ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004 From: Chehalis, WA Status: offline
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This puts things in good perspective. The full text is at: http://www.microworks.net/pacific/intelligence/pearl_harbor.htm quote:
It is important to emphasize the lack of any formal distribution procedures to inform responsible fleet commanders of the intelligence information being gleaned from decrypts of Japanese communications. In the Navy, this was complicated by the self appointed intelligence expert of then Captain Richmond K. Turner known as “Terrible Turner”, the new head of the Navy’s War Plans department of CNO. The weakness of Admiral Stark as CNO let Turner completely usurp the functions of ONI and DNC to fulfill their responsibilities to properly warn fleet commanders of the impending Japanese actions based on the Purple diplomatic decrypts and other indicators. More serious war warning messages and a more accurate picture of the current situation as indicated by Japanese decrypts that were advocated by Captain Laurence Stafford as OP-20-G, Admiral Noyes DNC, and the acting Director of Intelligence (DNI), Captain Kirk, were forestalled or greatly watered down by Turner. One excuse Turner tried to give for such perfunctory warnings was that Pearl Harbor had all the Japanese diplomatic decrypts, which was false. Earlier, Captain Turner was convinced Japan would only attack Russia and just before Pearl Harbor he convinced Stark that Japan was not ready to attack the U.S. only the British. The new DNI Theodore S. Wilkinson refused to challenge Turner’s rebuff of a further specific war warning drafted by Captain Arthur H. McCollum on 5 December. Again on 6 December, Stafford tried again but was dismissed by Noyes so as not to antagonize Turner. On the Army side, General George G. Marshall and intermediaries vetoed similar requests made by Colonels Rufus S. Bratton and Otis K. Sadtler. Later, Marshall denied receiving the related decrypts. As Washington politics go, both Stafford, Bratton and Sadtler were relegated to rather minor posts and discredited, while Noyes and Turner were given prime advancement billets and promotions. Although General Marshall was held to have been derelict in his duties by the first Army board of inquiry on the Pearl Harbor attack, the subsequent congressional investigation only found Admiral Kimmel and General Short at fault for the Pearl Harbor disaster. Marshall had the backing of both Secretary of War Stimson and President Roosevelt. Stimson instigated a fierce campaign to reverse Marshall’s prior dereliction finding. During the latter hearings, none of Turner’s subordinates would break ranks and reveal Turner’s derelictions due to his great wartime achievements and rank as Vice Admiral. Only subsequent revelations have verified Turner’s and Marshall’s responsibility for impeding more appropriate and timely warnings urged by intelligence professionals based on Purple decrypts. Chez
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Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998) VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78 ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81 VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87 Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90 ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92 NRD Seattle 1992-96 VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
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