Carrier grouping (Full Version)

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alfrake -> Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 6:57:32 AM)

I understand that Allied carriers need to be in personal TFs early in the war because the game is hard coded to hurt multi-carrier TFs for them. But why would you ever want lots of carriers in one TF instead of lots of single carrier TFs following each other around?

In practice, it seems that the strike targetting code gets obsessed with a single TF and sends everything at it. If you have only one carrier in that TF, the other carriers don't get attacked. The one carrier may die, but that's a lot better than multiple ones dying.
I've played through multiple battles with my 6 Japanese carriers fighting 5 allied carriers in March or April of 42 (test runs repeated). The KB is one TF, the allies are in 5 TFs all in the same hex. 1 to 4 hexes flight range. Essentially, each day the Japanese sink one allied carrier. I believe they have never attacked two carriers on the same AM/PM operation phase and rarely on the same day. The Allies tend to hit multiple Japanese carriers. I have doubts that the damaged Japanese carriers will survive and they are wrecked even if they do. As the Japanese are overkilling allied carriers, the engagement ends up roughly a material draw, which is a massive defeat for Japan. 2 dead allied carriers vs one to two wrecked and one to two damaged Japanese carriers is a disaster for Japan.

Is this just something I'm encountering? If so, how do I avoid it? Or should the KB just operate as 6 TFs?




Milman -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 12:15:25 PM)

I lost 3/4 CV as a allied and hit 2 JAP CV's with 2 bomb each(both survived) with that tactic . It was may 42 . What is date in your test ?




Andy Mac -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 3:37:11 PM)

Ouch 6 CV's even Jap ones in a single TF is to much after Pearl.

Should have AT LEAST 2 TF's of 3 each IMO




niceguy2005 -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 4:42:10 PM)

I've been playing PBEM so long that it's hard to recall my last carrier duel (I'm very careful with my allied carriers). What I do recall of the outcomes, were that the planes do tend to concentrate on specific TFs, so you're carriers in one TF tend to take a beating. Also, planes do tend to gang up on injured ships, carriers or otherwise. So, once hit, a carrier is more likely to be hit again. However, playing Coral Sea and GC several times, I have had lots of instances with one US carrier sunk, one severly wounded or sunk. Often Japanese damage was one or two CVs damaged, but not sunk.





DFalcon -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 6:25:24 PM)

I want larger carrier groups when I have overwhelming force. If the strikes I expect are weak then I want any damage spread across multiple targets. It is then less likely a few hits will cause serious damage. If the attack is going to be strong then I want it to limit damage by limiting the targets and use smaller TFs. Better to have one CV hit 20 times than 4 hit 5 times each.




alfrake -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/18/2006 7:55:35 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac
Ouch 6 CV's even Jap ones in a single TF is to much after Pearl.
Should have AT LEAST 2 TF's of 3 each IMO


But why? My comment about overkill and spreading attacks, or something else?
And why not just 6 TFs with 1 CV each?




tsimmonds -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/19/2006 12:37:10 AM)

As IJ I put 2 CV and 1 CVL in each. Can't have more TFs cause not enough escorts. Don't want fewer TFs cause too dangerous. You can always operate multiple TFs together for extra weight.




spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/19/2006 12:58:11 AM)

WitP wrongly it would seem presumes that the Japanese fought the KB in a manner identical to the USN's TF38/58.

According to Shattered Sword the KB's fighting formation was extremely dispersed with the carriers steaming in a rough box/rectangle formation separated from each other by 3-4000 meters, the heavy screening units deployed in a circle roughly 8000 meters from the carriers, and the majority of the destroyers in a rough circle 15000 meters from the CVs (the whole formation thus sorta resembles a "Bullseye" with 3 concentric circles of warships). Only a single plane guard destroyer operated closely enough to each CV to actually assist in the carrier's defense with its flak guns.

The purpose of this dispersal was to provide air raid early warning so that the CAP could deal with the attack before the attackers reached attack positions. The CVs were expected to deal with those attackers that penetrated the CAP with their own flak and especially radical manuevering. Even after Midway the Japanese did not adopt the idea of a tight protective formation around the CVs although they did
recognize that the overall dispersal of their huge fleet in that battle had handicapped them there. After Midway they concentrated the fleet better but instead of deploying the heavy ships in direct support of the CVs they used them in an extended scouting formation 100-200 kms in front of the CVs (more or less in the direction the enemy was supposed to lie): the purpose of this Van Force was to provide early air raid warning and also to deploy the scout planes of the BBs/CAs closer to the enemy. This type of fleet deployment is evident in the deployment of the IJN at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.
The idea of a tighter steaming formation of mutually (flak) supporting ships eventually did develop in the IJN in 1944.

To refight Midway as a WitP CV vs CV Battle:

Within the framework of WitP mechanics deploy the KB as 4 TFs of 1 CV and 1 DD operating (folowing would be best I guess) in the same hex along with a Surf TF composed of 2 BBs, 2-4 CAs and 6-8 DDs fighting against 3 US CVs + cruisers and destroyers deployed according to US doctrine




jolly_pillager -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/19/2006 10:34:10 PM)

Because Japan does not have the escorts for that many CV TF's




herwin -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/19/2006 11:58:38 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: alfrake

quote:

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac
Ouch 6 CV's even Jap ones in a single TF is to much after Pearl.
Should have AT LEAST 2 TF's of 3 each IMO


But why? My comment about overkill and spreading attacks, or something else?
And why not just 6 TFs with 1 CV each?


History:

At the very beginning of the war, it looked like a deckload strike could take out a couple of carriers, so the USN didn't want that deckload to find more than one carrier at a time. The results of the early battles seemed to support that assessment. Later the defense got better, so multi-CV TFs were introduced to coordinate multi-airgroup strikes. Plus, several CVs could then share a screen. The IJN was _always_ short of escorts, so they always operated in multi-CV TFs.

BTW, the escort group for the Pearl Harbor attack consisted of two fast BBs, two scout CAs, and nine DDs for six CVs. Essentially nil screen, since there would have been a hole somewhere from the attack to penetrate to the carriers. If Halsey had found the KB (or the oiler group they brought to give them the range to reach Pearl), it would have been messy. The Japanese estimated they would lose two CVs in the operation, and expected to sink at least one carrier. Given that the KB had almost no way to stop an American dive bomber attack--a Zero couldn't catch an SBD once it went into its dive--the estimate was probably accurate. If Lexington and Enterprise ganged up on the KB, it might have been Midway six months early. My dream as the Allies is to find and sink the IJN replenishment group, then snipe at the KB as it slowly steams home on its remaining fuel. Even if the carriers got back intact, the Japanese naval offensive would have been very short legged with no AOs left.

Also note the US carriers had been practicing surprise attacks as Orange on Pearl through the 30s--the Japanese attack was not a surprise to a lot of people.




spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/23/2006 11:44:11 PM)

quote:

Because Japan does not have the escorts for that many CV TF's


NOT TRUE IF YOU ACTUALLY FIGHT IN THE MANNER OF THE JAPANESE (that is to say according to the official doctrine of the Imperial Japanese Navy).

As I mentioned above, the number of close escorts for 6 CVs would be 6 DDs parcelled out 1 to each of the CVs.




bradfordkay -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 7:03:29 AM)

"In practice, it seems that the strike targetting code gets obsessed with a single TF and sends everything at it. If you have only one carrier in that TF, the other carriers don't get attacked. The one carrier may die, but that's a lot better than multiple ones dying."


Which is a pretty accurate description of what happened with the Japanese attacks at Midway, and as such it seems to justify what Herwin describes as the USN mindset in the early war.




akdreemer -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 8:45:33 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

Ouch 6 CV's even Jap ones in a single TF is to much after Pearl.

Should have AT LEAST 2 TF's of 3 each IMO

Really, there were 5 in the India Ocean Strike and would have been six again if the SHo and Zui had been more sucessful. At Midway there were 4 and should have been 6. Japanese carriers on the whole less capacity, and less robust, aircraft. Their fleet antiaircraft doctrine was poor with every ship maneuvering independently and no central doctrine that stressed protecting the carriers by forming a ring at close range. So they had a very good first strike capability, could dish it out, but could not take it. In smaller groups of carriers they should get mauled.

There is a chapter that discusses this statistically in "Fleet Tactic: theory and practice", by Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. USN (Ret) and published by Naval Institute Press. A very interesting and informative read.




medicff -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 6:55:41 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: DFalcon

I want larger carrier groups when I have overwhelming force. If the strikes I expect are weak then I want any damage spread across multiple targets. It is then less likely a few hits will cause serious damage. If the attack is going to be strong then I want it to limit damage by limiting the targets and use smaller TFs. Better to have one CV hit 20 times than 4 hit 5 times each.


As far as target acquistion spreading out it good, however for defense (CAP) it is better for the IJN to group together as their penalty is far less and can mass a larger CAP for ALL incoming small strikes. IF together CAP comes as one of larger percentage of planes available, IF in separate TF then a small CAP contingent comes from the other TF and a larger percentage from the one under attack. Therefore if split your CAP is less if IJN. If US, the early war penalty makes you split in the beginning as there is no combined CAP benefit (over 100 A/C in TF reduces those launching)




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 10:09:59 PM)

Shattered sword suggested that the Japanese tendancy to spread out the escorts was actually a proper use for their escorts, at least if they were weakly armed with AA guns. They pointed to the fact that the majority of the Midway Kido Butai AA power was actually concentrated among the four CV's themselves. The DD's basically just had their 25mm mounts, which would serve little...while Tone and Chikuma's scouting duties made their modest AA firepower a tradeoff if they coudn't do their scouting. There were of course the two Kirishima's as well.

Faced with that, it made more sense to spread out the DD's as distant visual warning could (and did) serve them well in alerting the CAP and the gunners. (radar is of course a better option)

If some AA DD's are available though they'd probably stick closer to the carriers as that was what they were built for.

If I'm going to be insisted on forming a TF with 1 DD for each CV, then i'd also want to see each US TF formed with one CV and a ring defense and no combining of air strikes [;)]

For the original poster....in game a good Japanese loadout is 4 CV's or 3 CV + 1 CVL per TF. Spreads things out nicely. USN TF's do just fine with two CV's per. In some cases you can get away with 3 CV in one TF.





dtravel -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 10:32:48 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Shattered sword suggested that the Japanese tendancy to spread out the escorts was actually a proper use for their escorts, at least if they were weakly armed with AA guns. They pointed to the fact that the majority of the Midway Kido Butai AA power was actually concentrated among the four CV's themselves. The DD's basically just had their 25mm mounts, which would serve little...while Tone and Chikuma's scouting duties made their modest AA firepower a tradeoff if they coudn't do their scouting. There were of course the two Kirishima's as well.

Faced with that, it made more sense to spread out the DD's as distant visual warning could (and did) serve them well in alerting the CAP and the gunners. (radar is of course a better option)

If some AA DD's are available though they'd probably stick closer to the carriers as that was what they were built for.



I'd say that is an example of doctrine affecting ship construction. If the IJN had had a doctrine of close in AAA support, then they would have built cruisers and destroyers with more AAA to provide it.

You may fight with what you have, but you build what you think you are going to use. (The corollary, of course, being that you then get your behind kicked and rethink everything for the next war. [:'(])




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 11:02:29 PM)

well the Japanese weren't stupid. I'm sure they were aware of the deficiency of their DD's as "AA" escorts in terms of the "DP" main armament, hence the Akizuki class but being aware of it and aggressively doing something about it are two different things. Another good point that Parshalls and Tully wrote about was that the whole concept of carrier forces was a 'new' technology and that there wasn't yet a long playbook to fall back on. The book was being written as the various navies went along. Another interesting point made was in loose relation to "victory disease". Disease in that having won so many victories early on, it did not spur them to innovate and make changes or adjustments. Nothing spurs innovation as much as defeat and in the dark early days of the Pacific war, the USN had to do some innovating. Good example: After Coral Sea....Yorktown was the first carrier to institute a policy of draining the fuel lines during an attack and filling them with inert gas. They felt it probably saved Yorktown from a similar fate as befell Kaga and Soryu.




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 11:15:28 PM)

Thread reminds me of GG's Carrier Force game. In it....all Japanese AA values were multplied by 0.75 when "attacking" aircraft. That was a neat and simple solution. You could form your TF composition anyway you want....but the AA values would not be added up in a 1:1 manner by at .75 Neat simple solution.

Course in a game the scale of WitP, this would have to be a rule with an expiration date.




spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 11:37:56 PM)

quote:

If I'm going to be insisted on forming a TF with 1 DD for each CV, then i'd also want to see each US TF formed with one CV and a ring defense and no combining of air strikes


Can't insist on any such thing. There is already a hard-coded rule that makes a coordinated strike by a/c from more than one US CV in 1942 unlikely. It just seems that assumptions re "best practice" were made without adequate research. As noted above, the "book" was getting written, throughout the war in fact; and the two sides were never on the same page.




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/24/2006 11:47:03 PM)

Since the rule isn't severe enough by half, i don't see it as an issue for the Allied player. I get around it just fine all the time. The point i was making is that if one is going to suggest that "proper" i.e. historically numbered TF's (vs. say, the max @ 25) then one could run away with it to extremes.

quote:


It just seems that assumptions re "best practice" were made without adequate research


I wouldn't agree with that assumption on your part. [;)] I think that in a game of this scope and scale, every little detail could not be fit in. Gary was able to fit in such a detail in regards to Japanese AA because his game was much less broad in scope and AA and fighter defenses were an integral part to it since it was devoted to carrier battles *only*

If something is missing, and I'm not disagreeing that Japanese AA should be further penalized, why is the assumption always that someone was asleep at the wheel?





spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 2:30:04 AM)

The Japanese created the First Air Fleet (grouping their carriers) for the express purpose of being able to launch massive air strikes. They demonstrated the capability on several occasions: Pearl Harbor most notably but also Darwin and in the Indian Ocean. The ability to (usually) launch such strikes early in the war is modelled in the game. The IJN conducted exercises to perfect as much as possible this ability before the war (I say "as much as possible" because I've read recently of two instances where the launch of KB's torpedo bombers was scratched because they would have delayed attacks on valuable targets {and in the events the Vals were successful anyway}: the attacks on Cornwall and Dorsetshire and the attack on the Pecos (or maybe the Langley).

Defense was clearly not a priority in First Air Fleet. I think it's pretty hard to argue that smokes screens and shells splashes are a better way to communicate with the CAP than radio or that hand signals between pilots engaged in air to air combat is the best way for the pilots to protect themselves or their carriers. Yet the Japanese did not equip their Zeros with reliable radios until 1943. The carriers are not equipped with radar when the war begins. More tellingly, the officer in charge of each carrier's CAP is assigned that duty as a collateral duty (that officer manages all flight and hangar deck operations). During the whole course of the war the Japanese never change that basic arrangement though they are studying a change as their last carriers settle into the mud at Kure in 1945. Possessing at least experimental radars as the war began in 1941, failure to in any way formally integrate the technology into their defense highlights an institutional failure to develop their defense beyond the practices of the 1930s.

Penalizing the USN for being behind the IJN in developing the offensive potential of the aircraft carrier is justified. But according the IJN the ability to match CAP coordination and fleet AAA defense with the USN is just not justified. As was pointed out in "Shattered Sword" IJN carrier construction and recycling the CAP combined to prevent the KB from launching its own strike before disaster struck at Midway. Yet the game allows the Japanese to put a 100+ CAP up and still launch 150 bombers in a coordinated strike at the USN. The Japanese Player should face realistic risks when sending the KB to war. The coded combination of Allied liabilities and ahistorical IJN defensive capabilities is IMHO the worst of all the foibles of WitP (which I love to play nonetheless).




AmiralLaurent -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 3:33:11 AM)

I think the IJN CAP is overestimated, as is the USN CAP later, by the WITP rule. Both the ability to combine CAP, and the rule of aerial battle then.

In my PBEM 'Bloody Pacific', I just saw a big carrier battle. I thought that each CAp unit will engage every attacking unit once, and then survivors will engage bombers. In fact, it seems to me that each CAP unit will engage every escort unit once per escorted unit, or something like that... in this battle there were at least 4 or 5 instances of VF-8 engaging F1/Tainan.

So while the first row of battles saw allready too high losses, but not much, the end result was that Allied CAP was annihilated, and none of my bombers were attacked.

While in real life, fighter losses of both sides should have been 5 times less and with a number of escorts rougly equal to the CAP at least some tens of fighter should have reached my bombers and down at least a dozen.

To come back to the original question: combining CVs into a single TF allows then to provide each other mutual AA support, and CVs are the best AA platforms for both sides in 1941-42. It also allows to use less escorts per CV to provide the same level of protection against subs and air attacks.

On the other hand if you except mainly air opposition and don't fear subs, splitting your forces into 1 CV-TF is a good idea. EIther the opposition will come as a big strike and hit only one of your CV or it will come as several small strikes that will be hacked down by the combined CAP.

It may be an option for the Allied player, but Japan has not enough good escort DD (or too many CV, depending of you see it) to do that. Also Japan can't use CLs for AA escorts (they roughly have as much AA as an US PT boat).




spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 4:00:22 AM)

I know what the Japanese should do with his carriers: act like he's TF38/58 (though within the equipment limitations of Japan). Just don't think he ought to be able to do that since there were a multitude of reasons that such an ORGANIZATION was utterly beyond the IJN in 1942 (in fact, throughout the war).




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 4:01:37 AM)

quote:


Penalizing the USN for being behind the IJN in developing the offensive potential of the aircraft carrier is justified. But according the IJN the ability to match CAP coordination and fleet AAA defense with the USN is just not justified. As was pointed out in "Shattered Sword" IJN carrier construction and recycling the CAP combined to prevent the KB from launching its own strike before disaster struck at Midway


There were a number of factors that prevented the Japanese from launching their own strike, the string of attacks was one of them. In regards to CAP, per the same source, the Japanese CAP was also fully capable of defending KB in similar vein to the US at that time given that the US Fleet defense doctrine was not yet solidified. (This would not occur until later in the war)

Kido Butai was however more 'limited' in how and when it could defend itself. Basically it required good weather and as much advance warning as possible. While the idea of smoke screens and shell firings does sound archaic (and it was in the dawning age of radar), it did help and one incoming raid was spotted coming in while still almost 30 miles away. If an attack was spotted and the CAP was not saturated by a multiple vector attack, it was fully capable of dishing out some adequate defense, which ironically, it did, damaging and shooting down many attackers over the course of the morning. The CAP did suffer from inadequate radios (USN ones wern't much better at the time), a lack of central fighter direction, and no radar. As such they tended to bunch up on the most immediate threat. USN CAP had all of these tactical elements mentioned but they had not yet gelled so the degree of superiority that I'm guessing is the focus of your last post would not be substantial except in specific circumstances (poor weather being the primary one) during the early part of the war. The material was there, but it didn't always sync. Radar's biggest aid during this time was that it gave them a heads up that trouble was coming allowing them to prepare the CV's for battle and attempt to vector the CAP but the primary edge was the CV preperation

Now that we've established that we both can tap this same source, lets get to the heart of the matter.

CAP edge - Allied side already has it. Its called radar - Radar allows Allied TF's to stage lower CAP levels yet get more planes in the air despite it (but not always) Radar also allows for defensive bonus rolls making their attacks better and longer. (but not always) There is a degree of abstraction here.

AA edge - Allied side already has it. Checked the OOB? the 5/38 in particular even without the proximity bonus is far superior to equivilent Japanese weapons that can also attack aircraft. USN/Allied TF in combination with more fragile Japanese planes usually takes a bigger toll on Japanese aircraft in the game.

Japanese mass strike edge -

As i said, its in there but like what i'll write below, its not nearly as big an edge as you are making it out to be at present in the game. I regularily avoid the "coord penalty" by simply keeping my TF's at 2 CV's per TF. Sometimes i'll get away with a 3 CV TF. They can and do regularily launch single large coordinated strikes in the same fashion as the Japan player will see. Hence, per the orig request subject of this thread....my recommendation for any WitP beginner as Allied is, use the CV's in two x CV TF's with a good number of escorts.

Issues:

Sound like a company man yet? Obviously there are some issues that could be improved. I have spent a considerable amount of time tinkering with the game in this regard so its not like i'm not aware of areas of improvement. Mayhaps its just that i spend more time tinkering and less time complaining as in some other threads so that little fact gets lost in the shuffle. (and some users of my work are playfully calling me an Allied fanboy for it given that one result of it is that it makes it tougher on the Japanese during their "happy time" [;)])


AA edge - I agree that Japanese shipbased flak should be weaker. Even in my mod i'm not always happy with the results i see though as with stock....the Allied TF's still take a bigger toll consistantly. A AA penalty similar what was seen in Carrier Force could be appropriate until mid 43, which is the year quoted in SS for when the Japanese adopted the ring defense.

CAP edge - It has long......and i do mean LONG admitted that the game does not represent large scale fighter battles as well as it might. This problem impacts BOTH sides. Why it is advertised continually as a Japanese-only edge built in i cannot fathom. I should show you my last PBEM result in 43 on how many of my planes Allied fighters downed in ONE DAY over China using just 40 P40's. KB's "uber" CAP as it is called, is primary focused on more than the Allied ability because, well most players are caught in the beginning of this long game so its during the period of Japanese initiative and secondly, well KB is Japanese. Having studied Lundstrom for a long time, i can assure you i reguarily see F4F CAP's slaughtering many times more the number of Kates and Vals AFTER trading a serious number of blows with the Zero escort than they did in real life.







spence -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 4:27:36 AM)

quote:

Why it is advertised continually as a Japanese-only edge built in i cannot fathom


I am quite sure that the reason IJN uber-CAP is focused on is that there is hard-coded mechanism that feeds the IJN CAP Allied airstrikes in bite-size morsels yet no corresponding mechanism that adversely effects the IJN CAP. The KB's CAP reaction to the single direction but hi-lo Yorktown airstrike at Midway illustrates just how fragile the CAP organization was.

The AARs illustrate over and over again that Japan is heavily favored to win (usually crushingly) CV vs CV battles in 1942. The history does not support such a proposition at all. In another thread I asked for any and all Allied Players to report on CV vs CV battles that they had out and out won. The responses were pretty underwhelming. I contend that the opponents were fairly evenly matched IRL. When they engaged both sides were genuinely at risk (and that defeat in battle for the IJN was more than a matter of 30 pilots and a month in the yards for a pair of CVLs).

Just checked the aforementioned thread: 2 people reported such wins (and one additional guy who asked if wins against the poor fellow who couldn't get the KB to launch counted).




Nikademus -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/25/2006 4:57:49 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

Why it is advertised continually as a Japanese-only edge built in i cannot fathom


I am quite sure that the reason IJN uber-CAP is focused on is that there is hard-coded mechanism that feeds the IJN CAP Allied airstrikes in bite-size morsels yet no corresponding mechanism that adversely effects the IJN CAP.


I don't agree. While the penalty is there, it can be avoided with ease. You just don't stack your CV's in big multi carrier TF's. Its not 100% but it often works. I've done it.

quote:


The KB's CAP reaction to the single direction but hi-lo Yorktown airstrike at Midway illustrates just how fragile the CAP organization was.


I believe i covered that. It also showed how potentially strong it could be too. 3 slaughtered torpedo squadrons (3 CV's worth) is nothing to sneeze at. The USN CAP was more flexible but it wasn't uber either anymore than the Japanese. Midway, ironically was the Japanese CAP's best preformance in comparison to the other three battles of 42. The fact that planes leaked through doesn't mean the fighters preformed bad, it just means that planes are a hell ova-lot tougher to bring down in real life than some wargames might lead one to think. (which is why i made them all tougher to shoot down!)

quote:


The AARs illustrate over and over again that Japan is heavily favored to win (usually crushingly) CV vs CV battles in 1942. The history does not support such a proposition at all.


The reason the "history" doesn't support such a proposition is because the Japanese threw away their key edge during mid 42....their superiority of numbers and the cohesiveness that came with it. Had Japan better understood the weapon it had they would have kept all 6CV together at *all times* to maximize their combat power. Either an operation warrented the full use of KB....or it didnt' warrent it at all. (thats in Shattered Sword too). A smart Allied player has no business trying to take on the full KB in early 42 at the height of their power. Those are usually the situations in the AAR's that cause mass slaughter. However AGAIN...and you seem determined to ignore this point, the Allies can do the same thing defensively with their CAP's en-mass defensively. I don't need an AAR to see that. I just experienced one in one of my PBEM's using a very old version of my mod. Ever try getting several hundred bombers through a 224 x F4F CAP + 3 Brit carriers worth of fighters in early 43? I did. 300 lost bombers later over two days, i'm a bit of a mess. I'm feeling the bias allright. [8|]

As Drongo was fond of saying, i think we've reached the end of productive discussion. The sad thing is i'm not really disagreeing with your central points. I've tried to address them. I agree that Japanese flak needs looking at, and that CAP in general has issues. I am disagreeing however with your determination to blow this up as yet another "Japan bias" thing. If your that disgusted with stock, give my mod a try. Its free.





Oznoyng -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/26/2006 7:12:09 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: AmiralLaurent
It may be an option for the Allied player, but Japan has not enough good escort DD (or too many CV, depending of you see it) to do that. Also Japan can't use CLs for AA escorts (they roughly have as much AA as an US PT boat).

The notable exception to this are the Agano class CL's that you start to get in 42. They are almost as capable as a CA or BB, with far less fuel requirements. If there is one ship that warrants Accelerated status on the Ship Availability screen, it is those ships.




Oznoyng -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/26/2006 7:17:28 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
....Ever try getting several hundred bombers through a 224 x F4F CAP + 3 Brit carriers worth of fighters in early 43? I did. 300 lost bombers later over two days, i'm a bit of a mess. I'm feeling the bias allright. [8|]...

The only way to go with regard to CV battles is to have them in range of your land based air assets. I had the same battle recently, but I had about 750 land based aircraft backing up KB. Result: 5 USN CV's and 3 Brit CV's sunk.




Drex -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/26/2006 8:43:33 PM)

I too, like Milman, just lost 4/5 allied CVs against KB and they were in 2Tfs of 2 CVs each and one of one Cv. All three TFs were attacked and hit. I for one would rather keep them together to at least get enough Cap over them.




bilbow -> RE: Carrier grouping (2/26/2006 9:40:58 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Drex

I too, like Milman, just lost 4/5 allied CVs against KB and they were in 2Tfs of 2 CVs each and one of one Cv. All three TFs were attacked and hit. I for one would rather keep them together to at least get enough Cap over them.


I'm the culprit here. [:D]. The battle was at 4-hex range, so Drex's TBDs could not engage. (They didn't float very well either). I was operating KB in one TF with a Surface TF in the same hex and 60% CAP. One of Drex's strikes went in against the surface group. One of his strikes did some damage- bomb hits on 2 carriers, but both survived easily.

I suspect the biggest factor for the lopsided result was lack of his TBDs flying. The strike that got through my cap started with 68 SBD, and about 30 or so got through. Frankly I consider myself lucky that his TBDs were not along or that his SBDs didn't hit more.

I would have preferred KB to be in 2 TFs, but I did not have the escorts available. In the end I think there are far more important factors at work here than how many carriers there are in a single TF.




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