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KG Erwin -> The Hungarians In Operation Barbarossa (6/16/2006 6:56:51 AM)
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This is quoted from http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/thou/thou01.htm :
"OPERATIONS OF THE GYORSHADTEST
(MECHANIZED ARMY CORPS).
Hungarian public opinion and that of the officer corps was divided on the issue of war. Ardent patriots argued that, to save Hungarian blood, the Hungarian Army (war or not) should not cross the Carpathian frontiers. On the other hand, those who had been mesmerized by the initial successes of the German Army, those who sympathized with the Nazi regime and those who craved a major role for Hungary in the "reordering of Europe" advocated participation in the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Regent Horthy and the government had made the decision on June 26 and Par1iament was informed the next day. Neither Minister-President Bardossy, nor Horthy rea1ized that their declaration of war and the decision to participate in the invasion of the Soviet Union were illegal according to Hungarian law. A strike force was then assembled by the general staff consisting of a mountain brigade, a border guard brigade and a mechanized corps. The commander of this "Karpat group" was Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi.
The most "modern" and best-equipped unit of the Hungarian Army was the Gyorshadtest ("Fast moving army corps"). We may call it mechanized army corps. It was only relatively "mechanized." Each of the two motorized brigades of this mechanized corps had a "reconnaissance battalion" with small and medium tanks (useless against modern antitank weapons); two motorized infantry battalions, two bicycle battalions, one mediumcalibre howitzer division, and one antiaircraft battery. The necessary engineering, communication and supply troops enabled the brigades to perform as independent tactical units.
One cavalry brigade (not only in name but actually on horseback) had two cavalry regiments, a reconnaissance battalion, two bicycle battalions and horsedrawn as well as motorized artillery units, engineering, communication and supply troops.
Directly subordinate to the corps commander were two bicycle battalions, medium artillery divisions, antiaircraft divisions, additional communication, engineering and supply troops, and one air force regiment.
The mechanized corps looked impressive on paper as a strategic unit. No doubt it included the most modern, best-equipped troops of the Hungarian Army, numbering about 25,000 soldiers and officers. In reality, it was less than a match for a Soviet motorized or tank corps. Because of the military leadership's wish to see the Hungarian troops in action as soon as possible, the mechanized corps was ordered to begin its march-up before completing mobilization. Therefore, the effective force was only 75-80 per cent of projected strength. Cars and trucks requisitioned for military operations failed to arrive on time at the mobilization stations. The horses requisitioned for the cavalry were untrained for military service.
The tanks of the armored units, small Italian (Ansaldo) vehicles, provided protection against arrows and lances in the Ethiopian War but were useless against modern antitank guns. The aircraft outdated German and Italian machineswere no match for Soviet fighter planes.
The poorly equipped, poorly supplied (but well trained and well disciplined) Karpat group (with an effective force of 44,444) was to attack and repel the 12th Soviet Army confronting the Hungarian troops with no less than eight divisions (about 56,000 strong) on a front close to 180 miles wide.
The German High Command ordered the Karpat group to repel the Russian troops from the Carpathian Mountains and to pursue the enemy to the Dniester River, thereby denying them the
opportunity to launch a counterattack against the right flank of the fast-advancing 17th German Army (Plan 9).
The attack began in the morning hours of July 1, 1941. By July 9 the Karpat group, paying a price in heavy losses, pushed the stoutly-resisting, superior Russian forces back and penetrated Russian territory to a depth of 60-70 miles.
The two infantry brigades (mountain and border guard) were unable to follow such a speedy advance on foot. Colonel-Genera1 Werth, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, then dissolved the Karpat group. He used the infantry brigades for policing and administrative duties on the occupied territory while placing the mechanized corps at the disposal of the German Southern Army Group under the command of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.
The extraordinarily heroic participation of this Hungarian mechanized corps in the German advance p1ayed a decisive role in several great battles. However, their victories cost them dearly and the retreating Russian forces still did not suffer a strategic defeat. Neither did the Germans gain strategic victories. Although by the end of July the German army groups were approaching Leningrad, Kiev and Smolensk. The Soviet armies, far from dissolving, were growing stronger.
Aware of the general situation, Horthy and the Hungarian political leadership tried to gain the re1ease of the Hungarian troops. Henrik Werth, the pro-German Chief of Staff, was rep1aced on September 5, 1941 by Colonel-General Ferenc Szombathelyi, who held the conviction (a "selfish view" according to the Germans) that the Hungarian troops should be employed only for the defense of Hungarian frontiers. He did not hesitate to communicate this view to the Germans. To force the Germans to release the mechanized corps, Szombathelyi neglected to replace either the armored vehicles or the personal carriers and trucks the corps had lost during the campaign. But the Germans still continued to uti1ize the weak mechanized corps until November 24, 1941.
The Hungarian mechanized corps in the Soviet Union proved only one point: the sense of duty, discipline, comradeship and extraordinary courage of the Hungarian officer corps and soldiers could prevail over a much better equipped enemy commanding superior forces.
Upon only one occasion did the commander of the mechanized corps, Major General Bela Dalnoki-Miklos, have the opportunity to make an independent decision (at the same time refusing to obey the instructions of Runstedt). After the Battle of Kiev on October 19, the commander of the German 17th Army ordered the
mechanized corps (melted down to the strength of six battalions) to break through the Russian defenses, which had once before successfully repelled the attack of forty German battalions. General Dalnoki-Miklos, instead of a breakthrough, planned and performed a maneuver which led to the encirclement of the superior Soviet forces and opened up the road for the continuation of the German advance.
The German general staff had high praise for the outstanding achievements and tactical victories of the mechanized corps which had fought for five months in a long campaign over 1,000 miles of territory. Yet these victories were too costly not only to the mechanized corps itself but also to the whole Hungarian nation. The losses were tremendous: over 200 officers and 2,500 of the rank and file, dead; 1,500 missing in action; and 7,500 wounded. Material losses: 1,200 personnel carriers, 30 airplanes, 28 artillery pieces, 100 per cent of the Ansaldo light tanks, 80 per cent of the medium tanks, 90 per cent of the armored cars.
The withdrawal of the mechanized corps did not mean the end of Hungarian participation and sacrifice in the war. On September 7, 1941, at Hitler's invitation, Horthy visited German headquarters accompanied by Minister-President Bardossy, General Szombathelyi and Counselor to the Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, Andor Szentmiklosy. During negotiations the Germans confronted the Hungarian visitors with the surprising statement that the released Chief of Staff, General Werth, had promised to send additional Hungarian troops to the front. Horthy could gain Hitler's consent to the withdrawal of the mechanized corps only in exchange for dispatching so-called "occupational divisions" to the rear of the German front in order to secure their communication and transportation lines against the fast-growing partisan activity. "
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