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mdiehl -> RE: Air combat testing (9/30/2008 5:35:13 PM)
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Look, I agree it is a game. At the same time it's a Historical Consim. That means it needs to have central tendencies that are historically quite plausible. To the degree they're not, it remains a game, but less a consim and certainly less historical.
On 7 Dec 1941. The Japanese had a fantastic initial operational plan, well pre-positioned assets and logistics, and kept a high operational tempo. The Allies had an operational plan that involved two years of preparation before it could be ready to defend against a Japanese attack. As a consequence, the Allies had weak assets that were poorly prepositioned and at the far end of a logistical pipeline that could not be sustained. It could not be sustained because the Japanese plan pinched off the pipeline in many places faster than the Allies could react. Much like the German invasion of France in 1940, or of Russia in 1941.
There's no doubt that the Japanese had well trained pilots and *some* good tactical assets (and many absolutely miserably bad tactical assets). But the mantra that every Japanese combat unit was proportionally better at its job than every allied unit, at least through May 1942, is simply incorrect. People who've read ALOT about air combat and naval combat in the PTO, know damned well that from Dec 1941 through the end of 1942, "pilot experience" and "ship crew experience" had far less to do in determining the outcome of battles than did operational plans, logistics, fatigue, logistics, massive firepower, logistics, logistics, logistics, just plain rugged construction, and logistics.
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