RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (Full Version)

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ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/12/2006 11:34:55 PM)

quote:

But don't let yourself get distracted. My point was that the USN was not adverse to exercising, either in fleet problems, or as individual units, in the North Pacific.


I absolutely agree that US forces were not adverse to operating north of Hawaii. Mike bases his abrupt dismissal of even the possibility of a carrier operating in that region on the weather and on "no logical reason for being there." By who's definition are we defining "logical?" Most admirals I knew didn't seem to know what the word "logical" meant.

First the weather front. It was not a strong weather front and and consisted of mainly low clouds and rain. Winds were no more than 40 knots. The front passed through PH on the 6th. When the Japanese launched on the 7th, their ships were still covered by low clouds but the rain and winds had greatly moderated. The weather over Pearl on the 7th was partly cloudy. These hardly severe enough conditions to prevent any ship from operating in them. Indeed at that time of year, this is pretty much the typical pattern around Hawaii. So weather wouldn't prevent the US from operating ships north of Pearl.

I would submit that there is any number of logical reasons for a fleet to be operating there. Considering the numerous war warnings, it is quite possible and logical that a US carrier force (or other warships) could have been assigned to patrol the northern approaches to Hawaii for early warning, just for training purposes or in transit to Alaskan waters. It could have been the perfect ambush position in which to strike the Japanese fleet during the attack had they been located.

I doubt Mike has ever been in the Navy. In all my years of service, only once have I ever seen a training exercise cancelled due to weather and that was due to the remmanants of a typhoon east of Japan. I have no reason to believe that the Navy of the thirties and forties was any more likely to cancel.

Chez




Terminus -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/12/2006 11:53:16 PM)

I was never in the Navy either, but might it not have been possible that flight operations would have been curtailed by 40-knot winds, low cloud and rain, back in the winter of '41? Asking because I don't know...



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 12:49:43 AM)

quote:

I was never in the Navy either, but might it not have been possible that flight operations would have been curtailed by 40-knot winds, low cloud and rain, back in the winter of '41? Asking because I don't know...


Sure it is possible. A cautious commander may decide the risk wasn't worth it. But I have also been launched in IFR conditions from Adak to prosecute a sub in peacetime. Now that's scary!

It would actually be the sea state that would have the biggest effect on air operations. For surface ships launching float planes, the sea state is critical for a safe launch and recovery. For carriers, sea state is less critical but still important. If the carrier steams into the wind, a higher wind speed is actually beneficial as it means a shorter takeoff run.

If you have ever seen videos of the Doolittle raid launching from the Hornet, you can see that the clouds, wind and rain weren't the concern. It was the pitching deck that caused the army aircrews to suck up their seat cushions but the B-25s all made it off safely.

On 7 Dec 41, the Japanese launched their aircraft into low clouds and rain showers and used homing devices to find PH and return to their carriers. Not one aircraft was lost during lauch and recovery so conditions obviously weren't that bad when you consider the planes taking off were all heavily laden and some of those returning were battle damaged. The sky was only partly cloudy over Pearl but 100% overcast north of Pearl.

The main point here is that the weather north of Hawaii wasn't bad enough to prevent flight ops.

Chez



Terminus -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 12:58:55 AM)

I've seen the Doolittle video... That first B-25 looks like it had about 11 yards to get airborne![X(]



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 2:12:57 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

quote:

NO it isn't. Steam north into bad weather and rough seas for "training"? Planes and pilots are expensive (as were torpedoes..., and we know where that led); why add to the risk of losses? In your eagerness to get some US CV's wrecked you are postulating the rediculous. There is one rational "what if" that puts a US CV in Kido Butai's sights..., and that is if the Enterprise Group hadn't been held up a day and had sailed into Pearl on the evening of the 6th. The rest is just "pie-in-the-sky" fanboyism. Like my suggestion of KB wrecking a couple of CV's on French Frigate Shoals through a night navigation error. That's silly..., but so is your "let's say a US CV was screwing around 500 miles north of Oahu for no understandable reason".


Respectfully, sir, it is not "ridiculuous" assumption that the Americans would excercise north of Hawaii.

https://txspace.tamu.edu/bitstream/1969.1/2658/1/etd-tamu-2005B-HIST-Wadle.pdf

In Grand Joint Excercise 4 (GJE40), in February 1932, Lex and Sara operated both north and south of Oahu to "attack" Pearl Harbor. (Described on page 80 of the above PDF.)
Later that year, Fleet Problem XIII, units based in Pearl were to attack the US West Coast. The opposing fleets engaged in the waters far north, and eventually east, of Hawaii.
In Phase 2 of Fleet Problem XIX, March of 1938, Saratoga repeats the PH attack, from a point 100 miles north of Oahu. (Phase 1 involved a carrier battle around the Hawaiian waters between Lex and Sara. Phase 3 involved Sara and Lex operating versus "enemy" bases in the Sab Fran area, but again maneuvering out of the shipping lanes north north-east of Hawaii, attempting to avoid detection.)
The USN was not as timid in getting their ships banged up as you seem to indicate.


All of which is true..., and all of which is meaningless. The US Navy was not conducting a Fleet exercise or a wargame on the weekend of December 6-7th. The CV's were engaged in ferrying aircraft, and the rest of the fleet in weekend liberty. As you pointed out, during the wargames of the 30's, the US had used the "northern approach" to achieve "suprise" in the same manner (and for the same reasons) that Kido Butai was during December of 1941. But for "peacetime" aircrew training during the ferrying operations, going North makes no sense. South offers better weather and sea conditions, insuring more and safer training operations. So I repeat, the ONLY reason for a US CV to be 500 miles North of Oahu on the first weekend of December 1941 is to allow the Japanese to sink it. It is not a realistic situation to postulate for a "what if". And I gave a realistic one as well with the Enterprise Group returning as scheduled to PH...., for those which want to deal with such things.



Daniel Oskar -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 2:52:30 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

I was never in the Navy either, but might it not have been possible that flight operations would have been curtailed by 40-knot winds, low cloud and rain, back in the winter of '41? Asking because I don't know...


I was a Marine helo driver, so this may be apples and oranges, but the ships I was deployed with were always able to steam in such a manner as to make the relative wind over the deck conform to our wind envelopes for launch and recovery. What smashed our bag for flight operations was usually exceeding pitch and roll limits. As for getting back aboard under IFR conditions, I don't know that there were procedures in effect back in the 40's.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 3:34:04 AM)

quote:

As for getting back aboard under IFR conditions, I don't know that there were procedures in effect back in the 40's.


No, there were no effective procedures for landing IFR back then. Pretty much screwed under those conditions.

However, IFR conditions did not exist where the Japanese fleet was at the time of the attack on PH, just low clouds (1000' ceiling) and CAVU above about 4000'. Pearl itself had scattered clouds with bases above 10k.

Weather was not a significant factor beyond providing the Japanese fleet a place to hide beneath.

BTW, I think I would much rather take a cat and a trap rather than land on a ship in a bird without stationary wings!

Chez



mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 5:18:35 AM)

quote:

The US Navy was not conducting a Fleet exercise or a wargame on the weekend of December 6-7th.


I was only quoting scource material that you can look up yourself. I dont have access to the ships navigational logs for the whole of 1941. I believe that if I could, I could show you times were ships exercised north of Hawaii. You do not seem to think that they did. Is that because they were not there on that fateful weekend? Just because I am not out in front of my house every time the mail man comes by does not mean I will never be, or that I actively avoid being there at all other times.

quote:

The CV's were engaged in ferrying aircraft, and the rest of the fleet in weekend liberty.


The "purpose" the what-if's is to have an intellectual exercise to discuss, or war play, situations that might have occured differently. We know were they actually were, and why...

quote:

As you pointed out, during the wargames of the 30's, the US had used the "northern approach" to achieve "suprise" in the same manner (and for the same reasons) that Kido Butai was during December of 1941. But for "peacetime" aircrew training during the ferrying operations, going North makes no sense.


Let's say Halsey has orders to report to dry dock, Bremerton, on 31 December. He receives his orders, and they indicate that he should conduct ASW and carrier landing quals on the way. Where does he go? South? Nope. too far to make it to Bremerton by the given date. So he goes North. He also, coincidently, wants to avoid those same shipping lanes the Japanese are avoiding. (A carrier needs some serious sea room if it need to steam into the wind for a couple hours. Best if there are few civilian boats around to get in the way.)

Why is that so unbelievable? Because it didn't happen historically, on the date in question?

quote:

South offers better weather and sea conditions, insuring more and safer training operations.


The seas within 500 miles to the North of Hawaii have roughly the same weather "zones" and sea states as the seas to the south. The weather is roughly similar as far north Latitude as Midway. I am not saying that these areas will be covered by the same storm. I am saying that they share the same weather and sea state characteristics.

The waters south of Hawaii were not any more favorable for exercising than those north, other than the fact that the PH channel faces south.

"So why did the fleet remain south of Hawaii at the end of '41?"
Lack of fleet oilers. Good gunnery and bombing range in Lahaina Roads, very near Oahu. Maybe even a little bit of peacetime sloppiness in the Operational Staff work.

quote:

So I repeat, the ONLY reason for a US CV to be 500 miles North of Oahu on the first weekend of December 1941 is to allow the Japanese to sink it. It is not a realistic situation to postulate for a "what if".


"What if" Halsey took the Enterprise "east, then south" to return to Hawaii, instead of "south, then east"? No reason for him not to. If the Japanese were able to sail their carriers in the sea state NE and E of Midway, so too could the Americans.

Basically, the way I am looking at this: Just because the Japanese did not bump into any US ships North of Hawaii does not mean the US Navy never sailed there. They picked the "least likely" path for them to encounter someone. Not the path where it is "impossible" for them to encounter someone.

edited for spelling errors.



Hunter2006 -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 5:24:37 AM)


This is an iteresting thread, but I think it ignores what was going on elsewhere...

Maybe I am wrong here, but didn't the Japs invade the Phillipines a few hours before the PH attack actually happened? If my memory serves me correctly, this indeed happened and therefore, there was no option for Nagumo to run away and hope for a better day. He HAD to attack and attack fiercely. I think the fact that he did not launch successive attacks is indicative of his fear of US CVs being "out there somewhere".

Embarking on a mission with that many ships and with that many resources, I dont think that "ooops... we been spotted" would have been sufficient cause for him to turn home and have to commit hari kurri as an apology to the emperer.

Can someone back me up on this timeline that Japan was launching invasions all over US/allied territory by the time the PH event actually happened?





el cid again -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 6:01:32 AM)

quote:

I doubt Mike has ever been in the Navy. In all my years of service, only once have I ever seen a training exercise cancelled due to weather and that was due to the remmanants of a typhoon east of Japan. I have no reason to believe that the Navy of the thirties and forties was any more likely to cancel.


The US Navy does not run exercises in bad weather. Only one navy before WWII - or now - does that - the Japanese navy. Japan pays the price in lives lost EVERY YEAR because they believe in it. And I did serve in the Navy - and knew/know a fair number of admirals. I have no clue why you "never met an admiral who was 'logical'"? But I never met one who was not.

In your defense, however, I think it WAS logical to patrol NW of Hawaii - due to weather patterns and Japanese training doctrine!




el cid again -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 6:02:25 AM)

quote:

Maybe I am wrong here, but didn't the Japs invade the Phillipines a few hours before the PH attack actually happened?


You are wrong in detail but right in spirit: It was Malaya they invaded just before - too close to know about though.



jwilkerson -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 6:22:38 AM)

quote:

I have no clue why you "never met an admiral who was 'logical'"? But I never met one who was not.



[:D][:D][:D]

At least we got some humor goin' in this thread !




Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 7:05:38 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees
Basically, the way I am looking at this: Just because the Japanese did not bump into any US ships North of Hawaii does not mean the US Navy never sailed there. They picked the "least likely" path for them to encounter someone. Not the path where it is "impossible" for them to encounter someone.

edited for spelling errors.


FINE GENTLEMEN..., make up whatever nonsense you want. How about tossing in "Godzilla eats the Lexington"? "Kimmel orders all his ships to steam slowly around the island while Pearl Harbor is being cleaned"? "Colorado and Saratoga skip their re-fits and steam to Oahu so they can be sunk too"? "All the ships at Pearl have their double bottoms opened up for inspection on Monday". "The PH Tank Farms have all just been washed down with AvGas to clean off the oily residue---one spark and they all explode"?

OK..., I'm being rediculous. But so are you. Yes, it's not IMPOSSIBLE that Kido Butai could have met something even though they were taking the northern route. But of several thousand ships sailing the Pacific that weekend..., why a CV? Are you willing to say that the odds are at least 50:1 that whatever they met WOULD get off a sighting report; but WOULDN'T be a CV? Or that if it happened to be a submarine it might have torpedoed the Kaga? All the possibilities you have offered have been pro-Japanese. A true "what if" goes both ways..., sometimes it helps, sometimes it hurts.



mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 7:24:32 AM)

quote:

OK..., I'm being rediculous. But so are you. Yes, it's not IMPOSSIBLE that Kido Butai could have met something even though they were taking the northern route. But of several thousand ships sailing the Pacific that weekend..., why a CV? Are you willing to say that the odds are at least 50:1 that whatever they met WOULD get off a sighting report; but WOULDN'T be a CV? Or that if it happened to be a submarine it might have torpedoed the Kaga? All the possibilities you have offered have been pro-Japanese. A true "what if" goes both ways..., sometimes it helps, sometimes it hurts.


Sigh. Actually, I am an Allied fanboy.

The Original Poster (OP) asked, if I may be allowed to paraphrase, "What were Nagumo orders if spotted before launching?".

Some replies posted the actual operational orders, translated.

I think the general consensus was that, if the contact was made by a civilian ship, or some other weak opponent, Nagumo would blow it out of the water and keep going on to PH according to his orders.

The OP himself, in post #4, asked what do you think would have happened if the contact was with a US CV. From there, I speculated on what I thought was a likely course of action (post #7). I tried to think up some reasons why a US carriers might be in those areas. You called them balderdash. And here we are...

I did not include time warps, Klingons, elite US Navy Strippers (Dancer, exotic, female, 1 each) employed as distractions, or FDR arranging it so PH could happen. I tried to keep it within the realms of reasonable possibility.

I understand that you disagree with those possibilties actually happening. Arguing about it is merely an intellectual exercise, as far as I am concerned. If you remain unconvinced, I will not take it personally.

But I ask you, why do we play this game? Isn't that a big what-if?



bradfordkay -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 7:43:10 AM)

Mike, I can't agree with you at all. It is not completely ridiculous to postulate that insteead of shipping fighters to Midway and Wake Kimmel might have ordered his carriers to patrol the waters northwest of Oahu. After all, the earlier exercises had produced attacks from this direction - so why wouldn't he think about sending a carrier patrol out in that direction?



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 7:59:04 AM)

quote:

The US Navy does not run exercises in bad weather. Only one navy before WWII - or now - does that - the Japanese navy. Japan pays the price in lives lost EVERY YEAR because they believe in it.


I strongly disagree about not conducting exercises in bad weather! Make that most strongly disagree. I've been part of many, many national and international ASW exercises that were conducted in storm conditions. One was Exercise Testgate 80, an exercise designed to test NATO's ability to interdict submarines transitting through the Straits of Gibraltar. Atlantiques, Nimrods and P-3s were flying in and out of Gibraltar in 40-50 knot winds and driving rain. 2 Brit and 2 US frigates patrolled each side of the strait. The ships operating to the west of the straits were taking it green over the bow with 15-20 foot seas yet they continued to bang away with their sonars (much to my chagrin).

RIMPAC 83 was another. Flying out of Adak in search of a Japanese diesel submarine operating about 700 miles SW of Adak in a full gale was no fun. We were bounced around so bad in the turbulence at 5000' that we couldn't even fill out our search logs. The carrier we were supposed to be working with shut down flight ops but we didn't. We ended up diverting into Shemya that night because of the wind and snow back at base.

I can believe that amphibious exercises might be cancelled under such conditions but as I said before, I can only remember 1 ASW exercise being cancelled due to weather. And that was a joint US Navy / JMSDF ASW exercise conducting a dual prosecution of a US nuc.

quote:

And I did serve in the Navy - and knew/know a fair number of admirals. I have no clue why you "never met an admiral who was 'logical'"? But I never met one who was not.


My comment was meant to be humerous. But seeing that you didn't take it that way, I'm sorry. Logic, however, is in the eye of the beholder so I will give a few choice examples from my navy experiences:

I found it illogical to be launched while standing an ASW ready alert in Jacksonville, FL to pick up an admiral's potted palms in Key West and ferry them to Norfolk on a Sunday afternoon. We carried a full crew and full ASW load "just in case."

I also found it illogical to ferry a group of admirals from San Diego to Pearl Harbor so that they could play golf. We were on the ground just 15 hours (almost minimum crew rest) and had a 0100 Sunday preflight to bring them back so that they would be rested for Monday morning.

We also once had to conduct a VIP flight for an admiral from Moffett Field to Atsugi, Japan. I found it illogical, ludicrous and extremely uncaring of the SOB to come onboard and have his aide inform the crew that the admiral would be occupying the galley and crew area in the tail and was not to be disturbed. We were absolutely refused permission to go past the curtain that was rigged up. That meant we were unable to get a cup of coffee or even retrieve our box lunches for the full 15 hour flight. Not only that but the SOB brought his own personal steward onboard and the smell of breakfast and lunch cooking wafted through the aircraft. My stomach was growling and grumbling the whole way.

And the real doozy? Having to unload nearly 300 pounds of spare parts and tools at Lajes when returning from a Sigonella deployment just so that we could load 10 cases of Mateus wine for CincLantFlt. We had to deliver it to Norfolk for the admiral to pick up BEFORE we could return to Jacksonville to see our loved ones after 6 months overseas. Can you spell "p i s s e d o f f!?"

To be fair, most admirals and commodores I met were pretty good men and excellent politicians but there were some idiots among them too.

quote:

In your defense, however, I think it WAS logical to patrol NW of Hawaii - due to weather patterns and Japanese training doctrine!


Now, this we agree on!

Chez




mlees -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 8:16:57 AM)

quote:

I strongly disagree about not conducting exercises in bad weather! Make that most strongly disagree.


As a member of "ships company", USS Ranger, CV61, from 1986 to 1989, I can verify that the ship conducted flight ops in "foul weather" and heavy seas. The ship would avoid typhoons, but anything less was fair game. Yes, the ship suffered superficial structural damage as a result, and the CO was not cashiered.

Now, I understand that the USN in the eighties was different in both material and doctrine from that of the thirties. (I had refrained from offering my anectdotal experiences as "evidence" based on this.) But not that much, in my opinion. The peacetime CO's and Admrials are just as "Political and Career Oriented" now, as then. But I could be wrong.

However, as I understand it: the Navy realised, then, as now, that weather is something the Navy needs to learn to operate in. (Typhoons aside, again.)

The Japanese did not "exercise" in Typhoons. That is to say, when a Typhoon blew up, they battened down the hatches and manuevered their ships with the weather as the primary concern. They did not shoot guns or fly planes in Typhoons any more than others did.

There was a couple Typhoons that caught their fleet at sea (during exercises) in the twenties and thirties. They handled their ships with full regard for the sea state. Some of these ships received extensive damage, and revealed weaknesses with welding techniques of the day. Were you thinking of these, el cid?



Nikademus -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 4:30:42 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

I also found it illogical to ferry a group of admirals from San Diego to Pearl Harbor so that they could play golf


Thats taxpayer's money paying for that round of golf.....can i write that off on my taxes this year, with interest? [:D]



mogami -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 5:27:20 PM)

Hi, I went through 2 hurricanes on an FFG. (we were part of screen for CV)



Ursa MAior -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 6:03:45 PM)

In reply to an earlier post the japanese have only realized that THE CV was the most important warship only after Midway, same time the USN I think. According to SS the IJN looked at CVs as disposable assets to weaken the main US battleline. Same as with subs.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 9:22:16 PM)

quote:

In reply to an earlier post the japanese have only realized that THE CV was the most important warship only after Midway, same time the USN I think. According to SS the IJN looked at CVs as disposable assets to weaken the main US battleline. Same as with subs.


That's very true for both sides. Many battleship admirals looked at the carrier as a means of augmenting their search capability, not for its attack ability. Pearl Harbor helped change that reasoning as did subsequent engagements. I highly doubt that by the end of 1942 there were any battleship admirals left who didn't view the carrier as a major threat to their beloved ships.

Chez



Feinder -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 10:49:58 PM)

quote:

FINE GENTLEMEN..., make up whatever nonsense you want. How about tossing in "Godzilla eats the Lexington"


A Feinder Original -

[X(]


The ultimate Japanese Fanboy
[image]local://upfiles/7554/C4E4818B25E84DFCADD0268D4E95D34C.jpg[/image]



mogami -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/13/2006 10:59:43 PM)

Hi, Gotta dance after that.

[image]local://upfiles/944/61BB3482433E4B31B8A135B68F85E476.gif[/image]



Cap Mandrake -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/14/2006 4:11:14 AM)

Stimson's message to Short..Nov 27

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat can not, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action at might jeopardize your defense. Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task signed in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

And the order to Kimmel:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

So the way I see it, Short (and Kimmel) have authority to 1) put the ships out of harm's way (or at least ready a counterstrike) 2) conduct recon 3) ready airfields for attack and disperse aircraft...but he has to do this quietly. Hard for me to see how they could send all the ships out of PH quietly, but they would really get there cajones roasted if they did nothing, so they would likely alert the military but not tell the civies. [:)]

It does seem they would not be authorized to launch a pre-emptive strike.




Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 2:47:28 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Mike, I can't agree with you at all. It is not completely ridiculous to postulate that insteead of shipping fighters to Midway and Wake Kimmel might have ordered his carriers to patrol the waters northwest of Oahu. After all, the earlier exercises had produced attacks from this direction - so why wouldn't he think about sending a carrier patrol out in that direction?


So you DO contend that of ALL the Allied shipping in the Pacific Basin the only ship that KB could meet during it's run to PH would be a US CV? Nothing else that could get off a sighting report and spoil the Japanese "suprise" could possibly be out there 500 miles North of Oahu..., but a CV could? I said it was extrodinarily unlikely that a US CV would be duncing around up there during the weekend of the 5th-7th; and get countered with all sorts of speculation about how this was a possibility. But where is the speculation on the much more likely event that something else might have been up there and spoiled Nagumo's day by crying "wolf"? You and Chez only seem to be interested in "what if's" that will hurt the US. What happened to the "other side of the coin"? The spotting report that totally destroys any hope of suprise on the 7th? Why no "speculation" on the equally far-fetched "possibility" of dawn on the 7th arising and KB finding a fully alerted US Fleet 10,000 yards to the windward planning live fire gunnery exercises? Very unlikely? Certainly! But NOT IMPOSSIBLE..., which seems to be your criterion. My suggestion was to keep the "what if's" fair and reasonable for both sides.



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 4:55:01 AM)

quote:

You and Chez only seem to be interested in "what if's" that will hurt the US. What happened to the "other side of the coin"? The spotting report that totally destroys any hope of suprise on the 7th? Why no "speculation" on the equally far-fetched "possibility" of dawn on the 7th arising and KB finding a fully alerted US Fleet 10,000 yards to the windward planning live fire gunnery exercises? Very unlikely? Certainly! But NOT IMPOSSIBLE..., which seems to be your criterion. My suggestion was to keep the "what if's" fair and reasonable for both sides.


Whoa!!! You need to lay off whatever substance is giving you these paranoid delusions about this "what if". In no way, shape or form was my hypothesis meant to be present anyone's fanboy supposition. I have no idea why you would choose to take it so.

And no one is talking about a US CV being all alone up there. No one is talking about a surprise attack so devasting that no message could be sent. You may have been mislead by my use of the word "carrier" rather than carrier task group. It certainly was not meant to imply no other ships were present. I chose "carrier" for expediency's sake only. The same as someone might say "Hornet steamed to Japan to launch Doolittle's Raiders." Sure doesn't mean she was by herself. And it could be a rowboat with a radio for all I cared. I chose a carrier for the simple reason that it would have been the only type ship capable of inflicting damage on KB in return.

The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?"

And the issue of surprise is exactly the question. Would Nagumo have thrown it away to sink a CV? Pure and simple. I think he would have, especially if he has been detected in return. Others don't think so. If he did attack, his reception at Pearl would most certainly have been a "little" warmer. Wait, let me rephrase that. His attack on Pearl Harbor would been hotly contested. Specific enough for you?

As far as why a CV TG would operate in that region, logic should have told US operational planners that the northern route offered the best chance of an enemy being able to approach the islands undetected. A look at the map clearly reveals that. The southern route contains too many shipping lanes for a covert transit and the US had several bases guarding the western route (Midway, Wake, Johnston, western HI islands, etc). So even though war hadn't started yet, it would have been very prudent to patrol ALL the approaches to Pearl.

And the other side of the coin is: "What would the US battlefleet have done in response?" Stay inport? Sortie towards safety? Sortie for sea room but remain near Pearl? Attempt to engage KB? Who knows?

These were the questions being asked. You chose to take it as a Jap fanboy "What if" conspiracy. Ridiculous.

Chez



bradfordkay -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 7:08:03 AM)

Mike, now you're coming from out in left field. We were discussing A possible "what if," not the only possible "what if."

You were arguing that no way in heck would a US carrier would be in the waters to the northwest of Oahu, and we pointed out that there were reasonable scenarios where that could have happened. For you to misconstrue that as some "fanboy's wild desire" to put the screws to the USN is laughable.

How could I possibly be an Axis fanboy? I've never even opened up a game on the Japanese side... It's just that I am open to ideas that don't follow the straight and narrow...



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 6:04:24 PM)

To return to the original question. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" . OK..., we know that at duks on the 6th KB was 500 miles north of Oahu. So where was it 24-36 hours earlier? (On the 5th) Well on the 4th, 5th and 6th, until the speed run south, it was coming SouthEast at about 15 knots. So during the day of the 5th, KB was between 415 and 620 miles NorthWest of it's position on the evening of the 6th. So it was approximately 1000 miles NNW of Oahu on the 5th, or about 800 miles NNE of Midway. And it was still in the foul weather it had followed across the North Pacific. That's a long way out in the middle of nowhere. If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity



ChezDaJez -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 7:47:42 PM)

quote:

If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity


It was this kind of thinking that led the US to discount the possibility of a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. Oops.

And who's talking about the 5th? We're talking within 24 hours of the historical attack.

Chez



Mike Scholl -> RE: Quick curiousity - What were KBs orders on 12-05? (4/15/2006 8:19:28 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

If you want to say that it is theoretically possible that a US CV COULD have been in that area during the 5th, I can't argue. But to say that it was in anyway a likely occurance is stretching credulity


It was this kind of thinking that led the US to discount the possibility of a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. Oops.
And who's talking about the 5th? We're talking within 24 hours of the historical attack.

Chez


Who's talking about the 5th? Feinder, the fellow who started this thread. "What would KB have done if it had discovered a USN CV on say 12-05?" comes straight from his initial post. You made the statement: The original premise was "What if KB encountered a US CV Task Group enroute Pearl Harbor? What would they have done?" I was just quoting the time frame Feinder mentioned.



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