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ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 6:41:06 PM)

Good info Big B. [8D]



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 8:25:44 PM)

Big B. to further your casualty list in the book the The Face of Battle, John Keegan wrote this, Counting the fighting infantry of a division at 10,000 and the number of British, French, Italian, and Russain divisions engaged against the Central Powers as 60, 110, 45 and 120, we get figures of 600,000, 1,100,000, 450,000 and 1,200,000 which are more or less the totals of deaths suffered by each cmobatant power at the moment its army underwent collapse or crisis.

Keegan was discussing the Battle of the Somme which started on July 1st 1916. The figures mentioned above are roughly accurate for the summer of 1917. Keegan admits that the British army suffered 100% casualties of its own divisional strength and underwent crisis. Now I can see how the AEF was cause for psychological and morale motivation as you and others have posted. Though I still have to give credit to the BEF because the UK did not fall under political turmoil as Russia did and did not have a mutiny like the French Army.

Keegan points out that the BEF had problems with self inflicted wounds and disobediance. DId the AEF suffer from these problems?



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 9:05:22 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4
Keegan points out that the BEF had problems with self inflicted wounds and disobediance. DId the AEF suffer from these problems?


I don't beleive insubordination and self inflicted wounds were particularly comon in the AEF, there of course will always be cases of that in every army in history - but to put it at the "problem" level indicates a general dissatisfaction, and the beginnings of real trouble with morale (not unlike our later experience in Vietnam towards the end). This did not particularly effect the AEF - however, had they gone for years as the Allies did - no doubt the problem would have shown up. As I recall reading, a lot of the initial enthusiasm for the war was wearing off by November 1918, though I am not suggesting, nor have I ever read that morale was becoming a "problem"

B



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 9:31:05 PM)

quote:

don't beleive insubordination and self inflicted wounds were particularly comon in the AEF, there of course will always be cases of that in every army in history - but to put it at the "problem" level indicates a general dissatisfaction, and the beginnings of real trouble with morale (not unlike our later experience in Vietnam towards the end). This did not particularly effect the AEF - however, had they gone for years as the Allies did - no doubt the problem would have shown up. As I recall reading, a lot of the initial enthusiasm for the war was wearing off by November 1918, though I am not suggesting, nor have I ever read that morale was becoming a "problem"


Exactly, the AEF never experienced anything like the Somme. They did not suffer defeat and casualties prior to the battle and did not endure defeat and casualties afterward. Naturally, their outlook on the war was quite different than Great Britains. I agree things might have been different in that case for the had the AEF had a similar experience. Keegan, in the same book, writes about an experience during World War II, "This realization was to have important poictical after-effects druing the Second World War: 'On one occasion when [the Amiercan] General Marshall was in England, pouring forth the most cogent and logical arguments in favor of a promp invasion of the Continent ... Lord Cherwell remarked to him, "It's no use-- you are arguing against the casualties of the Somme."



Syagrius -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/3/2006 6:20:37 PM)

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/3/2006 11:55:09 PM)

quote:

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.


Yes but one could also make a different conclusion and say that the British suffered more casualites in the same period of time at the Somme for example. John Keegan wrote, "By the time the battle ended, 419,654 British soldiers had become casualies on the Somme, and nearly 200,000 French" This was between 1 July and 18 November 1916. The US was effectively in Combat from June to November of 1918 and suffered 116,516 KIA. Keegan points out that on the first day of the Somme there were 60,000 casualties of which 21,000 were KIA. Many posted claiming the AEF was green and mismanaged it still makes me wonder why the AEF met different results.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/4/2006 12:25:42 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

When the US troops arrived on the western front they proved to be green and lacking in tactical abilities in comparison of other Allied troop and the Germans. That is why they suffered that much casualities in a short period of time.


Yes but one could also make a different conclusion and say that the British suffered more casualites in the same period of time at the Somme for example. John Keegan wrote, "By the time the battle ended, 419,654 British soldiers had become casualies on the Somme, and nearly 200,000 French" This was between 1 July and 18 November 1916. The US was effectively in Combat from June to November of 1918 and suffered 116,516 KIA. Keegan points out that on the first day of the Somme there were 60,000 casualties of which 21,000 were KIA. Many posted claiming the AEF was green and mismanaged it still makes me wonder why the AEF met different results.


Numbers speak volumes, I for one have stressed that the AEF was by definition very green, but I have also pointed out that their training was not poor, and the basic tactics taught in the Field Manuals still are quite valid today. The US suffered about 300,000 combat casualties June - November 1918, of which under 60,000 were KIA (the remainder seems to have been noncombat deaths). For the numbers involved and the results gained - this is not bad by WWI standards.

I leave it at this; - The AEF did just fine (aside from logistical problems encountered in the Argonne). The idea that the AEF was somehow below the standards of the other combatants, and was in some undefinable way 'lacking' - is largely the result of constantly repeated, unsubstantiated criticism, that over the decades has taken on the mantle of truth through repetition.




IronDuke_slith -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/4/2006 2:44:28 AM)



Lets not revise history too far the other way, though. A German assessment of the Meuse-Argonne attack stated.

"The American Infantry is very unskilful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns, in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by Tanks. This sort of attack offers exellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry and machine guns."

To be fair, some was merely inexperience. There was an instance when advancing American infantry failed to clear trenches properly and were machine gunned from behind by Germans unmopped up, not a mistake British and French forces were making. One American historian wrote about Pershing's tactics.

"In the main, there weren't any tactics employed. Committing hundreds of thousands of infantrymen in a narrow zone directly against heavily defended and fortified positions guaranteed high casualties and small gains".

In the end, success was bite and hold. By mid end 1918 the British were having unbroken success with it and the Germans could produce no answer.

Hunter Liggett certainly improved things for the Americans and I'm sure they would have been better in 1919, but the war ended in 1918 and it is on their performance then we must adjudicate.

Regards,
IronDuke




Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/4/2006 9:03:11 PM)

IronDuke,

Maybe at this point we are kind of talking past each other. ...or at maybe we just see things from an entirely different light. But..

German assessments of the Americans also included statements like: "Their nerves are unshaken, the men must be rated as First Class"

And whoever that historian was (sounds like the controversial S.L.A.Marshall), stating that the Americans used no tactics at all - begs for an explanation of the meaning of the word by tactics? Infantry fowllowing behind tanks during an advance is a 'tactic'. Infantry, organized into squads and platoons with mutually supporting missions are also part of 'tactics' ...as opposed to a leaderless riotous mob.

I would also ask -if American attacks were massively too crammed with too many troops on too small a front - then why were American attacks successful (taking ground) and with less casualties than the French and British suffered at places like the Verdun and the Somme?

I have always freely agreed that the US Army was very green in 1918, and many times men forgot their training when under fire - and this does explain many circumstances of troops bunching up, learning the hard way to properly clear a trench, -etc. But it is important to also recognize (when pondering combat effectiveness) that American troops also accomplished their objectives and enjoyed success on the battlefield, so I would say it's fair to call them very much battlefield effective.... it's not as if they could not deliver what the generals ordered.

I also still do not agree that bite and hold won the war. -Those tactics (limited battalion sized attacks, where the infantry will not advance far - leaving the artillery out of supporting range) helped eat away at German positions for years, but produced no major gains....unless you consider Rowlinson's summer 1918 offensive as a bite and hold attack (which to my mind was nothing of the sort, it was a massive operation employing an entire army, with hundreds of heavy tanks and hundreds of aircraft, and was one of a series of large offensives that Foch ordered along the entire Western Front that summer ... to stretch the Germans to the breaking point).

Lastly, don't think I am suggesting that the French and British weren't very good indeed, I am merely stating (IMO) that US forces were also very effective where ever they operated (soldiers are there to die and take ground - and they did that) and as a whole, US participation on the Western Front was decisive - for all of the reasons stated earlier in this thread.
Too bad we live different sides of the pond - I would love to talk this over with you over a pint. [sm=party-smiley-012.gif]



GoodGuy -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/5/2006 12:00:03 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

German assessments of the Americans also included statements like: "Their nerves are unshaken, the men must be rated as First Class"


This kinda assessment might have aimed at their psychological strength/stubbornness, not at their tactical/combat abilities. Compared to the psychological state of the average german soldier, the American forces showed less signs of battle fatigue (if any at all) than the Germans, or let's say than the French or British. I'm not saying that they didn't provide any combat value, I'm just pointing out that this assessment may have to be interpreted differently.

quote:

Infantry fowllowing behind tanks during an advance is a 'tactic'. Infantry, organized into squads and platoons with mutually supporting missions are also part of 'tactics' ...as opposed to a leaderless riotous mob.

Yes, but unlike in WW2 (where German Panzergrenadiers, Russians, and even American Inf troops used to use tanks as protection during the advance), where the tank's engines used to be able to put up decent speeds, tanks in WW1 used to be extremely slow, thus providing a lot of opportunities to shell the tanks and the following lined up troops on their slow advance. It's a tactic that led thousands of soldiers right to the shambles, imho...... means, it's rather a questionable one.

quote:

I would also ask -if American attacks were massively too crammed with too many troops on too small a front - then why were American attacks successful (taking ground) and with less casualties than the French and British suffered at places like the Verdun and the Somme?

Very interesting question.
The fact, that Germany's level of resources (manpower and ammo/supply) hit the bottom in 1918, might be one if not the major reason for these attacks being successful. Furthermore, the US approach used to be somewhat more aggressive, they also might have expected/accepted a higher amount of casualties (as experienced when they entered the theater), leading to bold attacks never conducted by the british/french. The british "Bite and hold" style used to result in smaller territory gains, but although it was supposed to be more careful and resource-saving, it offered opportunities to the Germans to inflict heavy casualties on quite a few occasions.

Assuming the US casualty rate was like 100 k from 1917-1918, then it might look like it's a very low rate. But they did not have to fight attritional battles like Verdun or the Somme offensive 1916. It would be interesting to see whether they really would have had these same "low" casualty rates if they'd have been in from the beginning, since 1914. Also, they did not have to cover as large sectors as the French/British, and they didn't have to cover their sector for a period of 4 years either.

A good number of strategical misinterpretations and mistakes might have added to the already strained/desperate situation on the German side. Furthermore, the implementation and use of the "Stormtroops" units (1918?), which appeared to be quite successful when spearheading attacks on trenches and when clearing them, was not applied to the entire front - for various reasons, therefor it only provided some local success. Losses among those specialized infantry units, unlike the huge pool of general replacements on the US side, could barely be replaced, if at all.

The German High Command was able to straighten or at least sort out breakthroughs (or attempts to make such a breakthrough) by directing reserves to a given sector, for 2 or 3 years. The implementation of these reserves can be seen as reserves serving in a "firebrigade" role, strengthening weak/contested sectors, or stopping enemy offensives where the enemy was about to gain vital ground.

This rudimentary WW1 doctrine, this way of using reserves, had been improved and deployed by the Germans in WW2, mostly executed by armoured divisions or "Abteilungen", or in ad-hoc scratch formations (so-called "Kampfgruppen") later on. German Airborne units (Monte Cassino, Arnheim) and American Airborne units (e.g. the 101st during the Ardennes offensive) had been deployed in a similar "firefighter" role imho, on the inf level, on quite some occasions.

In late 1918, the ability, to sort out enemy breakthroughs that way, was very limited, or even non-existent in some sectors, due to the lack of reserves. The sheer number of American troops and the dwindling ability to replace losses on the German side, to counter or slow down the Allied effort in late 1918, might have been one reason for the High Command to revise the situation (in terms of thinking about to surrender).

quote:

I also still do not agree that bite and hold won the war.


In fact, recent German studies (along with studies published during the last 30 yrs) display an interesting picture. The menpower resources appear to be sufficient halfway to carry on with fighting until (mid of) 1919, terrain losses taken into account here. But, logistically (ammo and food, even weapons/guns), the German Army may have collapsed after like 3 or 4 months after the actual surrender.
That said, "Bite and Hold" did hurt actually, and it was one reason for the situation getting worse for the Germans on the logistical side of things (menpower, supplies). It did not win the war, though.

The German High Command made a mistake when assessing the supply situation, actually. They expected the supplies to last for several weeks only, and, with some troops starting to be low on ammo and food (due to a partial collapse of the logistic system and due to the fact that the economy's production [food/ammo/equipment] output decreased tremendously), and with huge amounts of civilians starting to starve at home (in cities mostly), they decided to stop fighting. They did not want the troops to fight starving, as they feared chaos and mutiny - resulting in a massive collapse of the front line.
The situation in Austria and South East Europe (Hungary, Balkan) was never as desperate, but the (mistaken) assessments made by the German High Command back then lead to the actual decision to negotiate/surrender ASAP.

An interesting what-if would be to explore a situation where German civilians (women, older ppl) had been conscripted massively, country-wide, just like in WW2, to ensure production of ammo, supplies, weapons etc., in late 1917. In this case, the war may have lasted 'til 1920, but would have resulted in a defeat anyways, I guess, due to the massive superiority regarding equipment, menpower and ammuntion on the Allied side, after the US entered the war.

Anyway, IMHO, Germany rather lost WW1 on the "production" front mainly, as its economy could not keep up with the Allied output. The limited resources regarding menpower, after 4 yrs, did the rest.
That said, the US-participation was successful in terms of putting up virtually unexhaustable amounts of menpower and material/supplies, but never in terms of deploying decisive tactics or some kind of superior/decisive staff/personnel quality.

quote:

I see no reason to even expect that Germany would starve.

The German economy could not provide food / resources for both the civilians AND the Army, in the long run, as the system lacked organization and prioritization. The production focused on military supplies (ammo, guns and planes), but even the ammo production could not serve the needs at the end, let alone food production.

With the US remaining a neutral nation Germany still would have had to end the war by late 1919, either by winning it, or by surrendering. That's my guess.... and it seems that many German accounts point to the same conclusion.
It might have been different if there would have been the level of organization/planning that could be seen in WW2, coming into effect in 1943. The German production climbed to a wartime-high in (mid) 1944, when production lines had been tightened, and when planning/allocation had been centralized. Even the output level of luxury goods could be maintained if not raised, way into the year 1944.

The year 1918 did no feature that level of mass production, not on the German side, at least [:D].
Just my 2 cents.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/5/2006 7:41:49 AM)

quote:

Yes, but unlike in WW2 (where German Panzergrenadiers, Russians, and even American Inf troops used to use tanks as protection during the advance), where the tank's engines used to be able to put up decent speeds, tanks in WW1 used to be extremely slow, thus providing a lot of opportunities to shell the tanks and the following lined up troops on their slow advance. It's a tactic that led thousands of soldiers right to the shambles, imho...... means, it's rather a questionable one.


How do you explain the battle of Cambrai? For as slow as the British mk. iv was, it managed to completely outpace the infantry. And they fell prey to mechanical failure, lack of fuel, and makeshift anti-tank weapons.



GoodGuy -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/5/2006 10:25:06 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

How do you explain the battle of Cambrai? For as slow as the British mk. iv was, it managed to completely outpace the infantry. And they fell prey to mechanical failure, lack of fuel, and makeshift anti-tank weapons.


...and artillery. [:D]

As far as I know, the Mark IV had a max speed of around 6 km/h (on main roads), with a somewhat lower speed in rough terrain, most likely, and it was way slower in a heavily entrenched/shelled evironment for sure. I'm pretty sure that troops were able to keep up with these speeds.

I'm not an expert regarding the battle of Cambrai, but, if I'm not mistaken, the British attacked all along a narrow 5 mile sector, and the plan indicated that a concentrated attack of mixed infantry and tank formations would break the German line. This concerted action - the use of mixed tank/inf formations, along with dedicated air support strafing the area - might explain the early successes there, not an imaginary rapid advance due to imaginary tank speeds, imho.

According to the accounts about WW1 I've read so far, tanks in WWI were not able to defend / occupy territory that had been captured. Enemy infantry often fell back, just to retake their positions when the tanks moved on, or they even started to attack the tanks with grenades and make-shift bombs, with quite some success.
That said, tanks in that era had to be backed up/followed by infantry closely, where the inf then was supposed to clear trenches, or take over enemy trenches, in case the advance had been stopped.

Cambrai:
"The first advances were mixed tank and infantry in 'Tank Battle Drill', with a leading tank echelon and then 50 yards back infantry platoons in two files, assigned as eight platoons per tank as either trench cleaners or trench 'stop'. Fourteen Royal Flying Corps squadrons were assigned to the battle, to provide trench strafing and to cover the noise of the tanks' advance."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cambrai

While the portion above is quoted from wikipedia (given, these entries are hard to verify sometimes), I believe that many details mentioned in that article have been researched thouroughly halfway.

I've seen a german tv report with accounts reporting about the 51st Highland Division (which is being mentioned in that article as well), as an example for failures when commanders did not stick to the drill, which means that attacks with Mark tanks were less successful if conducted without close inf support.

The french light tanks, Renault FT-17 were fast and agile, and could have achieved what you might have been suspecting here, a deep tank penetration of a German rear area leaving behind friendly infantry, but
1) they had not been used in Cambrai,
2) they had entered mass production during or after the battle only, and
3) the early versions got stuck in trenches and even in small craters already, which could be corrected with a tail-weel/weight as late as late 1917 or early 1918.
4) their guns were relatively weak

During the Cambrai counter-attack (10 days later), the Germans regained all early territory losses plus a little bit more, and they kind of traded a portion of the Hindenburg Line (which they couldn't recapture) with another sector.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 12:11:51 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

Big B. to further your casualty list in the book the The Face of Battle, John Keegan wrote this, Counting the fighting infantry of a division at 10,000 and the number of British, French, Italian, and Russain divisions engaged against the Central Powers as 60, 110, 45 and 120, we get figures of 600,000, 1,100,000, 450,000 and 1,200,000 which are more or less the totals of deaths suffered by each cmobatant power at the moment its army underwent collapse or crisis.

Keegan was discussing the Battle of the Somme which started on July 1st 1916. The figures mentioned above are roughly accurate for the summer of 1917. Keegan admits that the British army suffered 100% casualties of its own divisional strength and underwent crisis. Now I can see how the AEF was cause for psychological and morale motivation as you and others have posted. Though I still have to give credit to the BEF because the UK did not fall under political turmoil as Russia did and did not have a mutiny like the French Army.

Keegan points out that the BEF had problems with self inflicted wounds and disobediance. DId the AEF suffer from these problems?


Sherman..As much as i respect and enjoy reading Keegan.He seems to have his own biases in disecting battles and coming to conclusions in his earlier work.I often wish that he would update his pre-80's work with the eye of experience and further study.He is one of Britians and the wests emiment military historians,but his early works reek of idealism and pre-concieved notions.To see what i mean reread Faces of Battle then read his book on North American warfare.He even goes so far as to question the myth of the military genius of Lee given his actions at Mehanicsville early in the war and his reliance on the frontal,and costly, and similar assault at Gettysburg that both times led to major losses in his army without any noticable gain.

I only mention this because he seems to lose his conception of war as a meaningless and madding thing(a preconception popular at the time of his earlier writings)and seems to focus more on the who,what,why,and how of the battles and campaigns he is presenting rather than trying to deliver some sort of moral judgement on warfare.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 12:57:11 AM)

quote:

Sherman..As much as i respect and enjoy reading Keegan.He seems to have his own biases in disecting battles and coming to conclusions in his earlier work.I often wish that he would update his pre-80's work with the eye of experience and further study.He is one of Britians and the wests emiment military historians,but his early works reek of idealism and pre-concieved notions.To see what i mean reread Faces of Battle then read his book on North American warfare.He even goes so far as to question the myth of the military genius of Lee given his actions at Mehanicsville early in the war and his reliance on the frontal,and costly, and similar assault at Gettysburg that both times led to major losses in his army without any noticable gain.

I only mention this because he seems to lose his conception of war as a meaningless and madding thing(a preconception popular at the time of his earlier writings)and seems to focus more on the who,what,why,and how of the battles and campaigns he is presenting rather than trying to deliver some sort of moral judgement on warfare.



ummm......what? [&:] I don't understand what you are saying.

I'll have to admit, this is the only book of Keegan's I've read. I enjoyed parts of it. I especially read it to follow up withy my studying of WWI. I thought the account of the Somme was thoughtful and thorough. It made me conclude that many lessons the British army has learned they learned at the Somme.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 1:24:15 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

quote:

ORIGINAL: Maliki

I only called it controversial because there seems to be a large difference of opinion between European and American historians on the AEFs impact.Most of which i think boils down to national pride.


This is very true, and I would like to point out that there has been a long revisionist movement by historians from across the pound to downplay the USA's contribution after the war. In Britain particularly, it has become chique for historians to barley even mention US involvment...kind of like ignoring the elephant standing in the room.

quote:


As for the Meuse Aragonne campaign..I touched upon this earlier.It was some of the worst terrain to conduct an offensive operation in on the Western Front.The AEF did very well in conducting the campaign there.This was the prize given to it for not giving in to French and British demands of it being broken up and used as cannon fodder in their armies.

In most aspects,given its inexperience,the AEF performed well.But..The fact of the matter is that the inexperience of high and mid-level officers in command and control of such large numbers of troops and the logistics behind that,led to a less than optimal performance. I would give the AEF a B+ for effort in its operations...and also the fact that the Germans were alarmed enough by its entry that they launched a last desperate offenisve before it could be utilized as a whole in theater.Also that they were very impressed with the high morale and doggedness of the forces it employed.

Once again the major impact was a pyshcological one upon the German army.


Well, I may disagree a small bit (the US Army certainly did have officers that needed to be and were replaced...but like I pointed out earlier - as mediocre as some US officers certainly were, that paled in significance compared to some of France and Britain's Senior Generals during the war).
Regardless - it is certainly true that US involvement made a massive psycological impact on the German High Command.


quote:


The war may have been won by the major Entente powers by the starvation of the German home populace even without its introduction.

Theoretically - perhaps. In the face of reality in 1918 with America as a nuetral..not a chance. The Germans would certainly have won the war outright on the battlefield in France long before the economic effects would have brought Germany down - in fact, under the assumption of US neutrality, with Russia out of the war and Eastern Europe pacified and Germany no longer fighting a two major front war - I see no reason to even expect that Germany would starve.

quote:


It is also important to to remember that the US was viewed as a minor power by France and Britain..along the lines of Portugal.[X(]..Another major impact of it being that France and Britian did not face major social uphevial after wars end by it soaking up casualties that they would needed to have taken if the US had not entered the war.The two major powers were treading a very fine line,domestically,before Americas entry,


Well, Britain and France may have wanted to view the US as a power as signifigant as Portugal, but the reality was quite different and Britain and France knew that all too well - that was one of the reasons why Pershing alone, of all the Allied National commanders, didn't have to do what Foch said or wanted. Pershing not only was the only Supreme commander with the full backing of his government - but it was also well understood of the power the USA wielded among the Big Three (GB, FR, USA) the USA could basically call the shots by 1918...it wasn't until after the war that Britain and France took advantage of Wilson's political weaknesses visa-vie an isolationist Congress, and shoved him aside at the Peace Table.

But overal Maliki, we pretty much agree..[;)]


snip..sorry for cutting out your treatise.

I'm not an expert on the Great War,but i do have a high interest in it.I have come by my opinion by reading Gilbert,Keegan,and various other works..mainly the Encyclopedia Brittianica.The latter of which i have found the most useful and unbiased concerning the roles of the armies and their impact on the fighting of WWI.Your best bet at understanding most history is a encyclopedia with a chapter or volume devoted to one subject.[;)]

Also a very interesting and rare pictorial history of the AEF in WWI that a friend had.My interest was piqued in this period and the twenty years previous when i first found a grave of an American sailor whom died in Russia in 1919,and an American Marine killed in the Boxer Rebellion,further exploration of the cemetery unvieled no less than ten graves of soldiers whom were killed fighting with the AEF,including an amazing tombstone of the first soldier KIA in WWI from where i grew up.Being that the local cemetery was on the way to school and we would often cut through it for a shortcut.If that doesn't excite the interest of a young boy in an era than i don't know what will[;)]

Anyhow i don't pretend to be an expert..and there is alot i agree with you upon given a caveat.That being that there have been no good French,German,Austrian,Russian,etc.. histories of WWI published in English and until there are our understaning of the full conflict will only be limited to the the arrival and impact of American forces on the Western Front.So as far as their historians i can't say...Our greatest mainstream source for the contribution of the AEF outside of our own writers and history books,and the most accesible are those of the British.Which the majority give very short thrift to the impact of the AEF and the majority of American writers seem to overestimate their actual impact and performance on the battlefield.This is where national pride and bias come to play in our understanding of conceptions of actual contributions of the efforts forces in the years'17-18.

I still believe that given all that i have read that Germany would have succumbed to the blockade imposed upon her,even with the resources that their conquest of Poland and Russia afforded her,without American intervention.Though given the attitudes of the time that a major military effort would also have been pressed against leading to 100'000s of Entene casualtieswith war weay and unhappy homefronts,and very little battlefront gains.Also that by pointing out that many senior and mid-level AEF officers were not up to the task of such a war is by no means a black mark on the AEF,but like in all wars prior and latter it took time for the wheat to seperate from the chaff under wartime,and highly different from the previous conflicts,conditions.

That is why i give the AEF a B+,they went into a war with numbers of troops and with a defiency in Modern Warfare,since lost among senior officers that served in the Civil War,and logistics and the command of large numbers of men..and manged to succeed in every task given them,even with difficulty.

In terms of Armies in the latter years of the war the Germans would recieve an A-,the Bulgarians an A+,,Romanania and Italy would both recieve a D in their conduct.The French despite their innovative small unit practice would get a C and the BEF would get a B+ along with the Belgians for sheer stuborness.The AEF proved far more decisive upon the battlefields of the western front than what the two major powers wishedto give them credit for,but far less than what American historians like to believe they accomplished in their time as an independent fighting force.

Personally i would like your comments and opinion here http://www.madcowssteakhouse.com/viewtopic.php?t=14174

sice this predates the topic here and that you may provide a different and fresh perspective on this subject[;)]

I already know and respect Irondukes take on military matters of the early-mid twentieth century conflicts and your opinion would be very welcomed as you seem very well versed in the era.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 1:34:17 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

Sherman..As much as i respect and enjoy reading Keegan.He seems to have his own biases in disecting battles and coming to conclusions in his earlier work.I often wish that he would update his pre-80's work with the eye of experience and further study.He is one of Britians and the wests emiment military historians,but his early works reek of idealism and pre-concieved notions.To see what i mean reread Faces of Battle then read his book on North American warfare.He even goes so far as to question the myth of the military genius of Lee given his actions at Mehanicsville early in the war and his reliance on the frontal,and costly, and similar assault at Gettysburg that both times led to major losses in his army without any noticable gain.

I only mention this because he seems to lose his conception of war as a meaningless and madding thing(a preconception popular at the time of his earlier writings)and seems to focus more on the who,what,why,and how of the battles and campaigns he is presenting rather than trying to deliver some sort of moral judgement on warfare.



ummm......what? [&:] I don't understand what you are saying.

I'll have to admit, this is the only book of Keegan's I've read. I enjoyed parts of it. I especially read it to follow up withy my studying of WWI. I thought the account of the Somme was thoughtful and thorough. It made me conclude that many lessons the British army has learned they learned at the Somme.


Sorry.Going past his earlier writings you will find much less idealism against the nature of war and more understanding in the hows and whys of campaigns of battles.Early Keegan is temepred by idealism and the belife that all wars are wrong...Latter Keegan tries to understand the why's and hows of military actions.Faces of battle was wrote in his earlier years..and thus some of his opinions and theories doesn't stand up to his latter more mature works.Is war wrong or right..who knows..but up to Faces of Battle Keegan is tempered by the earlier belief and doesn't spend as much time in understanding campaigns and battles as he does in passing judgement upon the actions he is writing about.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 3:03:47 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Maliki
[snip]

Personally i would like your comments and opinion here http://www.madcowssteakhouse.com/viewtopic.php?t=14174

sice this predates the topic here and that you may provide a different and fresh perspective on this subject[;)]

I already know and respect Irondukes take on military matters of the early-mid twentieth century conflicts and your opinion would be very welcomed as you seem very well versed in the era.


Thank you Maliki... In a few days I think I will take you up on the invite [;)]

B



redcoat -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 2:11:40 PM)


There are a few pictures of the AEF on the 'Heritage of the Great War' website on the 'Americans are Coming' page.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/8/2006 10:49:33 PM)

quote:

Sorry.Going past his earlier writings you will find much less idealism against the nature of war and more understanding in the hows and whys of campaigns of battles.Early Keegan is temepred by idealism and the belife that all wars are wrong...Latter Keegan tries to understand the why's and hows of military actions.Faces of battle was wrote in his earlier years..and thus some of his opinions and theories doesn't stand up to his latter more mature works.Is war wrong or right..who knows..but up to Faces of Battle Keegan is tempered by the earlier belief and doesn't spend as much time in understanding campaigns and battles as he does in passing judgement upon the actions he is writing about.


I've only read the book once. I did not notice this, but I will have to look out for it the next time I read it.


quote:

That is why i give the AEF a B+,they went into a war with numbers of troops and with a defiency in Modern Warfare,since lost among senior officers that served in the Civil War,and logistics and the command of large numbers of men..and manged to succeed in every task given them,even with difficulty.


By the time ther Americans entered WWI, there was nobody left in the US Army that served during the Civil War. The last veteran of the Civil War serving in the Army was the famed "Drummer Boy" of Shiloh who retired in 1916 at the rank of Colonel. Interrestingly enough, the US Government and Army became fairly progressive. The Congress aloted money for the Army to establish the Army War College in 1911. This began eliminating the old guard.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/9/2006 5:53:15 AM)

Off topic a bit, but still on topic - I thought this was interesting (from http://www.greatwar.nl/frames/default-americans.html ):

There is no doubt that Winston Churchill (1874-1965) never was very enthusiast about America's entry in the Great War.
[image]local://upfiles/16855/AA1A04D8F68F4655821DE685ACD9B134.jpg[/image]

Churchill wrote: "Suddenly a nation of one hundred and twenty millions unfurls her standard on what is already the stronger side; suddenly the most numerous democracy in the world, long posing as a judge1), is hurled, nay, hurls itself into the conflict."

He was not alone. His political opponent James Ramsay MacDonald, one of the leaders of the British Labour Party, expressed similar thoughts. MacDonald, who had been trying to get England out of the war since the beginning, expressed concern that America's appearance on the battlefield would frustate ongoing peace attempts. In England and in France talking about peace became little less than high treason. Who wanted peace now? With America on her side the allies were sure of the final humiliation of the enemy.

Years later, in August 1936, Churchill, then an ordinary Conservative member of the British parliament, gave an interview on this matter to mr. William Griffin, editor of the New York Enquirer2), who stayed in London at that time. "America should have minded her own business and stayed out of the World War", Churchill was quoted.

In the interview Churchill explained that the fighting parties at that time - Spring 1917 - were ready for peace. The 1916 disasters of Jutland, Verdun and Somme had taken most, if not all, of the fighting spirit out of Germany, Britain and France. There had been already several peace-proposals from German and Austrian sides and there were attempts at mediation going on by neutral Danish, Swedish and even American negotiators.

Churchill: "Peace at that moment would have saved over one million British, French, American, and other lives."

But because the United States suddenly wanted their share of the war all peace-talk became useless.

Dispute

There is an ongoing dispute whether Churchill really spoke these words. When Churchill later denied having said that the US should have minded her own business, William Griffin, publisher of the New York Enquirer, testified in Congress that it was indeed Sir Winston Churchill who made this comment in an interview with him in London in August 1936 (sworn statement, Congressional Record, October 21, 1939, vol. 84. p. 686.).

Griffin also brought a $1,000,000 libel suit against Churchill.

The libel case was not called until October 1942, in the midst of the Second World War. Churchill was now prime minister in Great-Britain. Griffin and his lawyers failed to appear in court. At that time the journalist was under indictment in Washington, D.C., on charges of conspiring to lower the morale of the armed forces of the United States of America3). Because Griffin did not show up, the charges against Churchill were dismissed. In a conversation with the The New York Times Churchill admitted having the 1936 interview, but disavowed the disputed statement (The New York Times, October 22, 1942, p. 13).

It is a pity that most attention went (and still goes) to the question whether Churchill did, or did not utter these words. The opinion itself deserves more consideration. In 1936 the doom of new armed conflict was already hanging over Europe. As we can see now, afterwards, the arguments in the statement were pointing directly to the origins of the Second World War.

Sweeping

If only for the sake of discussion4), here follows what Winston Churchill - according to the New York Enquirer - in 1936 has said literally :

"America should have minded her own business and stayed out of the World War. If you hadn't entered the war the Allies would have made peace with Germany in the Spring of 1917. Had we made peace then there would have been no collapse in Russia followed by Communism, no breakdown in Italy followed by Fascism, and Germany would not have signed the Versailles Treaty, which has enthroned Nazism in Germany. If America had stayed out of the war, all these 'isms' wouldn't today be sweeping the continent of Europe and breaking down parliamentary government - and if England had made peace early in 1917, it would have saved over one million British, French, American, and other lives."

In the USA there was also support for this opinion. In 1939 the American historian professor Harry Elmer Barnes bluntly stated: "Not only was our entry into the World War a calamity of the first magnitude for Europe and contemporary civilization, it was also a serious disaster for the United States".5)

× × ×

1) - England and France were not always happy about the way America conducted 'neutralism' in the time before the United States declared war on Germany. Click here to read what the English author Edward Wright wrote about this subject.

2) - The New York Enquirer was a Sunday afternoon paper William Griffin started in 1926 to fill the gap between Sunday morning and Monday morning, and to give William Randolph Hearst a paper on which to try out experimental ideas. After Griffin's death in 1952, the newspaper was sold to Generoso Pope, who turned it into the National Enquirer.

3) - The proceedings against Griffin were quashed after a hearing in federal court on January 26, 1944.

4) - Since The Heritage of the Great War in 1998 published the text of the alleged Churchill interview for the first time on the Internet, this website has been under constant attack by (mainly American) readers who 1. did not believe that The New York Enquirer ever existed, 2. doubted whether editor William Griffin was a real person, 3. doubted that Churchill had ever given him an interview, 4. were certain that the words were spoken by a nephew of Winston Churchill, 5. were convinced that The Heritage of the Great War had made the whole story up. There were also serious reactions.

5) - Click here to read Harry Elmer Barnes' full explanation of his argument, written down in 1939. Similar statements are still being made, e.g. by historian Thomas Fleming in his recent (2003) book The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I.




mlees -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/9/2006 6:39:31 PM)

quote:

Our greatest mainstream source for the contribution of the AEF outside of our own writers and history books,and the most accesible are those of the British.Which the majority give very short thrift to the impact of the AEF and the majority of American writers seem to overestimate their actual impact and performance on the battlefield.This is where national pride and bias come to play in our understanding of conceptions of actual contributions of the efforts forces in the years'17-18.


I was going to say that this is the biggest modifier on what we (Americans) "know" about WW1 (and indeed, many events that occured before I was born).

The historians may bring in their own biases (and grumpiness) to the treatises, and this makes it difficult to discern the exact truth.

For example, the American newspapers may have been crowing about "saving" France at Belleau Wood, and that ruffled the feathers of the French. By not mentioning the French sacrifice during that time frame, it has the appearance of totally discounting their contribution. In "retaliation", the French accounts downplay the American contribution, and/or the quality of the AEF in general.

But we should be able to get a sense of some generalities by comparing multiple works against each other.

I think the AEF played an important role in 1918, and contributed to, but was not responsible for, the overall victory. I think the overall victory was a team (and combined arms) effort.

I think I agree with BigB in that there has been some overly dismissive works painting the AEF as a "green" mob, (re)learning the tactics that the more senior partners of the Alliance already learned by late 1916. The AEF may not have been as "hard bitten" as some of the French or British units, but they weren't as "green" as the "green" formations that marched to war in August of 1914, either.

The casualty list for the Americans, as posted by BigB, seems somewhat light for a force the size the Americans eventually fielded. I am not sure that was due soley to the fact that the Americans didn't have to fight a Verdun style battle of Attrition... This may indicate that the AEF did indeed absorb some of the advice the British and French offered.

On the Navy side, the American Admiral Rodman got along very well with Admiral Beatty, and was eager to learn and volunteered to do their share of the drudge work (North Sea blockade duty, minelaying), which was probably a pleasant surprise to the British, I imagine.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/9/2006 7:51:08 PM)

quote:

Years later, in August 1936, Churchill, then an ordinary Conservative member of the British parliament, gave an interview on this matter to mr. William Griffin, editor of the New York Enquirer2), who stayed in London at that time. "America should have minded her own business and stayed out of the World War", Churchill was quoted.


Well then I guess Mr. Churchill certainly learned to eat his humble pie on Mr. Roosevelt's rear-end. [:D]
I am not sure I believe this without doing some more investigating. This statement is not, altogether, out of line for Mr. Churchill. One thing we can be certain of, Mr. Churchill was an ardent nationalist, and the effects of the Great War no doubt furthered his patriotism and his belief on the importance of the English speaking world.



anarchyintheuk -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/9/2006 7:58:21 PM)

Interesting . . . revisionists have Churchill not wanting the US to enter the war, conspiracy theorists have him sacrificing the Lusitania to get the US in it. Guess it depends on who you listen to. Those remarks occured during the interwar years and, more specifically, right when the UK had to start rearmament in response to Germany's military expansion. Sounds more like regret and wishful thinking because he could see the future hostilities approaching rather than any cogent analysis of the situation during the spring of 1917, by which time Churchill had already resigned. I haven't seen any statement made by Churchill during the war that indicated he wanted anything less than the full involvement of the US.

Does anyone have any information as to the peace proposals made during early 1917? I've never really read about the subject and was wondering if the offers were of the status quo ante bellum type or more punitive in nature.

As to Churchill's comments about the amount of lives that would have been saved, I'm suppressing several sarcastic comments.



mlees -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/9/2006 8:13:13 PM)

Maybe Churchill was thinking of President Wilson's "14 point" peace plan (when he said the US should have not gotten involved), which ended up not solving anything (and hence, WW2 being made more likely...).

Thoughts?



anarchyintheuk -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 1:08:44 AM)

An adherence to the 14 points during the treaty convention would have made German revulsion to the Versailles treaty less likely I'd think. The fact that they were announced but were not the basis of peace didn't seem to be an issue w/ negative reaction to the treaty.

Whether or not the 14 points were actually workable is another matter.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 2:18:48 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

Sorry.Going past his earlier writings you will find much less idealism against the nature of war and more understanding in the hows and whys of campaigns of battles.Early Keegan is temepred by idealism and the belife that all wars are wrong...Latter Keegan tries to understand the why's and hows of military actions.Faces of battle was wrote in his earlier years..and thus some of his opinions and theories doesn't stand up to his latter more mature works.Is war wrong or right..who knows..but up to Faces of Battle Keegan is tempered by the earlier belief and doesn't spend as much time in understanding campaigns and battles as he does in passing judgement upon the actions he is writing about.


I've only read the book once. I did not notice this, but I will have to look out for it the next time I read it.


quote:

That is why i give the AEF a B+,they went into a war with numbers of troops and with a defiency in Modern Warfare,since lost among senior officers that served in the Civil War,and logistics and the command of large numbers of men..and manged to succeed in every task given them,even with difficulty.


By the time ther Americans entered WWI, there was nobody left in the US Army that served during the Civil War. The last veteran of the Civil War serving in the Army was the famed "Drummer Boy" of Shiloh who retired in 1916 at the rank of Colonel. Interrestingly enough, the US Government and Army became fairly progressive. The Congress aloted money for the Army to establish the Army War College in 1911. This began eliminating the old guard.


I have read all of Keegan except Five Armies in Normandy.For awhile there i was about to give up on him,as he seemed more interested in passing judgment in his conclusions than in understanding the conflicts and battles he was describing.Maybe i just read him wrong.


Yet going into the Great War the US army seemed fixated upon the offensive and the massive charge,and the bayonet.There was very little difference in the tactics she used during the Civil War and what she used in WWI.There was very little excuse for it as she out of all of the nations fighting,forgetting the Franco-Prussian War,had a huge amount of experience to fall back upon of massed troops assaulting defended trenchlines.It was as though the Army didn't take any lessons from the earlier conflict.One of the strange things about the war was that the US almost completely shunned the small unit tactics that the French and British had painfully learned and were trying to implement in their own armies.Given the circumstances her adherence to attrition warfare wasn' fatal,but against a fresher foe it may have proved even more costly.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 2:33:22 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

Maybe Churchill was thinking of President Wilson's "14 point" peace plan (when he said the US should have not gotten involved), which ended up not solving anything (and hence, WW2 being made more likely...).

Thoughts?


The major Entente partners made WWII more likely..not the US.You want to find a major cause for it look no further than the French.First in their demands on reperations,which one can not blame them,then in their unwillingness to back them up with force afterwards when it mattered.The greed and hatred of the major powers had alot to do with sowing the seeds for a future conflict.If anything the US can be blamed for wanting to be disentangled from Europe and her whims after doing her partIn the aftermath of the Great War the US just wanted a return to normalcey.I think we learned our lesson though after WWII
,and look what living up to our commitments,and trying to shoulder the burden,have cost us from '45 to the present day.[;)]



7th Somersets -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 3:40:25 PM)

Can I add a view from the European side of the pond...

All combatants in WW1 (and WW2) have their own, quite proper, respect for the sacrafices made by their own soldiers.

There is a long standing complaint here in the UK that the USA should have joined in both wars earlier. In WW1 (under the guise) of protecting Belgium from German invasion we found ourselves at war from August 1914 until the bitter end... as has been pointed out before we were well supported in ammunition by the USA (at a price that nearly bankrupted the UK). USA troops only started being deployed in significant numbers at the very end of the German March 1918 offensive - the last 'big' offensive of the war (if one excludes the 100 days). The British and French had been through hell for 3 1/2 years.
In WW2 Britain (and Commonwealth) - after the collapse of France in June 1940 - stood alone against Facism in the world until Germany decided to invade Russia in the summer of 1941. The USA involvement started, as you know after the Pearl Harbour attack towards the end of '41. In the mean time British cities were being flattened by the Luftwaffe and British and Commonwealth soldiers were dying all over the world fighting for all of our freedoms. Once again Britain suffered financial ruin - that we are still affected by today.

(You might find that British attitudes towards people not supporting them in times of trouble is in part of the reason why we are side by side with the USA in Iraq/Afghanistan today).

All that said... there cannot be any dispute that the USA significantly helped to win both wars. The ammunition and equipment supplied while the USA was not directly involved was vital. Once the USA became involved the morale effect was considerable (both with regard to British - and I assume French attitudes - and also negatively on German attitudes). Once the AEF started to deploy and become battle hardened it was a potent and significant force, that would have become overwhelming in its own right even if the war had not ended when it did. Quite understandably Pershing was reluctant to deploy troops that were not properly equipped and trained at first. Quite understandably there was a steep learning curve once the men were deployed.

My own reading of AEF tactics (which I accept is very limited) is that they were not particularly well developed (at least in execution - whatever the theory) when first implemented. I would like to stand corrected. Has anyone written a modern study of AEF tactics (similar to Paddy Griffiths book on the BEF?)? I have seen a US study "Infantry in battle" written in 1939.



oi_you_nutter -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 5:04:30 PM)

although i dont have a lot to add to the debate in general, i would have to say that this debate has some damn interesting points of view concerning the role and effect of the AEF, and the US involvement in the Great War. 

this has caused me to re-evaluate some of my exisitng viewpoints and sparked my interest in finding out more.


keep the debate going lads.



oi_you_nutter -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/10/2006 5:19:25 PM)



joing in with what 7th Somersets said

a simple way to sum up WW1 and WW2 for the British... we were in it from the start, took part in all theatres of war and although we were not invaded ourselves the human cost was high, it also cost so much money that it cost us the Empire. As a victor we came out of it tired and weaker in both money and industrial base.

WW1 put the USA on the World stage and made it a lot of money, WW2 ended with the USA in the position of a superpower.

i think that Churchill knew that the more the USA was involved in Europes and the worlds business, then Britain (and the Empire) would have a rival as a world power. in WW1 he may have tried to prevent it, in WW2 he knew that he had no choice but involve the USA if democracy was to survive.



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