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Prince of Eckmühl -> Shattered Sword Website (8/11/2007 5:16:20 AM)

For anyone interested in the book's subject matter, check out the website:

http://www.shatteredswordbook.com/

PoE



hempy -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/12/2007 12:49:38 AM)

thank you for your info! I like it very much!!



Duck Doc -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/12/2007 7:40:36 PM)

I totally agree. I am just finishing Shattered Sword & it is the best WW2 Pacific Theater battle history I have ever read. It is a very thorough & detailed treatment of the Japanese dilemma at Midway & provides very good reasons why the Japanese experienced the lopsided defeat they had visited upon them. I learned more about carrier operations from this book than from all my other reading combined. The diagrams, maps & OOB's are painstakingly complete. I can't recommend the book highly enough. It is very innovative & most entertaining.



BlitzDude -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/13/2007 2:09:30 PM)

Thanks for the link. I finished the book a couple of weeks ago and thought it was excellent. It is, however, essentially the Japanese side of the story - but that's why I bought it. Among the interesting facts...the USN lost about 40% of its carrier strike force in it's attack, much of this due to ditching the planes as they ran out of fuel while attempting to return to the US carriers. The Japanese CAP was HIGHLY effective but limited ultimately in its ability to handle a (simultaneous) *multi-vector* attack as the CAP tended to "bunch up" and ended up in a lop-sided formation around the IJN carriers. The Akagi was sunk by only ONE direct hit. Another near-miss jammed its rudder. Yet another near-miss produced no effect. That was it...ONE hit. The book dishes out plenty of criticism at Yamamoto and the other Japanese leadership and doctrines. It praises the Japanese naval air forces except for their tendency to clump together in CAP. In the end though, there was a great deal of luck involved (as there is in any battle) and it was all of the bad variety for the IJN. Overall highly recommended.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/13/2007 5:09:44 PM)

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/13/2007 6:00:21 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: BlitzDude

Thanks for the link. I finished the book a couple of weeks ago and thought it was excellent. It is, however, essentially the Japanese side of the story - but that's why I bought it. Among the interesting facts...the USN lost about 40% of its carrier strike force in it's attack, much of this due to ditching the planes as they ran out of fuel while attempting to return to the US carriers. The Japanese CAP was HIGHLY effective but limited ultimately in its ability to handle a (simultaneous) *multi-vector* attack as the CAP tended to "bunch up" and ended up in a lop-sided formation around the IJN carriers. The Akagi was sunk by only ONE direct hit. Another near-miss jammed its rudder. Yet another near-miss produced no effect. That was it...ONE hit. The book dishes out plenty of criticism at Yamamoto and the other Japanese leadership and doctrines. It praises the Japanese naval air forces except for their tendency to clump together in CAP. In the end though, there was a great deal of luck involved (as there is in any battle) and it was all of the bad variety for the IJN. Overall highly recommended.


I came away from the reading with the impression that, from top to bottom, the IJN was saddled with operational and tactical doctrines that were overwhelmingly slanted in the direction of attack and that this pervaded every aspect of the battle. While certainly highly-skilled aviators, Japanese fighter pilots were undisciplined when committed to the defensive role. Examples in the battle can be found in the CAPs pirahna-like reaction to the presence of Jimmy-Thach, their tendency to clump together that you describe above. Another example of this lack of discipline occurred when the Hiryu's torpedo planes were abandoned by their escorts to attack U.S. bombers. In both cases, the behavior was associated with a feverish determination to attack and destroy, defensive duties being looked upon as inherently less effective (and less honorable). Certainly, when tasked with defensive duties, Japanese personnel would carry out their orders, but their training (and heart) really wasn't in it.

In concert with what was essentially an ethic of all-out attack was Kido Butai's doctrine of massive, deck-load strikes. This reliance on concentration to obliterate an enemy before the assailed could effectively respond was full of holes, the foremost of which was the formation's inability to defend against a large, multi-vector threat like that which it experienced at Midway. It's weaknesses were manifold, running the gambit from it's CAP, which were essentially "wild-boars" once they were launched, lacking even rudimentary radio contact with their ships, to their anti-aircraft doctrine, which could be best summarized as "every carrier for itself." One of the assertions that the authors make is that these weaknesses were so dramatic in their implications to the fate of the KB that the formation was essentially doomed as soon as the U.S. carrier strike(s) had cleared their decks. The vaunted collection of ships was just that vulnerable to that which was headed its way.

Finally, I found their depiction of Nagumo and his decision-making to be profound in the extent to which his actions were dictated by circumstance, of how he became aware of the presence of enemy carriers AFTER the U.S. strikes had already launched, of how his own strike aircraft were held below-decks because of the need to recover the Midway strike and the incessant cycling of a CAP that was inexorably trending toward disintegration. And again, it's culture expressed via doctrine that is the culprit. The authors posit that Nagumo withheld orders to immediately launch a strike against the U.S. carrier sighting because it would have meant attacking dispersed, willy-nilly, "American-style," if you will, and that he would not do. It would have been a violation of doctrine and, were it to fail, he would shoulder the blame rather than the system that had generated it. And that was too great a burden for any Japanese commander to bare.

I'd encourage anyone who's interested in the 1942 carrier battles to read Shattered Sword. Parts of it, particularly those which are open to interpretation, such as a figures motivation for doing this or that, can be argued up a storm. But it's certainly a breath of fresh air to read a book that was written by authors who bothered to seek the counsel of Japanese historians before generating their volume. It's great that someone has actually done their homework in documenting what occurred on the decks of the KB and why it was destroyed.

PoE





Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/13/2007 6:15:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?


Much of it is from eye-witness accounts produced by Japanese historians. Also, a lot of work has been devoted to flight-logs of the KB airgroups. The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



GoodGuy -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/22/2007 5:50:12 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl
The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)


Hi POE, you suggested that I should read Shatt.Sword a while ago, and I've read a lot of reviews and reader comments, and now I think ppl should read this interesting book, especially since the US Navy put it on their list of "must-read" works for their academy and their research facilities.
I have not read the book yet (delivery to Germany takes several weeks [8|]) but I've ordered it.
I do think, despite all the numbers and facts the authors collected, that this work has a few weak spots, though. Correct me if I'm wrong (since I've not read the book yet), but I got the following impressions after I did quite some research about the book:

Since the authors communicated with so many ppl around the globe (via email, hey this is the electronic age :p) many quotes/footnotes refer to emails only. Japanese experts/historians forwarded numbers/figures, blueprints etc., but original sources/works (given, most likely in japanese anyways) remain unknown/unmentioned, with some of these "evidences" coming across as hearsay, although these experts might be spot-on. In quite some cases, the authors never got their hands on original sources/material. Don't get me wrong, with their thorough research/communication, they collected a massive amount of facts, no doubt.

Still, all the details about hangar setups, loading processes, operating mode and construction design of AA's, fire control, doctrines, do not tell what the USN did right (besides having a good amount of luck), so I still tend to think that dedication and a few quick bold moves on the US side, and - in turn - some bad coordination and delayed decisions on the jap side were important factors at Midway, maybe a tick more important than the authors would accept.

They paint a picture where the IJN's assets and doctrines were ill-fated right from the start, with doctrines, procedures and even vessels/aircrafts having quite some weaknesses.
I for one do think that, in addition to these weaknesses, some officers within the KB were "just" incapable and/or they proposed/conducted half-assed operations.

Misconceptions during the planning phase (for Midway), poor planning (or bad luck, depending on your POV) regarding the collection of intel (i.e. operations of the seaplane base, which was supposed to track the movement of US carriers, were delayed), bad a/c coordination and double minded officers ... all of these factors have to be added to the facts stated in the book.

The US in turn did have one or another incapable high-ranking officer, even with subordinates demanding the removal, but dedication and finesse presented by some of the TG commanders partially made up for some dumb moves.

Also, I don't know if the authors factor in the sheer US advantage when it comes to industry/weaponry production. Even if IJN doctrines / procedures / weaponry would have been superior all along the way, the amount of weaponry the US could field after Midway was impressive and a tough nut to crack. Until Midway, US air assets for example, were not as successful/capable as one might think after reading Shattered Sword.
I think I'll stick to my theory (for now) that the IJN would have had a chance at Midway, if the operation would have been planned differently. Spreading the forces (by ordering the simultaneous attack on the Aleutians, which wasn't even conducted simultaneously [8|]) was one of the worst moves around.

Last but not least, it seems to be like KB here KB there in the book, although the term for the "combined fleet" (superior unit, I can't recall the japanese term atm) was the more important part within the japanese doctrine.
Gigantic surface ships played a vital role in that fleet and in their doctrine in general, since the IJN believed that these monstrous BBs were needed, although we know today that they bet on the wrong horse, so I would like to know how the authors treat that part of history.
(High numbers of) Carriers turned out to be one of the decisive factors during the war in the Pacific, with the USN's submarines accounting for 55% of all Japanese tonnage sunk in the war, maybe the most important branch if you look at what quickened Japans fall.

Unlike the fight for resources in Europe, namely the Allied doctrine to cut supply lines/resources of the Axis, which was only partially successful (because the Axis powers managed to rebuild/repair plants often), the raids on Japanese supply lines, conducted by a/c's, TGs and submarines, with the latter being the most succesful branch, were impressively successful.

I think reading a good book covering the US POV, along with reading Shattered Sword, would be the way to go, since Sh.-Sword delivers valuable insights, but it does not draw the whole picture.

My 2 cents.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/22/2007 6:50:06 PM)

... Gigantic surface ships played a vital role in that fleet and in their doctrine in general, since the IJN believed that these monstrous BBs were needed, although we know today that they bet on the wrong horse, so I would like to know how the authors treat that part of history ...

Re the History Channel: IJN BBs were to be used in a stand-off role, engaging enemy surface ships w/o having to close the range between them and the rest of their fleet. BBs are also handy for pre-invasion shore bombardments. We even used the Missourri in Korea and outfitted it w/cruise missles for DS.

I wouldn't say the IJN underestimated carrier power since they used it fairly effectively at Pearl Harbor; Japan just didn't have the resources to mass produce CVs.

Anyway, just got the word from the bookstore that my "Sword' is in; After I read it, maybe then I will become more knowledgable on this subject.



GoodGuy -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/22/2007 7:18:10 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Re the History Channel: IJN BBs were to be used in a stand-off role, engaging enemy surface ships w/o having to close the range between them and the rest of their fleet. BBs are also handy for pre-invasion shore bombardments. We even used the Missourri in Korea and outfitted it w/cruise missles for DS.

Some of the reasons for reactivating the US BBs after WW2: The US had to do something about the fact that they were facing a massive amount of Warsaw pact ships, so they tried to make up for the lack of tonnage/firepower after the war. Also, the US BBs were meant to act as deterrence mainly, especially for smaller states (sending a BB to the coast of {what we call} a "banana republic" used to impress foreign leaders, hehe), as their combat effectiveness was somewhat low during the cold war era, if compared to modern frigates or nuclear CVs.
Given, as u pointed out, they were somewhat useful for shore bombardments, but they did not gain any combat effectiveness before they had been equipped with missiles, keeping in mind that it takes like 2 anti-ship missiles only to strike a BB.

Btw, were u referring to "history channel" documentaries? If so, let me tell you that you should watch these with suspicion, hehe. They often shuffle around statements/numbers and mix up facts, research is often sloppy. I tend to refer to most of their docs as "junk food", especially if looking at some of their docs about the German "blitz" (full of errors and misinterpretations). There's nothing like a thoroughly researched BBC doc.

quote:

I wouldn't say the IJN underestimated carrier power since they used it fairly effectively at Pearl Harbor;
I didn't say they underestimated CVs. They just overrated the usefulness of their BBs, which is funny, since Japanese air assets sunk 2 British BBs right after the Pacific war started. They saw how vulnerable the British ships were, but still proceeded to speed up production of their own BBs.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/22/2007 11:25:25 PM)

Some History Channel shows are certainly better than others; I don't think they have a very big budget. We sometimes get BBC International, but it's usually a series of shows re their monarchy.

I think those Brit BBs were the Repulse and Prince of Whales; they were operating w/o any air cover, and suffered accordingly. Even the Japanese were surprised they were sunk so easilly.



GoodGuy -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/23/2007 3:03:10 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Some History Channel shows are certainly better than others; I don't think they have a very big budget. We sometimes get BBC International, but it's usually a series of shows re their monarchy.

We have a few channels which are either co-producing series with the BBC (ZDF/ARD) or obtaining the BBC productions about military history. Other formats (like Spiegel TV, a spin-off of the Spiegel magazine) dig for unknown material ("WW2 in color", KG Peiper - Ardennes) on their own and they produce their own doc's.

quote:

I think those Brit BBs were the Repulse and Prince of Whales; they were operating w/o any air cover, and suffered accordingly. Even the Japanese were surprised they were sunk so easilly.

Correct. They proved to be useless if without fighter cover. But, for the Japanese, even if using fighter cover, a higher number of IJN light/heavy cruisers and CVLs may have been the better choice, imho.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/23/2007 3:01:12 PM)

... Correct. They proved to be useless if without fighter cover. But, for the Japanese, even if using fighter cover, a higher number of IJN light/heavy cruisers and CVLs may have been the better choice, imho ...

A very fast task force; first the enemy has to find it, and if they do, the CVLs can put up CAP.

But my book is in, so I'm off.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (8/24/2007 1:32:24 AM)

Thank you for recommending this book and posting its Website: although I haven't even finished the first chapter, I have already learned about the Kido Butai (Mobile Group), its ships and commanders.

Unfortunately, I guess that after I finish Shattered Sword, I will never be able to watch the movie Midway the same way again; it was one of my favorite WW II naval flics.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (9/30/2007 10:55:10 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Does anyone know where the authors got their source material for this book?


Much of it is from eye-witness accounts produced by Japanese historians. Also, a lot of work has been devoted to flight-logs of the KB airgroups. The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)


Almost finished Shattered Sword and just read that sailors did manage to save the ship's log from Nagumo's flagship, Akagi. They had plently of time to do this; allthough all the IJN CVs eventually became burning hulks after they were hit, they didn't take on water and had to all be scuttled w/torpedoes.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?



wworld7 -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (10/1/2007 12:53:46 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?



Joe,

You are thinking like a Westerner, you have to try to undestand the "way" and "why" the people of Japan lived their lives and made their priorities the way they did. Some were choices we disagree with and some are just hard to understand from our point of view.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (10/1/2007 3:23:08 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

And if the Japanese had (more than) enough time to retrieve the Emperor's photo from each crippled carrier, why not all the ship logs as well?



Joe,

You are thinking like a Westerner, you have to try to undestand the "way" and "why" the people of Japan lived their lives and made their priorities the way they did. Some were choices we disagree with and some are just hard to understand from our point of view.


Have we had this discussion before? It sounds very familiar.

Anyway, they did save all the flights logs and the log of Nagumo's flagship. Nagumo and his staff were as steeped in IJN doctrine and Japanese culture as any of the other CV officers, and it's not like there was a choice between the Emperor's portrait or the logs.

And if any KB carrier officer had anything to conceal by letting his logs go to the bottom, it was Nagumo who, as commander, had the most (face) to lose.

Oriental or occidental, I still find this inexplicable.



wworld7 -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (10/1/2007 7:16:19 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


Have we had this discussion before? It sounds very familiar.

Oriental or occidental, I still find this inexplicable.



Joe, we have not had this conversation before.

I believe you find it inexplicable. I am at a loss as how to assist with this.



NawlinzVoodoo -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/2/2007 7:33:47 AM)

Read the 'Sword' book, then...go get the book called 'Midway Inquest'. Blows this book and all others out of the water. [;)] hehe. Seriously, this book is awesome, I promise you will love it!!! Was release in July of 2007!!!!

http://www.amazon.com/Midway-Inquest-Japanese-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253349044



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/2/2007 3:25:18 PM)

Did you read sword, cause Midway Inquest seems similar in that it goes back to IJ records?

The price of MI is certainly cheaper than Sword.



NawlinzVoodoo -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/3/2007 5:40:25 AM)

I did not read Sword, but I did read every other book on Midway. Yes, MI does take into fact, the IJN numbers and post-war information. Poor Nagumo, that was one unlucky SOB. [;)]



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/3/2007 3:25:25 PM)

Nagumo led the most successful raid in IJN history and still got chewed-out by Yamamotto because he didn't sink the US CVs; what was he supposed to do, wait at Pearl for them to return from Wake? The surprise was over by his 2nd air strike when the kido butai began losing aircraft that were needed for all the other IJN Ops to be set in motion once PH was neutralized!

Nagumo began his career as a torpedo officer and commanding a carrier group was apparently beyond his abilities, but IJ seniority was inflexible when it came to appointments, i.e., the next man in line, not the best man suited for the job at hand.



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/3/2007 6:00:16 PM)

I'm gonna get the book because of the subject matter, but I have to mention that the customer review at the bottom of the product page details information that was previously revealed in Shattered Sword. The "revelations" that I'm referring to are those associated with the technical challenges of arming IJN strike aircraft and the apparent truth that the Tone's #4 search-plane wouldn't have overflown U.S. ships even if it had launched on time. If in fact these are presented by the author as "breakthrough discoveries" on his part, then he's full-of-bull. We'll see. [;)]

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/3/2007 6:54:01 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: NawlinzVoodoo

I did not read Sword, but I did read every other book on Midway. Yes, MI does take into fact, the IJN numbers and post-war information. Poor Nagumo, that was one unlucky SOB. [;)]

Nagumo was really just a cog in the machine that was the Kido Butai. He was straight-jacketed by the finely-honed doctrine that had grown up with the legendary force. What's not always understood or appreciated in this regard is that it was created not only to deliver decisive blows against enemy naval forces, but that it was supposed to do so without significant loss of its own ships or aircrew. That was what the KB was all about.

That's what it trained for, and that's the way it behaved operationally. Everything had to be done, just-so. For example (as I've noted numerous times previously), the KB's carriers operated by division. Come strike time, one of the division's carriers would provide 18-21 dive-bombers, the other would provide 18-21 torpedo-bombers, and each would provide 6-9 fighters. The ships would launch together, the a/c would form-up and off they'd go, joining up with a/c from another carrier division if available.

I'd be errant if I didn't emphasize what I described in the paragraph above was not a "preferred mode of operation," rather it was a religion of sort to the officers of the KB, carved in stone, if you will. Japanese naval officers believed, perhaps justifiably, that this was the only method of attack that would allow them to deliver a knock-out blow while suffering minimal losses. They knew that a battle (or war) of attrition would see them at a steadily worsening material disadvantage, one that they couldn't win, so they weren't gonna play that game. No, it was gonna be all or nothing.

So, you've got this guy, Nagumo. He's in charge of a superb group of four carriers, the forte of which is air-raids against unprepared targets. Decisions well beyond his purview dictate that his force will be used in totally different role, to go on station and support an invasion of an island that's been heavily fortified during the preceding year. After he's neutralized the island's air-defenses, it's believed that the enemy fleet will emerge to do battle, and a second Tsushima will ensue, a battle of annihilation that was totally dependent on the doctrine that made it possible, one that Nagumo simply could not deviate from.

So long as Nagumo adhered to doctrine, he couldn't fail personally. If the battle were lost, it was because the doctrine was flawed, which of course it was, at least in the bastardized form that manifested itself with the Midway fiasco. If on the other hand, Nagumo had acted on his own, the failure and disgrace would have been on his head, something that was simply unthinkable to any admiral in the IJN. So, no, I don't see Nagumo as being unlucky, a sad sort of victim, perhaps, of his own culture and that of the IJN. And I suspect that his family was really sort of relieved when he was killed in the Marianas in 1944 and whatever tinge of dishonor that stained his reputation was finally expunged, his luck having finally improved.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/3/2007 11:19:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

... Nagumo was really just a cog in the machine that was the Kido Butai. He was straight-jacketed by the finely-honed doctrine that had grown up with the legendary force. What's not always understood or appreciated in this regard is that it was created not only to deliver decisive blows against enemy naval forces, but that it was supposed to do so without significant loss of its own ships or aircrew ...
PoE (aka ivanmoe)


That's because after spending millions of yen to convert and then refit IJ's hybrid CVs -- Akagi and Kaga -- it couldn't afford to lose them; there were no cost-effective replacements for these ships.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar, the latest AAA ,redundant fire and damage control systems, etc., is beyond my understanding.

What was the IJN thinking?



Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/4/2007 12:39:58 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar, the latest AAA ,redundant fire and damage control systems, etc., is beyond my understanding.

What was the IJN thinking?



Let me begin by noting that the items that you cite as being essential to the preservation of the KB are ones that would make its ships more survivable if successfully attacked. And let me add another "feature" to your list...decent radios for the CAP, channels over which they could be alerted to an enemy encroachment. As it was, ships sought to communicate the presence of hostile aircraft by firing their main batteries in the direction of the intruders and hoped that the CAP would get the message. I don't know about anyone else, but that strikes me as a little too "Nelsonian" for what was otherwise billed as a technologically advanced military, one which sought to challenge the largest navies of the age, those of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

Given its country's very limited industrial base, the IJN was forced to make critical decisions as to how and where to focus the precious resources at their disposal. If you break those items down into two categories, defensive and offensive, those that would make its ships more survivable as opposed to those that would make them more lethal, what you see is that they consistently erred on the side of the latter. This dovetailed nicely with cultural norms that placed great value on attack, as a virtue of sorts, and conversely, was rather more circumspect about devoting too much attention to what many viewed as essentially less honorable defensive duties.

The strategy of seeking a decisive engagement and executing an all-out-attack worked against the Russians in 1905. The Czar's navy was soundly defeated and there was essentially no navy left to carry on the fight. Without a doubt, this emboldened the IJN to believe that they could pull it off again if only they could find the proper weapon. The "sword," as it were, turned out to be the Kido Butai. And one of the great ironies attendant to WW2 is that Japan's "cleanest" victory, its attack on Pearl Harbor, failed to knock-out the USN and it's Pacific Fleet. In effect, the KB had failed at the first and most important task presented to the force during it's career against the USN.

Even after its post-Midway doctrinal reforms (circa 1943), evidence suggests that the IJN could never really bring itself to devote too much attention to defensive measures, and continued to seek a time and place to knock the USN out of the war with a decisive attack. In a very real sense, what all this indicates is that the Japanese never had a chance in hell of winning this war, short of an outright session by the U.S. of its interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Failing that, just about everything else that Japan did, militarily, was doomed to come up a day late, and a dollar short. It simply wasn't gonna happen for them, so long as the U.S. remained committed to prosecuting the war.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)





Gregor_SSG -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/4/2007 6:00:19 AM)

It's interesting to note that the Japanese Army suffered from the same problems. Retreat was an unword, and defense existed only as a purely tactical state which merely denoted any necessary and grudging pause between otherwise continuous offensive action. The Brits completely failed to understand this in Malaya, but worked out what to do in Burma, and used their new knowledge
to rout the Japanese.

Not helping the Japanese was the fact that their offensive doctrine was also very limited, and the only correct response to a failed attack was to repeat the same attack but with an increase in zeal (though probably with a decrease in personnel). The correct response to series of failed attacks was a banzai charge, which guaranteed a serious decrease in personnel, and rarely gained a victory.

Gregor




Prince of Eckmühl -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/4/2007 6:37:37 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gregor_SSG

It's interesting to note that the Japanese Army suffered from the same problems.



When I was composing my post(s) above, I kept thinking about the failure of the Japanese Army to develop an effective anti-tank weapon during WW2. Had they succeeded in doing so, many of the Allied amphibious landings in 1942-1945 could well have been compromised. Again, however, such a weapon would be used primarily in defense, so anti-tank guns and/or shoulder fired weapons simply didn't find their way into the procurement queue, at least not as a priority item.

PoE (aka ivanmoe)



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/4/2007 2:51:35 PM)

Since both Imperial services were effected, I would say their common denominator was the ancient Japanese warrior code of bushido.

Failure causes a warrior to lose face, unless he dies in the act of serving the emporer, which is always a personal honor despite the tactical outcome. In any event, he would have to peform harri karri/sepuko if he made it back alive w/a failed mission, which would not only dishonor him, but his entire family, even his dead ancestors. Perhaps the IJ commander felt he had nothing to lose at this point, so he rolled the dice and attacked, again and again.

Re IJN offensive/defensive doctrine: As IJN/kido butai commanders were reluctant to use their strike planes as scouts -- it decreased their offensive capability! -- I went in the CaW editor and decreased the training and admin settings of these planes to help simulate this doctrine.



Joe D. -> RE: Shattered Sword Website (11/4/2007 3:01:03 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl

quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

But not only was it unrealistic to assume that the kido butai was going to incessantly inflict damage and never catch hell itself, but to send them to sea w/o bothering to install radar ...


... As it was, ships sought to communicate the presence of hostile aircraft by firing their main batteries in the direction of the intruders and hoped that the CAP would get the message. I don't know about anyone else, but that strikes me as a little too "Nelsonian" for what was otherwise billed as a technologically advanced military ...

PoE (aka ivanmoe)


Reminds me of the incident -- was it in the Indian Ocean? -- where Brit bombers were attacking the Akagi and Nagumo wasn't aware of it until the water spouts from the bombs began splashing on his deck!

In a memo, an IJN officer suggested radar be installed. But if one of those Brit bombs had hit home, the IJN may have rethought air radar as the KB CVs were "priceless." Then Midway might have been a very different battle.



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