RE: General Douglas MacArthur

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Wirraway_Ace -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/27/2008 11:20:30 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK I mostly agree with your comments, BUT[:D] The japanese pushed to Manila just as fast as they got to Singapore, relativly speaking. The ability to move the Phillipines Army into a remote area such as the Bataan Peninsula wasnt available to the British. The japanese pushed to the head of the Bataan peninsula in abot a week from the Lingayen Gulf landings. In Korea, DD beat the Nth Koreans, after a near run thing, but was comprehensivly thrashed by the Chinese which saw him "panic" and seek a nuclear solution. Jeff, my thoughts: MacArthur had no intention of defending Manila--the Philippean statesmen in him was already thinking post-war. Mac was also about the only one in the U.S. Military who was trying to hold any part of the Philippeans. The Brits definitely were trying to hold Singapore, yet they were essentially bluffed into surrendering. Mac's soldiers, even in his absence, fought to the limit of their ability. "Comprehensively thrashed by the Chinese"? I realize these are subjective terms, but there wasn't anything particularily comprehensive about the Chinese victories. MacArthur was thoroughly surprised by their intervention (his arrogance getting in the way of some clear indications) and his widely dispersed forces thrownback with significant losses in personnel and equipment, but it is pretty clear the VIII Army wasn't comprehensively beaten. A nuclear solution was a key componant of U.S. Army doctrine in the 50s and doesn't strike me as entirely irrational if you are faced with fighting China in a land war in Asia. That the VIII Army was able to fight the Chinese to a standstill isn't relevent to the discussion of MacArthur, but it surpises me still to this day....

JeffroK -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 1:52:18 AM)
I believe that the War Plan was to fight for Manila, and only a last minute change altered this to the Bataan Pen, otherwise DD would have transferred supllies and ordered defensive works and a proper road network built. Even given 11 days grace from a surprise invasion, MacArthur did little to alter this. The Brits were bluffed? Outfought, Outmanouvered, Outsmarted definately. But the only "bluff" was at the end, and then it was a lost cause. In Korea, the UN forces were chased from the Yalu to south of Seoul, maybe they weren't smashed because they bugged-out so efficiently. It was comprehensivly beaten, and performed a tremendous job in finally holding the Chinese and then pushing back north of Seoul.

JeffroK -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 1:56:33 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: niceguy2005 quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK quote: From Niceguy I don't think the Malaya, Manilla comparison is a fair one. Yes, IJ put more pressure on the conquest of Singapore, but Singapore should have been a very defensible position. Bataan held partly because it was remote and IJ wasn't in as big a hurry to take it, but it also held because under Mac's command a great deal of preparation had gone into its defense. I cant see, in the official history, that much effort had been spent in preparing the Bataan Pen. Certainly supplies were not concentrated there in sufficient numbers. I can only see 1 reference to barbed wire (In front of 3 Rgt/51 Div) with the "rest of the line unprotected by obstacles other than the natural jungle". There were plans for defensive positions but the first draft was submitted in Jan 42. Jeff, I've always found your posts insightful and accurate and look forward to many more. Do you have a reference to the Jan 42 plans, or better yet just more information about them? I had always read and heard that the plans to retreat to Bataan had been in the works for some time - which I found interesting because Mac is not a retreat kind of guy. How detailed those plans were I'm not certain, but it had always been my impression that they were fairly detailed, representing troop deployment, logistics plans, etc. Any chance the 1/42 plan was a revision of the earlier plan to reflect the new realities? I was working from the Official History (Green Book) I'll find the details if you wish. IMHO, there are alway lots of plans floating around, there has to be. But they go from "ideas" through to firm plans. My reading of the relevant chapter makes me think the plans didnt get past the paperwork stage. But I could be wrong[8D] It also isnt impossible the writer could put some "spin" on the facts, the Brit History doesnt paint Wingate in a rosy light. More though omission than anything else.

Wirraway_Ace -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 5:48:45 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK I believe that the War Plan was to fight for Manila, and only a last minute change altered this to the Bataan Pen, otherwise DD would have transferred supllies and ordered defensive works and a proper road network built. Even given 11 days grace from a surprise invasion, MacArthur did little to alter this. The Brits were bluffed? Outfought, Outmanouvered, Outsmarted definately. But the only "bluff" was at the end, and then it was a lost cause. Sure, I don't disagree. My orginal point was that the troops under MacArthur performed at least as well as the Brits in Malaya quote: In Korea, the UN forces were chased from the Yalu to south of Seoul, maybe they weren't smashed because they bugged-out so efficiently. It was comprehensivly beaten, and performed a tremendous job in finally holding the Chinese and then pushing back north of Seoul. I guess we are arguing over semantics. To me, an army that has been comprehensively beaten can't turn-around and fight its opponent to a stand-still and then counter-attack (i.e. MacArthur's army was comprehensively beaten in the PI; he had to raise a new one to come back, but not in Korea). But I believe your point was that MacArthur's mad rush to the Yalu and disregard of intelligence suggesting enemy forces were infiltrating along his flanks was poor judgement--agreed; however Monty managed a very similiar blunder during Market Garden. Both operations were characterized by nearly blind confidence by the Commanders in their own assessment of the tactical and strategic situation. Both resulted in heavy casualties among the exposed formations. It should also be noted that Mac was over 60 on Dec 7, 1941 and over 70 during the Korean Conflict. That is a very advanced age to be leading soldiers and trying to deal with the incredible changes in warfare that occured during his professional life. For all his faults as an objective author, I still like Manchester's preamble to AMERICAN CAESAR: "He was a great thundering paradox of a man,..."

anarchyintheuk -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 6:55:55 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: niceguy2005 quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK quote: From Niceguy I don't think the Malaya, Manilla comparison is a fair one. Yes, IJ put more pressure on the conquest of Singapore, but Singapore should have been a very defensible position. Bataan held partly because it was remote and IJ wasn't in as big a hurry to take it, but it also held because under Mac's command a great deal of preparation had gone into its defense. I cant see, in the official history, that much effort had been spent in preparing the Bataan Pen. Certainly supplies were not concentrated there in sufficient numbers. I can only see 1 reference to barbed wire (In front of 3 Rgt/51 Div) with the "rest of the line unprotected by obstacles other than the natural jungle". There were plans for defensive positions but the first draft was submitted in Jan 42. Jeff, I've always found your posts insightful and accurate and look forward to many more. Do you have a reference to the Jan 42 plans, or better yet just more information about them? I had always read and heard that the plans to retreat to Bataan had been in the works for some time - which I found interesting because Mac is not a retreat kind of guy. How detailed those plans were I'm not certain, but it had always been my impression that they were fairly detailed, representing troop deployment, logistics plans, etc. Any chance the 1/42 plan was a revision of the earlier plan to reflect the new realities? This is an old source but it provides pretty good detail on pre-war plans and dispositions. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_4.htm#p61

Mike Scholl -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 8:09:39 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk This is an old source but it provides pretty good detail on pre-war plans and dispositions. http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_4.htm#p61 And it points out the biggest single weakness of MacArthur's thinking. Even when planning his more active and positive defense strategy, he KNEW (if he didn't he would have to be a complete idiot) that his "Philippines Army" could not possibly be trained and equipped to face the Japanese before the Fall of 1942. Yet he made NO "contingincy plans" or logistical arraingements for the Japanese refusing to go along with his schedule and attacking before he was ready. He could easilly used the fortification of the Bataan Penninsula as part of Filippino training (they had to learn to dig in and camofluage anyway---why not have them practice where it might do some good?), and have the roads and storage facilities on Bataan improved and stockpiled. He rejected any such efforts on the part of his Staff as "defeatist" and refused to consider them even when War broke out and he knew his forces weren't ready. Result? The Bataan Garrison went on half rations the day it finally fell back to the position..., and the Japanese could live on American Supply for the entire campaign.

anarchyintheuk -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 9:23:42 PM)
All true. However, iirc Mac was looking at 4/42 for completion of mobilization and training, whether that was possible or not is another matter. He had a choice to make: accept the prewar thinking of retreat to Bataan and eventually surrendering his force or trying something else. It wasn't really in his character to be defeatist. Feel free to equate that with lacking a clear grasp of reality. So given time (possible) and equipment (more difficult but still possible) he chose to try a forward/beach defense. I don't think he had the time or resources to simultaneously prepare a forward defense and prepare Bataan. Having sold Roosevelt and the JCS on the idea that the Phillipines could be held via a forward defense, he wasn't really in a position to backtrack. Let's face it, it wasn't a popular idea in higher command circles to just write off the Phillipines and the men defending it. Mac's dream/delusion of actively defending the Phillipines was preferable and not considered unrealistic (particularly with the prewar theories of the effectiveness of the B-17 and an understimation of IJA capability). The JCS had to have a certain amount of belief in it because they basically gave Mac a blank check in the form of scarce equipment to realize it. Although not strictly relevant, politically there would have been a lot of 'splaining to do by Roosevelt and the JCS if it appeared they had a prewar plan to surrender the Phillipines and leave its defenders holding the bag. In hindsight the forward defense was grasping at straws by Mac, the JCS and Roosevelt in an attempt to avoid the inevitable: the fall of the Phillipines. At the time I don't think it was so clear. Either choice would have ended up with the garrison surrendering. Brutal and unfeeling as it sounds, whether the garrison was starving or well-fed when they surrendered is irrelevant.

Mike Scholl -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/28/2008 11:05:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk All true. However, iirc Mac was looking at 4/42 for completion of mobilization and training, whether that was possible or not is another matter. If that was the case, he was a complete idiot. He wouldn't have even have recieved all the weapons and equipment he needed by 4/42. My point was that even if he wanted to try his "forward defense", there was nothing but his own ego stopping him from preparing and stockpiling the Bataan position before the War, or even doing much more after the War started. And if the men on Bataan hadn't been starving and running out of munitions, they could have dragged it's defense out a good deal longer. In the end, surrender was in the cards.., but buying time and tying up Japanese resources were worthwhile and valuable goals.

witpqs -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/29/2008 1:15:56 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl If that was the case, he was a complete idiot. He wouldn't have even have recieved all the weapons and equipment he needed by 4/42. My point was that even if he wanted to try his "forward defense", there was nothing but his own ego stopping him from preparing and stockpiling the Bataan position before the War, or even doing much more after the War started. And if the men on Bataan hadn't been starving and running out of munitions, they could have dragged it's defense out a good deal longer. In the end, surrender was in the cards.., but buying time and tying up Japanese resources were worthwhile and valuable goals. Remember what you are talking about: MacArthur's EGO

Big B -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/29/2008 1:47:32 AM)
Hi, I haven't shot my mouth off for a while - but a "who was the worst general thread" is too good to pass up. Mixed feelings here. On the one hand, it's always good old fun to verbally abuse those b@$!@&#$ we were taught to dislike. On the other hand, I always feel a bit uneasy in conscience about pretentiously passing judgment on the men who made history - the men who had to make decisions NONE OF US will ever have to (kind of like ants discussing lawn mowers). Mac Arthur's big sin to us in the 21st century was his ego - we must have humble saints, Monty's big sin was the same. If you think otherwise - you're not really being truthful with yourself. War is about killing, and as my father told me...there is NOTHING good about it - World Wars are about MASSIVE killing. If you can't live with horrendous casualties - you are probably a decent human being, but you're also a lousy general. War is about winning - regardless of cost. What matters, in the long run, is all about who wins... if you doubt that - ask the American Indians, or perhaps the Carthaginians. Furthermore, I know of no general who didn't have 'too much' blood on his hands - somewhere along the line. I'm an American, so I will be content to admire the better qualities of MacArthur, and ignore the protests of the others. If I were a Brit, I would feel the same about Monty, if I were German - I'd hold up von Manstein, Japanese - general Homma, etc. I guess it's really all just fun to argue about, but until YOU have life or death to decide ....I wouldn't be too ardent about condemning the men who had THAT thrust upon them. (for goodness sake let's face it, most of us can't handle big corporate decisions, I don't know of any self-made billionaires on this forum - and surely that is easier than ordering the death of friends and deciding the fate of their nation). B

Nikademus -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (10/29/2008 4:20:37 PM)
Discussions about leaders are always a thorny proposition, (which is why i tend to stay out of them!) .......not the least of which is due to the contamination of hindsight. Another reason is that even professional historians have differing opinions and viewpoints. My current read, Atkinson for example, paints a more sympathetic portrayal of Mark Clark than in Neillands or Porch though he does admit that ultimately Clark remains a controversial figure. Rather than dwell on whether or not a general was "good" or "bad" I look for consistant patterns in the Pro and Con catagory that cross author lines. I also try to look at the situation they were in and put it into proper context....if i get muddled, at least i know i'm in good company. [:D] Monty, to use an example consistantly is portrayed as brilliant but saddled with an arrogance that could blind him at times to the reality of a situation and made him hard to get along with. He is consistantly applauded as a master of set piece battles of large scale and complexity, but is less sure when the situation gets murky. Atkinson goes further and comments that mountainous terrain seemed his bane.....not in the least due to the negating impact it had on firepower and timing. (support for this can be found in other works as well if not mentioned specifically) MacArthur, the subject of this thread seemed to consistantly dismiss the work of his own Intelligence staff which led to problems with properly appreciating enemy force levels and intentions. On the Pro....he was a great administrator and Hastings considers his finest hour to be not during wartime but post-war as de-facto ruler of Japan....a situation which suited his characteristics and ego. Even comparing frontline generals can be tricky. The saga of General Lucas, Corps Commander at Anzio is a good example. Atkinson is somewhat mercurial in his view on this one......he tries to portray both sides of the argument but his own view is harder to pin down. (Neillands, a former soldier does this better than most authors i've read) It is a tough one though. Lucas "won" technically but was sacked none the less because he was considered too timid for the situation.

borner -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/1/2008 4:33:53 AM)
Can anyone think of a nearly even battle where Monty did well? Seems all his great acheivements were when he had overwhelming numbers and supplies.

JeffroK -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/1/2008 8:12:14 AM)
From 1942 the Western Allies fought most battles with a superiority in numbers and supply, you could ask the same question of Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley or Clark. I believe that Monty's failings are often connected to the "Culture" of the British Army. Its Artillery was fantastic, an excellent if stolid Infantry Army with some Armoured support controlled by the Cavalry. Monty therefore used its "strong points" in the planning and control of his battles. If Eisenhower was truly great, he would have used his varied commanders and forces using the best of each forces abilities rather than try to treat them as the same. I'm the fan of a single thrust on germany, but I'm not sure where it should have been aimed. As for Monty being put of by the Italian Mountains, who wasnt......... More in theatre, whats the general thoughts about Eichleberger & Buckner. I've read good things about the first and varied reviews of the second.

madgamer2 -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/1/2008 11:17:56 PM)
YA beat me to it! My thoughts exactly. Madgamer

madgamer2 -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/1/2008 11:23:17 PM)
GEEZ HUGGER!....why that....makes ya .....a celebrity ....almost. Just think I know a guy that sat in the same jeep with him. I AM honored. How did they come to pick you in the first place? Madgamer

borner -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/2/2008 2:55:05 PM)
I agree about the culture of the British army comment, but still think Alexander was a better commander than Monty. It is somewhat sad that MOnty's success, such as it was, in france vaulted hi past Alexander as the "best" GB commander of WWII. A great what if - and I now I am way off topic now, is if O'Connor had not been captured and been aound to command what became the 8th army and beyond.

JeffroK -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/2/2008 8:20:00 PM)
And what exactly did Alexander achieve?? I would also rate Wavell highly, but politics and the size of his command finally wore him out.

Nikademus -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/2/2008 9:57:14 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: borner Can anyone think of a nearly even battle where Monty did well? Seems all his great acheivements were when he had overwhelming numbers and supplies. Alamein. Some historians have given credence to Rommel's complaints that he was "simply" overwhelmed by Allied material superiority there...yet he made a number of mistakes during the defense of the Alamein line and his offense IMO suffered from having been done one too many times the same way. Porch and Neillands however do conceed that his point has some merit....but the same authors also point out that the British had even greater material superiority in past big battles in 42 and failed to pull off a victory. Monty didn't simply walk in......say "cherrio" and order a Zhukov type offensive. First he defeated Rommel's initial attack for one thing....and while Monty benefited from Auchenlick's initial defensive setup, he made many key changes that produced dividends when the Axis attacked the line. Neilland's credits Monty's impact on Eighth Army's morale and level of training....and says he had "Grip" which is described as a feel for the battlefield and the pulse of the men who he commanded....something many a British general in the past lacked. Auchenlick suffered here, mainly because he commanded from far in the rear area and largely let his appointee's manage the army. (until first Alamein). Monty's energy, organizational skills and focus on training were vital to helping win the battle. Numbers helped of course.....they always do, but even Porch...who is more on the fence where "Monty" is concerned admits that a 2:1 edge in numbers isn't a gurantee of victory.

Commander Stormwolf -> RE: General Douglas MacArthur (11/2/2008 9:59:12 PM)
quote: Can anyone think of a nearly even battle where Monty did well? Seems all his great acheivements were when he had overwhelming numbers and supplies." [:D] "First you win, then you fight" [8D]

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