RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (Full Version)

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MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/11/2007 8:48:20 PM)

Has anyone noticed that weather fronts seem to move consistently fast in the game? (almost at the top speed of carriers)

Is it my imagination or does all weather move fast? Is that realistic? Doe weather move much faster over the open ocean?

Thanks.



GoodGuy -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/11/2007 8:49:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

Fast carrier task groups could travel about 400 miles OVERNIGHT.

441.52 miles/12 hrs at 32 knots, to be exact, and 275.95 miles/12 hrs at 20 knots, which used to be the normal (cruise) speed. [:D]

Right, they were fast. But I (and others it seems) think that these task groups don't have much space to manoeuvre on these small maps, one can't use speed (maybe coupled with the enemy's problems to spot the player's assets) as a real advantage, since the cruise speed of enemy TGs always seems to be higher than the historical cruise speeds, and they seem to hit the pedal each time their planes got back. Also, search planes seem to spot enemy TGs most of the time, I can't spot a (working?) algorythm to depict a situation where search planes suffer of technical failures (broken radios) or where they are shot down before they can spot/relay the position of the enemy task force.

I'd still say quite some of the actual historical encounters were limited to a relatively small part of the theater (if you look at the size of the PTO), despite a TG's speed, due to limited (historical) ranges of strike a/c or weapons (in surface battles), due to the US reading vital parts of the IJN communications and due to IJN or USN forces being bound to support ground operations many times.
Also, unlike in the real world, the player is being limited (additionaly) regarding the selection of routes or approaches, either by the map's boundaries or by the low number of supply units, where the latter were able to keep up with a TGs cruise speed (~20 kts), historically, imho.

The "manageable/limited area" thingy was even more valid for battles like the one at Midway:
It was "just" about what direction the japanese Carrier group would choose for their approach/attack, as the strike range was an expected/known constant in this computation. Also, the US had accurate infos about the complete IJN OOB prior to the start of the battle, because the IJN code had been cracked.
It then was only a matter of proper search procedures, and, a certain amount of luck regarding the japanese search planes failing to spot the US TGs at an early stage and having troubles with a failed radio device later on, giving the US the opportunity to assemble at an advance position ("Point Luck") really close to the actual strike range.

quote:

It's also worth noting that Midway PROVED that IJN carrier assets couldn't go on station and fight in effective range of Allied air-bases.

Well, no ...... it just proved they couldn't go on station in effective range of 3 US carriers - the equivalent of 1 1/2 IJN carrier divisions (assembling NE of Midway, undetected by the IJN) - AND a landbase. They couldn't bombard 2 targets simultanously, as the different types of targets (airbase in contrast to 3 carriers) called for different a/c armament, plus they made a series of bad and time-consuming reconsiderations (they equipped bomber squads with bombs for a 2nd wave scheduled to head for Midway, just to change their minds a bit later and equip the bombers with torpedos, for example), although their superior amount of aircrafts should have been able to smash the US carriers.
It's a fact that the USN caught the IJN with their pants down. It wasn't a "wild west"-style duel where the guy who pulled his gun first won, ya know :)

Even worse, shortly before the operation, the IJN search planes scheduled to refuel at the French Frigate Shoals (to recon Pearl Harbor - to get infos about the location of the remaining US carriers) could not be deployed, as the shoals were occupied by US warships.
The result was that Nagumo did not know anything about the whereabouts of the US carrier groups, which displayed THE dark horse in his considerations. He still kept sticking to the initial plan, rushed his forces to Midway, although he could have deployed 5 carriers, instead of 4, and diverted vital surface forces in order to execute a simultaneous attack on the Aleutian Islands. So you might want to include hasty/stubborn planning on the IJN side, if you review the Battle of Midway.

I think you over-estimate the impact of strikes launched from Midway's airbase. Allied land-based air-cover (the "umbrella" u were talking about) expanded to its fullest extent in 1943 in the Atlantic Ocean, but did not feature a similar expansion in the Pacific until around 2 years after Midway, except for the temporary advanced umbrellas provided by the US carriers.

The Japanese forces, in turn, did not have long-range/turbo-charged a/c's, unlike the US, so the japanese "umbrellas" were less effective and smaller than you might think. I've read about rare japanese bomber runs that were one-way (note: not kamikaze) missions, as their targets were way off-range, and the bombers' fuel tanks did not hold enough fuel to return.
Also, Japanese bases like Truk and others were left out (regarding invasion -> isle hopping), but were completely neutralized by continous Allied bombing raids.

The IJN strikes on Darwin (given, RAAF at Darwin had only 11 modern planes) and other bases, and the excursion of a IJN group towards the Indian Ocean, despite some resistance from RAF airbases, rather proves that strikes from Allied airbases were less of a threat during the first 12-18 months of the Pacific War than depicted in some literature/docs, especially the strikes coming from Midway were not much more than a kind of harassment, in terms of forcing the IJN to employ their Zeros more often, just - if at all - raising the chance of them being low on fuel or being in the process of rearming when the real threat (US carrier wings) would appear on the scene. The bombers on Midway didn't hit anything afaik, and only 3 survived the battle, this puts the virtue of airbases into perspective, for the first 12-18 months. for sure.

Some of the Allied airbases (Henderson airfield for example) even didn't have enough aircrafts to seriously counter enemy threats until some units were rushed to the theater.
Except for Port Moresby, and for Saipan and Okinawa later on, Allied airbases mainly employed fighter squadrons to counter IJ bombers/fighters.

It's not surprising, that the final diversion of the IJN fighters in the Battle of Midway was achieved by one of the US carriers' bomber squadrons.

quote:

One or both sides are assigned missions against a land-base which gives the fighting focus and definition. The situations depicted by the game are historical in nature, albeit with variants. Were the game maps to be quadrupled in size, squared in area, if you will, it wouldn't significantly alter the nature of the fighting, because the fighting should still revolve around the objective(s).


Well, the objective would not change, right, but there are details which make things less believable in this game. A TG can sit in or right next to an enemy harbor, without getting any fire from coastal artillery (since it's not rendered). As IJN, you can "gut" Pearl Harbor and sink every frickin ship in there.... you can finish off the US TGs inside, if you send in your surface TGs - by completely ignoring the US airbases in the beginning. Such defects in scenario design and game design could be ignored and the game could be more fun, if the player's TGs would have more space to manoeuvre and if 1 or 2 days would be added in terms of a mission's duration. Although the scenarios might be accurate regarding historical duration the short amount of time and limited space make it a piece of very limited enjoyment.

quote:

As has been noted previously, what IS needed in the game are exit points
Well, this sounds like a good idea, basically, but it could be exploited in SP and MP if you don't expand map sizes. It will be like "gun and run" most likely, one side might be able to pull off an early strike, just to take advantage of a bad weather front above his TGs (so that enemy strikes would not be able to score substantial hits) and then run home to hide under mommys skirt (Pearl), in order to save the score advantage til the end of the scenario. It might also lead to situations where you chase enemy TGs, with you, after crippling their main assets, not being able to finish off the enemy's main assets, as they reached the exit area.

My 2 cents... err wait... 10 bucks now, sorry [:D]



Joe D. -> RE: MarkShot's CAW/CCAW tips - use at your own risk! (7/11/2007 9:11:34 PM)

I've only played C@W a few weeks, but here are a few tips I've picked-up:

- whenever possible, let the enemy come to you while you are in a wx front.

- sacrifice a small surafce TG as bait by letting the AI target fixate on it, then hit his CVs. I discovered this quite by accident as the Allies in the advanced warning variant of the Pearl Harbor scenario.

- If a strategy worked for you in UV, it will probably work in C@W; same war, same map, same ships.



Adam Parker -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 1:32:58 AM)

Here's a few questions regarding tactics for those in the know, that fits in with the discussion of recent:

1. Are the game's aircraft ranges accurate - are they too long?

2. Are search planes being launched too frequently - we know strikes can be re-tasked too quickly?

3. Is it historical to place a surface TG in front of an Air TG to use as cannon fodder - we've questioned auxiliaries?

4. What is the measurement of a hex in this game?

5. How far would a TF spread its TG's out?

Finessing any one of these could change the tactical and strategic feel of the game markedly.



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 2:46:23 AM)

Hi Goodguy,

For brevity's sake, I'm not gonna try and dissect your excellent post, particularly the parts about the Midway airbase. What I will assert is that the U.S. had advantages in the battle which transcended its intelligence coup (which really can't be simulated in CaW), or luck (to which their victory is so often attributed). One of the most important of these was its doctrine of dispersal, a key component of which proved to be Midway itself. The Japanese had all their eggs in one basket, the Kido Butai. The U.S. had its air assets divided among Midway and two task forces, the practical impact of which was to reduce the possibility of the IJN inflicting catastrophic losses on the U.S. in one or two strikes, while not suffering a similar fate, to something rather less than improbable.

The existance of the Midway air garrison created a situation such that the Allied force actually had a numerical superiority in strike a/c. And while many of these assets were outdated and/or flown by inexperienced aircrew, this superiority dramatically improved the possibility that the U.S. could place some semblance of a saturation strike over the Kido Butai, one that the vaunted Japanese force was simply incapable of repelling. And if you examine the record carefully, it's hard not to be amazed at how the U.S. forces seemed for half the morning to do all in their power to FAIL at this task, the operational miscues were just that pronounced. Still, when high-noon arrived, and enough aircraft appeared overhead, the KB succumbed, as I believed it was so destined.

The air forces based at Midway may not have scored the hits that won the battle, but they kept the KB's strike aircraft hangared so long as the carriers were cycling their CAP and the island absorbed the blow of the ENTIRE OTHER HALF of the formation's Kates and Vals, aircraft that would have otherwise been hunting down any U.S. ships that might have been spotted. That Midway's airbase and it's several squadrons of aircraft took this option off the table until USN dive-bombers finally set three of four Japanese carriers ablaze, I believe, is irrefutable.

That Kido Butai was in fact a raiding force, rather than one that could successfully engage in a struggle with powerful land and sea-based air assets, is equally unquestionable. In evidence, I have only to offer history, and the simple fact that it was NEVER able to do so, not once in the course of the war in the Pacific. This was not the fleet that came to stay, it wasn't designed as such, and when Yamamoto attempted to so transform it, he got his proverbial clock cleaned.

Thanks for your comments, [:)]

PoE (aka ivanmoe)




MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 6:00:41 AM)

Adam,

In response to your questions:

#4 - a game hex is 20nm

#5 - the manual says that a leading or trailing TG maintains a 40nm distance from the TG command unit. However, the CCAW manual notes one important provision that the speed of the trailing or leading unit should be set to exceed the command unit by 5-10kts such that it can maneuver as needed relative to the command unit.



GoodGuy -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 11:00:43 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

The existance of the Midway air garrison created a situation such that the Allied force actually had a numerical superiority in strike a/c. And while many of these assets were outdated and/or flown by inexperienced aircrew, this superiority dramatically improved the possibility that the U.S. could place some semblance of a saturation strike over the Kido Butai, one that the vaunted Japanese force was simply incapable of repelling.

Sorry, but I have to disagree [:)]. The Zero was the superior fighter in 1942.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/carriers/midway.html

"Ens. George H. Gay, USNR, the only surviving pilot, reached the surface as his plane sunk. He hid under a rubber seat cushion to avoid strafing and witness the greatest carrier battle in history. Of 41 torpedo planes launched by the American carriers, only six returned. Their sacrifices drew enemy fighters away from dive bombers of Enterprise and Yorktown which sank three of the four Japanese carriers (Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu) with an assist from submarine USS Nautilus (SS 168). The fourth Japanese carrier, Hiryu, was sunk the following day."

If the japanese Zeros would have provided close cover for the carriers, instead of focusing on a group of US a/c's aloof from their carriers, the US dive bombers would have been less successful, for sure. The "superiority" of US planes had been pretty much "adjusted" by the first wave that had been sent to Midway already, which you can check yourself in the ONI review (1947) linked below. It contains the official Japanese action report, and you can see, although many parts are based on estimations or enthusiastic (therefor partially incorrect) reports regarding the US carriers, that the a/c groups at Midway got ripped apart. A second wave would have trashed Midway completely, most likely. The total number of US a/c doesn't tell the whole story.
It was the lack of coordination of the Zeros and a question of (missing) proper guidance for the japanese fighters.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/rep/Midway/Nagumo/index.html#III-3

quote:

Still, when high-noon arrived, and enough aircraft appeared overhead, the KB succumbed, as I believed it was so destined.

Yes, destiny might have been the main trigger there. [:D]
Again, the final blow might have had less of an impact if the japanese fighter cover wouldn't have turned by this particular carrier squadron.

quote:

The air forces based at Midway may not have scored the hits that won the battle, but they kept the KB's strike aircraft hangared
They didn't hit anything, except for 2 cruisers (both were sunk) that got (too) close to Midway, because they were ordered to bombard Midway's installations - at least one cruiser bombarded Midway all through the night afaik -, they did not score any (substantial) hits on any of the carrier groups' ships.

quote:

[].....the island absorbed the blow of the ENTIRE OTHER HALF of the formation's Kates and Vals, aircraft that would have otherwise been hunting down any U.S. ships that might have been spotted.
I have to disagree again. It was the reconsideration (2 choices: send a 2nd wave to Midway or rearm and ready up for the US carriers?) and late feedback from the search planes that got them in trouble, it wasn't a question of Midway keeping the KB (too) busy.
Also, Nagumo decided to start the operation at Midway, although there was no intelligence about the whereabouts of the remaining US carriers, and, even worse, he decided to do without his 5th carrier (where he would have had to postpone the Midway operation).

During the actual battle, quite contrary, the Yorktown absorbed 1 and a half strikes, saving the rest of the US carrier fleet unintentionally, tempting the IJN to think they sunk 2 carriers.
Nagumo was too cautious, as he kept parts of his wings in reserve. If he would have committed all bombers for the strike on the US carriers, things would have turned out differently, I'm pretty sure.
The reconsiderations caused a situation where the IJN carriers were served to the US bombers on a silver plate, since flight decks were packed with ordnance and a/c's being rearmed/refueled on deck, while IJN fighters were low on fuel and ammo, as the busy flight decks hampered efforts to resupply them.

quote:

That Kido Butai was in fact a raiding force, rather than one that could successfully engage in a struggle with powerful land and sea-based air assets, is equally unquestionable.

It was a capable force, capable of trashing 3 US carriers, especially since one of these carriers wasn't fully repaired (and rushed to Midway after only 72 hrs of nonstop-repairs). The IJN had a massive amount of bad luck, coupled with poor decision-making, knocking out the IJN backbone eventually. The IJN had veteran pilots, superior fighters, and 4 carriers, but still failed. Luck and bad luck are both big factors in the history of warfare, influencing outcomes on and off.
While it took the IJN 3 yrs (until early 1945) to replace the lost carriers one by one, the US ordered 32 carriers, light carriers and escort carriers, but, since the CV program clearly could not complete CVs before 1944, the USN focused on building CVLs, with their shipyards spilling these "baby" carriers all through the following years, a wise decision in retrospect.

I tend to think that the US forces (this goes for Europe and for the PTO as well), besides them commencing bold amphibious invasions during their "isle-hopping"-tour, including the invasion in Normandy, and besides them fighting some attritious campaigns on some of these islands, won because of superior numbers (personnel, materiél, industry production), while they managed to cripple the industry and cut the supply lines of their opponents (Germany and Japan).

The IJN could have succeeded at Midway, since the basic idea to conquer this advanced outpost at Midway wasn't a suicide run, but it seems like "destiny" had another layout ready. [:D]



Joe D. -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 2:27:18 PM)

Just a few observations on all this:

... The Zero was the superior fighter in 1942.

In retrospect, many considered the Zero to be over rated. Like the samurai, it was all offense w/little in the way of pilot protection, i.e., no shield, no armor/self-sealing tanks. By analogy, Sherman tanks were mechanically superior to Axis ETO armor, which often broke-down. Shermans were as dependable as a US auto, but when hit, they lit up like the 4th of July.

Re Midway: I think the IJN shared a common trait w/it's counterparts in C@W; target fixation. Midway's airfield became a major distraction for the Japanese, who assumed US CVs were heading to Dutch Harbor, as per their overly complicated attack plan. Perhaps if Halsey had been in command, this would have worked in their favor; look what almost happened to the landings @ Leyte when "Bull" charged after an IJ CV fleet sans planes, and left the Allied invasion force (almost) all alone.

Of course, breaking the IJN code and knowing their plans proved more advantageous than any tactical or numerical advantage.



GoodGuy -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 7:43:48 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

In retrospect, many considered the Zero to be over rated. Like the samurai, it was all offense w/little in the way of pilot protection, i.e., no shield, no armor/self-sealing tanks.

The Zero was more maneuverable and had a better climb rate. The wildcats could only escape if they performed an emergency dive where a Zero's wings, if it tried to follow, would freeze, rendering it uncontrollable, due to a flaw in wing/airframe design . Except for this then common US tactic, and except for the Zeros' deficits regarding pilot protection, they could outperform any Allied plane in 1942.

Although development started before Pearl Harbor, the Hellcat included designs to outperform the Zeros, which they did in most if not all aspects once they were commissioned eventually, let alone the nightfighter/night-recon capabilities in early 1944. The hellcats turned the tide in aerial warfare in the Pacific, and Navy/Marine Hellcats destroyed 5100+ enemy a/c at a cost of 270 planes (Pacific). There are some sources claiming that the Hellcats accounted for 75% of all aerial victories tracked by the USN in the pacific.
However, wildcats could not put up such a performance, not in the least.

http://www.historynet.com/air_sea/aerial_combat/3028101.html?showAll=y&c=y

The article linked above accurately describes the reliability of "US autos", US wildcats in this case:

"Early Wildcat guns had a tendency to jam during hard maneuvers; furthermore, if the oil necessary to prevent rust on the guns in the humid sea-level air was not removed before takeoff, it froze at altitude, jamming the actions)."

This was caused by a flaw in the design of the Wildcat's installations. Well, that would be like a teethless cat roaming through the air, right? [:D] Furthermore, the Wildcat's climb rate was extremely low, especially after it received more primitive superchargers (F4F-3A in 1942 I think), due to a shortage of two-step superchargers. If looking at these details, one can imagine why Wildcats weren't that successful, despite their robustness.

Another example for flawed US weapon design would be the torpedos' ignition system, resulting in a high number of duds, hampering efforts of the airforce branch and the submarine branch of the USN in the Pacific.

quote:

By analogy, Sherman tanks were mechanically superior to Axis ETO armor, which often broke-down. Shermans were as dependable as a US auto, but when hit, they lit up like the 4th of July.

Seriously now, I don't see an analogy there, and it's a pretty plain generalization to brand all German tanks as unreliable. The Tiger was unreliable because of the problems with its clutch, especially the first series (of 250 tanks) which was underpowered. The problems with the clutch never got solved completely for the duration of the Tiger's production. Additionally some german tanks had problems with the transmission.

The successor, the KingTiger had somewhat less problems with these parts of the engine, but problems, due to some crews' careless handling and due to the weight, still came up. The real problem for the KingTiger was that it got the late Tiger I's engine - KingTigers were absolutely underpowered, so the engine had to run at full power just to start moving. Many breakdowns were in fact engines that blew up. Testing phases for Tiger I and Tiger II had been shortened or even canceled in order to quickly deploy them on the frontlines.

Late PzIV models and especially the Panthers in turn did not have as many problems, and captured Panthers were very popular among Russian tank crews, as the Panthers used to be reliable and their guns effective, plus they did not feature the problems of T-38/85 or JS-II tanks. Pz I to III were pre-war models that shared technical/engineering problems with their Allied pendants.
On a sidenote, the Zeros were pretty reliable, as far as I know.

quote:

Re Midway: I think the IJN shared a common trait w/it's counterparts in C@W; target fixation. Midway's airfield became a major distraction for the Japanese


Well, fixation, not sure..... May I quote one of your older posts? [:)] I'll paste your statement from last year regarding a tutorial scenario for the game COTA, a tactical exercise:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe 98

quote:

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy
No, It's relatively easy to sneak around that front guard unit at night, as you can see on the screenshots.


No body in their right mind would leave an enemy unit of unknown strength in their rear.

While your assessment of this particular situation in that scenario was wrong, the statement would be valid for Nagumo's situation, and could be adjusted as follows: "No body in his right mind would leave an enemy carrier group of unknown strength in his rear". The actual objective would have been to find/screen and decimate the US carrier group, before even attempting a bombardment on Midway, let alone an invasion. It was rather undecidedness than fixation, since Nagumo seemed to listen to subordinates each time, with them suggesting a 2nd wave on Midway at first - although intel about the US carrier fleet was missing - but with them suggesting a strike on the carriers (along with changing the bombers' armament) eventually. Bad leadership imho.

However, the Midway airbase turned out to be the lesser threat, imho.



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/12/2007 11:05:29 PM)

Goodguy, I'm out of pocket at the moment, and can't begin to keep up with you volume wise.

I do want to challenge you to update your sources, however.  I'm not suggesting that you buy a bunch of books, or anything. Perhaps you could access some titles that are more contemporary to ourselves at your local library,  ones that delve into modern Japanese interpretations of the battle. The problem with works that rely on postwar Japanese accounts from the 40's and 50' is that the principal figures were in full-bore, damage control mode and trying to salvage their reputations, Fuchida, foremost among them. Failure and shame are inextricably linked in Japanese culture, and the stakes in rehabiltating ones image were something of a life and death matter. And it was his collection of fables about the fighting that were among the cheif sources of information, not only for conventional, postwar authors, but also service-produced accounts like the one that you cite above.That Fuchida has come to be recognized as such a shameless liar is not a product Western revisionists but of Japanese historians who have pored over the logs of the Kido Butai's airgroups, and proven as much.

Respectfully, can we dispense with Fuchida's account(s) of the Battle of Midway?

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



Joe D. -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 12:10:35 AM)

I'll be brief, as usual.

Re the Encyclopedia of Aircraft of WWII: "The Wildcat never outpeformed the Zero, but it won battle after battle nonetheless ..." Midway is just another example of that.

The same book also said, "While the Zero was fighting ill-trained Chineese airman ... it was almost unbeatable. But even during the early years of WW II, when folklore has it that the Zero was 'invulnerable,' small numbers of aircraft were dispatched by 'inferior' Allied types, including the Hawker Hurricane, the widely disparaged Brewster Buffalo, and even the unwieldy Britol Blenheim." So even the best pilot in the best plane could have a bad day, and apparently many IJN airmen did during Midway.

Re tanks: although just an analogy, I once interviewd a Fort Hood soldier whose grandparents were tankers in WW II on opposite sides, American and German. the American drove his Sherman throughout all of Europe sans any serious problems, but the German grandparent -- who was in a Mark IV, which suffered from the additon of more armour on a chasis not meant to carry this load -- was always repairing his vehicle. I think this was a problem in general for most German armor after the T-34 "surprise" in Russia.

He did disparingly refer to the Sherman as a "door knocker" when ever it hit his tank; at least German engineering kept crew survivability in mind.

I'm not Joe 98, I'm Joe D. Interesting quote, though.



Baskaatje -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 1:03:38 AM)

Interestingly enough, a couple of years ago I did an article for a Dutch aviation magazine on the Brewster Buffalo (later published in American Aviation Historical Society http://www.aahs-online.org/BackIssues/v49n2.htm) in which the Brewster was compared for its service with the USN, RAF and ML-KNIL (Netherlands East Indies AF) against that in the Finish AF. In Finland the Brewster was hughly succesfull against Rata's and not soo good Russian pilots and very well liked by its pilots. In the Far East the Brewster was less succesfull, but not as bad an airplane as always thought to be.

Bas



Adam Parker -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 2:53:57 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Adam Parker

Here's a few questions regarding tactics for those in the know, that fits in with the discussion of recent:

1. Are the game's aircraft ranges accurate - are they too long?

2. Are search planes being launched too frequently - we know strikes can be re-tasked too quickly?

3. Is it historical to place a surface TG in front of an Air TG to use as cannon fodder - we've questioned auxiliaries?

4. What is the measurement of a hex in this game?

5. How far would a TF spread its TG's out?

Finessing any one of these could change the tactical and strategic feel of the game markedly.


Just getting back to the above. After replaying Coral Sea yesterday against the historical map I'm pretty confident that items #1, #4 and #5 are playing out well.

Issues such as the aircraft launch cycle, I believe, are being worked on by SSG.

That just leaves the tactical use of surface TG's as bait and likely (not mentioned) the use of storm fronts as cover, as abstractions within the game design players (as in every design) will need to live with.

I was very happy to see the B17's from Australia come into play rather than having to transfer them to Port Moresby to become operational. The reach of Japanese land based air is awesome and historically effective. The ability to spread TG's across the map fit perfectly with history as a valid strategy.

Are bigger maps needed? I think I'm going to sit back on the fence regarding that now, as the amount of maneuver I experienced yesterday was superb and the fact the Japs had room to sneek right by me under a full umberella of air, convinced me that the map scale is likley indeed fine as is.

I think once SSG tweaks randomness and historical replayability as it is currently working on, we'll find quite a mature, integrated strategic-operational carrier warfare game here, even though it will still include a schizophrenic blend of manning the fuel pumps too. But that can always be left for a tweak later on [;)]



GoodGuy -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 3:04:24 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

[]....small numbers of aircraft were dispatched by 'inferior' Allied types, including the Hawker Hurricane, the widely disparaged Brewster Buffalo, and even the unwieldy Bristol Blenheim."
Very interesting section, indeed. The emphasis here should be put on "small numbers", though.
The hurricane did well during the battle of Britain, its performance was good. Maybe the nightfighter-version of the Bristol Blenheim (MK IV) Bomber might have had some value (since it scored some kills against German bombers during the night raids on London), but I doubt that it was successful if operating in the PTO in a daylight fighter-role (with its low top speed of ~266 mph). Whatsoever, none of these aircrafts could outperform the Zeros. I didn't say Wildcats, Hurricanes, or whatever other a/c didn't score kills. The real killer employed by the USN in the PTO was the Hellcat, and that one didn't see action in the Battle of Midway (correct me if I'm wrong :p), that's all I said.

quote:

Mark IV, which suffered from the additon of more armour on a chasis not meant to carry this load
.... probably the latest PzIV, add. armor skirts, turret upgraded, general armor upgraded. Not sure if these ones were underpowered too, would have to check. :) The desert/tropics version of the PzIV serving in North Africa did pretty well. I've read the complete history of a particular Pz Regt. serving in the Afrika Korps (with numbers regarding tanks fit for service and with numbers of units being repaired - covering quite some operations), but I don't recall a massive amount of breakdowns/failures. Most of the unintentional "stops" were caused by the invariably imminent lack of fuel supply or noteable encounters where 70-100 British tanks got driven away by ~20-30 German tanks, PzIV, few PzIII.

quote:

I'm not Joe 98, I'm Joe D. Interesting quote, though.
My apologies, sore eyes here. [:)][&o].



GoodGuy -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 4:21:23 AM)

@ Adam Parker et al: Sorry for posting off-topic stuff again, hehe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

And it was his collection of fables about the fighting that were among the cheif sources of information, not only for conventional, postwar authors, but also service-produced accounts like the one that you cite above.That Fuchida has come to be recognized as such a shameless liar is not a product Western revisionists but of Japanese historians who have pored over the logs of the Kido Butai's airgroups, and proven as much.

Respectfully, can we dispense with Fuchida's account(s) of the Battle of Midway?

What "more recent" accounts are you referring to in particular? "Dispense with" means "do without"? Sorry, but my english skills go on vacation at times :).
I'm convinced that Nagumos subordinates triggered/suggested a good amount of the bad decisions, I've stated that already. His staff had conflicting suggestions/opinions, which didn't help to make up his mind.



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 6:04:17 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

@ Adam Parker et al: Sorry for posting off-topic stuff again, hehe

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

And it was his collection of fables about the fighting that were among the cheif sources of information, not only for conventional, postwar authors, but also service-produced accounts like the one that you cite above.That Fuchida has come to be recognized as such a shameless liar is not a product Western revisionists but of Japanese historians who have pored over the logs of the Kido Butai's airgroups, and proven as much.

Respectfully, can we dispense with Fuchida's account(s) of the Battle of Midway?

What "more recent" accounts are you referring to in particular? "Dispense with" means "do without"? Sorry, but my english skills go on vacation at times :).
I'm convinced that Nagumos subordinates triggered/suggested a good amount of the bad decisions, I've stated that already. His staff had conflicting suggestions/opinions, which didn't help to make up his mind.

Quickly, let me apologize. I realize that my comments sound kind of pedantic, at best.

The real culprit, however, is Fuchida. He's been haunting this forum for what seems like months, now. "Fuchida said this...Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan said that." The man was also a principal source of information about the day's events in the Lord and Prange books. And then there are all the "official studies," the USSBS and other postwar government-generated reports that use him as the main source of information about IJN operations at Midway.

All these folks went looking for an eyewitness and factual expert on the proceedings, before, during and after the battle. And his central role in retelling its story wouldn't be a problem if he hadn't been exposed by Japanese researchers as a fraud as relates to the events associated with the Midway operation. I'm sorry, but the irony attendant to so many of my peers forever referencing his "contributions" to the body of knowledge surrounding the battle just got the best of me.

But, don't take my word for any of this. Seriously, there are excellent books available that draw heavily on the work of Japanese historians bent on telling the truth. For decades after the Fuchida book, they have systematically dismembered his account of the events associated with the battle of Midway. and language differences held the bulk of their work in obscurity for far, far too long.

Shattered Sword is one such book, one that focuses primarily on the Japanese experience at the Midway, one which would appear totally foreign to anyone who grew up as I did, reading books filled with Fuchida's nonsense. Another, book that draws heavily on Japanese research is The First Team, a book about the U.S carrier fighters in the first six months of the war. Lundstrom goes out of his way to "fill in the blanks" associated with Midway by using Japanese sources.

These are just two, but if you will give them a read, I honestly think that they will seriously alter your beliefs and understanding of Midway, and by extension, about the carrier engagements of 1942.

Again, however, I apologize for my tone.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



Joe D. -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 2:47:51 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: baskreuger
Interestingly enough, a couple of years ago I did an article for a Dutch aviation magazine on the Brewster Buffalo (later published in American Aviation Historical Society http://www.aahs-online.org/BackIssues/v49n2.htm) in which the Brewster was compared for its service with the USN, RAF and ML-KNIL (Netherlands East Indies AF) against that in the Finish AF.

In Finland the Brewster was hughly succesfull against Rata's and not soo good Russian pilots and very well liked by its pilots. In the Far East the Brewster was less succesfull, but not as bad an airplane as always thought to be.
Bas


For some reason, I can't access your link to the American Aviation Hist. Society.

In a similar situation, the US-built P-39 Airacobra did not perform well for the Brits, who transfered many of them to Russia, where the P-39s peformed much better. I recall one Russian ace was very fond of -- and very successful with -- the P-39 against superior German fighters.

I wonder why certain peoples/nationalities do better w/a particular aircraft than other peoples, or is it simply a matter of the singer, not the song, i.e., the pilot rather than the plane.

Of course, during WW II lend-lease, "beggers" couldn't afford to be choosers when it came to flying other people's planes.



HansBolter -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/13/2007 10:22:16 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Oleg Mastruko

Of course there are always some universal truths & time proven strategies: drink a glass of milk every day, keep carriers fueled, don't run with scissors.... [:D]




Never seems to work for those of us who are lactose intolerant......our motto is NEVER drink a glass of milk! [;)]



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 5:28:02 PM)

Added tip #14.



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 5:36:22 PM)

More refinements to tip #14



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 5:43:34 PM)

Added tip #15



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 10:52:17 PM)

More tips based on "search and strike".



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 10:58:10 PM)

quote:


(16) It seems that during an air base strike, your recon and bomber AC are quite vulnerable to damage. Perhaps simply getting them airborn at first light when an airstrike is expected might be a good means of force preservation. So, "search and strike" artificial siting report may serve as a means to get non-fighter AC out of harms way when an airstrike is imminent.


The following screens illustrate the above technique of getting Midway's non-fighters out of harms way - an inbound large Japanese alpha strike.



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 10:58:51 PM)

Artificial report ...

[image]local://upfiles/8864/E6BCD8EC2273466988A5EF11B61CD408.jpg[/image]



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 11:00:40 PM)

Alpha strike inbound. Red AC are the enemy. My non-fighters, white AC, are already 30-60 miles from Midway.

[image]local://upfiles/8864/5DA9590E1E8A46CBA311876F4F80EC3E.jpg[/image]



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/23/2007 11:02:05 PM)

Air operations, you can see a large number of planes have gotten away before the strike ...

[image]local://upfiles/8864/0D4DE320C87544AD8692B67650164E57.jpg[/image]



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/24/2007 3:14:12 AM)

Added tip #18



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/24/2007 3:25:02 AM)

Added tip #19



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/24/2007 3:32:14 AM)

quote:


(19) In a multi-day scenario, it may benefit you (especially if you are the defender and the underdog) to not rush into the battle area. Instead first make sure that you have positioned your forces relative to the weather and that you have a good understanding what the weather is doing in different sectors of the map. (I believe the scenario editor provides for 9 quadrants of weather behavior across the map.) Having done this, remember that the presence of mission objectives having locations make the enemy predictable, and may, in fact, force him to expose himself to clear skies. In the meantime, you can use hit and run tactics peripheral to the main battle area. Although it is nice to sink the enemy's carriers, if you can continue to maul him without being hit back, then you can certainly run up the score in your favor. A strategy based soley on catching the enemy's carriers can be very risk prone. Landing forces and capital ships without air cover can be torn up pretty good for not too much cost in aircraft or pilots.


Midway Historical: The screenshot shows an example of the above. I am striking at the distant enemy having massed my three carrier force. The enemy is exposed in clear skies. My TGs are station keeping as a squal line drifts over them towards the West. The enemy will be striking in heavy weather. In the meantime, I have a full three CV emergency CAP up to meet inbound Japanese strike force. I expect to inflict a lot of damage while sustaining fairly minimal damage myself.

[image]local://upfiles/8864/D782CBA3D5F348D1BED4E61B74EA71E4.jpg[/image]



MarkShot -> RE: A thread of strategy, tactics, and tips? (7/24/2007 3:50:11 AM)

Added #20



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