quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

quote:

CAP is not able to do what Japanese CAP could really do - engage in OTHER hexes. [See the record of Genda's Blade for one - and there was a similar JAAF outfit. They used recon planes to find enemy strikes far from their targets and engage them with fighters en route. They used electronic warning systems to find the strike packages. NONE of this is EVER possible in WITP - so you NEVER have to worry about what real commanders had to face.]

I regularly see my area CAP effectively intercept incoming strikes against targets up to two hexes away.

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

All well and good and interesting, except you misstate the case when you call the USN intelligence error an "operational defeat." It was nothing of the kind.

You are not using your terminology precisely: a failure of reconnaissance is an OPERATIONAL failure, not an intelligence failure. And the Japanese understanding of our intentions was a judgement by their commander, not intelligence superiority. Our failure to understand the Japanese intentions also was an error in judgement by our commander, not a failure of intelligence. I repeat - you are about 90% confused about what happened - so you cannot achieve a useful analysis - until you come to terms with what happened. IF you don't understand our OPERATIONAL failure, you are still confused.

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ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

Make fatigue a greater factor by increasing the fatigue rate so those silicon pilots and soldiers become in effective unless they are rested and fed. So players would be foolish to abuse them so...

Go over to UV and look up the way players felt about heavy bombers when they would not fly without being treated like babies. It may be that bombers and crews were temprimental, but players don't like units like that!

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

ORIGINAL: witpqs

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

Make fatigue a greater factor by increasing the fatigue rate so those silicon pilots and soldiers become in effective unless they are rested and fed. So players would be foolish to abuse them so...

Go over to UV and look up the way players felt about heavy bombers when they would not fly without being treated like babies. It may be that bombers and crews were temprimental, but players don't like units like that!

Well Cid, if you are saying the sqweeky wheel get's the grease, I'd say you are generalizing. I'm like a screaming seized bearing and have been, but no joy aside from getting Canada in...guess you have to be loud and wrong to get something alterred.[8D]

I got a favorable response by being polite and right...

I used to be polite...[:(]

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

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Have you looked at the stock OOBs and replacement rates and such? Does any of that suggest anyone could expect historical play, given the system in place?

I have. They are pretty awful. We can certainly expect a lot better results if we fix them - which we can. We probably cannot make a useful criticism of the model until we do. And if you play me, you may expect historical play by the other side. Maybe creative - I won't promise not to invade Hawaii - and in fact the only reason I won't is it is impossible with the current system. But it was really possible and should have been done - for lots of reasons. It totally changes the strategic situation, and focus of operations, and gives a nice bargaining chip to end the war with. If the US tries to take Hawaii back and fails (which is fairly likely since there are no air bases in range) - it may prefer a neutral Hawaii to a Japanese one. But I do expect historical play - not gamey play.

See the 'Bloody Pacific' AAR. Admiral Laurent captured Hawaii.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Erik Rutins

snip...

Very large battles get very bloody and differences in quality of aircraft and pilots (especially on the order of a 20-30 point difference in experience) tend to exacerbate that.

...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Demosthenes

quote:

ORIGINAL: Erik Rutins

snip...

Very large battles get very bloody and differences in quality of aircraft and pilots (especially on the order of a 20-30 point difference in experience) tend to exacerbate that.

...

Has anyone (other than Ron Saueracker) considered simply lowering pilot quality down?
Say Japanese at 55 to 60 and Allied 50 to 55? (+5 for CV and elite sqdns).

Let's see if that won't make ALL air combat - and especially large ones - less bloody?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

I'm ashamed to admit that I read most of this thread, even after promising myself I wouldn't get embroiled into any rants.

I really like this game, and after 18 months really want to love it, but I think I'm going to have to finally admit it's screwed up beyond repair, hope someone starts from scratch on a similar project, and just try to enjoy my pbems despite some wacky outcomes. It's the "healthy" thing to do, and I suggest you all take a step back and stop bitching about the mechanics. It's like complaining that it keeps raining.

Anyone with me?[&:]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

I'm ashamed to admit that I read most of this thread, even after promising myself I wouldn't get embroiled into any rants.

I really like this game, and after 18 months really want to love it, but I think I'm going to have to finally admit it's screwed up beyond repair, hope someone starts from scratch on a similar project, and just try to enjoy my pbems despite some wacky outcomes. It's the "healthy" thing to do, and I suggest you all take a step back and stop bitching about the mechanics. It's like complaining that it keeps raining.

Anyone with me?[&:]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

I'm ashamed to admit that I read most of this thread, even after promising myself I wouldn't get embroiled into any rants.

I really like this game, and after 18 months really want to love it, but I think I'm going to have to finally admit it's screwed up beyond repair, hope someone starts from scratch on a similar project, and just try to enjoy my pbems despite some wacky outcomes. It's the "healthy" thing to do, and I suggest you all take a step back and stop bitching about the mechanics. It's like complaining that it keeps raining.

Anyone with me?[&:]

Agree somewhat but what's the point in attempting a WITP 2 if the various issues in WITP are not ironed out and explored further? Seems to me this game may as well be used as the test bed it actually comes across as. Fix the bugs, watch play for a year or so more, tweak various issues again, and so on. Then, when someone does attempt the project again they will have some idea and some experience. No point in just regurgitating the same concepts and design assumptions over and over as has been done up to now. You end up with something that hits a target like a shotgun rather than a tight grouping. A few shots in or near the bull, the rest just fanning out further and further from centre.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

I'm ashamed to admit that I read most of this thread, even after promising myself I wouldn't get embroiled into any rants.

I really like this game, and after 18 months really want to love it, but I think I'm going to have to finally admit it's screwed up beyond repair, hope someone starts from scratch on a similar project, and just try to enjoy my pbems despite some wacky outcomes. It's the "healthy" thing to do, and I suggest you all take a step back and stop bitching about the mechanics. It's like complaining that it keeps raining.

Anyone with me?[&:]

Agree somewhat but what's the point in attempting a WITP 2 if the various issues in WITP are not ironed out and explored further? Seems to me this game may as well be used as the test bed it actually comes across as. Fix the bugs, watch play for a year or so more, tweak various issues again, and so on. Then, when someone does attempt the project again they will have some idea and some experience. No point in just regurgitating the same concepts and design assumptions over and over as has been done up to now. You end up with something that hits a target like a shotgun rather than a tight grouping. A few shots in or near the bull, the rest just fanning out further and further from centre.

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

I'm ashamed to admit that I read most of this thread, even after promising myself I wouldn't get embroiled into any rants.

I really like this game, and after 18 months really want to love it, but I think I'm going to have to finally admit it's screwed up beyond repair, hope someone starts from scratch on a similar project, and just try to enjoy my pbems despite some wacky outcomes. It's the "healthy" thing to do, and I suggest you all take a step back and stop bitching about the mechanics. It's like complaining that it keeps raining.

Anyone with me?[&:]

Agree somewhat but what's the point in attempting a WITP 2 if the various issues in WITP are not ironed out and explored further? Seems to me this game may as well be used as the test bed it actually comes across as. Fix the bugs, watch play for a year or so more, tweak various issues again, and so on. Then, when someone does attempt the project again they will have some idea and some experience. No point in just regurgitating the same concepts and design assumptions over and over as has been done up to now. You end up with something that hits a target like a shotgun rather than a tight grouping. A few shots in or near the bull, the rest just fanning out further and further from centre.

But why run tests with a system that is broken...After a while I'm sure it became apparent that the square wheel just wasn't cutting it.

EDIT: Yes a bit harsh but afterall nothing would ever get fixed if no one complained.

quote:

I regularly see my area CAP effectively intercept incoming strikes against targets up to two hexes away.

So have I.

quote:

A "failure" or "mistake" or "momentary or one-off lapse" here and there during an operation is one thing, an "operational defeat" per se is quite another. My point is that we did not suffer any kind of defeat, in any manner, shape or form, in the Marianas. You said we did. Therefore you were mistaken. End of point.

I'm hardly about 90% confused as to what happened, Sid. You're not the only person on this board who has a sound education in military history. You ought to believe that, though you sometimes seem not to.

quote:

But that's not the way to handle it. It isn't a "morale" issue but a command decision. "Morale" is always an issue in war (it's always an issue in life!) and must be (should be) taken into due consideration. But if pilots are available to fly planes that are capable to fly, and those pilots are ordered (wisely or no) to fly those planes, then those planes ought to fly. That is how it works in real life.

quote:

Very large battles get very bloody and differences in quality of aircraft and pilots (especially on the order of a 20-30 point difference in experience) tend to exacerbate that.

quote:

But, an *exchange ratio* is something that happens over time for a number of engagements. You can not expect that ratio to hold for every engagement. There were times when the Japanese, even in 1945, were able to achieve surprise and had a positive *engagement ratio* for that engagement. Additionally, the historic *engagement ratio* is for historic forces. As soon as a game of War in the Pacific gets to turn 2 things are no longer historic.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

A "failure" or "mistake" or "momentary or one-off lapse" here and there during an operation is one thing, an "operational defeat" per se is quite another. My point is that we did not suffer any kind of defeat, in any manner, shape or form, in the Marianas. You said we did. Therefore you were mistaken. End of point.

I'm hardly about 90% confused as to what happened, Sid. You're not the only person on this board who has a sound education in military history. You ought to believe that, though you sometimes seem not to.

To begin at the end, I don't think I have a "sound education in military history." I once asked a (British) historian I knew fairly well - the historian of Evergreen State University - an unusual school that allows you to define your own program in any field - about getting a degree in history. She said "Don't you dare." She went on to say things too flattering to repeat - but the point is I have no education in history whatever in a formal academic sense - although I do write for academics and authors - particularly on the technical side - and particularly about Japan.

What I do have is a bit of formal military training - and exposure to IDF under circumstances we cannot talk about (because we were never there). And also I have an article from US professional naval literature whose thesis I am merely agreeing with - not inventing. The US did suffer an operational defeat at the Marianas - and we need to insure our naval-air students understand this - and why. There was nothing momentary about it. We had a fundamentally flawed operational plan, based on a wholly incorrect assessment of the situation by our commander. He thought he understood what the Japanese commander was thinking and could do - and he had it exactly backwards. The Japanese commander understood what we were going to do, and when and where we were going to do it. He did all you can ask a good fleet commander of the carrier sort to do: he put his carriers undetected in range of the enemy and launched what was to that point the largest naval air strike in the history of Japan - and possibly of the world. That it turned to mud tactically he could not know - nor could we. That the scope of our tactical victory outweighed the utter mess we made of things operationally does not change that we better NOT be letting OTHER enemy carrier fleets get undetected into strike range and launch a full strike against us. This is a really big deal and I don't care a whit who is upset by saying so - or what their formal credentials may be? It needs to be understood and I will say it at every opportunity. In fact the more unpopular it is the more it needs to be said. I think IDF has it right:

"The side that wins is not the side that makes the fewest mistakes. The side that wins is the side that learns from its mistakes fastest. This requires ruthless self criticism without any trace of sentiment."

quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

A "failure" or "mistake" or "momentary or one-off lapse" here and there during an operation is one thing, an "operational defeat" per se is quite another. My point is that we did not suffer any kind of defeat, in any manner, shape or form, in the Marianas. You said we did. Therefore you were mistaken. End of point.

I'm hardly about 90% confused as to what happened, Sid. You're not the only person on this board who has a sound education in military history. You ought to believe that, though you sometimes seem not to.

To begin at the end, I don't think I have a "sound education in military history." I once asked a (British) historian I knew fairly well - the historian of Evergreen State University - an unusual school that allows you to define your own program in any field - about getting a degree in history. She said "Don't you dare." She went on to say things too flattering to repeat - but the point is I have no education in history whatever in a formal academic sense - although I do write for academics and authors - particularly on the technical side - and particularly about Japan.

What I do have is a bit of formal military training - and exposure to IDF under circumstances we cannot talk about (because we were never there). And also I have an article from US professional naval literature whose thesis I am merely agreeing with - not inventing. The US did suffer an operational defeat at the Marianas - and we need to insure our naval-air students understand this - and why. There was nothing momentary about it. We had a fundamentally flawed operational plan, based on a wholly incorrect assessment of the situation by our commander. He thought he understood what the Japanese commander was thinking and could do - and he had it exactly backwards. The Japanese commander understood what we were going to do, and when and where we were going to do it. He did all you can ask a good fleet commander of the carrier sort to do: he put his carriers undetected in range of the enemy and launched what was to that point the largest naval air strike in the history of Japan - and possibly of the world. That it turned to mud tactically he could not know - nor could we. That the scope of our tactical victory outweighed the utter mess we made of things operationally does not change that we better NOT be letting OTHER enemy carrier fleets get undetected into strike range and launch a full strike against us. This is a really big deal and I don't care a whit who is upset by saying so - or what their formal credentials may be? It needs to be understood and I will say it at every opportunity. In fact the more unpopular it is the more it needs to be said. I think IDF has it right:

"The side that wins is not the side that makes the fewest mistakes. The side that wins is the side that learns from its mistakes fastest. This requires ruthless self criticism without any trace of sentiment."

My problem with your thesis is the Japanese plan called for their strike to be launched well outside American range using Guam as a staging base. The carrier planes would launch strike the Americans and return to Guam and not the carriers then rearm and refuel and return to the carriers, thereby allowing Ozawa to keep his carriers well outside the range of the Americans.

In addition the Japanese were far from undetected having been shadowed by American submarines for five days, in addition Ozawa had broken radio silence to order the Guam based aircraft to attack.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ABSOLUTELY. They were hardly "unspotted" when two of their best CV's had been sunk by US subs. Their "plan" called for taking advantage of their A/C's longer range and the Mariania's Airfields to strike from ranges at which the US couldn't retaliate. Nimitz accepted this scenario, and used TF 58 defensively.
With the US's massive superiority in Radar, AAA, and Fighter Direction Center control, he realized that the Japanese plan actually played to US strengths. "The Great Mariana's Turkey Shoot" was a well-planned defensive victory. Who wound up chasing who home?

quote:

I guess I just don't understand your definition of "operational defeat".

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ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

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ORIGINAL: BlackVoid

It's already fixed in Nik's mod. In stock game A2A is way too bloody.

Not quite. CAP needs to be tweaked.

quote:

ORIGINAL: el cid again

quote:

Very large battles get very bloody and differences in quality of aircraft and pilots (especially on the order of a 20-30 point difference in experience) tend to exacerbate that.

Maybe it is just me, but I think a large difference in experience PLUS plane quality OUGHT to make things very much like shooting fish in a barrel!

In a simulator, I will take the inferior plane. And I will win, mostly. It is not the plane that matters - it is the pilot.

I know a Chinese aggressor unit leader who was told he was going to get new Su-27s. "I don't want them" he said. "I can do a better job with what I have" (a version of the venerable MiG-21 - although a very very nice rewinged version in a different league than any MiG-21 you ever saw - the J-7E). No one thought it possible - but he was adament - and he suckered them into a contest: he alone without a wingman vs the most experienced flight of Su-27s in the PLAAF. He got two camera kills and drove the other two from the sky for fear of also being kills. But he had over 5,000 hours in fast movers - and virtually no one was in his league.

Pilot quality alone ought to be decisive. Air combat is determined by who sees the enemy first (today that includes "detects" by non visual means).
Japan had a real edge because they trained to see first magnitude stars in daylight - we still do not do that. The plane with surprise wins 9 times in 10 - regardless of other factors. It has been so since WWI and may always remain so. The way an experienced pilot wins is not to fight fair - none of this head to head stuff. He figures out how to ambush. Many really good aces did NOT enter the "furball" at all - they hung out waiting for some wounded straggler to limp home without a wingman - and then tried to come in on him from a blind angle. He also was probably low on ammunition and fuel. Victory is victory, and has nothing to do with Marcus of Queensberry rules. I win by deceiving you about where I am - until it is too late. And I put all my energy into knowing where you are - even when it is "impossible" I will know.

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ABSOLUTELY. They were hardly "unspotted" when two of their best CV's had been sunk by US subs. Their "plan" called for taking advantage of their A/C's longer range and the Mariania's Airfields to strike from ranges at which the US couldn't retaliate. Nimitz accepted this scenario, and used TF 58 defensively.
With the US's massive superiority in Radar, AAA, and Fighter Direction Center control, he realized that the Japanese plan actually played to US strengths. "The Great Mariana's Turkey Shoot" was a well-planned defensive victory. Who wound up chasing who home?

I think the shuttle-bombing plan (as it was later called) was not anticipated.
I also think you are quite right about the tactics playing right into the USN strengths at the time. However, AFAIK the plan was for more of a coordinated strike rather than such a piecemeal affair, which might have proven more troublesome. Who can say? We only know what really did happen.