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Rafael Warsaw -> US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:07:23 AM)

Hi Fellow geeks!

I was studying political science and international relations but I’m not an expert in ww2 US/OZ internal politics and or public relations and Government/public interactions.

I wonder If there was any way to press US into peace talks with Japan?

In our games (If we are lucky) we can press US really hard like:
BBs gone
Hawaii gone
PH under blocade
OZ treatened
Phillipines lost
Lots of other fleet assets lost
Carriers Lost so West Coast is threatened
New Guinea Lost/OZ threatened
India Invaded/jewel in an imperial crown seriously threatened
Etc.

And all in about first 3-5 months of the war. A hit after a Hit after a blow.

I would like to know Your opinion about this:
Was it ever possible to press US into peace talks ie IF US carriers were lost at Midway, Midway taken, Hawaii threatened?

How about OZ? Was it ever possible/considered by OZ Gov. to sign a peace with Japs If OZ was cut? Well we know that it was not possible to really cut OZ for a long time but some events, sometimes even minor, can influence public opinion waaaaay too strong.

How US and OZ Goverments of those times have acted/reacted to public?

Im looking for some serious thought from You.

Ah, we players know that 43 WILL come, US Gov knew it too but sometimes its just imposible to convince a group of people even to something more obvious. This is a weakness of Democracy (which I Love and Cherish). Peace.






KDonovan -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:20:21 AM)

can't speak for the Aussies, but i can't imagine the US ever bargining a peace deal after Pearl Harbor. That and the invasion of China probably killed any chance of a peace deal being made.




Terminus -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:21:15 AM)

Pearl Harbor cinched it. The US isn't capable of forgiving sneak attacks...




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:28:43 AM)

Well,
This is a common opinion made by Victorious country.

A good Examples are:

Proud confederate states during ACW. Territory taken.

Russia in 1905 after Cushima - remember - not a democratic country but an authoritarian EMPIRE. Russians are very proud You know. Really proud but they asked for peace. Territory not taken, Army not destroyed.
Im rather looking for a possible "break even" point. Theres always one. Always.

Every Democratic government have to take into an account public opinion. Just have to especially in countries with developed political system like US (only 2 powers that counts - You mess with public a little to long and you can be gone for a decade).







spence -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:33:32 AM)

For the 1940s, I feel that a measure of what it would have taken to force a peace upon the US can be found in US History approxiamately 80 years prior: the American Civil War. The South had both to be razed to the ground and occupied, its armies destroyed and its leaders captured before the war was over. From talking to my father, who served in WWII and hailed from Massachussetts, the war was still something of a bitter "memory" for some of his contemporaries who came from the southern states.

IIRC Yamamoto told his contemporaries that he felt that nothing short of capturing Washington and dictating the peace in the White House would suffice and that "there would be a gun behind every blade of grass (or something similar)" along the way.

As to 2007, I believe that today the Congress finalized particulars of a bill to force the withdrawal of all US troops from Virginia.




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:45:37 AM)

Was a Confederate states a developed democracy with vote rights given to basicly everybody? Sure not. North was closer.

You know, theres always an establishment of some kind (we can call it a political system if we like). An internal threat to those ppl (political system of the country) positions - 1905 movement/so called 1905 revolution - forced Russia to seek for a peace with Japan to ease an internal situation. Trust me - They are at least that proud as americans are. INMHO - much more.

36 years later comunist establishment was threatened only by germans but by no means by internal affairs - so they fought to the death even with whole country burned to the ground and with uncounted millions of deaths.

There were an establishment in Czar/Comunist Russia there was one in Washington in 1940. ACW? Pres. Lincoln was always worried about elections. Whole pennsylvannia campaigne was all about incoming election. He was lucky, They have won at Gettyssburg (thanks to incoming elections? Union commanders have seen a wall behind them built by Washington ie: a line in the sand?)






KDonovan -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:54:31 AM)

maybe if a staunch pacifist like Charles Limbaugh ran for president and won in 1940 instead of FDR....

if Japan had only attacked the Phillipinnes......

if the British had to come to peace terms with Germany.....

if isolationist sentiment had remained high....

then possibly some sort of agreement could've been found





Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:00:55 AM)

Well, its possible but I think that it got nothing to do with pride.
I think that there were no way to try to impeach a president in 42. Next elections was in 1944 so it looks like Japs have had to beat US way into 1943.

What about OZ?





spence -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:10:32 AM)

quote:

Was a Confederate states a developed democracy with vote rights given to basicly everybody


Yes and no. The Confederate States had the same sort of "universal suffrage" as the US at that time: that is, all white males that owned property. There were IIRC some states that allowed free Blacks to vote and non-property holders to vote but I don't think that that was encouraged at all.

The South was not waging a war of aggression against the North (in spite of tactical invasions) and I think that that is important. There was political opposition in the North to the prosecution of the North's "aggressive war" but I think that it would have become insignificant if the South had tried to impose slavery on the North. In the end, the CSA formed and the war was mostly about the North's signal (by electing Lincoln)that it would not continue to prop up "the peculiar institution" forever (even though Lincoln's election hardly made that threat imminent).




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:30:10 AM)

Well, a kind discussion has emerged.

I know what was a political system in ACW states and I know that South was not an intended aggressor – for sure not what simple people wanted (heavy desertions while crossing Potomac, “melting army” in worlds of gen Lee etc). I just make a suggestion that a public opinion was one of the reasons HOW this war was conducted already during ACW and XIX century is when a modern society has emerged. How whole WAR was conducted not how single operations were executed.

It’s obvious that a significance of public opinion rose from ACW with its observed peak about Somalia/Mogadishu venture. Now we can observe a public impact even to a planning stage of an military operation not to mention whole war. Im still courious about public mood in states in early 40ies truth is that its hard to find a good source. Propaganda You know (I call it M1A1 propaganda [sm=00000028.gif] [:D])

Modern times gives us lots of what if possibilities/observations too.
Bottom line is that It looks to me that 1943 was a key and that national proud got less to do with it than one might expect.




niceguy2005 -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:40:37 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rafael Warsaw

Well,
This is a common opinion made by Victorious country.

A good Examples are:



Anyone that suggests that the US would ever negotiate a peace with Japan during WWII just doesnt understand the American psyche. After PH no solution short of unconditional Japanese surrender ever would have been considered and it would have been political suicide for any politician to suggest it.

Americans don't like to lose. As evidence I offer up Vietnam as an example. The US beat its head against the wall for 12 years before pulling out and this was for a conflict that had moderate support at home at best.

Perhaps if a country could deal the sort of defeats against the US that Japan did those first 6 months for 12 years and they had not directly attcked the US, then maybe negotiation is possible.




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:41:46 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: KDonovan


if isolationist sentiment had remained high....

then possibly some sort of agreement could've been found





Isolationist sentiment WAS high. Splendid Isolation - it was not a sentiment but a political doctrine. trust me, a doctrine is more important to country political affairs than sentiment. [;)]
Thats why some out of this planet lads thinks that PH was a decoy [:D]




niceguy2005 -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:49:11 AM)

PH a decoy? do you mean a fake? or that they were sacrificed intentionally?

Nope. The Japanese simply made the critical mistake of not understanding ones enemy.

In my personal opinion they waited at least a year too late to attack if they were going to. The US war machine was already beginning to rev up.

By 1941 the best thing to do would have been to let the US and UK try to blocade them and then attack the blockade. This lower level of conflict wouldn't have been as likely to induce a strong reaction from the US population.




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 2:50:26 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: niceguy2005


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rafael Warsaw

Well,
This is a common opinion made by Victorious country.

A good Examples are:



Anyone that suggests that the US would ever negotiate a peace with Japan during WWII just doesnt understand the American psyche. After PH no solution short of unconditional Japanese surrender ever would have been considered and it would have been political suicide for any politician to suggest it.

Americans don't like to lose. As evidence I offer up Vietnam as an example. The US beat its head against the wall for 12 years before pulling out and this was for a conflict that had moderate support at home at best.

Perhaps if a country could deal the sort of defeats against the US that Japan did those first 6 months for 12 years and they had not directly attcked the US, then maybe negotiation is possible.


When pride kicks in things start to get messy...

You can be pride beyond imagination but one thing about US is for sure - they are commercial. What means that they are the most racionale/comon sense nation on this planet. I have no doubt about US pride. Glorious nation. Got reasons to be proud (Im polish so we know smth about pride here too [;)])

Point is that I wanted to start a thread about political aspects of our actions in the game what leads us straight to macro political issues related to US internal affairs in early 40ties.

Im not that SURE that another elections (44) might have been won even with PH in mind like Im not sure If Reps are able to win now EVEN with 911 in mind. You can play national pride but not for ever. As I wrote earlier - modern political party is like a business corporation. You just have to step back today to be back in business sooner than later.


And Japs were no ALIENS out of space - its a product of a ww2 propaganda - they were allies few years earlier
so is it possible that mood would have changed:

maybe our gov screwed this relation, Japs just wanted to coexist as a modern nation!
they (gov) are not capable - we are loosing in fact we have lost everything we could.
who need philipines anyway? Where is it? Never been there and never would!







hueglin -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 3:38:26 AM)

Food for thought.

1814 - British forces march on Washington. At a brief battle on the road, known as the Battle of Bladensburg; the British forces defeat the American forces, who withdraw in disarray, thus opening the road to Washington. The British burn the White House and the Capitol, but the rest of Washington is saved by a strong rain storm. The British, under orders not to hold any territory, withdrew.
© 2000 MultiEducator, Inc. All rights reserved

One might expect that having the capital burned would result in a determination to fight to the end, but this war ended in a negotiated peace.





Japanese_Spirit -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 4:19:02 AM)

You all forget the term "Cease-Fire", that is prevalent between the two Koreas and even both Russia and Japan to this day.

Japan's ultimate success in the war depending upon Germany. If Germany remained ultimately victorious and there was no chance for an allied front, Japan would have had a better time of it should it come to peace negotiations, providing that it had severly mauled the US fleet and perhaps taken Pearl Harbour and the rest of Haiwaii.

The U.S and Japan would probably, if it became too long and overdue to fight, signed a cease-fire. Not a full peace treaty but simply one putting an end to the fighting for the time being.

It's an interesting concept but a hypothetical situation could have evolved with some kind of "Three Way Cold War" developing after the war, between Germany, the United States and Japan, should both Germany and Japan had been victorious.

But that's just should a cease-fire have been attained and a belief of mine should that have been the overall result.




Rafael Warsaw -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 4:34:57 AM)

Peace negotiations can lead to whatever treaty, I do agree that a cease fire was more likly than peace treaty.

WHAT event/chain of events on PACIFIC, could in Your opinion lead to such a public preassure over politicians to make even unwilling goverment seek for truce?

hueglin: appreciate but from political and sociological point of view its not relevant.

[sm=sign0031.gif]





Skyros -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 4:49:54 AM)

As all ready pointed out, we had to dictate peace terms in the Confederate White House. I know appomattox. The Russians went to the Peace table because of internal issues, revolution was always brewing.

THe major impact would be the reversal of the Europe first policy. The isolationists had been discredited because of PH and would have had a hard time rebuilding there political muscle. They were responsible for the United States not being prepared. You also have to bring in the racial factor, the US would not deal with the Japs, they protrayed them as subhuman monkeys back then.


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rafael Warsaw

Well,
This is a common opinion made by Victorious country.

A good Examples are:

Proud confederate states during ACW. Territory taken.

Russia in 1905 after Cushima - remember - not a democratic country but an authoritarian EMPIRE. Russians are very proud You know. Really proud but they asked for peace. Territory not taken, Army not destroyed.
Im rather looking for a possible "break even" point. Theres always one. Always.

Every Democratic government have to take into an account public opinion. Just have to especially in countries with developed political system like US (only 2 powers that counts - You mess with public a little to long and you can be gone for a decade).









pasternakski -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 5:21:46 AM)

I'd like to see a computer wargame that depicts all the posters on this thread. Call it "War of the Uninformed Political Sh1theads" (WUPS for short).




Feinder -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 5:24:46 AM)

Be aware that most countries (very much including the United States) during the 1940s were very pre-occupied with their own national and/or racial superiority.  Thru the 20s and 30s, the US viewed the Asians, not exactly as "sub-human", but certainly racialy inferiror.  There were "scientific studies" that "proved" that caucasian was superiour to to negro and asian gene pools.  Naturally, we think it's load of horse **** now, but back then, many folks genuinely bought into it.  Whether it was excluding blacks from flying, or that, "the Japanese couldn't beat us in a fair fight, look how small they are! and near sighted! They HAD to sneak attack!".  We bought into our own racism, and turned it into some very motivating propoganda.

That being said, if you genuinely believe that the race that you are fighting against is truely racially INFERIOR to you, why WOULD you sue for peace?  You just need to wipe your bloody nose, and go kick some butt.

Naturally, there were many motivations thru-out the war, but our own sense of racism would have had some bearing on our un-willingness to give in.  Not the only thing, but it's an interesting point of discussion.

-F-




wdolson -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 5:45:26 AM)

Countries start negotiating peace in wartime when the situation looks hopeless. 

The Russians negotiated a peace with Japan in 1905 because most of the entire navy had been sunk.  Both the Pacific and Baltic fleets were mauled by Japan.  Russia had nothing left to fight Japan with.  The political situation in Russia was not good either.  The 1917 revolution was only the outcome of decades of festering resentment against the Czar.

In 1941, when the situation in the USSR looked grim, Stalin didn't quit because he knew that the USSR could survive the winter.  Germany was running out of steam as the weather got colder and the Soviets had evacuated their factories well east of the fighting.  A super human effort had slapped together working factories in record time.  The USSR had many times the manpower of Germany, they were getting some equipment from the UK and US, and their own production of war material was just starting.  The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a bit relief to Stalin for two reasons: 1) the US was now fully in the war, and 2) his Far East territory was now safe from Japanese invasion.

The Confederacy surrendered because they had little left to fight with.  The North had ground them down in a war of attrition and occupied much of their territory.

The US pulled out of Vietnam when it finally got through to the politicians that there was no winning the war.  Nixon tried and when it became clear that there was no winning, he started the withdrawl.  The US will likely come to the same point with Iraq.  IMO.

Even if the first few months of WW II had gone much worse for the US than it did, the US would not have gone to the negotiating table.  Pearl Harbor and the pride involved was a factor, but a bigger factor was US production.  Anybody who had any clue about US production capacity knew that the US would be massively out producing Japan by 1943. 

The game also doesn't model the extreme cases very well.  In the real world, invasion of Australia or India would have been impossible for Japan.  The game doesn't represent the small militias all over India that would have been called upon to fight if Japan had managed to get very far into India.  The Japanese would also have to garrison the territory they captured.  Guerilla activity in the Indian countryside would have been prevelent and fierce.  Some Indians were pro-Japanese, but the majority were not.  News of some Japanese attrocities on Indians would have hardened the resolve of the public against Japan.

Australia is a large continent.  Most of the population is on the coasts and it would be easier to control the population centers there, but there is a whole lot of land that would be tough to control.  The Australians are known for creative solutions and had a well educated population.  Probably the best average education of any home land threatened directly by Japan during the war.  They would have had a very tough time taming Australia.

China was much easier to conquer by comparison.  Education levels were poor, leadership was even worse.  The entire country had been in civil war and warlord chaos for quite a few years before the Japanese invaded.  Despite all the weakneses among the Chinese, the Japanese were never able to pacify the country.  They could occupy cities, but had a much tougher time controlling the countryside. 

The education levels in India were not much better than China, but the culture was more unified (the problems between Muslims and Hindus did not come to the surface until after the British left) and they had much better leadership.

If the Japanese had made a maximum effort to capture Hawaii, they may have managed, but they would have had to strip China to the bone and reduced the garrisons in much of their occupied territory to do it.  It would have been a huge struggle.  The US would have put up much more of a fight than in the Philippines.  The US military had a much stronger presence in Hawaii before the war and it's much closer to the US mainland.  Japan would have been fighting at the extreme end of the longest supply line in history up to that point and the US would have been fighting in their backyard.

The US mainland was never really threatened.  If the KB had been *very* bold, they may have raided some west coast cities, but they would have been putting their carriers at extreme risk at over 1000 miles from the nearest base (if they had occupied Hawaii).  Japan also never made use of fleet oilers like the US did.  US doctrine had fully incorporated refueling at sea by the start of the war.  Japan did it some, but it never became common practice.

Japan's navy was built to dominate the western Pacific where bases are plentiful.  The US is on the most easily defended continent on Earth.  The mainland's coasts are a long ways from any potential enemy.  To be able to hit an enemy at extreme distance, the USN had to be built to withstand very long ocean voyages just to get to the enemy.

Short of something fantastic like the Japanese getting nukes and a delivery system in 1940, the US would not have given up.  It was obvious to everyone who understood the US' production ability that victory was a matter if when, not if.  Winston Churchill's words when he first heard about Pearl Harbor were, "so, we have won after all!"  He understood.

Bill




Ursa MAior -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 5:46:03 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

I'd like to see a computer wargame that depicts all the posters on this thread. Call it "War of the Uninformed Political Sh1theads" (WUPS for short).


Wazzup pas? You suddenly have found your nationatlist self? People are asking questions, cuz they are interested even if from the ebony tower it seems they speak nonsenses.

As of negotiated peace it was no way possible after PH. If the declaration of war had arrived in time is another issue.




spence -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 5:53:05 AM)

The ultra-nationalistic drivel that passed for socio-political thinking in Germany and Japan convinced most of the rest of the population of the planet that even submitting as a slave would not secure even the most basic of considerations from those governments and people (the Axis). Both Germany and Japan quickly disabused anyone who thought otherwise by their behavior in other people's countries.

ESSENTIALLY 'THE BREAK EVEN POINT" AS YOU CALL IT, FOR THE PEOPLES WHO WERE FIGHTING THE AXIS; WAS PERCEIVED BY THEM, AT THE TIME; AS THE COMPLETE AND UTTER DESTRUCTION OF AT LEAST THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS; IF NOT THEIR COUNTRIES. The Seperate Peace Scenarios existed in reality only in the fanatical minds of the leaders of the Axis.




wdolson -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 6:03:32 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

I'd like to see a computer wargame that depicts all the posters on this thread. Call it "War of the Uninformed Political Sh1theads" (WUPS for short).


Obviously it appears you have a difference of opinion with one or more people in this thread. I don't think that is grounds to start name calling.

If you feel we are uninformed, please enlighten us with your opinions on the matter. I won't be offended if you tell me my ideas are off base and give reasons why. Heck, I might learn something new.

Bill




AU Tiger_MatrixForum -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 6:05:05 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rafael Warsaw

There were an establishment in Czar/Comunist Russia there was one in Washington in 1940. ACW? Pres. Lincoln was always worried about elections. Whole pennsylvannia campaigne was all about incoming election. He was lucky, They have won at Gettyssburg (thanks to incoming elections? Union commanders have seen a wall behind them built by Washington ie: a line in the sand?)



That doesn't make a lick of sense. The elections occurred 17 months AFTER Gettysburg. The whole Pennsylvania campaign was solely because Bobby Lee was there.

And in a later post you talked about desertions at the Potomac river as the army crossed. Actually in '63 the troops were in excellent morale and looking forward to campaigning in a country rich in forage. The desertions you are probably referring to was in '62 when the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland. A number of units had signed up to defend Southern soil and had moral problems with carrying a war of aggression into a foreign land.
A number of them refused to step across the river.




Ursa MAior -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 6:16:21 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: AU Tiger


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rafael Warsaw

There were an establishment in Czar/Comunist Russia there was one in Washington in 1940. ACW? Pres. Lincoln was always worried about elections. Whole pennsylvannia campaigne was all about incoming election. He was lucky, They have won at Gettyssburg (thanks to incoming elections? Union commanders have seen a wall behind them built by Washington ie: a line in the sand?)



That doesn't make a lick of sense. The elections occurred 17 months AFTER Gettysburg. The whole Pennsylvania campaign was solely because Bobby Lee was there.

And in a later post you talked about desertions at the Potomac river as the army crossed. Actually in '63 the troops were in excellent morale and looking forward to campaigning in a country rich in forage. The desertions you are probably referring to was in '62 when the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland. A number of units had signed up to defend Southern soil and had moral problems with carrying a war of aggression into a foreign land.
A number of them refused to step across the river.



Yes I think there is a difference between a civil war and one waged against an aggressive enemy. There were similar issues in the hungarian 1848-49 uprising when a number of honved officers have refused to enter austrian soil saying they swore to protect their land not to invade others (even if militarily speaking that was the ONLY way to win that war).




AU Tiger_MatrixForum -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 6:48:01 AM)

Raphael:

Not trying to be offensive here but you are reminding me a little of some liberal arts students on campus the other day. They had set up a little table near the engineering building and were passing out literature and lecturing everyone on "Green Power." Some engineering students (I was one) talked with them for a little bit. They had no idea about the realities of what they were lecturing us about.

The point I am trying to make is this. From your studies, from the current state of international events, and the "Peace at any Price" movement in the States apparently you have developed an opinion about the American psyche that has no relation whatsoever with the American people following December 7th, 1941. Apparently these things are cyclical because there was a very similar PaaP movement in the Northern states during the War of Northern Aggression much like the one today in this country. I guess I am trying to say is the only way the American people would have submitted to a negotiated peace would have been at bayonet point. Any politician that tried to do so would likely have found himself dangling from a sour apple tree.




pasternakski -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 7:14:27 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson
Obviously it appears you have a difference of opinion with one or more people in this thread.

Bill, that's not it. In case it slipped past anyone, this forum is for discussion of matter relevant to the Matrix/2by3 game WitP.

I have no interest in adding to, or disputing, this unconscionable drivel, offensive as it is in many respects, particularly due to its undisciplined, informationless blathering.

It just needs to crawl back under its rock where it so obviously belongs. I am surprised that the moderators have not long since locked this thing.

I am further surprised to see the screen names of several people whose decorum and discussion I respect and enjoy allowing themselves to be sucked into this nonsense.




CobraAus -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 7:40:22 AM)

nasty politics Aus 1942 and still talked about today
this was to be Aus' answer to an invasion of Aus by Japan - thank God it did not happen

there is a lot more about this subject on the net just Google

The Brisbane Line


Percy Spender was Menzies' foreign minister, but, Neale Towart asks, was he also prepared to serve as Prime Minister in a Japanese controlled Australia?

**********

The Japanese military machine and the Australian ruling class, in another episode showing how the ruling elites will defend their privileges against any threat to the social order, planned for a Vichy administration in Australia.

Drew Cottle has given us the most detailed outline to date of all that is known of "The Brisbane Line" the plan of the Australian Gentry to do a deal with the Japanese during World War II and let them have the continent north from Brisbane. Rupert Lockwood, crusading journalist won lasting notoriety because of the Petrov Royal Commission and his alleged authorship of "Document J". That document is central to Cottle's researches and provides many clues to the truth of the Vichy administration plan.

Cottle explains that his fascination for the subject was stirred by his fathers anger every Friday night when he saw Charles Cousens appeared on Channel 7 to read the news, saying "Japanese agent" and "one of the Brisbane Line traitors". He could never understand this and in the frigid atmosphere of cold war Australia, where political debate was so constrained, the topic never got an airing elsewhere.

AT the time (1942) when the Japanese were advancing rapidly south an invasion did seem a real possibility. Eddie Ward was the first to accuse Menzies and his ilk of betrayal and being prepared to do a deal. There was a Royal Commission at the time but it was never transcribed. Max Julius communist lawyer and close associate of Fred Paterson the only Communist ever elected to a parliament in Australia, produced a pamphlet, "The Truth About The Brisbane Line" in 1942. The cover cartoon is a major indictment of all Menzies actions in his political history, with a reminder to readers of Pig iron Bob, his praise for Hitler, his support of the Munich Agreement, his non-intervention in the Spanish, his resignation of his military commission in 1914 and a quote that would do John Howard proud, "The Government of which I had the honour to be the leader has no apology to make to history: (22-6-1943, Hansard)

Cottle's book is the best guide yet to the lie in that statement.

The passions of the time are set out by Fred Paterson in his introduction to max Julius' pamphlet.

"No question has aroused such bitter feelings as the Brisbane Line Plan. The people of Queensland have every right to feel bitter. For the Brisbaner Line Plan involved giving up the greater part of Queensland, the Northern territory and North West Australia to the Japnese invaders without serius resistance.

To illustrate the outlook of the Tory defence experts I cannot do better than to quote the words of General Squires (Chief of the General Staff at the time), who, at an inquiry on defence matters, said-

"I am informed that there are only a few unimportant villages north of Brisbane".

Paterson went on the lay the blame on the United Australia party (Lyons and Menzies) and the Country Party for the defeatist program.

His final sentence unfortunately was proved wrong as Menzies and co quickly regained office after the war and the cold war kept them there for 23 years. Howard's regime is a resumption of the duplicity of this class of people and we should take to heart Paterson's summing up:

"No Australian could tolerate for one moment that our country's future should be entrusted to those who were responsible for this shocking strategy."

Cottle's main interest is not the military strategy of the Brisbane Line, although he does consider Macarthur's reaction to it and how he (Macarthur) saw it is a way on ensuring his heroic status as military saviour

Julius says in his pamphlet that the Brisbane Line Plan first existed in documentary form from 1942 when it was presented to, and rejected by, the Curtin government. The idea of the Brisbane Line, as a military strategy seems to go back to Lord Kitchener's visit to Australia in 1909-10 and his military plan occasioned by the fear of Japanese attack at that time. The British were concerned at the Japanese rivalry then.

Cottle is a Marxist historian so his concern is in the class origins of the Brisbane Line idea. The notion has been easily dismissed by the ruling class since the defeat of the Japanese as it was no longer an issue, but the willingness of the ruling elites to come to an arrangement should not be overlooked. Cottle points out that sections of society in France and Norway fro example, quickly and enthusiastically collaborated with the Nazis. The Philippine elite did the same with the Japanese.

Being of a different generation to Cottle, my first knowledge of the Brisbane Line stem from a review by Humphrey McQueen of Xavier Herbert's Poor Fellow My Country. McQueen notes Herbert's acceptance of the government plan to withdraw south of Brisbane for military purposes but Herbert does not take the extra step of seeing more sinister political forces behind this idea. As McQueen put is "the local bourgeoisie, which had been so stuck on the British, found little trouble shifting to the yanks. Doubtless they would have come to an arrangement with the Japanese in 1942, if the need had arisen." McQueen did not delve any further into the story. With the release of the Petrov case document sin the mid 1980s and discussions with the previously largely unheard of Ken Cook an "unofficial" intelligence operative, Drew Cottle founds his book on the hypothesis McQueen sketches out.

Cottle begins with an account of why appeasement was so appealing to the ruling classes in the wake of the slaughter of World War I. The rise of a newly educated and active working class, and the Bolshevik revolution led to a sense of unease amongst some and the results were the formation of the Old Guard and the New Guard, and various other manifestations of fascism that were thought necessary to safeguard the social order. Andrew Moore has perhaps looked into these movements more than most, and Jack Lang, himself violently opposed to communism, was the target of their concern, particularly after his Transport Administration legislation, when many garage owners around Sydney flocked to the New Guard. John Howard's father was a garage owner in the main stronghold of the New Guard, but no record exists of his membership.

These movements, and the Australia First movement (most notable for its inclusion of P.R. Stephensen and bankrolled by J Miles, a businessmen and both of whom were associated with Xavier Herbert, and whom he depicts telling in Poor Fellow My Country), were of interest to the Japanese, who throughout the thirties were keen to forge links with Australian business. The Japanese were large buyers of Australian wool, iron ore and other raw materials. So the Japanese were already important to the Australian economy. Also Japanese intelligence officials were active in Australia from 1931 to 1941, and were crucial in developing plans for the invasion, which were eventually abandoned in 1942-43. The Japan-Australia Society was formed in 1929 and officially disbanded in March 1941. The records left to us are scanty. Also the consulate before its closure destroyed many documents compiled by Japanese foreign and intelligence officials in Sydney in 1941.

Cottle goes on to look at the class membership of the society and the Australia First movement. He also devotes a chapter to the "white Japanese" those military and political figures who were sympathetic to the Japanese, and "whose importance to the potential Japanese invasion and occupation of Australia may never be known but for which there is tantalising evidence." Percy Spender, later foreign minister under Menzies is a key figure here.

Other writers have mentioned Ken Sato on the Japanese in Australia as the key source of evidence for the plans of the Japanese to invade. Many have thought that there were no such plans. Sato claimed that the Japanese had plans to move a large land attack between Townsville and Brisbane with Brisbane being the first objective, with Sydney to follow. The fall of Sydney and a move sought would lead to surrender. Sato named many Australians whom he knew (according to journalist Denis Warner) to be sympathetic to the plan and who would help make up a "Vichy" type administration.

Ken Cook, the unofficial intelligence operative is the real find of Cottle, and the person who seems to have been targeted by ASIO in the late 1960s up until the 1980s after he decided to write down what he had been doing in the 1930s and 1940s. He suffered a fire that destroyed his records and later a hit and run accident that almost killed him.

Rupert Lockwood and Document J, released in 1984 with the Petrov Archive, were vilified by the Royal Commission, and the Sydney Morning Herald, always reliable for the ruling class when the chips are down, backed up the Royal Commission with its editorial at the time of declassification. Cottle does a careful reading of Lockwood's What Is Document J and shows that much of what he wrote (of course unsupported by documents because they are hardly likely to be the kind of things those written about want recorded) is a reasonable account of what was going on up to 1942. He finds this from his talks with Ken Cook and his look at the connections and activities of such figures as Percy Spender, pretender to Menzies leadership but an outsider to the Melbourne Club. The reaction of his son, John Spender, former federal MP himself to the release of the Petrov Archive showed the sensitivity that still runs through the ruling classes on this cloudy part of out history.

We need to thank Cottle for remembering his father's anger and Humphrey McQueen for triggering Cottle's desire to find out what lay behind the Brisbane Line. As Cottle puts it, his "examination of the clues and starting points offered by Document J and other archival sources has suggested the Brisbane Line as a Vichy illusion of the Japan-minded n Australia. The treachery was never truly lost."

Drew Cottle. The Brisbane Line: A Reappraisal. Leicestershire; Upfront Books 2002.

Labor Council got a copy through amazon.co.uk as the book is printed on demand. The service is pretty fast. It shows the state of Australian publishing that Cottle could not get this work published in Australia.

Max Julius. The Truth About the Brisbane Line. Issued by the Qld State Committee. Communist Party of Australia, July 1943.

Humphrey McQueen. Poor Fellow My Country [review]. first published in Arena, no. 40, 1976. Republished in his Gallipoli to Petrov: arguments with Australian History


also follow this link - interesting reading

Cobra Aus




herwin -> RE: US Internal lpolitics and Public reaction (4/24/2007 1:59:56 PM)

It depends on whether the Germany First crowd could have kept King from sending troops and ships to the Pacific. (King was aggressive and liked taking calculated risks.) If the Japanese had not hit Pearl, it is likely that we would have settled for a stalemate in the Pacific until we finished off Germany. Hitting Pearl probably delayed by two years the date when the Navy had to start delivering victories on a regular basis. So play the game this way: if Japan *never* attacks Alaska, Hawaii, Canada, or the continental US, the US has to impose a close blockade on Japan by 1 January 1944 to win. If the US holds a major base in the Philippines or Taiwan at that point, it's a draw. Otherwise it's a Japanese win. If Japan has lost a major base in the Carolines or thereabouts, it's a marginal victory. If Japan still holds its internal perimeter, it's a regular victory. If Japan holds its external perimeter, it's a decisive victory. If the Allies have a close blockade on Japan, it's a marginal Allied victory. If there is a secure Allied bridgehead on the Japanese home islands, it's a regular victory. If one of the Japanese islands is held by the Allies, it's a decisive Allied victory.

BTW, this is what the USN thought pre-war.




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