Slitherine

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TOP SECRET
FOR DIPLOMATIC POUCH ONLY
DELIVER DIRECTLY TO SEC. HULL

FROM: Capt. Smith-Hutton, Military Attache, Tokyo
TO: Sec. Hull
DATE: July 10,1941

Sir;

I have, in my possesion, convincing evidence of practice raids by Japanese torpedo bombers using aerial torpedoes against capital warship targets in Ariake Bay. I believe these are not, repeat, not defensive in nature as some of the attacks seem to be taking place in depths as shallow as 6-8 fathoms.

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***********************MEMO***********************

From: Adm R. K. Turner, Director of War Plans Division, Navy Department
To: Adm Stark, Chief of Naval Operations
Date: July 19, 1941


Effect of Further Restrictions on Exports.

(a) The most important fields for exercising further restrictions
exports are petroleum products and raw cotton, which accounted 74% and
13%, respectively, of the trade in May, 1941.

(b) It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of
petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East
Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result.
Japan doubtless knows that wells and machinery probably would be
destroyed. If then engaged in war in Siberia, the necessary force for
southward adventures might not be immediately available. Furthermore,
Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months' war operations. Export
restrictions of oil by the United States should be accompanied by
similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.

(c) Restrictions on the export of raw cotton would probably be serious
for Japan only if India, Peru, and Brazil should apply the same
restrictions. Cotton stocks in Japan are believed to be rather low at
present.

(d) It will, of course, be recognized that an embargo on exports will
automatically stop imports from Japan.

(e) An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological
reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to
intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their
present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then
take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also
include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately
involve us in a Pacific war. Whether or not such action will be taken
immediately will doubtless depend on Japan's situation at that time with
respect to Siberia.

(f) Additional export restrictions would hamper Japan's war effort, but
not to a very large extent since present restrictions are accomplishing
the same result, except with regard to oil, raw cotton and wood pulp.
Thus, the economic weapon again Japan has largely been lost, and the
effect of complete embargo would be not very great from a practical
standpoint.

6. Effect on the United States of a Loss of Imports From Japan.

(a) As previously mentioned, exports and imports are approaching a
balance. If exports cease, imports will also cease, as Japan would not
have the means to continue her purchases. The same effect would be
produced if we stopped buying from Japan, but attempted to continue our
exports.

(b) In 1940, raw silk formed 67% of United States imports from Japan.
Silk is processed here. It is used in industry and for certain
munitions, particularly powderbags. The armed services have large stocks
of raw silk, and could get along without further imports, though silk
substitutes are not entirely satisfactory. Doubtless industry could
manage without silk, although the lack of it would cause a considerable
dislocation of labor now employed in the industry. The effect of
stopping the purchase of silk would also have an adverse psychological
reaction on the part of Japan, though possibly not so great as would an
export embargo.

(c) Stopping other imports from Japan would not cause any great hardship
in the United States, although the general effect on industry would be
adverse.

7. Conclusions.

(a) Present export restrictions, plus reductions of available ship
tonnage for use in Japanese trade have greatly curtailed both exports
and imports.

(b) The effect of an embargo would hamper future Japanese war effort,
though not immediately, and not decisively.

(c) An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by an on
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and possibly would involve the
United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to
be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if
practicable, be postponed until Japan is engaged in a in Siberia. It may
well be that Japan has decided against an early attack on the British
and Dutch, but has decided to occupy Indo-China and to strengthen her
position there, also to attack the Russians Siberia. Should this prove
to be the case, it seems probable that United States could engage in war
in the Atlantic, and that an would not intervene for the time being,
even against the British.

8. Recommendation.

That trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time.

R. K. Turner

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*********************TOP SECRET************************

TO: Adm Turner, Chief, War Planning; Adm Stark, CNO
FROM: OP-20-G, Naval Intelligence
DATE: 9-27-41

The following is a decrypted J19 Diplomatic Code message received 9-24-41 from Midway Station. We deem the reliability very high.

MESSAGE TEXT FOLLOWS:

To: Hon. S. Nigata, Counsul General, Honolulu
From: Chief 3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff, Tokyo

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"

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*******************TOP SECRET************************

TO: Capt. Stafford, Chief of Naval Cryptology
FROM: Capt. Beardell, Military Liason to the President
DATE: Nov. 28, 1941

Sir;

The president wishes to see not only summaries and estimates but all J25 code decryptions after translation from the Japanese. Please advise as to practicality.

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*****************TOP SECRET*********************

TO: Capt. Beardell, Military Liason to the President
FROM: Capt. Stafford, Chief of Naval Cryptology (COMINT)
DATE: Dec 1, 1941

Sir;

OP-20-G is now working round the clock. 85% of our manpower and the "A-team" is working on J25 Naval Code intercepts which number some 2,500 in the month of November. We are achieving fair readability on 70% of messages within 3 days of intercept. Adequate translation form the Japanese and collation of the data now our now our major hurdles. Please tell the President we have identified a single target of radio messages which are broadcast in duplicate on every odd hour (Tokyo time) with unique identifiying numeric tags for the last 2 weeks non-stop. This is extraordinary and strongly suggests a planned run-up to an operation or existing military operation. Repeated refences are made to "X-day".

Will coply with English transcripts when practicable.

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Excerpt of diary of Sec of War Stimson (Nov 25, 1941):

"FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."

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Strictly confidential

Transcript of Sec. Hull's oral message to the Japanese Ambassador
November 26, 1941

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measure to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussion with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of view in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

quote:

ORIGINAL: scott1964

I beleive I am on the other side, no not the dark side

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ORIGINAL: AdmNelson

To the Allied players--- we have been insulted. With that there is a state of war that exists between the Empire of Japan and the Colonial Powers of the West.

To Vice Admirals Scott1964 and Fabertong

From Vice Admiral AdmNelson

Commence Operations


We Japanese will discuss the War in a different post.

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************************TOP SECRET****************************

TO: General Short, Commander Army Forces Hawaii
FROM: Sec of War Stimson
DATE: Nov 27, 1941


Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

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************************TOP SECRET*****************************

TO: Admiral Kimmel, CINCPAC
FROM: Sec of War Stimson
DATE: Nov 27, 1941

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

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ORDER 132-221 08:30:30:11:41

Adm Brown, TF 12
from Adm Kimmel

You are ordered to embark aboard Lexington 10xF3F (with pilots) of VMF 211 at dock 4 as soon as practicable. Deliver by fly-off to Wake Island. Use full ASW precautions. Wake instructed to notify us of reciept. Will give further instructions at that time.

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Most Sensitive Status
URGENT
Personal Decryption

TO: Col. Weijerman, Military Attache, Netherlands Embassy, Washington
FROM: Gen. van Ter Poorten, ABDA, NEI
DATE: Dec 4, 1941

We have decrypted the expected Japanese "Winds Execute" order dated Dec 2. This is an unequivocal war order with execution date uncertain. Please convey this to Gen Marshall personally at once.

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************************TOP SECRET*****************************

TO:General Marshall
FROM:Army Intelligence Section, Far East
Date Dec 6, 1941

Sir;

What follows is the text of a message from the Japanese Consul General of Honolulu to Japanese Naval Intelligence which was sent by J19 encryption on November 18. We were alarmed by the level o detail provided by the report and the need for such detail. Prior decryption was not possible until we had built a J19 dictionary.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my No.219 on that day. Area A -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C -- 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.
3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor..."

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Radiotelephone message from Father Larmont, Our Lady of Perpetual Bliss Parish, Tarawa to Msgr. LaChance, Suva

"Msgr., we awoke to many Japanese landing on the Island. They are bringing large guns. They are on the Parish grounds! Non, non, si vous..."(transmission ended)

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Bridge Log: USS Chicago

.....13:15 (12/07/41) Making 32 Kts on course 280, clearing channel between Pandacan and Pangutaran Is. Captain orders course to Balikapan, Borneo at flank speed via Pangutaran Passage to Sulu Sea. Crew at battle ready.

13:20 3 enemy torpedo planes sighted preparing for starboard beam attack, range 3 miles. Battle stations ordered. Captain orders turn to port , new course 100.

13:21 All starboard secondary and after main battery firing. Torpedoes in the water! Course now 145. One enemy plane destroyed.

13:22 7 new enemy planes sighted approaching from SSE, range 2 miles! AA director orders new target. Forward mains firing. Course now 115.

13:23 Torpedoes in the water bearing 280. Torpedo hit near stern! Captain orders new course of 10.

13:24 2 torpedo hits engine compartment! 1 hit near bow.

13:25 Torpedo hit amidships. Captian orders new course 80. Heavy flooding No. 2 engine compartment. Large fire building amidships. Captain orders counterflooding. Speed reduced to 25 Kts.

.......

15:40 Starboard list 18 degrees. Speed reduced to 5 Kts to aid firefighting. Tarakan reports enemy CV operating in Sulu Sea 80 nm SSW our position.

15:45 Chief engineer reports damage likely fatal. Capatain orders course for Jolo Harbor with aim of beaching the Chicago in the tidal flats to effect repairs. Asiatic Fleet HQ informed of our intentions.

16:02 Asiatic Fleet HQ reports Jolo under attack.

.......

23:05 Course 120 speed, 8kts, 12 nm WNW of Jolo Harbor. Fires continue. Gunflashes bearing 170.

23:06 2 enemy APD sighted bearing 170, range 7000 yds. A and B battery firing independantly. C battery inactive due to powder magazine flooding. One APD burning. Range now 6000 yds.

23:07 Enemy APD explodes. Enemy AK under fire from 2 secondary batteries. Chicago now down 11 degrees by bow. Speed now 5 kts. Enemy vessles making smoke and retreating to SSE.

23:10 Firing ceased. Flooding forward powder magazine ordered to reduce risk from fire. Captain orders abandon ship. Crew ordered to make for Jolo.