I just want to ask a few questions. In Burma how many divisons did the Allies use to take it back, my PBEM partner is routing me in Burma in 2/44 and I noticed a ton of divisons. Not complaing becasue he is using what he has, but what was the reason the allies did not move real far there until 45. There has been all this talk of the Japanese moving fast, but the allies can do it too. So I think it is time maybe we exam this in the case of the allies as well as the Japanese.
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Joined: 2/3/2005 From: Washington DC Status: offline
Well I belive they had the 14th Army which included the XV, IV, and XXXIII Army Corps. Plese tell me if I am wrong but I think it was a pretty good size force.
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Well I belive they had the 14th Army which included the XV, IV, and XXXIII Army Corps. Plese tell me if I am wrong but I think it was a pretty good size force.
Did they have all of these forces in early 44 though.
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"Ours was the first revolution in the history of mankind that truly reversed the course of government, and with three little words: 'We the people.' 'We the people' tell the government what to do, it doesn't tell us." -Ronald Reagan
Source for this is World War II as Statistical Survey by John Ellis
14th Army was formed in Oct 43 under Slim
British divisions:
2nd inf to Burma April 44 36th (was 36th Indian) to Burma Sept 44 formed in 1942 as 36th Indian 70th Disbanded as such Oct 43 was the basis of the Chindits
Indian Divisions 3rd formed 44 Burma March -June 44 was the cover name for Wingates Chindits 5th Pre-1939 Burma Nov 43 was in Africa until Aug 42 7th formed 1940 Burma Sept 43 14th formed 1941 Burma Spet 42 -May 43 then to training 17th formed 1941 Burma Sept 42 19th formed 1941 Burma Oct 44 20th formed 1942 Burma Oct 43 21st formed 1944 Burma May - July 44 emergency HQ only 23rd formed 1942 Burma Sept 42-Aug 44 became India Command Reserve 25th formed 1942 Burma March 44 26th formed 1942 Burma Feb-Sept 44 became 14th army reserve 36 formed 1942 became British 36th
Indian Armored brigades (as many tanks as a divisions, but little support) 50 Tk formed 1941 Burma Nov 44 254 Tk formed 1942 Burma Oct 43 255 Tk formed 1942 Burma Oct 44
African Colonies 11 East African formed 1943 Burma June 44 81 West African formed 1943 Burma Dec 43 82 West African formed 1943 Burma Nov 44
For most of 1942 and 43 the British had 4-5 division in Burma by Oct 43 they had 7 in March of 44 it went to 9 and hit as many as 11 by Nov 44. During this time there were 3-7 divisions in the Indian Army Command some of which moved to Burma.
The RAF had 19 fighter squadrons in the Far East in Dec 42 and 29 by Dec 43. They had 7 and then 8 squadrons of heavy bombers on the same dates. There were 9 light bomber and 2 topedo bomber squadrons in Dec 42 and 5 light bomber and 5 torpedo bomber squadrons in Dec 43.
Also remember that the British delivered the 18th division to Singapore just in time to surrender buy your opponent is unlikely to have done the same so there is at least one more big formation there to attack you.
Given that our war is different from the actual war I don't see it as completely unreasonable for the British to attack earlier than they did historically. If the Brits had 7 divisions in India in 1943 and 4 in Burma all you have to do is move 5 of the 7 to Burma to get the 9 that actually attacked in 44. If the 18th Division is still existant then you only need to move 4 of the 7. Also a lot of the reason the Brits took so long to come back is that they were beaten so badly in the first place. If they leave without taking big losses they can recover faster.
< Message edited by Tom Hunter -- 3/15/2005 1:25:41 AM >
Source for this is World War II as Statistical Survey by John Ellis
14th Army was formed in Oct 43 under Slim
British divisions:
2nd inf to Burma April 44 36th (was 36th Indian) to Burma Sept 44 formed in 1942 as 36th Indian 70th Disbanded as such Oct 43 was the basis of the Chindits
Indian Divisions 3rd formed 44 Burma March -June 44 was the cover name for Wingates Chindits 5th Pre-1939 Burma Nov 43 was in Africa until Aug 42 7th formed 1940 Burma Sept 43 14th formed 1941 Burma Spet 42 -May 43 then to training 17th formed 1941 Burma Sept 42 19th formed 1941 Burma Oct 44 20th formed 1942 Burma Oct 43 21st formed 1944 Burma May - July 44 emergency HQ only 23rd formed 1942 Burma Sept 42-Aug 44 became India Command Reserve 25th formed 1942 Burma March 44 26th formed 1942 Burma Feb-Sept 44 became 14th army reserve 36 formed 1942 became British 36th
Indian Armored brigades (as many tanks as a divisions, but little support) 50 Tk formed 1941 Burma Nov 44 254 Tk formed 1942 Burma Oct 43 255 Tk formed 1942 Burma Oct 44
African Colonies 11 East African formed 1943 Burma June 44 81 West African formed 1943 Burma Dec 43 82 West African formed 1943 Burma Nov 44
For most of 1942 and 43 the British had 4-5 division in Burma by Oct 43 they had 7 in March of 44 it went to 9 and hit as many as 11 by Nov 44. During this time there were 3-7 divisions in the Indian Army Command some of which moved to Burma.
The RAF had 19 fighter squadrons in the Far East in Dec 42 and 29 by Dec 43. They had 7 and then 8 squadrons of heavy bombers on the same dates. There were 9 light bomber and 2 topedo bomber squadrons in Dec 42 and 5 light bomber and 5 torpedo bomber squadrons in Dec 43.
Also remember that the British delivered the 18th division to Singapore just in time to surrender buy your opponent is unlikely to have done the same so there is at least one more big formation there to attack you.
Given that our war is different from the actual war I don't see it as completely unreasonable for the British to attack earlier than they did historically. If the Brits had 7 divisions in India in 1943 and 4 in Burma all you have to do is move 5 of the 7 to Burma to get the 9 that actually attacked in 44. If the 18th Division is still existant then you only need to move 4 of the 7. Also a lot of the reason the Brits took so long to come back is that they were beaten so badly in the first place. If they leave without taking big losses they can recover faster.
I don't see it as a problem, but if you put it into the context of the Japanese moving through places fast like PI ot SRA while committing more than historic forces and attacks, why don't the people saying the Japanese move to fast complain about things like this. I guess my whole point is that it is always talked about the Japanese moving to fast, but when appilied in reserve with greater force by the allies it may be worse. I do agree that all operations should be slowed down. But what about the players who take until April or May to get where the Japanese did in real life. I think the pace is faster becasue players risk and throw away ships, planes, and troops more than what happened in real life. May be to slow things down they could say that you need so many prep points to move on a base, this would not mean the base that was going to be taken but planning for any base not controlled by that side or some thing. This would slow down rapid redepolment into action. Say 30 prep points to attack a base or some thing.
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"Ours was the first revolution in the history of mankind that truly reversed the course of government, and with three little words: 'We the people.' 'We the people' tell the government what to do, it doesn't tell us." -Ronald Reagan
I have started doing a lot of close, critical reading of the AARs. The more I read the more I am convinced that speed of advance is much more a function of the game style of the two (or more) players than of game mechanics. I am not saying that mechanics does not matter, I am suggesting that speed of advance is 70% players and 30% game mechanics.
If the logistics and command structure were designed to be more historical, then I would agree with you. However, I believe it's difficult to determine the reasons for the accelerated game play unless players are willing to adopt house rules to reflect reality.
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