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Mr. Z -> New troop counts for November scenario (3/26/2007 3:01:36 AM)
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The upshot is: 110K for Union in Potomac River (including garrisons), 10K in Baltimore garrisons. Then, 41K in Fredericksburg. (I don't know about the garrisons; I'm inclined to leave them as they are, unless someone would like to suggest another solution.)
Here is a brief essay outlining the reasons for these changes. You are all more than welcome to comment freely on them.
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The starting point is that Battle Cry of Freedom by McPherson does indeed state that “In October, McClellan had 120,000 men while Beauregard and Johnston had only 45,000 in and near Manassas". These are fairly accurate figures. However—
In McClellan’s letter of late October to Secretary Cameron (posted here by christof139) States that as of 10/15/61, the army included 133K present for duty, ignoring the sick, confined, and (obviously) the absent—including all those groups, the grand aggregate was 152K. This was “the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Potomac below Washington, and as far as the Cumberland above, the troops under the command of General Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies” (taken from McClellan’s official report, p. 10).
However, when, on 9/27/61, McClellan has reported a strength of 168,318, he had also “with a cautiousness that was to prove typical of him pared the number available for offensive action to 76,285” (from Russel Weigley’s A Great Civil War). What he had done was subtracted the troops that were either partially or wholly unarmed or unequipped, and then subtracted the numbers he figured were required for garrisons along the Potomac.
Considering that the aggregate had fallen between late September and mid-October, we could perhaps guess that the number of troops that were truly combat-ready may have fallen slightly, too. On the other hand, perhaps more became battle-ready by then. At any rate, there were at most 133K troops under McClellan’s command, including the brigades in Baltimore and Annapolis (and perhaps only 76K or so ready for battle) around 11/1/61.
As I said, it appears that McClellan is not including garrisons in the figure “available for offensive action”. In a letter which likewise dates from “the latter part of October” (McClellan, p. 6) he reports that Baltimore and Annapolis had a garrison of about 10K (ibid, 7) which was sufficient for their defense, but that Washington would need 35K to remain behind in the garrison, along with another 5K to guard the upper Potomac and 8K to guard the lower Potomac. Subtracting all those forces out gives him the 76K figure.
I’m going to guess that McPerson’s figure of 120K is just an estimate of the 133K present for duty on 10/15, minus the Baltimore and Annapolis garrisons.
So for our purposes, we should begin the November scenario with about 10K in the Baltimore garrison, and some figure no greater than 123K in Potomac province. I don’t know how we want to handle the unarmed and unequipped troops, which numbered as high as 12K in late September. Presumably some of those had become battle-ready, but presumably other new recruits had also undergone training and were awaiting their weapons. On the other hand, perhaps new weapons had arrived by then—but on the other hand, the number present for duty in general had dropped between late September and mid-October. So it may all be a wash, in which case we may only want to include about 110K in the Potomac for 11/1/61.
(BTW, In that same letter McClellan states that he has no official figures for the remainder of the US forces. However, he provides estimates of about 30K in Western Virginia—an overestimate, I would say—and 40K in Kentucky, as well as 80K In Missouri and 11K in Fortress Monroe, along with about 100K mobilizing elsewhere.)
(McClellan’s forces grew steadily, BTW—to 169K ready for duty out of an aggregate of 198K by 12/1. By 2/1/62 the figures were 190K out of 222K.)
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As for the Confederates, James Ford Rhodes, in his History of the Civil War 1861-65, also listed a figure of 41K under Johnson in late October, mentioning that “the health of the Union army was good, that of the Confederate bad…on the other hand, the Confederates had an immense advantage in the moral effect of their victories at Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff.” (Rhodes, 58-59) Johnson wanted another 19K immediately for offensive maneuvers (ibid, 69) but Jefferson Davis was certain that they were not available, and they did not materialize. At any rate, Johnston himself gives us the estimate of 41K at the beginning of November (including 2400 cavalry). By the end of the month it had grown to 47.2K, including 4.8K in the Acquia district and 3.7K in the Valley district.
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So, both USA and CSA numbers in the Eastern Theatre will probably be reduced significantly, to 110K for Union in Potomac River (including the garrisons) and 10K in the Baltimore city/fort garrisons, and to only 41K for the Confederacy in Fredericksburg. We may raise this slightly by giving Jackson and Holmes sizeable detachments for their respective districts, maybe 1-2K each. In addition, considering that the CSA troops were badly armed, it might be fair to give the USA back the 13K troops I left out due to their inadequate armaments and training. What do others think?
(I also confess to being a little fuzzy about how well-fortified the fort garrisons were—we generally followed a policy of giving forts whatever they needed to improve playability, though in crucial areas like Henry and Donelson they were based on somewhat detailed research.)
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