S. Brown. These writers, not Dupuy(!), have picked examples to support their opinions and viewpoints, with several errors in their basic data, and with no sound methodology at all.

Since Dupuy's Quantified Judgement Model (QJM) is the single most analyzed combat model ever designed, throughly documented, valitated to historical data, and succesfully used to forecast battle results, I tend to agree with it more than fiction...which is to say that German formations in Italy and Ardennes on average were more combat effective than the Allied counterparts. (Btw, Dupuy's most influentical books are "Numbers , Predictions & War" and "Understanding War".)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald. Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc. LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc. Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better. Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer. Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact. The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited? Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Keke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald. Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

Dupuy's work is no gospel and it doesn't present the absolute truth. However it presents a quite well working mathematical formula to assess combat efficiency of various formations, and it is valitated to historical data. When QJM was applied to Ardennes database, there's was no cherry picking of formations. It included all the Volks Grenadier units involved (Bastogne anyone?). Still on an average German formations had higher combat efficiency both in attack and defense.

Care to elaborate your criticism against Dupuy's methodology? I've found out that most critics are not at all familiar with the formulae, but just criticize them because they don't agree with the conclusions.

Regarding some American units fighting better than Germans...that's absolutelly true! As explained in the two books of Dupuy, mentioned above, for example the 88th Division had the fifth best Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) of all frontline units in Italy, leaving FE the 16th Pz Division behind.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc. LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

So you are claiming that German soldiers didn't perform other essential tasks like ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded etc., and that's why they were more combat effective?...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc. Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better. Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer. Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact. The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited? Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

KG Erwin didn't exactly present a theory, but his opinion, one that could be expected from any red blooded American. There are two types of arguments that one hears when considering an issue. One is objective analysis, which is an opinion developed as a result of research and the analysis of data, and the other is a "legal argument" in which one uses data to establish a viewpoint that one already believes in. Dupuy's work falls into the former category. It can, and should be criticized but not with "legal arguments", but with better research and analysis (like with the revision of QJM called Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM)).

Dupuy's theory is not that German soldiers are more effective than the American units, but his QJM-model. When it is used for Italian campaign and the Bulge it appears that the German formations on an average were more combat effective than the Allied.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

If I could just figure out this quote thing a little better. I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness. Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts? I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Keke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

If I could just figure out this quote thing a little better. I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness. Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

I don't know if Germans had higher % in actively engaging the enemy, but if it made their divisions more effective, then they were doing something right. Combat is a group effort, and how individual soldiers work together is the key to the efficiency. Do note that greater efficiency doesn't mean victory (just pointing ut the obvious here, hehe). Btw, Dupuy's formulae do take into account the combat value of individual weapons (Operational Lethality Index, OLI).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts? I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

I have no idea what kind of formulae Russians use or have been using, but it wouldn't suprise me a bit if it gave drastic overestimations of their capabilities. It would be ín line with their former ideology...

Anyway, the combat efficiency is really a quantative problem. The outcome in combat is strongly affected by factors such as numbers of men, tanks and guns and ammunition supply. The results of combat, such as advances made and casualties inflicted, are quantative data also. So, to make a through analysis it is necessary to resort to mathematics. Without going too much into details, Dupuy's QJM take into account terrain, weather, posture, strength and odds, suprise, sophistication (technology) etc. Non-technological factors are squeezed into CEV (combat effectiveness value), but that is usually the unknown to be calculated. What is very important, and sorry about repeating myself here, is that QJM is the only model (excluding TNDM here) that has been succesfully valitated to historical data, so it can't be all wrong.

quote:

Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald.

quote:

Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

quote:

BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc.

quote:

LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

quote:

This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc.

quote:

Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better.

quote:

Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer.

quote:

Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact.

quote:

The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited?

quote:

Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

quote:

I presented S.L.A. Marshall's and Grossman's theories for the purpose of illustrating a point. I know of no similiar study done on Germans soldiers. If 50% of the Germans soldiers were actively engaging the enemy with weapons vs 33% for the Americans that would equate into a difference in combat effectiveness.

quote:

Also because formations appear to be more effective does not necessarily equate to the individual soldier being more effective. Poor equipment can make the most effective soldier on the planet totally ineffective as can a host of other things. If you can not fire your rifle due to being out of ammo, you are combat-ineffective. The same goes for if your rifle is jammed because you were issued the wrong cleaning supplies for the climate or your tank is out of fuel or ammo, your radio's are dead and you can't call for fire etc..

quote:

In regards to Dupuy's methodology, my concern is how do you apply a mathmatical value to uniquely human values and thoughts?

quote:

I spent 30 years in the military and a good portion of that time working in Military Intelligence at the tactical level. The U.S. Military spends a great deal of time and money trying to assign mathmatical values to the enemies it may face. Sometimes these values correspond to reality and other times they do not. For every operation the U.S. Military conducts at Battalion Level or higher, a wargame is conducted. It is part and parcel of the Deliberate Decision Making Process. In the course of the wargame numerical values are assigned to both friendly and enemy units based on for example a U.S. Rifle Plt is a 1 and a T-72 tank plt is a 3.2. The point values for each side is totaled up and then the ratio's are determined (i.e. 3:1 for a deliberate attack, etc.). If the ratio's do not meet the requirements that are deemed needed for a successful operation, the scheme of maneuver is redone or supporting arms are added to the force structure, etc. But it is understood during the entire process that this is only an approximation. There are a lot of factors that can not be factored into the projected results. The Red Army was a great believer in the use of Norms and mathmatical values to determine the outcome of any given combat action also. This led the Red Army in my opinion to drastically overestimating their capabilities throughout the 70's through the early 90's. The Russian Army still uses most of these same methods and look at some of the results the use of these methods have produced in Grozny. I am not familiar enough with how Dupuy developed his formula to state categorically that the formula is wrong mathmatically. What I am stating is that I do not believe that some of the intrinsic humans values portrayed in the formula can actually be assigned a numerical value. Courage is not something a value can be assigned to, it is too situationally dependent. The same also goes for morale, leadership, and other military traits. Look at the shall we say "bipolar nature" of a lot of the formations of the Red Army in WW II. One day a rifle battalion would run at the first shot fired, but on the following day it would die to the last man rather than give an inch of ground. How do you fit that into a mathmatical model or formula? While I applaude Dupuy for attemping to explain the difference between the performance of U.S. and German Units. I just do not believe that a mathmatical formula will do it.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33
Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

quote:

ORIGINAL: Koper

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33
Depends on who you look at. Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army takes an unconventional and deeply unpopular look at Wehrmacht motivation and combat performance and concludes that brutalisation and fanatical Nazi ideology were the main components of both by the end of the war. His work is still quite controversial though!

Regards
33

True, but Bartov's work focuses on the Eastern Front combat reality, so I don't think it can be fully used when it comes to France/Italy...

quote:


Koper,

You're right to some extent, but some elements have attracted comment. For example, Zetterling has criticised Bartov's supposition that the Eastern Armies suffered uniformly higher casualty rates than the units in the west. Bartov thought this bred hatred and frustration which led to greater brutality. It may not be a uniquely Eastern phenomena.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

Hmm, I'm surprised that Paul Vebber hasn't weighed in on this discussion. Paul, where are you?

Marc von Martial
instagram stream

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Some people accept Dupuy's work as gospel and others don't. I believe that is a very safe assumption. While it has been a few years for me since I read Dupuy I still have some questions about his methodalogy that have not been answered. It does seem to me that Dupuy was careful to choose engagements that supported his conclusions. I find no engagements involving Volks Grenadier Formations in his tables as reprinted in "Fighting Power" by Van Crevald.

Dragoon,

I think critics of Dupuy fail for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, the initial set of engagements we've all referred to have been augmented since his initial work with other engagements, that give the same opinions. So, yes, whilst his initial set may have been slanted towards better German formations, the model used has been tested with many others since. It has been tested in Arab/Israeli conflicts as well, and is more tested and used than any other combat model out there. If it was skewed, I feel it would have been discovered by now.

Secondly, It has been said that certain factors are wrong within the model. For example, that defensive factors are not correctly weighted. However, since German combat effectiveness comes out better whether they are attacking or defending, any correction of this would not help the Allied cause.

One of the major critics, John Sloan Brown, used as part of his argument against Dupuy's work an analysis of the 88th Infantry Division. Brown had studied this American division and came to the conclusion it was very combat effective.

When this unit was analysed using Colonel Dupuy's model, it scored very highly, being ranked one of the top American divisions (amongst those tested) and better than many British and German ones as well. In other words, an American formation believed to have performed well from anecdotal and other sorts of evidence was also proved to be a good one using Dupuy's work.

Finally, I can't find any other model used that proves American divisions were better. Most critiques don't provide much statistical evidence to back up their point. There are hundreds of engagements analysed by Dupuy's model. If some one has something better, lets see it, but in the absence of that, Dupuy's conclusions are difficult to challenge.

As for the lack of Volksgrenadier formations, these were poorly armed and poorly trained. I don't think anyone would dispute that they were generally poor formations. Germany had five years worth of casualties behind them when they started to field these formations, and they lacked much of the heavier weaponry most standard german formations had. I'm sure some data must exist for them, but if to find engagements showing the American Divisions were better we have to compare them to units that were only one or two steps above the Volkstuurm, it suggests Dupuy is close to the truth.

quote:

Also I find that some American Divisions consistently performed better than German Formations, such as the 45th ID and 4th Armored, neither would be considered as elite but rather as veteran formations.

I don't know whether Dupuy's model has been used to test the 4th Armoured, although my own reading suggests this was one of the better performing American formations. I understood the 45th didn't do so well when analysed, though.

quote:

BG S.L.A. Marshall was probably the best known of the historians employed by the U.S. Army in WW II. I can not remember the book in which his findings were published but in his research he found that only 1/3 of the U.S. Infantry ever engaged the enemy with their weapons in WW II. Yes there were some men that didn't engage out of fear, but most were performing other essential tasks at the time, ammo resupply, call for fire, evac of wounded, etc.

It depends on what he was looking. If he was looking at American soldiers as a whole, then this is not surprising. The American tail was larger than most, and many US Soldiers would not have engaged in combat as a result.

If, however, he was looking at the men in the rifle battalions, then this offers some further explanation for Dupuy's findings. Two thirds of men in a rifle battalion should not go missing on evac etc. I thought SOP when on the attack was to press on and ignore wounded men, as there were stretcher bearers and medics behind the attack who would tend to these.

quote:

LTC Grossman wrote a book a few years back "ON KILLING" about this subject and the steps the Army has used over the years to correct the problem. Currently in the U.S. Army I would venture to say over 95% of the infantry engage the enemy today. But the training methods used to gain this increased combat effectiveness has also probably increased the incidence of PTSD and other mental problems in veterans. I offer this little theory in support of why German units may have been more effective in selected engagements than American units. Less firepower equals less combat effectiveness.

But the findings you present were general and not tied to certain engagements. This really suggests that Dupuy's model is correct, and that Marshall may have come up with one reason for the lesser combat efficiency of American units. Certainly, Van Creveld suggests several factors were involved.

quote:

This thread started out as the American combat soldier was just as effective as a German soldier, a theory put forth by KG Erwin. Col Dupuy's theory is that the German units were more effective than the American units. Most people who believe this theory take that to mean that the German soldier therefore is more effective than the American soldier, but this in not necessarily the case. Unit effectiveness depends on a lot of factors, such as morale, leadership, quality of the troops, logistical support, doctrine, level of training, weather, health, availability of supporting arms, the environment they came from, how they are equipped, etc.

Dragoon 45,
I think the problem you have is trying to reconcile all this. Dupuy was showing that German units had higher combat effectiveness. All of the things you mention can go into this. Van Creveld certainly lists several factors he thought played a part in higher German effectiveness. I don't believe the average German civilian was somehow intrinsically better than the average American civilian during the war. However, when all the relevant factors were added, the average German civilian became a soldier with a higher combat effectiveness than his American (or British) counterpart. Some of this was down to doctrine, some down to training, some down to tactics, some down to small unit leadership and some down to the intangible morale factor. Weaponry may have played some part, although the average American came armed with a better rifle so it can't be taken too far. Some of the factors you mention abouve like supporting arms and weather are built into Dupuy's model, so these are already accounted for.

quote:

Throughout this thread we have conceded that in some areas the Germans were better and that in some areas the Americans were better.

The only concession towards American superiority was in the area of logisitics, I think, although we also conceded their naval forces and air forces were bigger and better. These are harder to work out, though. In terms of the air force, the USAAF had better aircraft models for the most part, and far more flight and combat training than their AXIS counterparts. These areas are much harder to quantify on the personal level.

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Having served in combat as an infantryman, I know better than to take a one over the world statement and believe it at face value. There always more causes and effects than are factored into a question and its answer. Some have little bearing on the question and others have a large bearing. Some are used and others are not in formulating the answer.

True, however Dupuy's model has factored in all the relevant factors. It is not individual results that most effectively prove Dupuy for me, but the consistent trend of results. Some factors may be more important in some engagements than they are in others, but unless every anomaly within the engagements studied somehow favoured the Germans, then it is hard to explain his fairly consistent results.

quote:

Unfortunately, over time a theory if supported by enough people becomes regarded as fact.

Yes, but Dupuy has a model, it is a well known combat model, the most scrutinised and critiqued ever invented. this theory is supported because the model has survived its critics and no one disagreeing with it has come up with explanations as to why it is wrong.

quote:

The flat earth theory comes immediately to mind. I do not suggest that this is the case with Col Dupuy's work, but I would suggest that too many people have taken his work at face value and have not questioned it enough. Did Col Dupuy cover all the factors involved and take them into account in the engagements cited?

As I mentioned above, this model had been extensively critiqued and used to successfully predict (I believe) as well as study previous engagements. I would also say that if Colonel Dupuy has something wrong, say a defensive or offensive value, why would it make too much difference if the Germans are consistently better? It could surely make the Germans rate even higher in some cases.

quote:

Most importantly did he start the research with the conclusion already formed in his mind? I for one will never believe that the study of history, especially military history, can be form-fitted into a mathmatical equation that will produce the correct answer every time. There is always someone somewhere who will screw the question and its answer up.

Yes, but is this a danger just for Colonel Dupuy. With respect, are you as an ex (I presume American) Serviceman (my apologies if I have assumed wrong) searching to discredit Dupuy's work because it is hard for you to accept that the average American soldier was less combat effective? Dupuy was an American soldier. He had no reason to want to discredit his own. I am happy to consider any evidence he is wrong, but so far, no other combat models have been cited, or no other evidence produced. Some of the critiques of the work that has recently questioned Dupuy have been quite damning. I'm thinking here about Brown's work and the more recent book by Mansoor.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:


I am a retired U.S. Army MSG. I do not particularly want to discredit Dupuy's work. In all fairness to him he did some masterful work on his models. What I am saying through all my comments is that I do not believe that he took all factors into account. I will maintain that some of the human factors can not be accurately modeled. Take morale of instance, the loss of one key leader can have an immense effect on morale, totally out of proportion of the effect of the loss of one individual in a let's say a 200 man unit. This effect can take place in the blink of an eye. I do not believe that this effect can be accurately modeled.

quote:

There are dangers in overestimating your enemy although most of the time not as severe as underestimating him. Col Dupuy's model as I have seen variations of it used in modern military planning tend to produce either underestimation or overestimation of the enemy's capabilities. While overestimation is not nearly as bad as underestimation, it can cause the misuse of forces that produce needless casaulities. Underestimation of the enemy normally will cost the forces involved a significant defeat if not the outright loss of the war. All modern military wargaming used in the Military Decision Making Process is based in a large part on Col Dupuy's work. Numerical values are assigned to the enemy in all areas, then values are assigned to friendly units, and then a ratio is calculated on the totals of each side's forces. If the ratio fits within the predetermined force ratio needed for the type of operation, the planners assume success for the operation. Because of the cumbersome nature in assigning these numerical values, essentially using human judgement calls in assigning the value, a true value is never quite achieved for either friendly or enemy units. Not getting an accurate value thus will either lead to underestimation of the enemy's capabilities or overestimation of his capabilities, with the dangers inherent to either course.

For almost 30 years I watched Col Dupuy's model being used in ongoing military operations. True the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was only formally committed to doctrine a little bit over 15 years ago. But a variation of it was in use prior to that. Yes his model was modified to work in MDMP and possibly parts of it were ommitted. But from past experience, I have seldom seen it work correctly. There is always some factor left out of the equation. Weither that factor was the unknown and unknowable beforehand influence of a leader at the right place at the right time or was the mis-evaluation of an enemy capability, these types of problems occur quite frequently. Having practical experience using the model with the results I have seen, I do not believe that the model is near as accurate as most people believe. Yes it is a step in the right direction, but it still is not the end all and do all that it has been portrayed to be. All the failings I have seen have been Human failings. Misrepresentation of the effectiveness of intrinsic human qualities. With practical experience as my guide I therefore have misgivings on the results that Col Dupuy orginally published.

quote:

BTW in two engagements on the table attributed to Dupuy in Van Crevald's Fighting Power the 45th ID had as good as if not better rating than the 88th. According to this table the 45th outperformed the Germans in all but one engagement.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:


I am a retired U.S. Army MSG. I do not particularly want to discredit Dupuy's work. In all fairness to him he did some masterful work on his models. What I am saying through all my comments is that I do not believe that he took all factors into account. I will maintain that some of the human factors can not be accurately modeled. Take morale of instance, the loss of one key leader can have an immense effect on morale, totally out of proportion of the effect of the loss of one individual in a let's say a 200 man unit. This effect can take place in the blink of an eye. I do not believe that this effect can be accurately modeled.

Dragoon 45,
I agree with you. I just don't see this as a factor that would affect only Allied forces. Some AXIS units will have suffered this as well, so if we were able to model it we would see improvements in the performances of both sides which might cancel each other out. Some German units might score even higher if this could be modelled. As I said earlier, I think it is the consistency of Dupuy's findings which require explanation. Any single one of the human factors might be thought to affect both sides, so it would not affect a consistently higher German score.

quote:

There are dangers in overestimating your enemy although most of the time not as severe as underestimating him. Col Dupuy's model as I have seen variations of it used in modern military planning tend to produce either underestimation or overestimation of the enemy's capabilities. While overestimation is not nearly as bad as underestimation, it can cause the misuse of forces that produce needless casaulities. Underestimation of the enemy normally will cost the forces involved a significant defeat if not the outright loss of the war. All modern military wargaming used in the Military Decision Making Process is based in a large part on Col Dupuy's work. Numerical values are assigned to the enemy in all areas, then values are assigned to friendly units, and then a ratio is calculated on the totals of each side's forces. If the ratio fits within the predetermined force ratio needed for the type of operation, the planners assume success for the operation. Because of the cumbersome nature in assigning these numerical values, essentially using human judgement calls in assigning the value, a true value is never quite achieved for either friendly or enemy units. Not getting an accurate value thus will either lead to underestimation of the enemy's capabilities or overestimation of his capabilities, with the dangers inherent to either course.

For almost 30 years I watched Col Dupuy's model being used in ongoing military operations. True the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was only formally committed to doctrine a little bit over 15 years ago. But a variation of it was in use prior to that. Yes his model was modified to work in MDMP and possibly parts of it were ommitted. But from past experience, I have seldom seen it work correctly. There is always some factor left out of the equation. Weither that factor was the unknown and unknowable beforehand influence of a leader at the right place at the right time or was the mis-evaluation of an enemy capability, these types of problems occur quite frequently. Having practical experience using the model with the results I have seen, I do not believe that the model is near as accurate as most people believe. Yes it is a step in the right direction, but it still is not the end all and do all that it has been portrayed to be. All the failings I have seen have been Human failings. Misrepresentation of the effectiveness of intrinsic human qualities. With practical experience as my guide I therefore have misgivings on the results that Col Dupuy orginally published.

The fact that the Military use it to predict suggests to me it is abut as good as we are going to get. Likewise, Dupuy's model has been used in many additional analyses to those he originally did (which were from the Italian theatre, I believe). Those who do not find him believable don't seem to have any evidence, though, to prove him wrong. I haven't seen another model offered, or a critique of his model which shows a consistent weakness. As I have said, he is using hard data. Any of the intangibles you have come up with should be as likely to affect either side, therefore annulling any effect. The model itself does not have to be ultra accurate in prediction because there are many intangibles we don't know, however, in historial engagements we can find the intangibles out and factor them in.

You mentioned yourself earlier that you felt Dupuy may have started with a conclusion and worked his way back. Dupuy was an American soldier, I don't think he found his conclusions particularly uplifting. It seems to me this charge is best levelled at his opponents, who seem unable to accept the American GI was less combat effective and disparage Dupuy without being able to put their finger on exactly why. As I've said, I don't think this is anything to do with the Germans being some sort of supermen, but a combination of factors that all added up.

quote:

BTW in two engagements on the table attributed to Dupuy in Van Crevald's Fighting Power the 45th ID had as good as if not better rating than the 88th. According to this table the 45th outperformed the Germans in all but one engagement.

I understood from an article written by the Executive Director of the Dupuy institute that the US 45th Division finished with a CEV of .72, which was the lowest of the 6 US divisions tested. The 88th finished top of the US divisions.

Reghards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: tanker4145

I don't think you can ever truly quantify the combat effeciency of any forces in combat. There are too many variables which there is absolutely no way to quantify. Usually one side is defending which gives them an advantage on a man to man level (usually). Talking about the Hurtgen, Italy, and other dug in defenses as examples just doesn't cut it since you're talking about well dug in forces in good defensive terrain, of course the attacker will take more casualties. In the Bulge, the failure of intelligence, surprise, and a lack of forces (and green ones at that) faced the Germans initially. While I'd love to say the US was man for man the best, I don't think these arguments can ever go anywhere conclusive.

At the same time though, keep it up because it is quite interesting to read and a lot of good points are being made.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45


In regards to the Dupuy model being used in MDMP, right before I retired there was talk of using a computer program to do all the force ratio calculations. I do not know if this has happened or what program is used, nor do I know what the program is based upon.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
I do agree that German units outperformed American units on more occasions than not, probably 55-45 ratio. We can discuss the reasons for this probably for ever, without reaching an agreement as to what the particular reason for this to be. Currently the discussion has been going back and forth about Dupuy and his model. I will have to remain in the minority in that I believe it to be flawed. With 30+ years military experience I have developed a mistrust on any blanket statements about unit performance. That is why I have so vociferously argued the minority side on Dupuy.

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ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You stated Dupuy's work is based on data from the Italian Campaign. This is where the Germans managed to maintain a core of personnel in their units. They had the best defensive terrain to work with, better than any other part of the German Army had throughout the war. These units did not take the kind of crippling losses that units on the Eastern Front or Units retreating from Normandy took. So it stands to reason that they would be very effective units. I will concede that part of it.

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ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
But back to the original issue of this thread, was the American Soldier more or less combative effective than the German Soldier? By using Dupuy's work we only look at the cream of the German Army. No Volks Grenadier Divisons are included, no Luftwaffe field divisions are included either. Dupuy's work is mainly done as you admitted evaluating U.S. Forces against Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions with a very few Infantry Divisions also. But making a blanket statement that the German Soldier was more combat effective than the U.S. Soldier based only upon a portion of the German Army is misleading. Yes the German's had a manpower issue towards the end of the war, but so did all of the Allies. In the case of the British the manpower was not there, in the American case the trained manpower was not there. All the armies in Europe in WW II had significant problems with infantry replacements by late 1944 to include the Russians. There is no reason not to include the later Volks Grenadier Divisions into the issue also.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Where I think this discussion should have focused more on, were time frames during the war. I will freely admit that the German soldier was the most combat efficient in 1939-42, their victory record proves that. The initial forces sent to the continent by the Americans were undertrained green troops. But the American Soldier learns more quickly in battle than others. Even German commanders stated that, such as Rommel and von Rundestat. In 1943 the Germans still had an edge over the Americans. In 1944 the American Soldier I believe came even with the German soldier in effectiveness. And by 1945, the American Soldier had passed the German Soldier in effectiveness. Again I will cite the record of the Army in question in the only really authorative yardstick there is. Who won more victories, took more POW's, and won the war?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You touched upon it earlier. There is a sort of nostaliga for the German Army in WW II. It accomplished some amazing feats during the war, that by rights it should never have been able to. It endured many hardships and suffered massive casualities by war's end. And there is a tragic element there also in that it served an EVIL Master. The German Army fielded some impressive models of tanks and really developed the idea of close air support to its logical end. Also the German Army is not near as tainted with atrocities as the SS or Gestapo. Therefore I believe that a lot of historians and military buffs have developed an admiration of the German Army that sometimes blinds them to the accomplishments of the other Armies involved in WW II. How many times have you read a supposedly professional historian write about the overwhelming artillery barrages delivered by German 88's, William Breuer come to mind here? Michael Wittman has been elevated into some kind of superman in some circles due to his combat record. I personally will grant Wittman's record is impressive, but any well trained experienced tank crew who had the advantages he had should have been able to accomplish the same thing. When the Tiger ran, it was a very impressive piece of equipment.

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ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
There has been an almost unconscious need to elevate the German Army and its accomplishments in the modern world. I see this in the more recent books published on the subject. I do not know if this is to also raise the accomplishments of the Allied Armies to a higher level or not. Unfortunately as the World War II generation dies off, World War II with begin to take on some mythical connotations. It has already started in the United States with books like "The Greatest Generation" and others. I do not say this to downplay the accomplishments of the people who served in WW II but to further illustrate my point. World War II is regarded by a lot of people in the United States as the last popular war we fought. The vast majority of the population either served or contributed to the war effort. Also in the popular mind the Allied victory was not assured until late in the war. Setbacks for the Allies such as Market-Garden and the Bulge were easier to accept if one accepted that the German Soldier was somehow a much better soldier. Remember war news was tightly controlled by all the governments, and the public did not understand how a setback could occur to the advancing Allied Armies, this served to lessen the certainity of victory in a lot of peoples minds. In order to make a moral judgement on the war, it had to be fought for the highest moral reasons by a crusading army against a very very capable foe. That very capable foe in Europe was the Germans.

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ORIGINAL: Keke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45


In regards to the Dupuy model being used in MDMP, right before I retired there was talk of using a computer program to do all the force ratio calculations. I do not know if this has happened or what program is used, nor do I know what the program is based upon.

You must be talking about the Alternative Courses of Action Display (ACAD) software. It's a battle plan assistant (for short-term decision making), and it utilizes Dupuy's combat models somewhat. From its introduction:

The first feature in the ACAD model is the subjective information of the military experts. The second feature is the heuristic knowledge base developed from the Colonel Dupuy’s (1985) combat models of war. Dupuy’s model was chosen because of two reasons. First, the knowledge base contains the salient characteristics of a general
battlefield. Second, previous validation studies by Dupuy indicated a 90 percent correlation between theoretical and actual outcomes.

The Dupuy’s combat model was reviewed and found to fall short of addressing modern information-centric warfare environments. Therefore, the VIE model was developed in ACAD (Ntuen and Park, 2003, in this volume) to recalibrate Dupuy’s combat parameters to modern digital weapons. The VIE’s algorithm converts Dupuy’s operational lethality index (OLI) to values in Battalion equivalents (BEs). OLI is a measure of the killing power of weapons ranging from the sword to the nuclear bomb. Dupuy provides tables of values as well as formulas for calculating OLIs of unlisted weapons for which certain characteristics are available. The OLI terminology is unfamiliar to many commanders who are more accustomed to the battalion equivalent (BE) concept. DOD (1997a) and DOD (1977b) have information for both American and Russian units in terms of BEs.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
I do agree that German units outperformed American units on more occasions than not, probably 55-45 ratio. We can discuss the reasons for this probably for ever, without reaching an agreement as to what the particular reason for this to be. Currently the discussion has been going back and forth about Dupuy and his model. I will have to remain in the minority in that I believe it to be flawed. With 30+ years military experience I have developed a mistrust on any blanket statements about unit performance. That is why I have so vociferously argued the minority side on Dupuy.

(KeKe)I think it is a blanket statement to say that QJM produces blanket statements.

I don't quite understand what you are referring to here. Is not the statement "Germans units were more combat efficient than American Units", a blanket statement?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You stated Dupuy's work is based on data from the Italian Campaign. This is where the Germans managed to maintain a core of personnel in their units. They had the best defensive terrain to work with, better than any other part of the German Army had throughout the war. These units did not take the kind of crippling losses that units on the Eastern Front or Units retreating from Normandy took. So it stands to reason that they would be very effective units. I will concede that part of it.

(KeKe) As mentioned above terrain and defensive postures are taken into account in QJM. When German formations were on the offensive they were still more efficient on an average...and not only in Italy but in the Bulge battles too.

The only Volks Grenadier Division that I know of the performed up to par in the Bulge was Kokott's 26th VG Division. Most of the VG Divisions in the Bulge were slaughtered making mass attacks on U.S. units by Artillery Fire. Advancing in column during an attack against an entrenched enemy armed with MG's and supported by a large amount of artillery is not my idea of combat efficiency. It is more like combat stupidity. KG Piper with most of 1st SS Panzer's combat power went for a long drive and was hemmed in by the American engineers blowing bridges on his routes. Then he was cornered near La Glieze Be, by the 30th Infantry Division and only managed to save some 600 men and no equipment. The Fuehrer Begleit Brigade was composed of veterans of the eastern front who had been seconded to the bodyguard of Hitler. They were committed in the Bulge and performed sub par at best. The 2nd Panzer was almost totally destroyed by the 2nd Armored Division near the Meuse River on 24-25 Dec. The German tanks were out of Gas and Ammunition. What is combat efficient in this? The 2nd Armored lost I believe 16 tanks in the two day period. The fact of the matter is that German Units lost combat efficiency as the war progressed because of a lack of supplies, lack of equipment, being out maneuvered, etc. Also American casualities declined as the war progressed into 1945. Therefore logic to me indicates that the Americans gained in combat efficiency and the Germans lost in combat efficiency. And yet again Dupuy did not account for the Vosges Mountains campaign of late 44-early 45. The American Divisions fighting there did not have any air support, were limited in the use of fire support due to the terrain, and at times were outnumbered by the defender, yet who steadily gained ground and lost less casualities? The Americans. Dupuy may have been correct at a certain period of time late 43-early 44 although I have my doubts.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
But back to the original issue of this thread, was the American Soldier more or less combative effective than the German Soldier? By using Dupuy's work we only look at the cream of the German Army. No Volks Grenadier Divisons are included, no Luftwaffe field divisions are included either. Dupuy's work is mainly done as you admitted evaluating U.S. Forces against Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions with a very few Infantry Divisions also. But making a blanket statement that the German Soldier was more combat effective than the U.S. Soldier based only upon a portion of the German Army is misleading. Yes the German's had a manpower issue towards the end of the war, but so did all of the Allies. In the case of the British the manpower was not there, in the American case the trained manpower was not there. All the armies in Europe in WW II had significant problems with infantry replacements by late 1944 to include the Russians. There is no reason not to include the later Volks Grenadier Divisions into the issue also.

(KeKe )While German armor and mech divisions do figure quite prominently in the data presented in the original comparison, German infantry divisions had also a rather consistent advantage. This is especially shown in the Bulge battles (including VGs). If we assume that German armor and mech divs always received the best personnel, then the original results would have been slightly distorted.

I will have to re-read Dupuy's original work, because the only reference to his tables I have available right now is Van Crevald's "Fighting Power" and the tables that he attributes to Dupuy in the book do not match what you are saying.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
Where I think this discussion should have focused more on, were time frames during the war. I will freely admit that the German soldier was the most combat efficient in 1939-42, their victory record proves that. The initial forces sent to the continent by the Americans were undertrained green troops. But the American Soldier learns more quickly in battle than others. Even German commanders stated that, such as Rommel and von Rundestat. In 1943 the Germans still had an edge over the Americans. In 1944 the American Soldier I believe came even with the German soldier in effectiveness. And by 1945, the American Soldier had passed the German Soldier in effectiveness. Again I will cite the record of the Army in question in the only really authorative yardstick there is. Who won more victories, took more POW's, and won the war?

(KeKe) Doesn't sound very valid methodology in estimating combat efficiency to me...only opinions and assumptions...and the myth about Americans learning more quickly than anybody else.

- Edit: The "victory record" part is of course not an opinion or assumption only, but since it is not a reflection of combat efficiency of individual soldiers or formations, it is not a valid point in this discussion.

So then there is no gaining of combat experience in a Unit over a period of time? In the U.S. Infantry Divisions generally if a soldier survived his first combat experience without debilitating injuries he stayed with the Unit for the duration. His chances of becoming a KIA or WIA lessened with the increase of experience he acquired. Even quite a few WIA's were returned to their units after healing also increasing the experience level. So then even though the largest group of casaulities for the infantry were the new inexperienced men the units themselves never gained experience? In regards to the victory record is that not what orginally sent Dupuy on his work. He wanted to explain why the Germans won and when they were defeated why it cost the Americans so many casualities? Also who learns faster in combat the green inexperienced soldier or the seasoned veteran? You state it is a myth that American Soldiers learn faster in combat, yet I did not attribute this "myth" to American sources but to emminent German sources Rommel, von Rundestat, and others. They were the ones fighting against the U.S. and I for one would believe they knew what they were talking about.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
You touched upon it earlier. There is a sort of nostaliga for the German Army in WW II. It accomplished some amazing feats during the war, that by rights it should never have been able to. It endured many hardships and suffered massive casualities by war's end. And there is a tragic element there also in that it served an EVIL Master. The German Army fielded some impressive models of tanks and really developed the idea of close air support to its logical end. Also the German Army is not near as tainted with atrocities as the SS or Gestapo. Therefore I believe that a lot of historians and military buffs have developed an admiration of the German Army that sometimes blinds them to the accomplishments of the other Armies involved in WW II. How many times have you read a supposedly professional historian write about the overwhelming artillery barrages delivered by German 88's, William Breuer come to mind here? Michael Wittman has been elevated into some kind of superman in some circles due to his combat record. I personally will grant Wittman's record is impressive, but any well trained experienced tank crew who had the advantages he had should have been able to accomplish the same thing. When the Tiger ran, it was a very impressive piece of equipment.

(KeKe) There might be nostalgia existing, but it is not a factor in QJM-calculations.

No but it might very well be a factor in the belief that Dupuy is correct in his work and also in the acceptance of his work as gospel by some.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45
There has been an almost unconscious need to elevate the German Army and its accomplishments in the modern world. I see this in the more recent books published on the subject. I do not know if this is to also raise the accomplishments of the Allied Armies to a higher level or not. Unfortunately as the World War II generation dies off, World War II with begin to take on some mythical connotations. It has already started in the United States with books like "The Greatest Generation" and others. I do not say this to downplay the accomplishments of the people who served in WW II but to further illustrate my point. World War II is regarded by a lot of people in the United States as the last popular war we fought. The vast majority of the population either served or contributed to the war effort. Also in the popular mind the Allied victory was not assured until late in the war. Setbacks for the Allies such as Market-Garden and the Bulge were easier to accept if one accepted that the German Soldier was somehow a much better soldier. Remember war news was tightly controlled by all the governments, and the public did not understand how a setback could occur to the advancing Allied Armies, this served to lessen the certainity of victory in a lot of peoples minds. In order to make a moral judgement on the war, it had to be fought for the highest moral reasons by a crusading army against a very very capable foe. That very capable foe in Europe was the Germans.

(KeKe) So only for moral reasons some people claim that the Germans were quite combat efficient? It cannot be estimated in any scientific way?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it. In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too. Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

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ORIGINAL: Keke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dragoon 45

Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it. In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too. Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

I've got a creeping feeling that you haven't understood a bit what has been written about QJM in this thread, and actually have never been familiar with the formulae. Until you can crasp its "mathmatical methodalogy" (sic), and can present some valid criticism, there's really no need to continue discussing it. Otherwise you just keep on presenting the same kind of BS arguments, other critics, who don't actually have a clue, but are just pissed off for an obvious reason, have already presented. Get this first: It is not a formula made to prove that the Germans had higher combat efficiency.

(I'm not familiar with the books you mentioned above, so I cannot comment them.)

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Then also I don't understand how the result's of Dupuy's work can be so accepted based on assumptions that are quantified as a mathmatical value, and the work of other's derided when they use the same methodalogy. I refer to Mosier and his "Myth of the Great War" and "The Blitzkrieg Myth". He used official casuality figures in "The Myth of the Great War" and found that the figures did not support the history as written by the victors. He offered a substitute theory and as far as I can tell has been roundly condemned for it.

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In "The Blitzkrieg Myth" he again offered historical facts, i.e. the German Panzers never really traveled any faster than the foot and hoof infantry divisions based on official German records, offered a differing theory and has been condemned for it too.

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Mosier, an amature historian with little or no training in research methods (he's an English professor) produces half-baked conclusions based on insufficient research and faulty logic. He writes simply to provoke rather than inform, so the entire books is chock full of questionable statements resting on little or no evidence. Other conclusions are simply incorrect and can be made only after suppressing evidence or willfully misinterpreting it, which Mosier does constantly.

Avoid this book like the plague.

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Mosier shows that, despite what we have been told, Germany did not have a clear superiority in tanks at the beginning of the war, and that the Germans did not subscribe to the "Blitzkrieg" strategy to invade Poland and France. Instead, he demonstrates how a large portion of German military funding before the war was spent on fortifications on the French frontier, much like the French did with the Maginot line (and which the French have historically been criticized for doing). Thus, German tanks were small in number (the French actually had more, despite conventional wisdom) and many were obsolete when the war started.

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He also demonstrates that German military doctrine was far different then many have believed. They did not use armoured spearheads to inflict panic on Allied rear areas. Instead, they used a broad-front strategy, attacking in many different places at the same time, overwhelming the defenses and making it so they couldn't react. When they did attempt the Breakthrough strategy, it never worked or caused huge casualties when it did work (like the airborne drops on Belgium and Holland). In point of fact, Hitler was one of the few Germans who believed in the Breakthrough doctrine, and he attempted to use the strategy once he took over military affairs. He tried it twice (Avaranches in France and the Battle of the Bulge in Belgium), and both times resulted in the hastening of the German defeat. Allied generals who tried the strategy inevitably found that the Germans were able to quickly shift defenses to halt the attacks. If Hitler hadn't wasted German resources on futile offensives, the Germans could have held on a lot longer than they finally did.

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Other conclusions are simply incorrect and can be made only after suppressing evidence or willfully misinterpreting it

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Mosier also attacks the concept of strategic bombing in the book, making a vivid case for how immoral it was. This was because it didn't work, but ended up killing hundreds of thousands of civilians anyway, despite having no real effect on the war. He shows that German industrial capacity did not go down in 1943, when the bombing process really began. It did start going down in 1944, but a large part of that can be attributed to the loss of natural resources in areas where the Allies were taking back territory and depriving the German war machine of these resources. Mosier attempts to discredit those who say the bombing campaigns contributed to the ending of the war, and criticizes those who massage the numbers (or completely ignore them) to make it look like it did have an effect.

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Yet Dupuy's work which starts out with an assumption, a numerical value assigned by the researcher for a certain combat factor (morale, experience of troops, training level of troops, etc.) that is then plugged into a mathmatical formula with other numerical values some of which are again based on assumptions and yields a result from assumption after assumption, is so accepted. What if terrain had given the German soldier a much higher advantage than Dupuy assumed in his calculations?

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ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

Keke and Dragoon45, here's where we get to the heart of the matter--the attempt to actually quantify Combat Effectiveness, in every situation, and the reasons behind the theories. This is why I wanted Paul Vebber to weigh in, as games such as SPWaW factor in a subjective level of "base experience" and "base morale" for all nations. I would like to know the criteria that was used for setting these levels. No subsequent OOB team fiddled with these--we left them as they were, as these values were outside of our purview. Same goes for Panzer Leo's H2H Mod and the SPWaW Depot's OOB Revisions. These levels were left alone, because they are the most difficult to measure. They have a profound effect on game play, and I argued (successfully) for removing the elite designation for some USMC units at the beginning of the war.

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As for the use of Dupuy's QJM in commercial wargames--who has actually used it? This is something I would like to ask of Jim Dunnigan, who designed many of the board games I grew up playing. He was one of the guys who automatically gave higher combat factors to German ground units to subjectively represent all of their early successes in WWII. He made an attempt to remedy this with the massive "War In The East" (yes, I have it), which had elaborate rules for the varying conditions of the war between 1941-45, different combat-results tables for the years, and stronger Russian units introduced from 1943-45 (the Tank & Mech Corps).

After all this, we still have no way to judge the human element, which is truly elusive and can't be measured objectively. This is why I play the tactical games, because you have individual squads commanded by leaders who may or may not perform to the standards necessary to ensure the safety of their men and the cohesion of the unit. The further down the chain of command one goes, the more uncertain the final result becomes, and the less you can rely on historical data.

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Thus, we are in a quandary, in which neither historians nor wargame designers can offer a definitive conclusion. I offered my opinion, nothing more, as the answer is by definition impossible to measure objectively for a given situation. This topic serves to illustrate the mystery and ultimate futility of trying to quantify a human activity--it becomes simply an exercise in rhetoric. It is not that much different from trying to define why a person falls in love--it cannot be explained, quantified or measured in its extent or depth.