Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

I understand he wrote another rant about the Blitzkrieg, apparently discovering things that were a surprise (not bad for an English professor coming to the war for his first book, after 60 years of scholarship from others).

It was mainly his attitude re American forces. There's ample evidence to show the Americans were brave but two years behind everyone else tactically when they got started, and there's plenty of evidence to show a learning curve amongst British Commanders that culminated in the series of successful bite and holds of 1918. The American's real impact in the war was to break German morale by convinving them that the war of attrition could not be won.

His point on casualties is also poor. On the Somme, I thought Allied casualties were usually put in the 6-650 000 mark, whilst German casualties look to have been almost 600 000 if memory serves. There's a quote from some German Officer somewhere where he says the Somme was the muddy graveyard of the German field Army.

There is some evidence to suggest the Germans were more innovative at a tactical level, and the work of Bruchmuller stands out as the war's finest artilleryman. However, the British Army learned much from Ypres and the Somme, at a time when the landscape for the attacking side had changed completely because of trenches, barbed wire, heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns. By 1918, those lessons were driving all before them.

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: geozero

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

I understand he wrote another rant about the Blitzkrieg, apparently discovering things that were a surprise (not bad for an English professor coming to the war for his first book, after 60 years of scholarship from others).

It was mainly his attitude re American forces. There's ample evidence to show the Americans were brave but two years behind everyone else tactically when they got started, and there's plenty of evidence to show a learning curve amongst British Commanders that culminated in the series of successful bite and holds of 1918. The American's real impact in the war was to break German morale by convinving them that the war of attrition could not be won.

His point on casualties is also poor. On the Somme, I thought Allied casualties were usually put in the 6-650 000 mark, whilst German casualties look to have been almost 600 000 if memory serves. There's a quote from some German Officer somewhere where he says the Somme was the muddy graveyard of the German field Army.

There is some evidence to suggest the Germans were more innovative at a tactical level, and the work of Bruchmuller stands out as the war's finest artilleryman. However, the British Army learned much from Ypres and the Somme, at a time when the landscape for the attacking side had changed completely because of trenches, barbed wire, heavy concentrations of artillery and machine guns. By 1918, those lessons were driving all before them.

Regards,
IronDuke

I agree that American intervention broke the German morale more than anything else. It also demonstrated to all European countries that the war would continue to "expand".

But there were some U.S. commanders with some prior military experiance, though not on the scale seen in Eurpoe. I think that the technical achievements were a larger contributor to Allied victory (American production, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, etc).

The British and French (and Germans) had a lot more battle experience. If U.S. had not intervened it is possible that Germany's 1918 offensive would have proven either successful or dragged the awr a few more years.

IN any event, on final analysis, America's involvement was needed.

quote:

ORIGINAL: FrankHunter

I believe the 1918 Spring offensives were not going to win the war for Germany regardless of US involvement. That's a personal opinion of course, pretty hard to quantify that morale bonus. But there was no plan to win the war. Ludendorff just somehow hoped he would break through somewhere and the German army would somehow force the Allies to surrender. It was after the offensives had been stopped and the US army was formed and began to join in Foch's "Everyone into the battle" that I think US forces made a real contribution.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: FrankHunter

I believe the 1918 Spring offensives were not going to win the war for Germany regardless of US involvement. That's a personal opinion of course, pretty hard to quantify that morale bonus. But there was no plan to win the war. Ludendorff just somehow hoped he would break through somewhere and the German army would somehow force the Allies to surrender. It was after the offensives had been stopped and the US army was formed and began to join in Foch's "Everyone into the battle" that I think US forces made a real contribution.

A good point. For all its advances, you don't see too much (until towards the end) in the way of a grand strategic plan. It was the most surprising thing about the entire offensive. I'm more familiar with WWII, but you look at the offensive plans there and there are objectives, aims, some idea of an "exit" strategy for the attack if you like. This offensive is designed to do precisely this....etc.

I'm not completely sure what the strategic objectives (precise objectives as opposed to the generic "win the war") actually were.

Regards,
IronDuke