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xj900uk -> RE: Any tips for a noob (10/24/2008 1:52:53 PM)
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However it is worth noting that even by early '43 the IJN were definitely feeling the pinch, and most of the best/most experienced pilots were already dead and the replacements coming through were not up to much.
This was probably the most serious problem facing their air-arm (although I grant you there were others!), lack of pilots and in particular lack of trained pilots. As they were running out of good pilots, the IJN in their great wisdom decided to dispense with their original idea of both basic and advanced training being conducted gradually well away from the front by instead cutting back on basic training to max 100 hours and then sending the fledgling pilots to the front line squadrons to complete their advanced training including gunnery and air combat tactics 'at the front'. Most of them didn't have a clue and the USN/USM shot them down in droves. And this is for a force that was already being bled white in combat! It is worth noting that, horrified by the losses and the fact that the half-trained pilot's life expencancy could literally be measured in minutes in combat, the IJN lobbied hard to go back to the old pre-war system (which they did adopt in late '44, by which time they no longer had a carrier arm anyway nor any aviation fuel to spend on any kind of training)
One could also argue quite convincingly that what really finished off the cream of good pre-war pilots was the Solomons campaign in particular around Lunga/Guadacanal. Both sides took horrendous losses (ships, men and planes) but the US could replace its losses (admittedly with difficulty), the IJN could not. In fact with hindsight it was a tremendous mistake by Yamamoto to strip the CAG's of their remaining pilots and send them to reinforce Rabaul and Bouganville for operations in the Solomons in late 42/early 43, they accomplished little and loss horrendously, thus reducing the cadre of surviving good/experienced pilots to pass on some of hte advice, ideas and tactis to the green pilots that were now turning up with depressing regularity at hte front-line squadrons. You could say even that getting involved in Guadacanal itself was a mistake on the part of the IJN as they got drawn into a war of attrition they could not afford - Yamamoto knew htis and still allowed it to happen, so one must adjudge that his decision over this was faulty.
Thus by early '43 there were loads of green inexperienced pilots already at the front-line squadrons, most having flown little over 100 hours operationally (their US equivalents on the other hand would have flown at least 300 hours before they got to the front-line squadrons, including a good amount of ACT and gunnery) and no advanced combat training, and very few remaining experienced pilots with the know-how and time to pass on their knowledge to the green horns.
By the time of Leyte Gulf this had reached quite ridiculous proportions, with some of the IJN proto-pilots lacking the experience or know-how to even land back on the carriers they were taking off from (IMHO one of the hardest things a pilot would ever have to do, regardless of his training/experience)
BTW I do agree with you that the IJN player has a chance to win in 1942 through his battlefleet and pressing on to take PM, some stuff on the Australian mainland, and most importantly Numeua by 31.12.42. If he hasn't won by the time the first Corsairs start to appear in Feb '43 (and the Hellcats in the Summer of '43), let's face it he's lost.
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