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ChezDaJez -> RE: Are the Japanese now TOO powerful?? (8/7/2006 12:18:01 PM)
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quote:
IMHO certain IJN operational capabilities are considerably better than real life or USN capabilities are considerably under-rated (worse than IRL):
1) "All torpedoes all the time" - Bettys, Nells and their descendants are all very experienced and always use torpedos when attacking shipping. Been through this in multiple threads but basically these aircraft used torpedoes only sometimes. The likely reasons being that not all aircrew were adequately trained and adequate stocks of aerial torpedoes AND torpedo maintenance personnel were not available everywhere (all level 4 airbases).
1A) Kates use torpedoes all the time too. IRL torpedo attacks seem to have been the province of the "real" KB (Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiryu, Soryu). Only those ships appear to have had the training in making this type of attack AND the personnel to maintain the torpedoes. The "mini-KB" composed of CVL's and CVEs is pure fiction. Certainly at the beginning of the war the aircrew, the torpedo maintenance personnel and the ships themselves were definite second-stringers. AND the availability of torpedoes in the magazines of all carriers (IJN, US, and RN) is overstated.
2) Japanese Battleships are allowed far too much flexibility with regards to bombardment missions. At the beginning of the war Japan had no HE ammunition for 14+". Not until late 42 did they have a limited supply (of shells originally conceived as AA ammo). They never really developed a NGFS doctrine and corresponding trained personnel to coordinate NGFS with ground operations.
3) Japanese fleet defense doctrine is completely misrepresented. Radar or not their CAP never received adequate direction and coordination. At the beginning of the war their flak defense was utterly uncoordinated with a ring defense of capital ships evolving only late in the war (when they were beginning to run out of capital ships). IJN FLEET DEFENSE IS REPRESENTED EXACTLY IN THE SAME MANNER AS USN FLEET DEFENSE WHEREAS IT WAS IRL BASED ON A TOTALLY DIFFERENT SET OF ASSUMPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
4) THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE IS OVER-REPRESENTED. THE IJN PLAYER SHOULD BE CHECKING ON WHETHER EACH AND EVERY MERCHIE IS DOING SOMETHING USEFUL EVERY SINGLE TURN. As it stands now Mogami lays up 2-3 million tons of shipping in some safe harbor at the beginning of the game cause he can't really find anything for it to do (and I guess cause he sorta shares the view that there may be a bit too much).
5) Jap CD units are over-rated. The only CD unit that ever did anything notable was the Defense Battallion on Wake at the beginning of the war (a US unit). And that was mainly because the IJN tried to take Wake "on the cheap". Besides that one incident, one might conclude the big (Heavy) CD units in a few major ports also accomplished their mission since nobody ever tried to take them on. As far as the Japanese CD units are concerned, they accomplished next to nothing against the invasions that challenged them - they were suppressed by the USN bombardments (the bombardments might not have knocked out the guns but they pretty much kept them from firing on the invasion forces). The alternative to Jap CDs being over-rated would be that USN bombardments are under-rated (same capabilities as IJN in spite of a much more advanced and developed doctrine).
Please let me reply to each of your points. It concerns me that you make no mention of these problems as they relate to the allied position. Why? Each problem you listed has an allied counterpart.
(1) All units, allied or Japanese, that use torpedoes have this problem. I could complain that Swordfish, T-IVAs, Beauforts, Avengers and Devastators can also make unlimited torpedo attacks at any time. Why aren’t we including them also? I have lost many a ship during the first weeks of war to Swordfish and T-IVAs. I wonder how many torpedoes did the Dutch really have available? And what about the Dutch submarines? Surely they didn’t have huge torpedo stocks.
Regardless, I have said on many occasions that I would love to see torpedo production and carrier torpedo stowage modeled. So basically I agree with you that torpedoes are a problem but it is a problem that applies to BOTH sides.
(2) I have never heard of any early war shortage of Japanese common shells which is what they called their HE shells for 14-16 inch guns. I would like to see the source that came from. Japan did use her BBs for the initial bombardment during the Khota Bharu landings until Japan pulled the BBs to intercept the POW and Repulse.
Japan also produced common shells under license from Britain for her British built (or designed) battleships. AFAIK, only Yamato and Musashi had a temporary shortage of common shells when they were first commissioned. Common shells were produced secondary to the AP shells for these ships as their intended mission was to engage the US fleet. The Shiki type shells used for AA defense weren’t developed until after the war began.
(3) I would agree for the most part. However it wasn’t until late 42 that the lessons learned in the Marshalls, at Coral Sea and at Midway had any appreciable impact on US fleet defense. US fighter direction and AA fire were shown to be wholly inadequate during the Marshall Island raid in Feb 42 and again at Coral Sea. While fleet AA fire had improved by the time of Midway, fighter direction had not appreciably done so. The biggest problem being the single communications network used for both ship-air and air-air control. Excited pilots literally jammed the transmissions of fighter directors. In effect there were occasions where fighter controllers were unable to direct their charges, a position the Japanese were often in.
Its interesting that you fail to mention the US uber-CAP. As Andy’s and PzB’s AAR clearly demonstrates, every attempt by the Japanese to attack US carriers after mid-43 results in a Mariana’s Turkey Shoot. US fleet defense was very good in 1944 but it wasn’t impregnable. I can not think of a single engagement where at least some Japanese aircraft didn’t penetrate the CAP. Yet this is an every day occurrence in WitP. That fact is, as many others have mentioned on many, many occasions, the air-air combat routines are simply too bloody. And this is where the root of the problem is. It is what causes Japanese players to have to continuously train, to ramp up production in excess of historical levels. If they didn’t, the game would be over by the time Hellcats arrived on carriers. The Japanese simply wouldn’t have an air force left.
(4) As is the US merchant fleet also over-represented by about 20 percent. Considering that a huge portion of the US merchant fleet was assigned to delivering Lend-Lease supplies, it seems to me that they become available a little too quickly. One of the major problems the US had was in finding enough shipping to send supplies to the front. There were no 200,000+ unit supply convoys enroute Australia in late December 41 like many allied players can generate. However, I have no problem reducing the size of the Japanese merchant fleet by 30-40%. I can’t use them all anyways and the US merchies just gives me more VPs.
But let’s also look at AOs and tankers. I would like to see a routine that limits at sea refueling to AOs only. The US had 11 AOs in the Pacific at the beginning of the war, only 4 of which were capable of refueling ships at sea. In effect, the rest of the US fleet AOs were nothing more than tankers. The Japanese had 24 tankers that had been converted to AOs before the war. Unfortunately the game labels all of them as tankers. The only Japanese AOs listed in the game were those that were purpose built as AOs. All of the AOs that accompanied KB to Pearl Harbor were converted from tankers and were capable of refueling at sea.
(5) All CD units in the game are overrated. As you stated, the CD at Wake was the only CD to actually repel an invasion. But the primary problem isn’t with the CDs themselves. Its with the fact that the game basically requires that APs run themselves up on to the beach to unload. The required landing craft are abstracted so the APs themselves become the targets. I would like to see landing craft added to APs as an expendable device.
I would also submit that Japanese CDs were effective when opposing landings and not one US naval bombardment was effective in destroying coastal defenses. Look at Tarawa and Peleliu. Massive casualties were incurred during the landings. The bombardments at Iwo Jima and Okinawa did absolutely nothing to soften the defenses as the enemy refused to contest the beaches, choosing instead to fight from the hills.
As long as I am at it, let me go on to another WitP inaccuracy.. That is the pilot pools. Andy is absolutely right that it makes no sense to receive only 60 trained USN pilots a month. The USN was churning out hundreds per month at this stage in the war. Indeed, the US began to cut back on pilot training by mid 1944 because there weren’t enough units to take them all. USN pilot pools should receive at least 120 per month and USMC pools should receive at least 90 per month. The USAAF pools appear to be correct as the vast majority of its trained pilots were earmarked for Europe.
In addition to the USN pools, I feel that the IJN and IJA pools are grossly understated, far more so than the US pools. The IJN receives 10 pilots per month for the entire duration of the war and the IJA receives 20. These numbers are not bad for the pre-1943 period but they seriously reduce the RL levels later.
Now without even using any sources concerning Japanese flight training, just consider that Japan produced over 55,900 aircraft of all types between 1 January 1943 and 15 August 1945. Approximately 36000 of these were bombers and fighters, 7000 were trainers and the rest were patrol, recon, and supply types. So with Japan producing 7000 trainers, in a little over 2.5 years, just who were going to fly these bright, shiny, new aircraft? Okay, I digressed but it is an interesting point.
Anyways, the IJNAF graduated 391 pilots in 1942. Over 900 graduated in 1943 and another 2000+ graduated in 1944. The ones that graduated in the latter half of 1944 had had their training programs drastically cut short due to a lack of fuel and instructors.
I am unable to find accurate numbers for the 1945 IJNAF graduates or for the entire IJAAF war program. I do have one source that says Japan trained over 6000 IJAAF pilots during the entire course of the war but it doesn’t break it down by month nor does it give a clue as to quality.
I believe the fix for this would be to provide Japan with 50 trained IJNAF and 100 trained IJAAF pilots per month after 1942.
BTW, Spence. I'm not trying to pick on you. You just happened to mention some of my own pet peeves about the game.
Chez
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