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Alfred -> RE: 14th August 1944 (3/11/2007 12:10:53 PM)
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Speedy,
I am not comfortable with the options you have listed in your post #1430. Before giving my reasons I will outline certain assumptions/understandings I have. Of course these may be quite incorrect and therefore invalidate my arguments.
My Assumptions/Understandings
1. The landings in the Saigon and east Malaya zones are intended to assist/develop your Victoria Point offensive.
2. My initial understanding was that the Saigon/east Malaya units, coming from Borneo, would be Australian/American units either already in Borneo or transiting from Darwin. However I may have misread you and point 3 applies instead.
3. The Saigon/east Malaya units are British units, amounting to about 1000 AV, which will be transported west (IRL south) of Sumatra and Java to Borneo.
4. You feel you can not gainfully employ spare British units in Burma and therefore, like Churchill and Lloyd George in WWI, seek gainful employment away from the "Western Front". In other words these options are not presented as a means to directly assist the current Burma and Borneo operations.
5. The Victoria Point garrison will not simply stay put but eventually will move somewhere. Although not specified where, I suspect logically it will move to reinforce the action taken either in east Malaya or the Saigon area.
6. Based on the disclosed AV of Allied troops to be deployed, Japanese opposition is expected to be light.
Speedy's Offered Options
1. Amphibious capture of Victoria Point, pin Jap at Tavoy with Moulmein units, and invade east Malaya (suggested sites are Mersing or Kuantun).
2. Amphibious capture of Victoria Point or Georgetown, and invade Indochina (suggested sites are Saigon or Kompong Trach).
Perceived Pros and Cons of Speedy's Outlined Options
The obvious benefits are that if successfully carried out and consolidated, either option will gain VP more rapidly than a successful breach of the Burma front. Unlike Option 2, Option 1 at least limits operations to roughly one area (viz Malaya) and the separate assaults may have a complementary multiplier effect on each other. Option 2 may limit the overland transportation of resources, oil, supplies etc between south and north Asia.
IMHO, the cons far outweigh the pros. Consider these observations.
An amphibious landing at Victoria Point is OK because, according to your screenshot, that location is ungarrisoned and will be linked up with the Burma front when you move from Moulmein to Tavoy, but the other amphibious operations keep reminding me of Gallipoli. They seem to be a dissipation of effort with dubious tactical, let alone strategic, value. In short, without additional complementary operations, the east Malaya/Saigon landings are dead ends which will constitute a serious drain on your logistics.
If you are intending to use only British forces (see assumption #3 above), to succeed the east Malay/Saigon area operations require minimal Japanese resistance, both in the local garrison and in the available Japanese land and air units which are in the vicinity and can be used to conterattack the beachhead and naval resupply. If on the other hand you intend to use other allied units (see assumption 2 above) then you may have more than 1000 AV available but for reasons which I outline below, these Allied troops would be better employed elsewhere.
IIRC, the situation on Borneo was that you had encountered stronger resistance, particularly at Balikpapan, than expected. To capture all of Borneo, and this includes Tarakan, Kuching, Miri, Brunei and particularly Jesselton, you may well need, without receiving substantial reinforcements, more than 3 months. Until you control all of Borneo, crossing the wide South China sea with the ever present threat of kamikazis is fraught with danger. Such a crossing is not comparable to the sea thrust to Banjarmasin because then there were no kamikazis available and there were no enemy air bases on your flanks (Java having been neutralised). The numerous air bases in Malaya, Indochina, Hainan and the remaining Borneo bases are significant threats.
The nearest potential land bases to support a Saigon landing are Kuching (10 hexes distant) and Miri and Brunei (both 11 hexes distant). None of these bases is yet under Allied control. At 10 and 11 hexes only P-38J and, from September 1944, P-51D will be able to provide LRCAP but this would be only at extended range. Saigon itself has four major airbases within extremely close range:
Bien Hoa (1 hex distant) max size 8
Phnom Penh (2 hex distant) max size 7
Camranh Bay (3 hex distant) max size 9
Kompong Trach (3 hex distant) max size 5
Will your Lightnings (and eventually Mustangs) fatigue and morale be able to provide continuous LRCAP?
The situation regarding Mersing is not quite as bad in as much as both Kuching and Singakwang (the latter being in Allied hands) are only 8 hexes distant. LRCAP at normal range is therefore possible for Mersing, but not for Kuantan. Mersing also has 4 airbases in close proximity:
Singapore (1 hex distant)
Johore Bahru (1 hex distant)
Malacca (2 hex distant)
Kuantan (2 hex distant)
Admittedly you could use naval airpower to assist but wouldn't USN CV be occupied with Iwo Jima and follow on actions. That would leave CVE. Remembering what happened recently in the Moluccas, do you seriously think the South China sea would be a safe working environment for CVEs?
I am not certain but I think that a Saigon invasion activates four new enemy divisions in Indochina.
Maximising Speedy's Outlined Options
Of the two options, I think option 1 is by far the best although I would prefer that you cut out the east Malaya landing and concentrated all the units at Victoria Point. Nevertheless if you implement it as outlined, I would add the following:
A. From Victoria Point move to Krung Thep and if you have sufficient force invest Bangkok. This will cut off supply to Rahaeng which is the entire supply terminal for the Burma front.
B. Before launching the east Malaya operation, capture Sinkep Island. This island is only 4 hexes from Mersing and will allow you to base your short legged fighters to provide cap and help to neutralise the Singapore, Johore Bahru et al airbases.
Alternative Plans
Assuming that we are dealing only with British units and that you are looking to open up a new front, I would consider Sabang. The screen shot shows no garrison but there must be some present as there are aircraft. Your earmarked forces should suffice for its early capture, well within 3 months. The infrastructure on Sumatra will not allow for any significant Japanese counterattack on Sabang. From Sabang you can leisurely stroll overland to capture, in order, Kuala, Medan and Bankha. Sabang is a max size 6 airbase and only 9 hexes from Singapore and less from Johore Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, therefore if your Liberator VI are bored with ground attacks in Burma, they can switch to new targets. You own the Andaman Sea therefore your logisitics to Sabang are invulnerable.
With Sabang under your control, you can consider limited amphibious actions against Padang and Benkolen. These two locations will allow short range British aircraft to operate against Palembang and Batavia.
Even if you completely dismiss everything I hope at least it aids you in reaching a decision.
Alfred
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