quote:

ORIGINAL: Redan

Were there really 27 subs at Manila at start of war? I accept that all the pig boats were there, and that the newer boats may have been administratively attached to asiatic fleet-- but were they actually there? If this has been asked and answered, I apologize. A nudge or hint to where I can see this info would be appreciated as well. Much thanks!


edit: change word pib to pig...[They call me Mr. Pibb!]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Actually, the Asiatic Fleet submarines were at a very low state of readiness for war. The level of maintenance and general crew preparedness were atrocious...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Redan

Were there really 27 subs at Manila at start of war? I accept that all the pig boats were there, and that the newer boats may have been administratively attached to asiatic fleet-- but were they actually there? If this has been asked and answered, I apologize. A nudge or hint to where I can see this info would be appreciated as well. Much thanks!


edit: change word pib to pig...[They call me Mr. Pibb!]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Caliban

My father was on one of those "s-boats". The alarum bells awoke them at 3:00am after radio communication ( I assume) informed them that Pearl had been attacked. They submerged in the bay to avoid aerial bombardment and then, that evening, set a northerly course where they encountered the invasion fleet the following day. They were sighted after a freak wave thrust their conning tower above the surface. They counted 57 explosions depth charges) as the Japanese sought them out. Their ship suffered structural damage and the loss of an their auxillary periscope. They spent the next 6 months attempting to find a safe port for repairs. This was finally accomplished at Balikpapan. His boat and the others of it's class, I assume, were primarily used for recon missions. He was 17 years old when he joined the "silent service" in June of 1941. He served the entire war in that service.

Larry Kocher (the very proud son of Wesley H. Kocher)

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

If I recall correctly, all but 1 or 2 departed for war patrols within 36 hours. I dunno why that is considered "low state of readiness", or that the subs starting in Manilla should be given high sys damage at start.

(1 sub was sunk at dock: USS Sealion, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-s/ss195.htm )

The only "shortage" (I can recall) at the start of hostilities was torpedoes, but this affected the Pac fleet as a whole, not just the subs in the Far East.

The Japanese blockade and conquest of the PI and DEI, of course, caused shortages of spare parts as events unfolded...

Am I recalling incorrectly?

quote:

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

If I recall correctly, all but 1 or 2 departed for war patrols within 36 hours. I dunno why that is considered "low state of readiness", or that the subs starting in Manilla should be given high sys damage at start.

(1 sub was sunk at dock: USS Sealion, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-s/ss195.htm )

The only "shortage" (I can recall) at the start of hostilities was torpedoes, but this affected the Pac fleet as a whole, not just the subs in the Far East.

The Japanese blockade and conquest of the PI and DEI, of course, caused shortages of spare parts as events unfolded...

Am I recalling incorrectly?

Actually, at the very beginning of the war, the USN had a lot (several hundreds) of torpedoes there at Cavite (or Manilla, i don't recall which), all stored neatly in the torpedo depot... the IJNAF rectified this by bombing it and blowing it up... then they REALLY have a torpedo shortage after that... [8|]

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

If I recall correctly, all but 1 or 2 departed for war patrols within 36 hours. I dunno why that is considered "low state of readiness", or that the subs starting in Manilla should be given high sys damage at start.

quote:

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

quote:

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

If I recall correctly, all but 1 or 2 departed for war patrols within 36 hours. I dunno why that is considered "low state of readiness", or that the subs starting in Manilla should be given high sys damage at start.

(1 sub was sunk at dock: USS Sealion, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-s/ss195.htm )

The only "shortage" (I can recall) at the start of hostilities was torpedoes, but this affected the Pac fleet as a whole, not just the subs in the Far East.

The Japanese blockade and conquest of the PI and DEI, of course, caused shortages of spare parts as events unfolded...

Am I recalling incorrectly?

Actually, at the very beginning of the war, the USN had a lot (several hundreds) of torpedoes there at Cavite (or Manilla, i don't recall which), all stored neatly in the torpedo depot... the IJNAF rectified this by bombing it and blowing it up... then they REALLY have a torpedo shortage after that... [8|]

Would have been nice if they had coughed up one or two of them for testing.

quote:

The true lack of war readiness came from planning, doctrine and training. There was also a self inflicted weakness at the Commander's level. Pre-war doctrine and excercise rewarded caution and low risk decisions which led to anemic attacks in war time, lost opportunities, suspected cowardice, and mental stress breakdowns of CO's.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

The true lack of war readiness came from planning, doctrine and training. There was also a self inflicted weakness at the Commander's level. Pre-war doctrine and excercise rewarded caution and low risk decisions which led to anemic attacks in war time, lost opportunities, suspected cowardice, and mental stress breakdowns of CO's.

Yep, there were many, many sub skippers relieved in 1942 for lack of aggressiveness, real or perceived.

And it went far above the skiipers too. As you said, the entire Navy was unprepared mentally, tactically and in many cases, logistically.

All the services had become bureaucratic organizations that steadfastly resisted change and stomped on the guys that dared break with doctrine and show any initiative. Only those that toed the line were rewarded with promotion. People like Mitchell, Chennault and many others were punished for daring to think outside the box. Well, the Japanese broke that box on 7 December and the brass didn't have a clue of how to respond.

Chez

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees
I agree with all of this analysis. However, I thought the ideas of these strategic wargames was to see how much "better" you (the player) could conduct the war than the real life theatre commanders did.

I don't think the subs starting in the PI should have sys damage (see post #10), either to simulate a poor material state of readiness (which I dont think existed, see my post #17), or command confusion, which the player is replacing with him/herself anyway... [:)]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees
I agree with all of this analysis. However, I thought the ideas of these strategic wargames was to see how much "better" you (the player) could conduct the war than the real life theatre commanders did.

I don't think the subs starting in the PI should have sys damage (see post #10), either to simulate a poor material state of readiness (which I dont think existed, see my post #17), or command confusion, which the player is replacing with him/herself anyway... [:)]

I think it's a worthwhile notion. After all, even if you are the "Theatre Commander", you don't carry much weight before the war with Bureau of Personell or Bureau of Ordnance. You would start stuck with whatever was "on hand". The game does give you the ability to "beach" poor skippers and "repair" systems damage, so you are in the same position as your historical counterparts. Christ..., look how long it took to convince Bureau of Ordnance that their wonderfull Mk XIV Torpedoes were a piece of crap.

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees
I agree with all of this analysis. However, I thought the ideas of these strategic wargames was to see how much "better" you (the player) could conduct the war than the real life theatre commanders did.

I don't think the subs starting in the PI should have sys damage (see post #10), either to simulate a poor material state of readiness (which I dont think existed, see my post #17), or command confusion, which the player is replacing with him/herself anyway... [:)]

I think it's a worthwhile notion. After all, even if you are the "Theatre Commander", you don't carry much weight before the war with Bureau of Personell or Bureau of Ordnance. You would start stuck with whatever was "on hand". The game does give you the ability to "beach" poor skippers and "repair" systems damage, so you are in the same position as your historical counterparts. Christ..., look how long it took to convince Bureau of Ordnance that their wonderfull Mk XIV Torpedoes were a piece of crap.

Which is already reflected in the dud rates located in the device file... paint me confused.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Or at least the magnetic exploders were...