Resource Centers

Resource Centers (Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> The War Room

Message

VSWG -> Resource Centers (1/19/2008 6:37:45 PM)
Did the Allies ever bomb something that is represented by resource centers in the game (in PTO? In ETO?)? I know about the raids on Sumatra's oil industry, but that's represented by oil centers. If they didn't bomb "resource centers", why not? Only because it was inefficient (less important than oil), or because they didn't want to destroy the economies the involved countries? Should resource centers be harder to destroy, because they represent industry that is more dispersed (=rice paddies, mines, timber industry,...) than HI (=factories)?

treespider -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 7:32:00 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG Did the Allies ever bomb something that is represented by resource centers in the game (in PTO? In ETO?)? I know about the raids on Sumatra's oil industry, but that's represented by oil centers. If they didn't bomb "resource centers", why not? Only because it was inefficient (less important than oil), or because they didn't want to destroy the economies the involved countries? Should resource centers be harder to destroy, because they represent industry that is more dispersed (=rice paddies, mines, timber industry,...) than HI (=factories)? YES - they did... According to the USSBS - the phosphate rock mining facilities on Nauru and the Celebes nickel concentration were successfully put out of action in 1943...although it doesn't say how they were "put out of action"

timtom -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 8:40:34 PM)
The RNZAF bombed some of the little truck gardens kept by isolated Japanese troops round the South Pacific [:)]

Feinder -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 8:54:37 PM)
Don't forget that the"resource centers" exist because a great deal of lattitude was taken in trying to create something that remotely resembled a historical strategic resource. "Remotely" being the qualifying word however. Their relative size and contribution are again, really nothing more than WAGs. But yes, the Allies did bomb more than just oil refineries in the SRA. -F-

VSWG -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 9:05:59 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: treespider YES - they did... According to the USSBS - the phosphate rock mining facilities on Nauru and the Celebes nickel concentration were successfully put out of action in 1943...although it doesn't say how they were "put out of action" Thanks, Feinder and treespider! Do you have some links? I found only this in the USSBS: "Prior to the occupation of the Marianas, B-29s could have been more effectively used in coordination with submarines for search, low-level attacks and mining in accelerating the destruction of Japanese shipping, or in destroying oil and metal plants in the southern areas, than in striking the Japanese "Inner Zone" from China bases." http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)]

VSWG -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 9:07:13 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: timtom The RNZAF bombed some of the little truck gardens kept by isolated Japanese troops round the South Pacific [:)] They bombed... a shrubbery?! [&:]

witpqs -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 11:08:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] Authoritatively settles many of those WITP forum arguments!

wdolson -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 11:43:26 PM)
I could see the combat report now: Boston Maru obliterated 20 hits from single B-29 attack. If nothing else something that large swooping down on you would be terrifying. Bill

treespider -> RE: Resource Centers (1/19/2008 11:57:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG quote: ORIGINAL: treespider YES - they did... According to the USSBS - the phosphate rock mining facilities on Nauru and the Celebes nickel concentration were successfully put out of action in 1943...although it doesn't say how they were "put out of action" Thanks, Feinder and treespider! Do you have some links? I found only this in the USSBS: "Prior to the occupation of the Marianas, B-29s could have been more effectively used in coordination with submarines for search, low-level attacks and mining in accelerating the destruction of Japanese shipping, or in destroying oil and metal plants in the southern areas, than in striking the Japanese "Inner Zone" from China bases." http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] I have a hard copy of Report #53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Japanese War Economy. On page 37 it has one sentence in reference to the above info. In Report #36 Coals and Metals in Japan's War Economy there is an annex on pages 50-58 devoted to the OMUTA Industrial Complex including the Miike Colliery detailing the effects of bombing on the mine and processing plant. For example average daily production at the colliery itself fell from 9640 tons a day prior to June 18 to 7,222 tons a day afterward.

wwengr -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 1:57:43 AM)
A couple of observations: Bombing of resource centers doesn't necessarily mean bombing resource itself. A resource center can be taken out, by bombing its infrastructure. In 1943, the Allies bombed the Japanese airfield on Nauru, putting it out of service. This prevented the Japanese from shipping food to the Island, so they shipped all 1200 of the Islands residents away. No more phosphate harvested... Taking out the elevator structure of a coal mine puts the mine out action. It is an interesting conclusion that the Allies should have used the B-29's for low level attacks. Initially, the B-29's were sent to China to Bomb Japan from there. They had serious problems with engines overheating and catching fire. When Lemay took over and ran the low level fire bombing raids from China, the B-29 losses from engine fires were extreme. Ultimately, the US Army withdrew the B-29's from China until they could solve the engine problem. I can not imagine how they would have fared better doing low level attacks elsewhere. PS Engine cooling worked better at higher altitudes where they burned less fuel

rtrapasso -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 1:59:30 AM)
quote: I can not imagine how they would have fared better doing low level attacks elsewhere. Probably because they didn't have nearly as far to go from the Marianas as from China, esp. after losing their bases in Eastern China.

wwengr -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 2:07:18 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso quote: I can not imagine how they would have fared better doing low level attacks elsewhere. Probably because they didn't have nearly as far to go from the Marianas as from China, esp. after losing their bases in Eastern China. That probably is the case. The report was very interesting. I think the conclusion was probably simply based on how ineffective the entire B-29's in China experience was. I think they would have been more effective in any role. The engine overheating was probably exacerbated by the extremely heavy bomb and fuel loads the planes had to carry. After reading the report, I wondered if there wasn't some politics involved in the conclusions also. There were many in the defense establishement that did not like Lemay's strategic bombing.

Helpless -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 2:29:36 AM)
Reposting my post in AE forum: quote: The problem IMHO that there is way too easy to destroy RCs in WITP and it takes way too long and expensive to repair them. Yes, they are not just plain plantation, mines, etc in stock. They do produce supplies, so there is production inside it. Now in AE they got separated. So, probably it makes sence to make much more difficult to destroy RC and much more easier to repair them. This would create more historical situation when transportation was primary target for attacks - ports, AF, convoys, etc. Also, in RL major part of resources were much more scattered to be an easy target for startegic bombing. Now in WITP single raid can bring down quite significant part of large RC. And it takes 1000supplies x dmg points and 1-3x dmg points x days to repair them. Broken elevator sounds serious, but would it take months to get it back in the place like Hanoi [;)]... may be.. [:)] .. But at the same time it takes just days to get large AF or port with tons of equipment back to life...

treespider -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 2:52:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Helpless Reposting my post in AE forum: quote: The problem IMHO that there is way too easy to destroy RCs in WITP and it takes way too long and expensive to repair them. Yes, they are not just plain plantation, mines, etc in stock. They do produce supplies, so there is production inside it. Now in AE they got separated. So, probably it makes sence to make much more difficult to destroy RC and much more easier to repair them. This would create more historical situation when transportation was primary target for attacks - ports, AF, convoys, etc. Also, in RL major part of resources were much more scattered to be an easy target for startegic bombing. Now in WITP single raid can bring down quite significant part of large RC. And it takes 1000supplies x dmg points and 1-3x dmg points x days to repair them. Broken elevator sounds serious, but would it take months to get it back in the place like Hanoi [;)]... may be.. [:)] .. But at the same time it takes just days to get large AF or port with tons of equipment back to life... See my post earlier in this thread where I provide info on a Japanese Coal mines operations being impacted by bombing....to the tune of 2000 metric tons per day.

witpqs -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 8:59:41 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: wdolson I could see the combat report now: Boston Maru obliterated 20 hits from single B-29 attack. If nothing else something that large swooping down on you would be terrifying. Bill Yah but if it was a B19 it would have also had 37mm cannon! [:D]

okami -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 11:27:30 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] The report only states that it would have been more effective had they. It did not say that these low level attacks were made.

VSWG -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 1:32:00 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: okami quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] The report only states that it would have been more effective had they. It did not say that these low level attacks were made. Yes, but it implies that low-level attacks could have been made, which is more than many people on this forum want to admit. [;)]

wwengr -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 2:57:13 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG quote: ORIGINAL: okami quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] The report only states that it would have been more effective had they. It did not say that these low level attacks were made. Yes, but it implies that low-level attacks could have been made, which is more than many people on this forum want to admit. [;)] Herein lays the problem.... The B-29 was designed as a high altitude, long range bomber. The operative paradigm was that the B-29 was the answer to the need to reach out and bomb Japan. It was specifically assigned only to the China/Pacific Theaters as an answer to this problem. Hap Arnold rescued the project from the scrap heap, for this specific need and ultimately control was given to Curtis LeMay, who was undeterred from his belief in Strategic Bombing from commanding the 305 BG in England all the way through his life. He was the one that said that we should "...bomb them back to the Stone Age" to end the Vietnam War. It took 20/20 hindsight with expert analysis in 1946 to conclude that it would have been more effective in other roles. Those that argue for historical accuracy would say that employment of the B-29's in Strategic Bombing show be as strong, if not stronger rule than using historical submarine doctrine. Other examples: We generally accept house rules limiting the employment of PT boats, becuase they inflict extreme damage when employed aggressively in large groups. A large group of MTB's attacking large surface vessels held the potential to inflict much damage. Historically, they were employed very timidly to the extent that service in MTB squadrons was rather safe and uneventful. This wasn't becuase MTB's weren't lethal, but rather 5 in shells were quite lethal to PT's and the early war experience of failed torpedos colored the doctrine for the remainder of the war. Japanese subs attacked warships because they perceived them as the real threat and did not appreciate the role of freighters and tankers. The exact opposite drove Allied sub doctrine. Numerous other examples exist. The answer to whether or not we can do it is different than whether or not we should do it. For that, you just have to examine why we play the game and make your own decision.

wdolson -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 3:04:14 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#hindsigh BTW, I like the part about B-29s on "low level attacks" against ships. [;)] quote: ORIGINAL: okami The report only states that it would have been more effective had they. It did not say that these low level attacks were made. The 20th AF was commanded by strategic bombing people, many from the 8th AF. The strategic bombing people screamed bloody murder at the idea of using their bombers for tactical missions. Even though the few times the 8th were used for tactical missions, such as to aid in the breakout from Normandy in the opening phases of Cobra, they were probably more effective than when they were trying to hit individual factories. The Germans bombed just before the Cobra breakout were so dazed and many of their tanks were flipped on their backs from near misses that they were inneffective. B-29s could have been used against shipping, but politically it wasn't going to happen. The game does a poor job of modeling the rivalries between services and between commands. Political points are a rough approximation, but it doesn't get the feel for how intense some of these fights were. Bill

VSWG -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 3:06:09 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: wwengr The answer to whether or not we can do it is different than whether or not we should do it. For that, you just have to examine why we play the game and make your own decision. Exactly. I will never use B-29s on naval attack in this game, because it just wouldn't "feel right".

wwengr -> RE: Resource Centers (1/20/2008 4:21:22 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: VSWG quote: ORIGINAL: wwengr The answer to whether or not we can do it is different than whether or not we should do it. For that, you just have to examine why we play the game and make your own decision. Exactly. I will never use B-29s on naval attack in this game, because it just wouldn't "feel right". Great discussion! The report was a very interesting read!

Q-Ball -> RE: Resource Centers (2/4/2008 8:23:03 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: wwengr Japanese subs attacked warships because they perceived them as the real threat and did not appreciate the role of freighters and tankers. The exact opposite drove Allied sub doctrine. Interesting comments, though I beleive this particular statement is a myth. It is not that the Japanese didn't understand the value of merchant fleets; on the contrary, as an Island Nation, they completely understood that value. The reason for the IJN sub doctrine is that commiting to a strategy of attrition, like sinking merchants, would be committing to what the IJN knew to be a losing strategy. This drove many IJN decisions that in hindsight look bad precisely because they were stuck fighting a battle of attrition. But, IJN planners absolutely knew that fighting an attrition war against the United States was suicide. IJN planners knew that the United States had two coasts, not just one, and was much more self-sufficient than Japan in raw materials. Attacking the merchant fleet would have had little effect, per IJN planning. Thus, the proper doctrine is to attack warships, to attrite the US Navy on it's voyage Westward, and utlimately defeat it in weakened state in one big battle. Or so the theory. That doesn't excuse the IJN's neglect of ASW, which was clearly a negligent oversight. You could also say this lack of long-range planning effected Naval Pilot training. In a war of attrition, a gross oversight, but the IJN knew it could not win a protracted war. USN Sub doctrine, and Allied sub doctrine in general, was more shaped by the experience of Britain in World War I, were commerce raiding nearly brought UK to her knees. Even so, USN were late converts to commerce raiding in general. They benefited from UK concentration on ASW, which is understandable given their experience in WW I.

Page: [1]

Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

1.203857