RE: What was Britian thinking

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Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:04:43 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac The RN didnt want to do anything off Burma the view was it was a total waste of time when the critical point was in CentPac Churchill had to virtually force them to prepare for ops there on Political grounds not Military. Also dont forget about th emonsoon restricting opportuniteis and ships take time to get from Overlord/Anvil to India its not a quick task Not sure what Churchill forced them to do that youre referring to. Could you refresh my memory please? AKAIK, they ran penny packet ops along the Burma coast for most of '44 but it was never anything significant. Mostly because there was hardly anything to do there. They did have a large-ish amphibious "Hail Mary" type of deal planned for later but it became a moot point when the Japanese front in Burma collapsed and the Indians marched into Rangoon with virtually no opposition.

dtravel -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:05:31 PM)
I don't know what Britain was thinking, but just the idea of a large island being cognitive is scarey enough! [X(]

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:06:15 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Wow, two dumbasses for the price of one...[8\|] Typical from a country that surrendered in 2 minutes. I think it was Shakespeare who said it best..... [;)]

Andy Mac -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:11:16 PM)
Churchill wanted operations against Sumatra, Andaman Islands and Burma in 44 but the COS talked him out of it the RN was especially opposed to them and there were extensive debates on what was the role of the RN on the war against japan should be. (My source for most of this is the Alanbrooke diaries so as with all diaries it may be biased), Politically the recapture of Burma/Malaya was important for post war imperial politicial reasons militarily it was viewed as marginal by COS better to use limited resources against targets on main line of advance. I think discussions were had as to whether it should be a TF supporting CENTPAC the RN helping SWPAC or even a seperate commonwealth attack out of North Aus. (I think Brooke was in favour of supporting Mac as he was a great fan of MacArthur) They finally settled on supporting Centpac not that I think King was particularily happy about it !!!!

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:12:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: dtravel I don't know what Britain was thinking, but just the idea of a large island being cognitive is scarey enough! [X(] In that case, "the world wonders" would just about give you apoplectic(sp?) fits. [:D]

madmickey -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:14:05 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac The RN didnt want to do anything off Burma the view was it was a total waste of time when the critical point was in CentPac Churchill had to virtually force them to prepare for ops there on Political grounds not Military. Also dont forget about th emonsoon restricting opportuniteis and ships take time to get from Overlord/Anvil to India its not a quick task Landing in southern Burma could have been used to cutoff the Jap line of communication to troops fighting in India and Northern Burma plus Singapore and Malaysia. Look at the amount of British Empire troops used did they not hear of The Island hoping or bypassing strong point strategy. After the 2nd Battle of Philippine Sea and later Leyte Gulf the Jap fleet was not a threat. Lord Louis Battenberg should not have even been given command of the destroyer Kelly.

rtrapasso -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:15:25 PM)
quote: they had a flying stringbag for a torpedo bomber Going back to the original premise... by early WW2, the Swordfish had been modified to be used as a NIGHT torpedo bomber. It was equipped with Air-Surface radar, and when used in this role it obtained astonishing results (witness Taranto, carried out at night). Of course, in WITP, nothing of this sort can be done. So, the question shouldn't be, "What was Britain thinking", it should be "What was 3x5/Matrix thinking?" BTW - don't think Britain had her torpedo problems solved by the time of the Bismarck saga - IIRC, the British accidentally attacked one of their own cruisers with Swordfish, and one of the reasons the cruiser wasn't struck was some of the magnetic torpedo detonators malfunctioned at the relatively high Northern latitude, and exploded when they hit the water. i could be wrong about this, though.

dtravel -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:22:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo quote: ORIGINAL: dtravel I don't know what Britain was thinking, but just the idea of a large island being cognitive is scarey enough! [X(] In that case, "the world wonders" would just about give you apoplectic(sp?) fits. [:D] [image]http://img221.imageshack.us/img221/507/spahhh1xn.gif[/image]

rtrapasso -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:28:40 PM)
quote: BTW - don't think Britain had her torpedo problems solved by the time of the Bismarck saga - IIRC, the British accidentally attacked one of their own cruisers with Swordfish, and one of the reasons the cruiser wasn't struck was some of the magnetic torpedo detonators malfunctioned at the relatively high Northern latitude, and exploded when they hit the water. i could be wrong about this, though. This from one history of the Bismarck: "The Ark Royal launched a first strike of 15 Swordfish at 14.50 but mistook HMS Sheffield for the target. A tragedy was only averted because the magnetic pistols fitted to the torpedoes malfunctioned when dropped in the very steep seas running several detonated on hitting the water, and the Shefield was able to dodge the remainder. The incident was turned to advantage when the Shefield signaled the Ark Royal, so that for the second strike the Duplex pistols were set back to 'contact'. "

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:30:35 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac Churchill wanted operations against Sumatra, Andaman Islands and Burma in 44 but the COS talked him out of it the RN was especially opposed to them and there were extensive debates on what was the role of the RN on the war against japan should be. (My source for most of this is the Alanbrooke diaries so as with all diaries it may be biased), Politically the recapture of Burma/Malaya was important for post war imperial politicial reasons militarily it was viewed as marginal by COS better to use limited resources against targets on main line of advance. I think discussions were had as to whether it should be a TF supporting CENTPAC the RN helping SWPAC or even a seperate commonwealth attack out of North Aus. (I think Brooke was in favour of supporting Mac as he was a great fan of MacArthur) They finally settled on supporting Centpac not that I think King was particularily happy about it !!!! Well, he did get his DEI raids in 44 and a landing in Burma was planned but scrapped because the Army had the situation pretty well handled. Churchill's problem was that at the time he started pushing for it, the local naval forces ammounted to about a dozen ships bigger than a DD. Thus they rightfully talked him out of it, or rather told him flat out that the idea was a no-go until and unless he committed more ships to the area. Youre completely right that what he really wanted to do was get into the big pond to play where the USN was playing. He eventually got both the ops out of Australia and ops around the Home Islands. One interessting theory (again from The Forgotten Fleet) is that while King was vehemently opposed to RN presence in the big pool, Nimitz was glad to have them there as were many of the local USN commanders who both treated the RN with respect and provided logistical aaid that they were in no way authorised to provide.

Andy Mac -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:40:03 PM)
Ummm landing in Southern Burma when the amphib assets were available is what they did in 45 how they were expected to do this in 44 before the monsoon hits but after Overlord/Anvil I dont see how they could the window for action is very very narrow Just checked some books. 1. Churchill wanted to do just as you suggest madmickey and land on Burmese/Malayan coast. 2. All 3 members of the British COS said not possible with available assets and wrong strategy and (per the Alanbrook Diaries please see previous caveat about relying on diaries) were willing to resign 2 months before Overlord if Churchill pressed the issue. 3. When US COS got wind of Bay of Bengall strategy they made it clear that under no circumstances would they support amphib ops in Bay of Bengal as they were unnecessary given situation in Centpac so all amphibs had to come from RN which was kinda busy with Overlord Mountbatten was probably more in line with Churchill on this but if all three COS say no and the US COS say no and are right what else can you do Andy

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:41:01 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac The RN didnt want to do anything off Burma the view was it was a total waste of time when the critical point was in CentPac Churchill had to virtually force them to prepare for ops there on Political grounds not Military. Also dont forget about th emonsoon restricting opportuniteis and ships take time to get from Overlord/Anvil to India its not a quick task Landing in southern Burma could have been used to cutoff the Jap line of communication to troops fighting in India and Northern Burma plus Singapore and Malaysia. Look at the amount of British Empire troops used did they not hear of The Island hoping or bypassing strong point strategy. After the 2nd Battle of Philippine Sea and later Leyte Gulf the Jap fleet was not a threat. Lord Louis Battenberg should not have even been given command of the destroyer Kelly. Youre not being terribly fair to Louie. When he assumed command he did not have very many assets to work with. Most of the pulling in the area was being done by the Army, and they did not see eye to eye. That being said, Louie was the theater commander and he did put an amphibious op, designed to cut off the IJA forces around Rangoon, into the pipeline. IIRC, they committed and entire Indian brigade to amphibious training. But by the time things rolled around to executing the landing, the Japanese front had collapsed and the IJA had executed a rather masterful withdrawl from the area. Again, IIRC they did actually land a part of that brigade in the area of Rangoon, but by that time the only people there to welcome them were outriders from another Indian unit that had gotten there by land. BTW, you also seem to be working on the erouneous idea that amphib ops were easy. It took the USN and USMC about 2 and a half years to figure out how to do it, and thats with virtually unlimited assets. All the RN had in the area was a middling sized squadron and a motley collection of old scows for transport. Even if they had gone ahead with an opposed landing, they would have been shooting from the hp at best. At worst, it would have been a fiasco, in which case poor Louie would have been villified even more than he is today.

Andy Mac -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:41:49 PM)
Yup everything I have read indicates the USN went out of its way to be helpfull including putting up with the RN still learning about underway replenishment. Only King was really opposed

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 9:47:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac Ummm landing in Southern Burma when the amphib assets were available is what they did in 45 how they were expected to do this in 44 before the monsoon hits but after Overlord/Anvil I dont see how they could the window for action is very very narrow Just checked some books. 1. Churchill wanted to do just as you suggest madmickey and land on Burmese/Malayan coast. 2. All 3 members of the British COS said not possible with available assets and wrong strategy and (per the Alanbrook Diaries please see previous caveat about relying on diaries) were willing to resign 2 months before Overlord if Churchill pressed the issue. 3. When US COS got wind of Bay of Bengall strategy they made it clear that under no circumstances would they support amphib ops in Bay of Bengal as they were unnecessary given situation in Centpac so all amphibs had to come from RN which was kinda busy with Overlord Mountbatten was probably more in line with Churchill on this but if all three COS say no and the US COS say no and are right what else can you do Andy I would also like to add that Winnie also wanted a landing iin Borneo in late44/early45. The RN, for all intents, told him he was out of his mind. I think the Americans just laughed.

YankeeAirRat -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 10:16:42 PM)
Both of the British aircraft were very capable for the early era that they were developed in, like most other people have said the Royal Navy Air Arm was caught in the tug of war between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy over who was to provide and train the crews in the depression era military. The Swordfish outlasted both of its replacements in war time service it wasn't removed from front line carrier squadron use until the British started to buy the Grumman Avenger and the Fairey Firefly. The last Swordfish squadron was stood down on the 25th of May 1945. The Fulmar was developed at a scout/fighter. It to is a mis-understood aircraft because it had a number of capabilities of a good fighter. It had a large number of guns (8 .303's mounted in the wings), it was nimble and very manuverable, it had decent range, however it was lacking in speed. The aircraft it self in real life had around 112 kills most of those from the Mediterrian theather of combat. Before the Fulmar came on scene the Royal navy was using carrier based version of the Gloster Gladiator and Blackburn Roc's. Neither of those could compete even agianst the Nates of Japan or the Brewster Buffalos of the US Navy, let alone against the Bf109's that that German's were using during the Spanish Civil War and the early part of World War 2.

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 10:33:30 PM)
The one thing I never understood about the Fulmar was that it seems to have been designed completely contrary to RN carrier doctrine. It was a very large plane. With its full combat weight it must have had a hard time getting off those small RN decks. It took up god knows how much hangar space, expecially considering that its wings were not completely foldable. So how did the RN wind up with it?

madmickey -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 10:34:11 PM)
The Jap did not have dedicated amphib landing vessel when they attacked Malaysia in December 1941 (northwest monsoon). In the British attacking Southern Burma you would attacking a long undefended beach line against an Enemy with limited armour assets. This would be much preferable to land movement in Northern Burma. Southeast Asia was still fighting on the defensive 2 years after the Americans/Australian were on the offensive. In addition earlier offensive (it was only at May 1945 when Rangoon was liberated) operation from Southern Burma toward China and reopening the Burma road from the south would have lessen the need for the request for the Soviet Union involvement in Far East. North Korea not being run by the Communist is a good thing. The British had sufficient Naval forces for raiding all the way down to Java it should have been sufficient to cover landing on southern Burma coast. "By April 1944 USS Carrier Saratoga, 3 British capital ships 1 French BB, 2 British carrier and some light forces were in Ceylon as the Year progressed 2 more British carrier arrived pg. 173 Triumph and Tragedy, W Churchill

madmickey -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 10:38:49 PM)
Onime, Louis Battenberg reversed the Kelly in a minefield before he was given command of Combined Operation where he butchered Canadian at Dieppe.

madmickey -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 10:48:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey The British Navy still seems to like small carriers with planes that have limited range, would the Argentine Air Force wrecked so much havoc on the RN if the Brits were using American style carriers and planes? I would argue that likes and dislikes hardly figure into it. I'm sure the RN would have loved to field a dozen behemoths the size of the Nimitz. The plain and sad truth was that they couldnt afford it. I cant say if they British powers-that-be were justified in slashing the military budgets to half past nothing, but the fact is that they did. I think the harrier was an excellent close air support plane but as a fleet air defense fighter it leaves something to be desired. The British Navy had regular carrier up until the 1970s, I think the Prince of Wales was a Phantom Pilot on one.

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:06:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey The Jap did not have dedicated amphib landing vessel when they attacked Malaysia in December 1941 (northwest monsoon). In the British attacking Southern Burma you would attacking a long undefended beach line against an Enemy with limited armour assets. This would be much preferable to land movement in Northern Burma. Southeast Asia was still fighting on the defensive 2 years after the Americans/Australian were on the offensive. In addition earlier offensive operation from Southern Burma toward China and reopening the Burma road from the south would have lessen the need for the request for the Soviet Union involvement in Far East. North Korea not being run by the Communist is a good thing. The British had sufficient Naval forces for raiding all the way down to Java it should have been sufficient to cover landing on south Burma coast. "By April 1944 USS Carrier Saratoga, 3 British capital ships 1 French BB, 2 British carrier and some light forces were in Ceylon as the Year progressed 2 more British carrier arrived pg. 173 Triumph and Tragedy, W Churchill Burma is definitely not Malaya. I would be curious to know where you would propose to execute these landings and to what purpose. As I mentioned before, the amphibious op was scheduled for Rangoon, where the coast is fairly suitable for it and there are at least some roads in the area. Most of the Burmese coastline was not nearly so pleasant. I think that simply gaining a beachhead would have accomplished nothing if they could not a) make quick flanking movements and b) keep their forces in supply. Neither of those was possible along most of the coast simply because were talking about some of the worst terrain on the face of the planet. When the Japanese executed their landing in Malaya, they were landing against an unprepared, disorganized enemy. The IJA in Burma in 44 did not fit that discription. British forces in Burma were very far from being on the defensive at the time. They were executing large, and largely succesful, land operations. The reason that the RN did not participate is that there were absolutely no objectives to be had there. I fail to see what the USSR has to do with Burma at all. In my personal opinion, neither the US nor England, or both for that matter, could have taken on the Kwantung army (which is what the USSR actually fought, if you recall) without a long preparation and probably a bloody campaign (the Russsians did not exactly have a bloodless victory either). And again, Burma is an long way from Manchuria. And no amount of help to the Chinese would have made them capable of fighting a stand up fight versus the IJA. As for Winnie's quote, what he neglects to mention is that the Sara was strictly on loan. The Americans would have had 3 kinds of fits and probably invaded Canada again if the British proposed anything that might have gotten her stuck there for any extended period. She was there on "break glass in case of emergency only!" basis. The French BB, Richelieu IIRC could not be used because of "political considerations". God for bid the thing got the paint scratched or something. As for the RN units, the BBs (and to a somewhat lesser extent the CVs also) had such short legs and the distances involved were so much greater than the ones in the North Atlantic and the Med for which they were designed, that keeping them fueled and supplied would have taken a major fleet train. Those suppy ships and tankers were not availible until much later.

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:16:04 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey Onime, Louis Battenberg reversed the Kelly in a minefield before he was given command of Combined Operation where he butchered Canadian at Dieppe. You are right on both counts. Also, I think that his qualifications for the post seem to be rather questionable to me in the first place. However, what I was saying was that you do not seem to be taking all factors into account on this particular topic.

Andy Mac -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:22:03 PM)
Big difference landing against unprepared inadequate troops in 1941 from cargo ships as against the forces the Japanese kept in Central and Southern Burma The Indian Army launched an offensive in 1943 down the Arakan that was unsuccessful so they were attacking. In 44 they were pre empted by the Japanese Offensive which sucked in most of the available Allied troops. I think you are strongly over estimating the assets available for an attack in this area Saratoga was only made available for attacking Palembang and the oil fields at Sabang not for any Bay of Bengal invasion (and in fact the US COS explicitly said NO to these operations) also a raid where you are not tied to protecting an invasion fleet is very different from covering a beachhead and those raids happended in April 44 how are the allies supposed to commit to another amphib operation 3 months before Overlord whent eh US COS and the British COS are still arguing over allocation of shipping for Anvil and the Overlord plan has just increased to a 5 Divisonal Assault. Also dont forget the R class ships were in a bad way by this time and the RN's no 1 job was to protect the sealanes down the African Coast and the Gulf. Also In 43 the Indian Army was still mobilising and its focus was still on reinforcing Iraq with what mobile forces it did have if the Germans broke through. Auchinleck only became head of the Indian Army in mid 43 that was when the Indian army really started to rebuild to the force that Slim won at Imphal, Kohima and the Irrawaddy with. I really dont think anything more could have been done than was done unless. A god like supreme commander 1. Forces the US to realise that Chiang is a waste of time. 2. Reinforces India with US troops, aircraft and ships 3. Forces the British to take risks with the Gulf convoys Anyway thats my tuppence worth Andy

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:25:28 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey I think the harrier was an excellent close air support plane but as a fleet air defense fighter it leaves something to be desired. The British Navy had regular carrier up until the 1970s, I think the Prince of Wales was a Phantom Pilot on one. Again, the RN was forced to design its force mix and equipment around their budget. Both the Harrier and the V/STOL carriers were a concept that they felt was justified as opposed to the operational costs of maintaining a full size carrier. Also, I think they were planning for a different kind of war when they came up with the concept. A big part of that concept was the participartion on the USN. In my opinion, the RN that went into the Falkland war was not designed to go to war all by itself. It was intended to deal with Soviet submarines, protecting the home waters and not much else, while the USN did the heavy lifting. Again, just a personal opinion.

Andy Mac -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:25:31 PM)
I agree Dieppe was a failure but how could they know it want going to work unless they tried it. With hindsight it was a massacre but they almost had to try The lessons leaned at Dieppe were vital to Overlord.

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:34:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac 1. Forces the US to realise that Chiang is a waste of time. Good point Andy. As I recall, British brass wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Chinese. The US browbeat them into it.

Onime No Kyo -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/28/2006 11:46:37 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac I agree Dieppe was a failure but how could they know it want going to work unless they tried it. With hindsight it was a massacre but they almost had to try The lessons leaned at Dieppe were vital to Overlord. I think that the biggest problem with the Dieppe plan was the complete lack of cutouts. It was either going to be a success or a massacre. But by the same token, Overlord didnt have any cutouts either. I have heard all sorts of therories about Dieppe, that it failed because of everything from lack of aircover (true), to lack of RN big gun support (true) to many other things. Ultimately, however, it was bound to fail because it was too small to be a landing and too big and unweildy to be a raid.

Rob Brennan UK -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/29/2006 2:00:24 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Andy Mac I agree Dieppe was a failure but how could they know it want going to work unless they tried it. With hindsight it was a massacre but they almost had to try The lessons leaned at Dieppe were vital to Overlord. Hear Hear ! .. yes i can imagine a lot of canadians are sore at mountbatton about that fisaco. BUT he did imo a great job in the burma front and post war especially in french indo china ( where he dis allowed french troops to garisson due to political and local animosity toward the french.. he started the practise of using surrendered japanese forces as peace keepers ( arguable on moral grounds , but who else was there [&:]) . Also the japanese troops took orders from the british as they were the conquerors , they ignored and hated the French as they viewed that the british/commonwealth had beaten them in years of hard fighting through burma, where as the new french troops were an unknown 'enemy' and not worthy of respect.

timtom -> RE: What was Britian thinking (5/29/2006 3:14:27 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo quote: ORIGINAL: madmickey quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Wow, two dumbasses for the price of one...[8\|] Typical from a country that surrendered in 2 minutes. I think it was Shakespeare who said it best..... [;)] Hey! Keep me out of this![sm=00000016.gif]

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