wosung -> RE: Norway (5/5/2008 2:26:20 PM)
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In retrospective, based on historical hindsight, the German occupation of Norway may seem a bit strange. Plus, the German attack on Norway was a prominent case of Initiating a War of Aggression during the Nuremberg Trials. Its surviving main actors (esp. Raeder) tended to belittle or falsify their role and to make up misleading arguments (Altmark case, British plans). These lies were perpetuated in the vast amount of German post-war historical memoir writing. It was foremost the Kriegsmarine (KM), which was interested in the occupation of Norway: KM wanted Norwegian Naval bases for a war against Britain’s maritime commerce. This was discussed the first time in a KM Kriegsspiel in Feb. 1939. Surprisingly, until then the KM just didn’t do any explicit operational planning for a war against Britain. Anyway the Feb 1939 Kriegsspiel was based on Hitler’s statement, that he didn’t need KM war-ready before 1943. KM knew it would need naval bases war against Britain’s maritime commerce, not to repeat being trapped in the Deutsche Bucht like in WW1. But for such bases KM preferred the French Atlantic coast to Norway for obvious strategic reasons. On the other side before the Frankreich Feldzug in 1940 it remained totally unclear, wether the french Atlantic coast could be occupied. Thus, for KM the attractivity of Norway rose: With Norwegian bases it seemed possible to enhance KM’s importance in inter-service-rivalries. Some KM planners pushed their case, by adding popular economical-ethnical “arguments” about extending the Lebensraum northwards to incorporate nordic people and to secure swedish ore. The Swedish ore also played a role in a study of OKW’s economical staff (Apr.39): In case of a common European war between 3,2 and 8,5 mio ts of Swedish ore would be lost for the expansion of the German Army. It was also clear that transports from the North Norwegian ore harbors could not be secured. (Narvik alone handled 4,9 from 9,0 Mio ts of yearly prewar Swedish exports to Germany. Therefore German representatives in Sweden lobbied for an modernization of Swedish infrastructure to make this connection more secure) Thus KM planners fully acknowlegded, that in case of war economically, Norwegian neutrality would be the best option. But quite symptomatically, KM insisted on the bigger importance of the Naval base argument. As for the fear of a British intervention in Norway. KM propagated it big style - to get Norwegian naval bases. In Jan 1940 it started to plan the occupation of Norway in detail. After the Cossack/Altmark incident Hitler ordered the preperation of Weserübung in case of a British/French intervention, using all the arguments KM had prepared. Luftwaffe and Heer were quite not happy about this distraction from the planned campaign in France, which was estimated to be the real hard campaign of this war. After the Finnish-Russian peace treaty even KM and Raeder didn’t believe anymore in a French/British intervention in Norway. But KM forces were prepared and thus unavailable for other glorious operations. Hitler himself was looking for arguments to give the order for the Invasion of Norway. Thus Raeder acted like a spin-doctor and just pushed him over the edge using all the well known arguments. Until 1943/44 the Nazis undertook some efforts to transform Drontheim into a huge naval base, which would be connected by Autobahn with the Reich. As for the Swedish iron ore: Because of the German occupation of Norway, the Nazis could apply even more pressure on Sweden, to export huge ammounts of ore. Germany enforced a “Swedish Neutralty”: Swedens economical policy now was partly decided in Berlin. Swedish mine workers were exepted from Swedish military service. In 1943/44 for Sweden it became save to change all this and to reduce and finally stop the ore exports to Germany. This was also the time of Speers armament miracle in Germany. Because of this, it was even stated that German armament was far less dependent on Swedish ore, than the Germans themselves had thought before. Sources: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol.2, pp. 189-202. Gerhrd Weinberg, A world in Arms, pp.130-139. (Germ. ed.) Regards
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