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mdiehl -> RE: History or Balance (5/17/2006 11:44:47 PM)
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They coordinated their (4 CV) combined strike packages together better (as a single large formation, compared to the American single CV strike groups).
The problem here is that we have several examples of the USN pulling of multiple CV well-coordinated strikes in 1942 with 2 CVs against naval targets. And we have multiple examples of the IJN pulling off 2 CV strikes against naval targets. But we have no compelling examples of anyone, Japanese or American, executing a >2CV strike against a target at sea during that time frame.
The only large, well coordinated strikes launched by Mobile force were directed at fixed targets. And that is a much simpler proposition than striking an enemy surface force. You can refine the balance between your a.c. range and knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts when you are hitting a land target. Everything's different for hitting a moving target that may also be capable of hitting you.
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Individual IJN CV's, coordinated their planes better. (Enterprise SBD group split off/away from the TBD/fighters.)
Yes but that does not speak to the coordination of the strike. The strike was launched as a package. 1 group of F4Fs, 2 of SBDs, and 1 of TBDs. The SBD group diverted on a hunch.
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They focused on Midway, first and foremost, without scouting out the surrounding seas properly enough to ensure that the USN was not nearby. "Target fixation", I think, is the phrase.
Doctrinal flaw is the more accurate phrase. They were relying on an inadequate number of recon float planes. Even had they all flown their routes on time and schedule according to the operational plan there were problems with coverage.
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When scouting reports of a force to the NE began to filter in (at first identified as a cruiser force), Nagumo waited for more info (and waited for Yamamoto, a day's sailing distance away, to offer advice, which did not come) instead of acting decisively. Minor error, considering the number of conflicting and incorrect reports that may have been coming in. Still, the successfull commanders, like Spruance and Halsey, somehow "knew" which ones were bogus, and which ones stirred the hairs on the back of their neck. The fact that an enemy force was present where it should not be should have raised some concern with Nagumo, or his staff.
You need to read Shattered Sword if you have not. The compelling analysis there strongly indicates that the only real "window" of decision open to Nagumo was very early in the engagement, around 7:45 AM for about 10-15 minutes. He'd have had to have launched his anti-ship strike force against an ambiguous target whose position as it turned out was inaccurately reported. Apparently Nagumo knew that the reported position was inconsistent with the ID number of the plane reporting the contact (given its recon line) and he delayed to obtain an accurate position report.
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When Nagumo finally decided to strike the force to the NE, he closed. This negates the range advantage of the IJN aircraft. (Was he aware of this advantage? Hmmm.) He should have sailed NW or west, to keep the enemy at his long range (and extreme range for the USN). This gives him more time to rearm and react to new sightings, as needed.
Japanese doctrine at the time favored closing the range a bit. As did USN doctrine. I think he acted consistently with the concern for recovering a.c. that may potentially have been substantially shot up in an engagement.
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But when it came time to attack, he waited to add in the Midway base-strike aircraft, which needed to be refueled and rearmed.
According to Shattered Sword he really had no choice. The only window in which he could have launched a strike was for about 15 minutes prior to 8 AM. After that he was consistently busy cycling CAP and dodging bombs. There wasn't enough time to spot a countership strike before the US dive bombers hit.
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It seems he did not understand the purpose of holding those anti-ship aircraft aside in the first place. (The idea being: Strike! Strike as soon as feasible! Don't loiter around! If you can get your strike off before the enemy can, you might be able to sink him before he spots, and launches, against you. At the very least, this disrupts the enemies tempo of operations, which was ultimately happened against the IJN that day.)
Strike as soon as feasible seems to have been USN doctrine. Apparently it was NOT IJN doctrine, which favored mass over speed. So he acted consistently with the basic principles of the IJN regarding carrier combat. I don't think we can fault him for not tossing aside "the book" which had been so successful, based solely on an ambiguous contact report from an aircraft that had obviously gotten the position wrong.
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Now, hindsight is 20/20, and it's easy to be critical when I have more info at hand then the guy did at the time. I realise this. But these errors, taken individually, may not have meant disaster. But additively, they do.
Agreed. But the errors at Midway weren't little "mistakes" made in the field that cascaded into a catastrophe. These things that you have attributed to Nagumo's erroneous judgment are, according to Shattered Sword, really just Nagumo behaving consistently with Japanese doctrine in the proper use of CV based air power. So the problems here were in part doctrine, in part CV design, and in large measure a monumentally bad operational plan for the Midway attack.
Nagumo's worst errors were after Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu were taken out of the fight. His decision to close with just Hiryu, with badly depeleted remnant a.c. complement against a force that had to be numerically superior (as evidence by the types and amounts of USN planes he'd seen) cost the IJN both Hiryu and Mikuma as well.
I highly recommend Shattered Sword. It's new, written from the pov of the Japanese side, and makes use of primary Japanese sources that have not been accounted for in previous western accounts of Midway.
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