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mdiehl -> RE: Was an invasion of India ever really possible? (7/18/2008 1:00:40 AM)
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Part 1 The Japanese could have invaded India:
They could have pursed the Commonwealth / Chinese forces across the border in a continuation of their live off the land / shoestring powered offensive. Allied forces would continue to collapse in front of the Japanese “Supermen”, even as the same invading army would significantly erode, as the Japanese Army continues its advance. The British were so of balance I do not believe they could have offered significant resistance at that time.
That is not correct. By the time Japanese forces had consolidated their positions in Rangoon, British resistence and Chinese resistence along the upper Irrawaddy had significantly improved, forcing the Japanese to attempt to dig in for a long campaign. Logistically overextended, Japan's attempt to sustain a campaign forced their effort to attempt to construct a Burma railroad. Vulnerable to air attacks, the never-completed railroad became a quagmire of death, sponging up ALL of Japanese logistical capability beyond the Malay peninsula into the Indian Ocean, and effectively terminating prospects for an invasion in Ceylon or India. Even in the event, the Japanese offensive by land towards India stalled, owing to a combination of effective allied resistence and the complete absence of the means (logistically) to continue forward.
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The Japanese Empire being a zero sum game – therefore something else is not done / supported. This means the cancellation of operations in southern and central pacific, and release of army reserves from Manchuria / Japan.
The release of significant army reserved from Manchuria or Japan would have imposed an even greater logistical burden on Japan than the effort to sustain the (small by comparison) armies already committed to the effort to bring the overland fight into India through Burma. Moving armies out of (relatively well supplied positions) in Manchuria, or very well supplied positions in Japan, would have resulted in significantly greater attrition rates in Burma without increasing Japanese power projection in the Indian Ocean.
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The UK government would have demanded a diversion / offensive be conducted ASAP by the USN in the Pacific to divert the Japanese, at the same time requesting that the USS Wasp and USS Washington remain in European waters.
No. The UK government would likely have welcomed any Japanese effort to field a larger army in Burma, because more Japanese would have died through malaria and malnutrition and at a greater proportional loss rate among the fielded Japanese army than Japan was currently losing. Almost certainly, attrition on the Japanese merchant fleet would also have increased, not only through submarine activity but also through the inability to keep up with normal maintenenance on engines and so forth. The relief that this massive diversion of Japanese assets would have brough to the United Kingdom would have allowed the western Allies to more rapidly develop bases and logistical centers in Australia and, likely, owing to inability to sustain Japanese Units in New Ireland, in Rabaul. The Japanese position at Truk would have been hopelessly undermined by an effort to Invade India, and the IJN's ability to react to anything would have been hopelessly compromised by the need to attempt to sustain six fleet CVs to protect operations in the Indian Ocean.
And having attempted to get ashore in India, Japan's army would have discovered even worse supply situations, coupled with a complete lack of mobility for their army ashore.
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The Royal Navy would have dispatched the A team to the Indian Ocean – The KGV / Nelson class battleships, newer cruisers and majority of their aircraft carriers.
No. The Royal Navy would not be needed in the Indian Ocean. It would continue to operate in the Atlantic in the arena of greatest threat, and in the Mediterranean to sustain positions there. The only units likely to be withdrawn from western operations would have been RN submarines, and these would likely have seriously compromised Japanese efforts to sustain carrier operations for the duration required to secure a foothold in India or Ceylon.
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It most likely resulted in the withdrawal of significant forces from the Middle East to hurriedly reinforce the “Indian Front”.
Doubtful at best. First, the RN would for the same reasons as Japan not have attempted in 1942-43 to sustain large troop transfers from the Middle East to India: lengthy supply lines. Secondly, the UK's ability to mobilize indiginous armies in India was greater than Japan's ability to project power in India. A sustained Japanese effort in India would have required only a small, modest UK force, and the Japanese would have been stuck to the most effective military "tar baby" in history.
Bear in mind, Japan could not subdue China, despite that nation's almost complete lack of a professional military, and despite that nation's near complete lack of large western Allied units, even though Japan already controlled much of China, even though Japan had air superiority in the theater, and with very very short Japanese logistical lines (as compared with what they would have had to sustain in the Indian Ocean).
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This could have resulted in the defeat of UK in North Africa. – Remember there will be less troops to stop Rommel. A president is the British failure to finish off the Italians in Libya in 1940 / 1941 instead to take Ethiopia / Somaliland and the to reinforce Greece.
No, it could not. The Axis were doomed to lose in North Africa the instant the Axis failed to fully commit to the seizure of Malta. That campaign was substantially decided before the Japanese entered the war. Axis logistics in Africa, best described as a shoestring, was barely able to sustain Axis forces for the defense of Libya as a consequence.
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The loss of Australian and New Zealand Aircrew would have impeded the success in the Battle of the Atlantic – Bomber Command would have continued its futile offensive at Costal Commands expense.
There would have been no diversion of assets from the Battle of the Atlantic. The only significant strategic threat to the United Kingdom, once the United States entered the war, were the German submarines.
The unasked question:
How would this effect the United States? Most likely, the USAFFE would have held out in the Philippines, ultimately defeating Japanese forces deployed to end the campaign there, as Japanese shipping and naval assets would be diverted to the Indian Ocean. Growing losses in the Japanese twin-engined bomber fleet as these attempted to suppress, without fighter support, RAF units in India, would have reduced Japanese ability to conduct basic recon missions in the central pacific. The consequent relief of USAFFE in November 1942 would have resulted in the restoration of civilian morale in the Malay barrier, and uprisings against the occupation regime would have required ever increasing garrisons to maintain production and protection in the Indonesian oil and rubber fields. Loss of Philippine rice supplies would have initiated malnutrition in the Japanese Home Islands by early 1943. These, by mid 1943, would have been disasterously escalated when US land based aircraft wholly sever Japanese supply lines between Malaya and Japan. By 1944, bereft of oil, food, and rubber, the Japanese war machine everywhere would have imploded as waves of starvation and disease reduced distantly deployed Japanese armies to small fractions of their original strength. Of the 100,000 IJA soldiers directed at an invasion of India, fewer than 1000 would live to see the sun rise on 1 January 1945, which would be the date of Japan's surrender.
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