ChezDaJez
Posts: 3436
Joined: 11/12/2004
From: Chehalis, WA
Status: offline
|
quote:
Howeaver as I have mentioned before all this real just caters to the Myth of the Japanese piolet pool and is as has been hinted at above part of the way the game is built and cant be entirely worked around. A look at the total number of Japanese piolets trained during the war and leval they were trained at particularly up till late 43 would shock many. The Japanese did expernce a lessing in the traing rutine but as Nikademus pointed out it was the old schoolers looking down on the Newbies in par tthat hepled to foster the idea that had not receaved a decent traing regime, a lot of the Pre War Training was on stuff not realy related to the Job at hand, they had a full well rounded training runtine that covered many subjects. Durning the early part of the war when traing was increased a lot of the fluff was removed. It was not untill late in 43 early 45 that Navay piolet traing saw an apricable drop in skilled out put. All this of course efeced by the war status at the time, In game the worsing war condations may not arise yet Japan must pay the price for it no mater what.
The following information was taken from Eric Bergerud's book, "Fire in the Sky", pages 324-326:
QUOTE
Here is what Captain Takeshi Mieno, Director of Flight Training for Navy Headquarters has to say about IJNAF pilot training when interrogated by USSBS personnel after the war:
"The flying experinece of the IJNAF pilots at Pearl Harbor averaged about 800 hours with a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 2500. That level was maintained by the first lilne IJNAF pilots until the Battle of Midway; the level fell off only gradually through 1942, but declined considerably in 1943 when field training was curtailed. In the Okinawa campaign, the average flying experience of pilots was between 200 and 300 hours, but that had been under instructors of less ability earlier. Physical standards of flying candidates were lowered slightly during the war, and the washout rate in flying schools was reduced from 40% to 5%."
Captain Minoru Genda, operational mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack, presented a similar picture:
"The strength of the IJNAF at the beginning of the war was 3000-4000 pilots. About 1500 were trained for carriers. The average experience of the pilots varied between 800-1000 hours. The minimum was 200-300. The Eleventh Air Fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor had 600 pilots with an average experience over 600 hours. A squadron leader averaged about 2000 hours. In 1945, the average was down to 400 hours with a minimum of 150."
Training within the army, unburdened with carrier operations, was less rigorous. Colonel Junji Hyashi, chief of staff of the army's 51st Training Division, told Allied Officers:
"IJAAF had approximately 2000 pilots with 300 hours training in 1941. Shortage of training personnel kept a buildup down until 1943. By the end of '43, we had 5000 pilots. However, the quality of the pilots steadily decreased as the war progressed. Originally students had 100 hours of primary training but that was shortened to 30. Sometimes the total came to 100- same as primary originally. We needed pilots in a hurry. Also fuel shortages began. We assigned more and more cadets to become instructors and thus instructors was not as good. We tried to find men who were wounded and could not fly combat for that role. We also used school graduates not up to the rigors of combat for instruction. There was no fixed rotation policy for pilots. Training divisions had 750 aircraft and each graduated 300 pilots every 3 months. Cadets had lower physical standards as war progressed, but mental skills remainined the same and there was no cause for degradation in that regard."
UNQUOTE
It goes on to say that the US 5th Air Force disputed these figures saying that the reported drop in Japanese flight experience was too rapid. According to the USAAF 5th Intelligence Division, the average Japanese naval pilot had 600-plus hours flying experience including training and operational experience. By August 1942, the 5th USAAF said that average Japanese flying experience had dropped to 500 hours; by July 1943 to 400 hours; by the beginning of 1944 to 300 hours.
It also reported that the Japanese allowed their highly experienced pilots to die in combat rather than rotate them back to Japan as instructors, the way th US did. They state that the number of Japanese pilots with 300-600 flight hours at the beginning of the war numbered about 1400. This number increased to 1800 by April 1943, dropping back to 1000 in early 1944. Also around April 1943, the Allies noted a large influx of trained Japanese pilots possessing 200-300 hours and attributed this to the large buildup of the reserve training program early in the war. From early-1944 on, there began a sharp decline in the quality of IJNAF pilots culminating with the Marianas Turkey shoot in mid-1944. Thereafter, the IJNAF was no longer a cohesive, skilled force. In a nutshell, it states that IJNAF pilots in mid-1944 possessed only 50% of the flying experience that their 1942 predecessors had. The IJAAF experience levels followed a nearly exact path with the exception that the IJNAF decline was first noted during the Battle for Gaudalcanal and the IJAAF decline was first noted during the air battles for New Guinea.
A couple of items for thought concerning differences in Japanese and US pilot training:
1. It wasn't the number of hours of training that was the problem for the Japanese until 1944, it was the quality of that training. In fact, the number of hours a IJNAF pilot received in training in 1943 compared favorably with US pilots but the US made extensive use of civilian pilots, some with thousands of hours, to provide primary flight training. These pilots, too old for combat duty, were commissioned in the USNR for the sole purpose of conducting flight training and were excellent instructors for the most part. US commanders also instituted a policy of rotating combat experienced pilots back to the States for use as instructors in advanced flight training schools. The Japanese were unable to provide seasoned pilots as instructors due to their non-rotation policy.
2. Air-to-Air gunnery. Jimmy Thatch noted during the Battle of Midway that IJNAF pilots were outstanding pilots but were also poor shots. A large part of this can be attributed to the fact that most Americans grew up using guns whereas the Japanese did not and so US pilots had a better, innate understanding of ballistics. But more importantly, the US stressed deflection shooting. The Japanese pilots were taught that the manuverability of their aircraft would allow them to gain an advantageous firing position from dead astern and this was true.... as long as the enemy attempted a "turn and burn" fight with a Japanese fighter. But Allied "boom and zoom" seldom yielded more than a fleeting deflection shot. One interesting note is that neither IJNAF/IJAAF or USN/USAAF provided for gunnery practice during primary or advanced training. The US pilots didn't receive aerial gunnery training until the had arrived at a fleet replacement center while the only gunnery training afforded IJNAF pilots consisted of strafing a fixed object in the water.
3. Aircraft Maintenance. Much has been made of the shoestrings efforts by US avaition maintenance personnel during the battles for the South Pacific to keep aircraft in the air. Shortages of spare parts, extended use of aircraft, primitive living conditions and inadequate training all contributed to reduce maintenance. But the US had an advantage that the Japanese did not. US and Allied boys were tinkerers by nature and, having grown up utilizing and repairing machinary, they had excellent mechanical aptitudes. Basically, they knew the proper "use" of baling wire and bubble gum before entry into the military. They also had little fear of bureaucratic BS and were able to jury-rig aircraft into flying condition.
On the other hand, Japanese mechanics had to be trained from the ground up and much of their training was rudimentary, starting with, "This is a wrench.". They might be taught how to replace a spark plug but not its importance. Japan was in the process of transitioning from an agricultural-based, feudal society to an industrialized one when the war started. Most Japanese men had little, if any, mechanical knowledge before entry into the service. Their shortage of spare parts was far more acute than ours after Guadalcanal and Japanese mechanics showed little aptitude for improvisation in the field. Once troublesome aircraft like the Tony arrived, the maintenance became a nightmare.
4. Another major contribution to the depletion of the Japanese air forces was the lack of a coordinated search and rescue plan. US forces expended extensive efforts in recovering downed airmen whereas the Japanese were either unwilling or unable to do so. This, coupled with the inability of their aircraft to absorb battle damage, virtually assured the loss of an experienced pilot even when able to bail out.
Bottomline is that Japanese pilot training decreased dramatically in effectiveness after 1943 and US training efforts, after a shakey start, continued to improve throughout the war. This training, combined with increasingly superior aircraft, allowed the Allies first stalemate the Japanese in the air during 1942 and then wrest air superiority away from the Japanese during 1943. By mid-44, it was no contest.
Chez
< Message edited by ChezDaJez -- 9/9/2005 11:07:55 AM >
_____________________________
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
|
Printable Version
RE: Japanese pilot replacement at start pool - 
New Messages
No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages
Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages
Locked w/o New Messages
Post New Thread