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MarkShot -> CAW/CCAW as a model naval operational warfare? (10/25/2007 12:42:19 AM)
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CAW/CCAW has been my first operational game of naval warfare. Prior to CAW/CCAW, I have owned more tactical games: AOD, SH1, SH2, SH3, SC, and DW.
After getting CAW/CCAW and looking for greater depth, I acquire Harpoon3 (version 3.8.0 and 3.6.3). Harpoon documentation and strategy guides do a fairly good job of talking about naval missions and combat considerations. But I still wasn't satisfied. So, I bought a professional book on operational naval combat.
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat by Capt. USN Wayne P. Hughes (retired)
http://www.amazon.com/Fleet-Tactics-Coastal-Combat-Hughes/dp/1557503923/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/105-3675089-9319628?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193262054&sr=8-1
This book is widely regarded as the definitive work concerning modern operational naval warfare.
This has given me chance to revisit CAW/CCAW and ask what should this game be modeling.
First, two key principles among others of naval warfare are made in this book:
(1) Strike effectively first.
(2) Ships should not fight forts
To discuss:
(1) Unlike in land warfare where defensive preparations (fortifications and defense in depth) can extract a very heavy toll on an attacker. Such does not really exist for blue water engagements. Thus, the attacker (who attacks first and effectively) has a much greater advantage than in land combat. CAW/CCAW: For the carriers, this game does model this fairly well.
(2) Land fortifications are almost invariably more robust than ships. Just a few hits can sink a ship, but hundreds of hits may be necessary to silence a fort. So, in brown water operations, the naval commander should rely on maneuver when faced with fixed fortfications or should seek with conjunction of other services like marines to outflank forts. The reality is that most naval struggles are focused upon events upon land. Thus, historically most engagements have been brown water. Brown water engagements often puts one side in the difficult position of defending a beachhead/supply line while the enemy fleet is only concerned with fleet elimination. Both the USN and IJN faced these issues as each marched across the Pacific and its islands. Only late in the war was the USN so powerful that it could go head to head with Japanese land based airfields. Despite this warning of forts. Land based bombers usually performed poorly against warships, but much better against merchant shipping. CAW/CCAW: The game does capture some of the dilemma brown water operations with the objective structure, but so much with risk and predictability of operations in combat.
Second, we have the some discrete models of naval combat for WWII:
(1) Battleships and big guns: Generally when the big ships faced off (in daylight), the ideal situation achieved through maneuver was capping the T. Meaning bringing all your firepower to bear against a limited amount of the enemy's. Effectively, the enemy's own ships blocked his ability to use all his guns. Unlike in land combat, naval warfare gains nothing by maintaining a reserve. Naval warfare emphasizes bringing maximum fire power to bear. Capping the T is somewhat analogous to land combats defeating an enemy in detail. CAW/CCAW: The game provides no opportunity for maneuver and change of formations.
(2) In the absence of capping the T, ships were formed into columns which would exchange fire at range. In this model, ships tended to degrade gradually under a number of hits. A battleship might be fully reduced in about 20 minutes of action. Small advantages in striking power or staying power or starting numbers could ultimately have a huge impact on the outcome. Effectively in this model of combat, there are cummulative affects (like compounding interest) that operate in a non-linear fashion. Later in the war, radar afforded the USN a significant operational and tactical advantage of the IJN of which the USN did not fully realize due to the newness of the technology. CAW/CCAW: Some of this appears to be capture in the basic surface combat model. However, mathematical testing of values and results would be needed to see if true naval operational model is represented. It is not clear radar modeling, plays any role in the game.
(3) There is also torpedo warfare which was precursor in some regards to airstrikes and missile strikes. This is where salvos are fired against the enemy (also known as pulse oriented warfare). The weapon involved is so lethal that only a few hits are needed to kill. Furthermore, the launching platform may potentially kill well in excess of its own weight and size of the enemy. The side that fires its torpedo salvo first (especially if the enemy is in columns for guns) and then rotates to minimize hull form for counter-fire of torpedos will devastate an enemy. Initially, a lot of these type of engagements took place at night with Japanese doing even better than mathematically predicted due to their "long lance" torpedos. Later the USN began to master these tactics when combined with the night vision of radar to close and strike unexpectedly. Such night attacks should never use guns, since they give away the presence of the attacker. CAW/CCAW: Simply not modeled.
(4) There is carrier airstrikes. Airstrikes were the precursor to today's ASM cruise missile warfare. This is also a form of pulse warfare. The carrier striking first had a tremendous advantage and it might only take a few hits to kill a target. Early on offense was clearly dominent and AA and CAP defenses provided little protection. Thus, a mininimal separation of carriers (20nm) made sense, since it still allowed for the massing of air wings, but greatly cut down on the chance of a single strike finding and taking out multiple carriers. However, later on in the war (for the USN), radar air raid detection and forming of CAPs, increased AA emplacements, radar fire control of AA, and radar proximity fuses made fleet defenses against air attacks much more potent. In the late war, the ratio of fighters to strike aircraft increased aboard USN carriers. Thus, later in the war, for the USN combining the defenses by massing carriers became practical and common. Of course, as the war dragged on, the IJN lacked the potent air strike power which they had once had. CAW/CCAW: The game clearly captures the early war years of the attacker's advantage and possibly dispersion of forces. It is not clear whether the game captures the late war years of superior air defenses and massing of carriers.
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Well, after so many learned discussions in this forum, I hope I have finally contributed something to theoretical discussion. Enjoy!
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