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ORIGINAL: Riva Ridge

It is as you said, he should have withdrawn at the end of the second day.  He had taken a sharp knock that day and the Federals had won the Battle by that point, but not decisively so.  Longstreet advised him to disengage and head for Washington where he felt they would have to abandon their strong position and they could bring the Federal Army to battle at a position of their choosing.  Lee pushing the issue at that point over the advice of the General that he had come to rely on after Jackson dying was very unwise.  It was essentially Fredricksburg in reverse and he paid for it.  I don't think Lee was a fool or a horrible General (that would be Johnston).  I mean, the man was the CG for over three years and he was bound to lose a battle and make a mistake at some point, I just believe knowing what he did at the point he did it, he really made a terrible call.

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ORIGINAL: William Amos

How much of Grants good comand statis have to do that Bragg was the west commander and not another Lee ? Lincoln could afford to give grant time as thee was no Lee howling at the outskirts of Chicago.

To say that McClellan got a rough ride while Grant was left alone is more in the nature that Lincoln saw Lee as a far greater danger than he had distrust in McClellan. One has to wonder if it wasnt Lee in command in the east if McClellan would have been in such dire straights as a commander

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ORIGINAL: RERomine

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

This is just plain wrong. Lincoln DID allow McClellan not just to "manuever", but to load up the Army of the Potomac and sail it around to the Penninsula..., effectively placing Richmond BETWEEN the Army and Washington! Of COURSE he was required to leave some troops to "cover" the nation's capitol! But he was promised that those 40,000 men would be moving to join him overland as soon as he had closed up to Richmond. And he still had more men with him than the Rebs had in the Virginia theatre. Lincoln not only didn't "have McClellan on a leash", he was often reduced to "begging" Mac to tell him what he and the Army were doing.

McClellan's army moved to the Peninsula in pieces, so Washington had troops in and was thus covered. Plus, while farther from Washington than the Confederate army, it could get there quicker via transports. This was proven by the fact some of the McClellan's troops withdrawn from the Peninsula participated in 2nd Bull Run. Still, Lincoln didn't allow the move until the Confederate forces withdrew from Manassas Junction. And Lincoln intervened, preventing some troops from being moved to the Peninsula. McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

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What happened? McClellan was so increadable slow that the Confederates were able to send more men to Jackson in the Valley and raise a huge stink while bluffing "Mac" with "smoke and mirrors". He had no-one to blame but himself that MacDowell's corps wound up being sent West to deal with Jackson instead of South to join him. All he had to do was get up off his ass and move and the Rebels would have had no choice but to unite to meet him---ending Jackson's campaign and allowing the rest of the Union Armies to join "Mac". Instead he spent weeks doing nothing, bawling for more of everything, and blaiming Lincoln and the Government for all his imagined problems. Show me a single instance of Grant pulling such a bunch of B.S. and I'll shut up. Grant took what he was given, and set out to do his job. No wonder Lincoln loved him..., he might get beat, but he usually won. And he never wasted a minute bitching and moaning about what he didn't have!

Yes, smoke and mirrors kept McClellan from moving when he should have, and a ship named the CSS Virginia, but he did end up moving. There was a series of major battles where the casualties were fairly equal on both sides, but Lee didn't have as many men and consequently the troop differential was greater. McClellan wanted to move against Petersburg but wasn't permitted to do so. Pope, with fewer troops than he had at 2nd Bull Run could have still proceded South. The could have accomplished in 1862 what Grant accomplished in '64-65, if he was allowed to execute the plan. Maybe Lincoln wasn't holding the leash all the time, but McClellan was on one. Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Grant usually won? I will say he was certainly tenacious, but I would hardly say he usually won when you look at his battles against Lee. He managed to get the siege that he was after, but was only able to after getting pummelled at Wilderness, Cold Harbor and Spotsylvannia Court House. The AoP suffered casualties almost double that of the AoNV with estimates of Union loses being over 50,000. This is little more than a month! These were tolerable in 1864 considering the Mississippi was under Union control and Sherman was moving on Atlanta. In what world would those casualties have been acceptable in 1862? The war was ready for Grant in 1864, but not in 1862. It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

I can't argue the personality differences between Grant and McClellan. Grant was a no nonsense type of person, which is what you need as an army commander. McClellan might have been given more latitude if he had checked his savior of the Union act at the door. Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"

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Truthfully, he could have been the biggest horse's ass in the world and Lincoln would have backed him if he would just have shown some drive and willingness to get out and fight the Rebels. Lincoln said as much, "Let you go forth and defeat the enemy, and I will risk the Dictatorship", in response to one of "Little Mac's" higher "flights of fancy"

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

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Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

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It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

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ORIGINAL: RERomine

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
McClellan had ALL of the Corps he had planned to move by sea available to him in the Penninsula before he ever even started to advance towards Richmond (like mollassas in January). MacDowells Corps (covering Washington during the amphibious movement and after) was supposed to march "overland" to join him IF he ever got close enough to Richmond to pull all the Confederate Forces there as well.

Yes, McClellan did eventually have all but McDowell's Corps available. The point is they didn't all get there instantly. I believe you pointed out there was a limited number of Union transports. While the move was in progress, it could have been countermanded if a threat to Washington developed. Most of the Confederate troops at this time were south of the Rappahannock, while the rest were in the Shenandoah Valley. And Johnston wasn't Lee. Are you reading what I'm writing? I said that Mac had ALL THE FORCES his own plan called for to be moved by sea..., and he still "crawled" up the Penninsula at the pace of a dead snail. Which allowed the Confederates to detach forces from Richmond to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, making it possible for "Stonewall" to raise merry Hell and "suck" MacDowell's forces West toward the Shenandoah. The point being McClellan had no-one to blaim but himself for MacDowell not joining him. All he had to do was push towards Richmond with even modest speed and Jackson couldn't have been reinforced.

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Check your timelines. Popes Army of Virginia wasn't really operational until after McClellan had lost the Seven Days and he was sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing trying to blaim everyone but himself for the defeat. As to Petersburg, Mac always wanted to move anywhere he thought the enemy wasn't. Lincoln had let him waste weeks going to the Penninsula when it was only a few miles from Manassas (where Mac had moved as soon as he heard the Rebals had gone..., only to suffer the embarrassment of finding their "impregnable works" stuffed with "quaker guns") to Fredricksburg where the Confederates had retired. He wasn't going to fall for that line of "BS" again.

Pope was moving forward by August 7, 1862 with 54,000 men (McDowell, 33,000; Sigel, 13,000 from the Valley; Banks, 11,000 near Culpeper, VA). The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought on August 9, 1862, before any of McClellan's army had reached Pope. The order to begin the withdraw was issued August 3. Part of the Confederate force near McClellan started moving north once the Union stated withdrawing from Harrison's Landing. Had movements of McClellan and Pope been coordinated by Halleck, the Confederacy would have had problems. There wasn't much available to stop Pope if McClellan had been allowed to move against Petersburg. Which as I said was LONG AFTER the Seven Days Battle in June. "Little Mac" had been sitting in the mud at Harrison's Landing for over a month DOING NOTHING! Meanwhile Lee, ever bold, had split his army at Richmond and sent Jackson's wing North towards Washington again. McClellan was called back because he wouldn't move forward. McClellan "moving to Petersburg" would only put him farther away from Washington and make his Army harder to supply. And as shown in 1864, Lee and Longstreet would have been there to meet him if he ACTUALLY did move and not just come up with another excuse. How could Halleck "coordinate" anything when McClellan ignored every order he recieved?

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It was more like 60,000 to 30,000, but note that after each successive "defeat" Grant was closer to Richmond and pinning Bobby Lee in a rathole. As I pointed out once before, if you treat losses as the measure of victory, the Russians "lost" WW II. But somehow they finished in Berlin anyway. Winning is taking from your enemy something he can't afford to let you have. And please note that the AoP under McClellan's command suffered close to 35,000 casualties and wound up EXACTLY where it had started (North of the Potomac). So Grant plus 60,000 casualties = Lee besieged in Richmond; while McClallan plus 35,000 casualties equals exactly NOTHING!

The casualties of the Union and Confederacy during Grant's drive to Richmond are subject to debate, even amoung historians. I've seen numbers that list Union casualties as high as 52,000 and Confederate casualties as high as 33,000. Taking Antietam out of the mix because it has nothing to do with McClellan being allowed to move against Petersburg during the Peninsula Campaign, Union casualties approximately 22,000 and Confederate casualties 25,000. Halleck should coordinated the move of Pope and McClellan because such a move would have forced the Confederates to split their army. Lee could have been pushed back to Petersburg in 1862 and McClellan would have had something to show for his move. This wasn't allowed. Grant had the luxery of having control over all of the Union forces, everywhere. If McClellan didn't have anything to show for the Peninsula Campaign, it was because someone called it to an end before the payoff could be reaped. And as I pointed out above, that SOMEONE was George B. McClellan. He sat on the James for FIVE WEEKS with his thumb up his butt doing absolutely NOTHING but complaining and screaming for every soldier in a blue coat on the Continent to be shipped to him. If he wanted to move against Petersburg or Richmond or anyplace else all he had to do was pull his thumb out and do it. He wouldn't. So Lincoln told him to bring the Army back to Washington.

I know this is speculation on my part. Lee could have cobbered both Pope and McClellan, but it seems like a sound strategy to me. Halleck was a weak commander for all the Union forces in the field. He should have seen the situation for what it was. Halleck tended to offer strongly worded suggestions and not orders. There was no proper control at the highest levels. All McClellan EVER had to do to have Lincoln's full backing, support, and confidence was move forward, find the Confederate Army, and attack it. Lincoln had given him "Supreme Command" in hopes that might get him moving, but he took it back when it was obvious that no matter what or how much McClellan had, the only thing he did was demand MORE.

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ORIGINAL: RERomine

Be that as it may, Washington was covered due to the staggered arrival.

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We know that now. Did McClellan? Obviously, the Confederates did an outstanding job of making it look like they were stronger than they were. How about a hurrah for an outstanding deception? While there were roughly 13K around Ft. Monroe, Johnston wasn't far away. McClellan probably didn't realize Johnston was as slow at moving as he was.

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This is still interference. Grant stripped all the defenses around Washington and almost got burned by Early's Campaign.

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re:Virginia
This still effected the planning. To me, the threat of the CSS Virginia was probably given more credence then than it should have been given. It was going to cruise up the Potomac and bombard Washington, when the reality was a strong tide probably would have carried it out to sea.

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After how many months delay getting things to his satisfaction?

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Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.

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ORIGINAL: jjjanos
Failure to properly estimate the CSA force rests with McClellan who discounted any evidence or indications that the CSA force was smaller than the size McClellan already determined. It was McClellan's job to understand the strengths/weaknesses of his opponent - Lee did it very easily regarding McClellan. Whether Johnston was near or far does not excuse the one month delay in beginning siege operations.

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You say interference. I call it enforcing the agreed upon deployment of troops. Grant let it be known he was stripping the Washington defenses.

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Virginia's ability to steam up the Potomac was neutralized the day after the vessel first engaged Union forces by the Monitor. I believe the 'phib operation was cancelled because, while the Monitor could keep the Virginia from steaming to Washington, there was no guarantee the Monitor could stop the Virginia before it raised holy heck with any 'phibs trying the by-sea flanking movement.

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Likely much less than the 24+ months when Grant finally got to Petersburg.

Siege of Petersburg lasted 9 months. Inactivity lasted from November 1864 through end of March 1865 - months in which both armies would have been inactive due to mud.

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ORIGINAL: RERomine

Since you said basically the same thing over and over again (maybe I did too [:)]) I'll just respond without the quotes.

Yes, McClellan did seem a touch on the slow side. [8|] Keep in mind he was constantly being told he was badly out numbered by Allan Pinkerton. I know McClellan wasn't, you know he wasn't and the spider in the corner of the room knows he wasn't, but McClellan thought he was. The information was coming from someone (Pinkerton) who had some credibility with the White House and thought to be an expert. At the same time, the Confederates are acting like they have all the men McClellan has been told they had. Maybe they were getting information from somewhere (newspapers?) and knew what to do. The end result, McClellan sat and waited for reinforcements he felt he needed. I can't say McClellan would have moved any faster if he had gotten his reinforcements (McDowell) or accurate information. There is just no way to know. One way or the other is just speculation. Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Jackson's Valley campaign should have been squashed. This had nothing to do with McClellan (other than inactivity allowing them to temporarily detach from Johnston's force) and everything to do with Halleck. With the troops previously mentioned availible, Halleck should have cooridinated the action against Jackson, but failed to do so. Halleck rarely gave orders, but more strongly worded suggestions. The situation should have been a strategic disaster for the Confederacy. Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

As far as supplies for a move by McClellan to Petersburg, the James river would have done nicely. Unless trains are used, ships are much faster than overland routes. Also, shipping routes are safe from cavalry raids. Although I haven't checked, Grant's supplies probably came up the James river as well.
I know all this. Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

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ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

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Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

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Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

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ORIGINAL: RERomine

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

I've read where Pinkerton's reports were inflated, but nothing about motivation behind them. There is some to what you say, but it seems as though inaccurate estimates weren't uncommon.

Confederate strength estimates before Antietam:

Stanton 100,000
Ft. Monroe commander 75,000
" 30,000-50,000
New York Herald 150,000
Penn. Governor 200,000 in MD
" 250,000 in VA
Gen. Banks 150,000
Pinkerton 100,000
McClellan 100,000

Guess if you throw enough darts at the board, anyone can get a bullseye. It wasn't exactly a "science", but professional military men could get reasonably close. The "Fortress Monroe Commander" is certainly pretty accurate. Lee had about 75,000 going into the fighting with Pope that ended at Second Manassas. But in Maryland he could muster only around 40,000 because of massive straggling and a certain reluctance among some of the troops to "invade" the North. Banks, of course, is one of the War's more complete idiots...., the New York Herald was trying to sell newspapers..., and the Governor of Pennsylvania obviously knew more about stuffing ballot boxes than estimating military strength. Everybody else just seems to like "round numbers".

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Halleck wasn't "on the spot", so any "orders" he gave would have been out of date when recieved. It's true that Jackson generally faced a set of "Bozo's" in the Valley, but that was the point of reinforcing him. So he could raise a stink and keep the Union worried. Had McClellan "pushed" to Richmond instead of "crawling" there, reinforcing Jackson would not have been an option open to the South.

Maybe Halleck should have gotten out of the house more often. No arguement. But he wasn't much of a Field Commander either. Which is why Pope was eventually brought East to command the forces that had made such a mess facing Jackson in May. When was Jackson reinforced when? In early May, while McClellan was still putzing around at the base of the Penninsula. His entire command was brought south in early June and participated in the Seven Days Battles. If it was before 2nd Bull Run, it makes sense because McClellan was in the process of leaving. I haven't read anything in great detail about the Valley Campaign so I don't know if Jackson got reinforcements then or not.

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Mac's supplies were coming by water during the entire campaign. But you need to realize that the "Petersburg Option" was just another "red herring" (Like the inflated Confederate Numbers) that Mac used to justify DOING NOTHING! The whole Penninsula Campaign was a "red herring" Mac used to put off having to face the Rebel Army. If he had wanted to fight, all he had to do was march South from Manassas. He could then have had MacDowell's 40,000 men as well as his other 110,000. And Jackson couldn't have stayed in the Valley under those circumstances (150,000 Union troops marching on Fredricksburg and Richmond), so those forces would have been available as well. Mac loved the "trappings" of power, and was scared sh-tless of losing a fight and having to give up all those "perks" and the public's adoration. He was deep down a "moral coward"..., which is why the closer he came to "action" the slower he moved and the more he complained. He was paralized with "fear of failure".

If McClellan's supplies were coming down by water, you answered your own question about how he would get supplied in a move to Petersburg. All I know about his Petersburg plan is Mark Boatner III considered it to be an "excellent plan". Would McClellan have executed it? I don't know. It would be nice to know if the there was a fleshed out version of it to see, but rarely do we see plans that aren't executed. How was it General Patton put it? "I favor a good plan executed violently RIGHT NOW over a perfect plan next week!" McClellan had a number of exellent plans, and did fine as long as he didn't have to execute them at all. As far as being scared sh*tless, I'm sure McClellan wasn't the only one after 1st Bull Run. Everyone at this point seemed to think an army could be destroyed in one big battle and didn't want to risk it in the East. Until Lee, everyone moved at the speed of a glacier. Yes, Jackson was fast, but his army wasn't large enough to worry anyone with more than 20,000 men. BTW, everything I've read puts McDowell at 30,000 men, not that matters a hill of beans. Depends on when you quote the figures. MacDowell had the largest Corps in the Army at the Campaign's start..., over 50,000 men. McClellan demanded and recieved Franklin's Division (12,000) very early on...., and later (after Seven Pines) recieved McCall's Division (12,000) as well.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

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ORIGINAL: regularbird

Actually, if you check the records closely you will find out that Pinkerton's ORIGINAL estimates were "right on the money". It was only when he realized that "accurate" WASN'T what McClellan was paying for that he began "inflating" them. He was giving his "customer" what his "customer" wanted. Everybody involved knew the numbers were crap..., but McClellan wanted them that way so he could do nothing and claim he was outnumbered and needed reinforcements. I pointed this out previously...

Don't worry about it I was just curious. If you stumble across I would like to know though.


Mike I am not doubting this but it is the first time that I heard it.  Can you tell me where you read this?  The Park Ranger at Antietam did not reveal this.  It was a while back that I had the guided tour there but I am surprised that it was not mentioned.

I'm not suprised the Ranger at Antietam didn't mention it..., that's a later Campaign. The "numbers inflation" began in November of 1861 when McClellan insisted on sitting in Washington giving his 175,000+ troops additional training and parades even though he himself had described them as "largest, best-trained, and best-equipped Army in the world." After he had opened his mouth, the press and the politicians began wondering why he didn't take this wonderful military machine out to Manassas and beat the stuffing out of the 50,000 ragged Rebs known to be there. So he hired his old friend Alan Pinkerton as his new "Chief of Intelligence", and "lo and behold" there were soon 200,000 Rebels at Manassas! Which gave "Little Mac" the perfect excuse to sit around and do nothing. Then in early March of 1862 when Johnson abandon his works at Manassas and everyone could "go and have a look", it became obvious that the numbers as well as the guns had been "quaker". Which didn't prevent McClellan from taking Pinkerton with him to the Penninsula..., where the numbers were soon growing again.

You've caught me out. I can't say for sure where I got that data from. I'd thought it was in Cullen's THE PENNINSULA CAMPAIGN, but I don't see it there. Might have been in a class or seminar (I studied Military History under Allen R Millett at Mizzou in the 60's before he left for Ohio State.) or in something I read in the 40 years since. Give me a week to root through books and notes and I can probably turn it up for you.

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"If you find anywhere that Pinkerton inflated his numbers on purpose you will have an original document on your hands read by no one before. "


It certainly would be. And that's not what I said. I said his "first estimates" of Rebel Strength at Manassas WERE accurate and gave Johnson's strength around Manassas as approximately 50,000..., the same thing everyone else was estimating. And his "employer" wasn't happy. And when those "estimates" were revised upward, his employer's contentment with them rose as well. Pinkerton was selling a service, and the first rule of "sales" is "Keep the customer happy". He was also an old friend of McClellan's from "Little Mac's" RR days, and knew him well; so it wouldn't take him long to figure out what he had been "hired to provide". The "story" is in the "numbers".

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ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
I wish I could tell you. If I could remember where I picked up this information it would be a lot easier to find it for others. Frustraiting part is I can almost remember/visualize the wording..., but not where I was reading it.