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OG_Gleep -> Lunga (4/20/2008 1:43:38 AM)
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Didn't want to interrupt the verbal sparring in the other thread..this was my original question:
quote:
Something I always wondered that maybe those of you who have read the Japanese accounts of things; why did the Japanese send their strategic reserve in with absolutley no cover at all. Those troops would have probably been enough to tip the balance at Henderson field. The marines were hanging on by their fingernails.
If I am not mistaken they had the resources, even if they had withdrawn their carriers. Never understood that given how important the security of the convoy was strategically speaking.
And Tocaffs response:
quote:
The Japanese were slow to realize the importance of the Solomon area and then sent forces there slowly at first. They underestimated the US resolve and desires and when they finally did wake up it was to late.
The Japanese planes weren't capable of carrying a heavy enough bomb load to knock out Henderson and the Tokyo Express wasn't a sustainable method. As long as the US had an operational airfield on Guadalcanal the IJN wasn't capable of running (safely) a convoy of slow moving transports there with the needed men and supplies to oust the Marines. Fast transports don't carry enough of anything to support an operation on the scale needed.
Historically the Japanese attacks on the Marines were undermanned and under supplied and yet they almost knocked the Marines for a loop. Maybe the Japanese should've shown a bit more patience and built up the men and supplies more before launching attacks.
The decision to commit 10,000 men to an island battle for the Japanese couldn't have been a light decision. They had a hell of a time supplying the men that were on Lunga. The Japanese were painfully aware of the fact that every pair of boots on the beach had a mouth that needed to be fed. So to commit their reserves (this is what they were correct?), and the nessisary supplies to sustain the current troops and not protect them always bothered me.
I did some searching but couldn't find out what was the thinking behind this process. They lost some 8,000 of the 10,000 while in transit and landing.
The night ambush by a US surface TF had something to do with it I am sure, but they had to have known that when attempts to bombard the Airfield had failed and it was still operational, landing within spitting distance of a functional US airfield would be suicide without proper support.
The convoy was hit in transit, and while the convoy was unloading...in broad daylight.
Anyhow, like I said, always bugged me.
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