hakon -> RE: AI (general): location v. destruction of enemy (8/11/2007 10:28:07 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Zorachus99 The reason I mentioned it is, if there is a spectacular breakthrough on the line, and you don't have 10 corps in reserve to exploit it, instead of a potentially strategic opportunity, you are relegated to killing units while you steal from other parts of your army to run toward the hole (often in poor order). While I ususally don't hold the reserve far off the line, I use this quite often when my unit density it satisfactory on other parts of the line. Stretching hexes north into the arctic is usually a losing proposition for the Germans. If your opponent chooses where the line is stretched, he has the initiative for all effective purposes. Regadless of how I play, your understanding of how the units should be used is excellent unto itself and should make a challenging AIO once it learns to stand up on it's own. Gotta learn how to walk [:)] A 10 corps reserve is a lot in 1941, and not much at all in 1944. As the was drags on, crucial areas tend to become double-lined (2 rows of units) in most places, in my experience. Due to a very short front, france can also afford such luxery in 1940 along the initial line, even if it usually doesnt help that much. If you talk about 1941 barbarossa, I have trouble seeing how keeping 10 units in reserve benefits german (the attacker). What it does, is to allow the USSR to shorten the line, which means that she can have 2 rows of units in the critical spots, preventing breakthroughs. A 1942 barbarossa would be very different of course. In a 1941 barbarossa, my experience with Germany is that numeical superiority is crucial. I would usually much rather have 5 more inf of 6 factors each than 3 more mech of 8 factors each. I also alway build all my militia prior to m/j 40, making the bad ones do garrison duty, and bringing the better ones to the front. If I dont have this numerical superiority, I find that I cant always move my units into enemy zoc, where a zoc defense is presented, as it overstretches my line. (My ambition is to press easy on a line from the Black sea to Moscow, often leaving Leningrad pocketed for a while). By streatching the russians this far, lots of attack opportunities are usually created, in my experience. And as long as I kill far more units than she produces, this has an escellating effect, which means that I can go on attacking all the time through winter and into the summer of 1942.
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