Ken Estes -> RE: Taming Expansion of IJ Production (1/17/2008 5:40:23 AM)
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Those remain very cogent points. In addition, apparently, Imperial Japan was in the same sort of financial trouble as the Third Reich because of poorly conceived autarky and even weaker industrial basis. The 1937 plan should have been the US 1940 Two-Ocean navy equivalent, but merely funded two oversize BBs and the two excellent Shokaku CVs and some escorts. By the time these neared completion in 1941, the US 1940 plan already threatened to swamp the entire extant and planned IJN: 11 BB, 6 CB, 18 CV, 27 CA/CL, 115 DD, 43SS added to construction already under way (130 combatants). However, the post 1940 IJN shipbuilding program became hopelessly confused and endlessly debated: improved Yamato class BB vs CVs, various CV classes, questions of escorts, plus finances-industrial capacity-economics plus replacing governments. While it is true that 5 more Taihos and 15 Unryus were conceived [planned is a stretch, it seems], exactly which ones had orders placed is not clear, even to Japanese scholars. The confusion as to what was to be built and what was ordered and with what resources apparently dogged JA for the entire war, thus yielding the less than potential some have noted above. The 1937 state budget was 3.694B yen, March 38 added another 5.270B of which 4.6B were for China War expenses alone; the Dec39 vote for FY40-441 was 5.822B with a 4.460 China Supplement = ~65% military portion of the entire state budget. At the same time, there was no solution to the 40% shortfall in merchant shipping, 92% shortfall in the synthetic oil program or the continuing dependence of Japan on the US for a portion of its high-octane aviation fuel. Refining and industrial expansion programs also failed to reach the goals set in 1937 onward. Capitalization remained flat. In short, any rational thinker would have opted against war vs. the West. The rest can be chalked up to wierdness of psychologies of Emperor worship and militarism, leading to the [for us in the west] bizarre notion that Japan was forced to go to war because its independence [=freedom to subjugate China, etc.] was directly threatened. The teaching of this notion has apparently continued to the present day in JA public schools. [Haruo Tohmatsu and HP Willmott, A Gathering Darkness (NY: SR Books, 2004)] What is to be done? I suspect the current design team has it right, given the apparently endless alternatives one can imagine for both Allied and JA production. For example, additional USN CV losses after 1942 could have accellerated CVL and CV production, or all six Alaskas could have been advanced in place of Baltimores, etc. to match a player whimsy. Nothing is wrong or particularly unhistorical about putting options into the game, but the player must be placed into the historical position of chosing priorities and being stuck with them for some amount of time, not being able to produce other things. For instance, the DE vs. LST production woes of the USN are not well known but relate in part to the valve gap: the designs used much of the same piping and valve production available in the US. quote:
ORIGINAL: JWE quote:
ORIGINAL: blam0 Also, I have to wonder (showing my ignorance of such things) if it was indeed possible for the US to increase production further in a meaningful way (20% or more), and how long it would have taken to ramp up. Bearing in mind that I'm no Allied production expert, then does No one understands Production. Not even today. In a wartime “planned” environment, changes are not conducive to job security. Everybody “knows” the allies could have built a billion tons of whatever their favorite vessel was; but consider some realistic factoids. After Midway, the Japanese were frantic to increase their carrier fleet, and planned for 15 Hiryu (Soryu) types to make up the difference. When all was said & done, they got 4 launched and into limited commission by 1945. As for the Allies, it takes a while to make the political decision to substitute “this” for “that”. Then, it takes a while to propagate the specs for “this” down to the builders. Then, it takes a while to exhaust the existing “thats” from the line and tool up for “this”. Nothing happens in a heartbeat. It takes maybe a year (likely 2 years) to do a big shift in production emphasis.
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