RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (Full Version)

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Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/21/2009 6:01:26 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

If you have to add masses of extra equipment to achieve this then obviously something has gone wrong.

I'm pretty sure it would be dense regardless. In my match, I recall I had a lot of combat units piled up in the rear areas to avoid density penalties. Reduce the levels of equipment in units and these go straight into the front line hexes- and you still have a dense battle.


Historically, the Allies were holding divisions out of the front lines at Normandy due to lack of space to insert them. It was a very dense situation. Without modeling that, the Allies would breakout too quickly. As it is, they breakout just about on schedule. That's why I'm pretty sure I've got it just about right.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/21/2009 6:08:18 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

There is the minor problem that as Ben noted, actually taking up positions in this density is tactically suicidal. Not only will you suffer severe losses, but you won't hold the hex either, as the decimated units will tend to evaporate or retreat out.

This leads to one of two possibilities. Either the historical Germans were complete idiots, or your scenario doesn't simulate the reality of the situation very well. That is to say, even if the troops were densely packed in, they couldn't have suffered the kind of increased losses this behavior will produce in TOAW.

Personally, my guess is that your denials notwithstanding, you're running afoul of Norm's excessively rigorous density penalties. If you do pack the troops in, you'll get hammered -- and if you've made the units larger still, the problem will be still worse.

Really, the whole issue could do with some analysis and discussion. But we won't get it. We'll stall out (once again) over the issue of whether your scenario is or is not perfection incarnate.


I have an AAR that analyzes the issue about as thoroughly as it can be analyzed. The scenario simply works too well to be that far off. As usual, all you have are untested theories - dashed by that AAR.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/21/2009 6:39:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

There is the minor problem that as Ben noted, actually taking up positions in this density is tactically suicidal. Not only will you suffer severe losses, but you won't hold the hex either, as the decimated units will tend to evaporate or retreat out.

This leads to one of two possibilities. Either the historical Germans were complete idiots, or your scenario doesn't simulate the reality of the situation very well. That is to say, even if the troops were densely packed in, they couldn't have suffered the kind of increased losses this behavior will produce in TOAW.

Personally, my guess is that your denials notwithstanding, you're running afoul of Norm's excessively rigorous density penalties. If you do pack the troops in, you'll get hammered -- and if you've made the units larger still, the problem will be still worse.

Really, the whole issue could do with some analysis and discussion. But we won't get it. We'll stall out (once again) over the issue of whether your scenario is or is not perfection incarnate.


I have an AAR that analyzes the issue about as thoroughly as it can be analyzed. The scenario simply works too well to be that far off. As usual, all you have are untested theories - dashed by that AAR.


...and I imagine the AAR -- like the one you pointed to for your Barbarossa scenario -- is based on you playing yourself.

Less than convincing...but here we are again.

You're firmly dug in on the grounds that your scenario is just fine, others are doubting it, and any issues of more general significance are getting left on the side of the road about six posts back.

Let me try to communicate something to you. I don't care about your scenarios -- and I mean that in the best way possible. They could indeed be jewels of the TOAW designers' art -- that's okay with me.

Really. If you're a designing genius, I can accept it. But can we discuss the larger issues without worrying about whether one of the points made implies a scenario you wrote in 2003 is or is not flawed?

...because this is at least the second time we've hit this obstacle. First it was Barbarossa -- and that turned into whether negative shock was or was not a completely sufficient device for modeling the deficiencies of the Red Army in 1941. Well whether it was or wasn't, and what other devices might be used, and whether it was possible to simulate the problems at all in TOAW -- all that had to take a back seat. We wound up with Bob's Hindenberg line across the whole conversation -- this implied criticism of Bob's scenario, and he wasn't going to take it. It had to be negative shock, and only negative shock, and negative shock was completely sufficient, and that was it. And why? Because that's what you had used.

Now here we are again. Actually I'm interested in the issues of density, appropriate ways of representing troops, and how to deal with rear-echelon elements. But no...the question becomes is Bob's Normandy scenario valid?

What other scenarios have you written? I mean, I just want to know where else I can expect road blocks.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/22/2009 5:17:23 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

You're firmly dug in on the grounds that your scenario is just fine, others are doubting it, and any issues of more general significance are getting left on the side of the road about six posts back.


I'm firmly dug in on the grounds that my scenarios be evaluated on how they actually perform. Not on how you think they perform, envision that they perform, or theorize that they perform. Experimental evidence trumps theory every time. One of these days you just might figure that out. If you read your post above it seems to be a demand that no theory of yours be subject to experimental evaluation. No - we're only supposed to "discuss" them.

And just for the record, I was not the one that brought "France 1944" into this discussion. That was Ben in post #36. I agree it was a diversion, and said so further back. But if my scenario is being discussed I think I have a right to join the discussion.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/22/2009 6:44:32 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



I'm firmly dug in on the grounds that my scenarios be evaluated on how they actually perform. Not on how you think they perform, envision that they perform, or theorize that they perform....


I agree. That's the problem. Everything becomes an involuntary referendum on your scenarios. You emotionally invest yourself in whatever solution you wound up adopting, refuse to consider the validity of any other solutions, and interpret even proposing these solutions as criticism of your scenarios.

Rather predictably, it DOES become criticism of your scenarios, because you advance your scenarios as evidence, insisting that (a) they work perfectly, and that (b) whatever solution you adopted in them is therefore (1) a completely satisfactory solution, and (2) the only possible solution.

We then get to fight about the validity of your scenarios. Why not just retitle every thread you post on 'the validity of my scenarios'?



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/22/2009 6:55:20 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


And just for the record, I was not the one that brought "France 1944" into this discussion. That was Ben in post #36. I agree it was a diversion, and said so further back. But if my scenario is being discussed I think I have a right to join the discussion.


Alright, that's true. However, look at what Ben said:

'This really comes across in Bo- Curtis' France 1944 scenario. When I tried that, it was virtually impossible to avoid density penalties. See, every unit had about twice as many active defenders as I would have expected.'

I would guess that's true. Do you dispute it? If you don't dispute it, are you claiming that (a) the Germans foolishly incurred massively increased losses in Normandy by packing their troops in too tightly, or are you claiming that (b) their historical assertions notwithstanding, they actually suffered from a massive glut of troops in Normandy, having far more than they needed to fight the Allies?

It must be one of these two, since you have already asserted that (a) your design solution has no drawbacks, and that (b) Norm's density penalties are calibrated just fine.

Now, at this point, my interest would be on either of the following: the validity of Norm's density parameters, or the drawbacks to representing non-combat elements of a division. Your position will be dictated by the need to defend without qualification whatever design decision you made, and we will get nowhere.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/22/2009 8:40:52 PM)

Anyway...looking at this without reference to CurtCross' Normandy and also without judging whether Norm's original density values are universally valid, we can make several related points.

1. Density penalties in TOAW can be devastating. If an orange- or red-light stack is hit with a serious attack, the defenders will be slaughtered, and the hex will probably be lost to boot. I've seen this in both scenarios I've played where density lights are likely to go off in the first place.

2. Judging by his designs for Korea and his Normandy scenario, and his response to the whole 'Jeeps and Tigers' thing (showing my age here), Norm's assumption when he came up with these density parameters was that only actual combat troops would be represented in the units. He wasn't allowing for cooks 'n clerks.

3. Therefore, in any scenario in which there's any likelihood that troops will be crowded, adding in cooks 'n clerks will produce density penalties in excess of those originally intended -- and this change will have a major impact on how the scenario plays.




ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/22/2009 9:00:10 PM)

Now, there are a couple of further points I think are germane.

First, Norm wasn't God.  A lot of these conversations take the values Norm chose as if they were product of years of research, and as if Norm had a miraculous ability to render the fruits of those years of research on each question into code.  Flawlessly, without error.

It's curious how many of the resulting values are integers.  Not x1.72, or x2.31, but x2.  Go figure.  The more cynical of us might suspect that a lot of these values were chosen casually, and that Norm may not have even devoted years of study to determining what they should be.

So heresy or not, I'll come out and say it.  Norm is probably often wrong.  Naturally, one should be careful to test the effects of tinkering with the machine, but it's theoretically entirely possible it would work better with other values than the ones Norm chose.

Secondly, any careful historical reading will quickly make it apparent that Norm's density values are off for a lot of times and places.  One repeatedly finds complaints of troops being overstretched -- and the densities would still be setting off yellow or orange lights in a TOAW scenario.  Attacks are mounted on frontages and in situations that would virtually guarantee futile slaughter in TOAW-land.  And that's without cooks and clerks.

I think the 'correct' density value varies by time and place.  There's communications, tactics, and I suspect terrain.  A lot more troops can find adequate cover in a square mile of devastated city than can find cover in square mile of flat plain.  Similarly with forest, bocage, etc.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 6:21:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

I agree. That's the problem. Everything becomes an involuntary referendum on your scenarios. You emotionally invest yourself in whatever solution you wound up adopting, refuse to consider the validity of any other solutions, and interpret even proposing these solutions as criticism of your scenarios.


I'm not emotionally investing myself in anything. I'm submitting detailed test results that contradict your (normally baseless) pronouncements. If my scenarios are shown to have problems (and that's happened many times) then I go to significant lengths to fix them. Most have been pretty well tested out.

quote:

Rather predictably, it DOES become criticism of your scenarios, because you advance your scenarios as evidence, insisting that (a) they work perfectly, and that (b) whatever solution you adopted in them is therefore (1) a completely satisfactory solution, and (2) the only possible solution.


"France 1944" and "Soviet Union 1941" do work quite well, as my posted AARs testify. I've never said they were "perfect" or the "only possible solution".

Look, if you say "Do A and B will result.", and I say "I did A and B didn't result.", why isn't that a legitimate response? Especially if you've never done "A".



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 6:35:30 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

'This really comes across in Bo- Curtis' France 1944 scenario. When I tried that, it was virtually impossible to avoid density penalties. See, every unit had about twice as many active defenders as I would have expected.'

I would guess that's true. Do you dispute it?


I would guess it depends upon how many defenders Ben was expecting.

quote:

If you don't dispute it, are you claiming that (a) the Germans foolishly incurred massively increased losses in Normandy by packing their troops in too tightly, or are you claiming that (b) their historical assertions notwithstanding, they actually suffered from a massive glut of troops in Normandy, having far more than they needed to fight the Allies?


Neither. I would say that both sides had no choice but to live with high density penalties. The Germans were desperately trying to hold the Allies in Normandy, and the Allies were desperately trying to break out. Neither could afford to thin out their lines.

quote:

It must be one of these two, since you have already asserted that (a) your design solution has no drawbacks, and that (b) Norm's density penalties are calibrated just fine.


Actually, what I asserted was that my design works extremely well (it does!), and that it was highly dubious that you actually had any rigourous evidence concerning Norm's density figures (you don't!).



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 6:41:39 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Anyway...looking at this without reference to CurtCross' Normandy and also without judging whether Norm's original density values are universally valid, we can make several related points.

1. Density penalties in TOAW can be devastating. If an orange- or red-light stack is hit with a serious attack, the defenders will be slaughtered, and the hex will probably be lost to boot. I've seen this in both scenarios I've played where density lights are likely to go off in the first place.

2. Judging by his designs for Korea and his Normandy scenario, and his response to the whole 'Jeeps and Tigers' thing (showing my age here), Norm's assumption when he came up with these density parameters was that only actual combat troops would be represented in the units. He wasn't allowing for cooks 'n clerks.

3. Therefore, in any scenario in which there's any likelihood that troops will be crowded, adding in cooks 'n clerks will produce density penalties in excess of those originally intended -- and this change will have a major impact on how the scenario plays.


Here we go again. You make an assertion that you've never actually tested out. If I now point out that I've done exactly what you say and got entirely different results then I'm erecting a "Hindenburg Line across the whole conversation".

Colin must be allowed to make any assertion he wants, no questions asked. I'm not sure what criteria could ever be used to evaluate them, because actual test evidence is unacceptable.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 6:47:02 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Now, there are a couple of further points I think are germane.

First, Norm wasn't God.  A lot of these conversations take the values Norm chose as if they were product of years of research, and as if Norm had a miraculous ability to render the fruits of those years of research on each question into code.  Flawlessly, without error.

It's curious how many of the resulting values are integers.  Not x1.72, or x2.31, but x2.  Go figure.  The more cynical of us might suspect that a lot of these values were chosen casually, and that Norm may not have even devoted years of study to determining what they should be.

So heresy or not, I'll come out and say it.  Norm is probably often wrong.  Naturally, one should be careful to test the effects of tinkering with the machine, but it's theoretically entirely possible it would work better with other values than the ones Norm chose.

Secondly, any careful historical reading will quickly make it apparent that Norm's density values are off for a lot of times and places.  One repeatedly finds complaints of troops being overstretched -- and the densities would still be setting off yellow or orange lights in a TOAW scenario.  Attacks are mounted on frontages and in situations that would virtually guarantee futile slaughter in TOAW-land.  And that's without cooks and clerks.

I think the 'correct' density value varies by time and place.  There's communications, tactics, and I suspect terrain.  A lot more troops can find adequate cover in a square mile of devastated city than can find cover in square mile of flat plain.  Similarly with forest, bocage, etc.


I actually don't have any objection to this. I'm pushing harder than anyone to get Ralph to add a "density scaler" to 3.4. There's a reasonable chance it will happen.

However, your original claim was far more specific. You were actually claiming that Norm was off by a factor of about 30%. Norm's values probably weren't the result of "years of research". But I'm guessing they have far more research into them than any figure from you.



golden delicious -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 7:16:28 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

"France 1944" and "Soviet Union 1941" do work quite well,


They're both probably the best scenarios so far designed on their respective subjects. That doesn't mean they are beyond improvement.



golden delicious -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/23/2009 7:48:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I would guess it depends upon how many defenders Ben was expecting.


Looking at the Germans, the number of squads for a regiment - 99 all in - doesn't seem too outrageous. However the addition of 36 AT+ teams (I realise these are in the TO&E but the game sees them as a 10 man squad for density purposes) and 15 Jeeps increases the density effect of the unit by more than 50%. You could mitigate this by putting the AT+ into the squads and just scrapping the Jeeps.

The Allies are worse. 231st Infantry Brigade has 210 combat squads and 145 active defender vehicles. I would have expected to see a maximum of maybe 144 squads or so, and very few active defender vehicles. I realise that most of these are tracked carriers which are in the TO&E, but they add a huge amount to the density penalty. The scout cars are another egregious point- these too are real, but hinder more than they help.

The fact is I think you could dramatically reduce the number of squads assigned to the Allies, dump them in replacements- and actually make the Allies more effective, not less.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/24/2009 5:43:47 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Looking at the Germans, the number of squads for a regiment - 99 all in - doesn't seem too outrageous. However the addition of 36 AT+ teams (I realise these are in the TO&E but the game sees them as a 10 man squad for density purposes) and 15 Jeeps increases the density effect of the unit by more than 50%. You could mitigate this by putting the AT+ into the squads and just scrapping the Jeeps.


The squads already have AT ratings. If I had plain squads without AT ratings, I could have incorporated the teams into them, but that wasn't the case. The jeeps affect recon levels. We're talking about actual combat elements that were in the unit.

quote:

The Allies are worse. 231st Infantry Brigade has 210 combat squads and 145 active defender vehicles. I would have expected to see a maximum of maybe 144 squads or so, and very few active defender vehicles. I realise that most of these are tracked carriers which are in the TO&E, but they add a huge amount to the density penalty. The scout cars are another egregious point- these too are real, but hinder more than they help.


So, we're not too far off on squads - less than 50% difference. Tracked carriers and scout cars are actual combat equipment in the unit. I'd be including them even if I wasn't modeling any rear-area elements. (Not to mention that if I had omitted the Bren Carriers, I would have had you haranguing me about it).

quote:

The fact is I think you could dramatically reduce the number of squads assigned to the Allies, dump them in replacements- and actually make the Allies more effective, not less.


But why would I want to do that? They're effective enough as it is. I don't want to pretend that Normandy was the eastern front. Furthermore, there was another, independent, adjustment made to combat lethality by the Attrition Divider. That was set by trial-and-error. Had average density for both sides been lower, then a correspondingly lower figure for the AD would have been obtained - producing a net wash in lethality.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/24/2009 6:07:38 PM)

I want to go all the way back to the original issue about how to model variable-sized squads. I think that has gotten confused with the completely different issue of how I chose to design France 1944. As I've said earlier, how to model the elements chosen to be included in the unit is different from what elements to choose to include in the unit.

Forgetting France 1944 for a minute, just assume the two forces have units with 36 combat squads each - nothing else. But those squads are 8-man with 1-LMG for one force, and 13-man with 2-LMGs for the other force. How do you model them?

Let's take the 8-man squad unit. It has 288 men and 36 LMGs. So you can form about 29 10-man squads from it. That leaves 7 LMGs extra. So 7 squads have 2-LMGs and 22 have 1-LMG. That equates to 22 Rifle Squads and 7 Heavy Rifle Squads. Since 1 squad will only have 8 men in it, you might reduce that to 21 Rifle Squads, 7 Heavy Rifle Squads, and 1 Light Rifle Squad.

Now take the 13-man squad unit. It has 468 men and 72 LMGs. So you can form about 47 squads from it. That leaves 25 extra LMGs. So, as above, 21 Rifle Squads, 25 Heavy Rifle Squads, and 1 Light Rifle Squad.

In each case, you get the relative density, lift requirements, and combat strength correct. That's impossible to do if you try to force both units to have 36 squads. And note that we've still only modeled those 36 squads - no cooks or clerks, etc. were added.



golden delicious -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/24/2009 9:41:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

The squads already have AT ratings. If I had plain squads without AT ratings, I could have incorporated the teams into them, but that wasn't the case. The jeeps affect recon levels. We're talking about actual combat elements that were in the unit.


Does your unit also have the exact same number of trucks as the real unit as well?

No. Design for effect. Best solution would probably be a modified .exe whereby your AT+ squads and Jeeps are passive defenders.

quote:

But why would I want to do that? They're effective enough as it is. I don't want to pretend that Normandy was the eastern front. Furthermore, there was another, independent, adjustment made to combat lethality by the Attrition Divider. That was set by trial-and-error.


Really? Because it strikes me that the loss rates of soft equipment in this scenario are so high that it almost breaks the scenario. Perhaps if there weren't so many squads to kill, you wouldn't have to skew the game to kill them.



golden delicious -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/24/2009 9:44:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Forgetting France 1944 for a minute, just assume the two forces have units with 36 combat squads each - nothing else. But those squads are 8-man with 1-LMG for one force, and 13-man with 2-LMGs for the other force. How do you model them?


To be honest, probably just rifle squads vs. heavy rifle squads. If pushed, I might make the 2nd battalion something like 24 heavy rifle squads and 24 rifle squads.

Anyway, clearly not what you've done in France 1944. You'd need British rifle squads of 22 men or something ludicrous.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 6:01:46 AM)

quote:

You were actually claiming that Norm was off by a factor of about 30%. Norm's values probably weren't the result of "years of research". But I'm guessing they have far more research into them than any figure from you.


Oh honestly. I assumed it was clear that those numbers were for illustrative purposes. The figure wasn't for Norm's original values, anyway; the point was that your technique of pumping in additional squads necessarily increases density by some factor. Even if Norm's values were perfect, what you practice would throw them off.

Anyone can see that '30%' was only intended as an approximate value to make a point, and what's more, '30%' would apply to what happens after you apply your theories of unit composition to what Norm did, not to what Norm did originally -- if you actually go back and read my post you'll see that I am implying his values are off by 10%, but even that's just a number to make my point.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 6:26:16 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




...Now take the 13-man squad unit. It has 468 men and 72 LMGs. So you can form about 47 squads from it. That leaves 25 extra LMGs. So, as above, 21 Rifle Squads, 25 Heavy Rifle Squads, and 1 Light Rifle Squad.

In each case, you get the relative density, lift requirements, and combat strength correct. That's impossible to do if you try to force both units to have 36 squads. And note that we've still only modeled those 36 squads - no cooks or clerks, etc. were added.


However, you now have 47 squads where Norm would have had only 36 squads.

Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent.

I'm not denying your solution isn't valid. I'm not even saying it's not the best choice -- given the situation you describe. I'm merely pointing out it can't be denied that it will skew the density.

In turn, particularly if we're dealing with a battle where density is already high to begin with, this increase will have a significant effect on how the scenario plays.

I might, for example, use this approach with a scenario covering North Africa. El Alamein aside, I can't think of any battle in that campaign where the armies couldn't just sprawl out to whatever frontage seemed best. Assuming I thought Norm's density values were right for that situation in the first place, I wouldn't anticipate too dire an effect from skewing them by a third.

However, I'd never try it in Seelowe. The thought of how that would play if the density problems got 30% worse isn't a pleasant one.





Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 9:38:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Does your unit also have the exact same number of trucks as the real unit as well?


Of course not. Most of the unit's trucks are for logistical purposes. You know that.

quote:

No. Design for effect. Best solution would probably be a modified .exe whereby your AT+ squads and Jeeps are passive defenders.


Again, what's wrong with the effect that I achieved? The scenario works pretty well. I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.

quote:

Really? Because it strikes me that the loss rates of soft equipment in this scenario are so high that it almost breaks the scenario. Perhaps if there weren't so many squads to kill, you wouldn't have to skew the game to kill them.


Here's the "Final Statistics" table from the AAR. German squads were lost at a 60.64% pace, AFVs at a 57.93% pace. A difference of 2.71%. Allied squads were lost at a 46.32% pace, AFVs at a 74.07% pace. A difference of -27.75%. Clearly, the loss rates weren't higher for soft equipment.

[image]local://upfiles/14086/F89088F776F346AAA5DA663438A6A69D.gif[/image]



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 9:41:17 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Anyway, clearly not what you've done in France 1944. You'd need British rifle squads of 22 men or something ludicrous.


I believe I clearly stated: "Forgetting France 1944 for a minute...".



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 9:53:06 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

However, you now have 47 squads where Norm would have had only 36 squads.

Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent.

I'm not denying your solution isn't valid. I'm not even saying it's not the best choice -- given the situation you describe. I'm merely pointing out it can't be denied that it will skew the density.


Absurd as usual. My way reflects the true density of the unit. Its 36 squads consist of 468 men. The other force's 36-squad unit consisted of 288 men. Clearly neither should have the same density as a unit with 360 men. Norm's formula for density wasn't based on semantics ("a squad is a squad no matter what size"), it was based on real equipment density.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/25/2009 11:07:03 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

However, you now have 47 squads where Norm would have had only 36 squads.

Assuming Norm's original density formula is accurate, your density is now off by (47/36=1.31) -- 31 percent.

I'm not denying your solution isn't valid. I'm not even saying it's not the best choice -- given the situation you describe. I'm merely pointing out it can't be denied that it will skew the density.


Absurd as usual...


So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.




Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 5:23:54 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.


Right. Whether it has 1 man or 1,000 men, a squad is a squad is a squad. And all squads have the same density. I can see you're going to stick to this lunatic nonsense to the bitter end. And you had the gall to accuse me of never admitting I'm wrong.

quote:

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.


Stop confusing what I'm doing in France 1944 with the technique I listed in post #76. That was only about how to model the 36 frontline squads. France 1944, on the other hand, does have extra elements added intentionally. That is a completely separate issue. What is included in the unit is not the same as how to model whatever is included.

And, of course, the disk Normandy 44 scenario was designed, not by Norm, but by the same team that designed the disk France 40 scenario. Care to discuss about how well that was designed? The disk scenarios aren't any sort of standard to follow.



Curtis Lemay -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 5:38:05 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.


I want to expound on this a bit more regarding encirclements. Earlier, I discussed how it was important to have more than just the frontline elements modeled if it was expected that rear-area elements were going to get involved in the fighting.

But the additional expectation of encirclements adds another justification: It adds a reward for achieving the encirclement. If all you model are the frontline elements, then an encirclement only traps those elements. That's not enough reward for the cost of driving the pincers through the enemy defenses and closing them on the pocket.

It also makes it unrealisticly easy to rebuild the trapped forces once destroyed. By losing only the frontline elements, the forces have not lost any more than they would have lost due to just having their frontline elements decimated via frontal assaults, etc.

It also makes it unrealistically easy to reduce the pocketed forces, since they lack all those rear-area elements - and won't be getting them via replacements while pocketed.

So, when modeling a topic that is sure to get wild, the need for modeling more than the frontline elements becomes important.



vahauser -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 6:03:08 PM)

The 231st Brigade had three combat battalions, right?  Even at 45 squads per battalion, that's only around 135 squads for the Brigade, right?



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 6:38:41 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

So charming. Anyway, it's obviously not absurd. Norm formulated his density requirements based on a certain way of constructing units. If you come up with another way that increases the amount of equipment in a given unit by 30% over what Norm would have chosen, you've obviously thrown off the density. Density penalties will kick in with a 30% lower concentration of units than Norm assumed they would.


Right. Whether it has 1 man or 1,000 men, a squad is a squad is a squad. And all squads have the same density. I can see you're going to stick to this lunatic nonsense to the bitter end. And you had the gall to accuse me of never admitting I'm wrong.

quote:

I'll sin here and refer back to your Normandy scenario. Conveniently, there is also a disc Normandy scenario dating back to when Norm was designing TOAW. Also conveniently, Ben has noted the number of squads and active defender vehicles you have in the 231st Brigade.

Ben counts 231 squads and 145 active defender vehicles in your 231st Brigade. The disc 231st brigade has 153 squads and 39 active defender vehicles.

And you think it's 'absurd as usual' to say that your approach will skew the density effect from what Norm intended. That you do so reflects on you, not me.


Stop confusing what I'm doing in France 1944 with the technique I listed in post #76. That was only about how to model the 36 frontline squads. France 1944, on the other hand, does have extra elements added intentionally. That is a completely separate issue. What is included in the unit is not the same as how to model whatever is included.

And, of course, the disk Normandy 44 scenario was designed, not by Norm, but by the same team that designed the disk France 40 scenario. Care to discuss about how well that was designed? The disk scenarios aren't any sort of standard to follow.


None of this addresses the actual point I am making; that your method for deciding how many squads to put into a unit, whatever its other merits, is going to skew the density equation away from what it would seem reasonable to assume Norm anticipated.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 6:40:44 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

The 231st Brigade had three combat battalions, right?  Even at 45 squads per battalion, that's only around 135 squads for the Brigade, right?


It would depend how you look at it. Curtis' posts outline the rationale for doing otherwise fairly clearly. Go back to about where he and I start throwing china at each other, look around carefully, and you'll find them.



ColinWright -> RE: Rifle Squad Differences? (3/26/2009 6:57:06 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

I've explained my philosophy about the need for more than just the immediate frontline equipment for those situations where the forces are going to fight beyond the point where the frontline elements have been lost, and where major encirclements are going to take place. France 1944 was one of those situations.


I want to expound on this a bit more regarding encirclements. Earlier, I discussed how it was important to have more than just the frontline elements modeled if it was expected that rear-area elements were going to get involved in the fighting.

But the additional expectation of encirclements adds another justification: It adds a reward for achieving the encirclement. If all you model are the frontline elements, then an encirclement only traps those elements. That's not enough reward for the cost of driving the pincers through the enemy defenses and closing them on the pocket.

It also makes it unrealisticly easy to rebuild the trapped forces once destroyed. By losing only the frontline elements, the forces have not lost any more than they would have lost due to just having their frontline elements decimated via frontal assaults, etc.

It also makes it unrealistically easy to reduce the pocketed forces, since they lack all those rear-area elements - and won't be getting them via replacements while pocketed.

So, when modeling a topic that is sure to get wild, the need for modeling more than the frontline elements becomes important.


I find your argument that the rear echelon elements can wind up fighting of some merit; the one for the need to reward encirclements less so. Encircling the enemy is plenty beneficial as it is.

However, you don't address the big problem; rear echelon elements normally don't fight at all if the unit is intact and at something approaching full strength. In fact, in many cases, they haven't fought even under other circumstances.

With your approach, they will fight all the time -- from day one. So I tend to see it as a matter of your approach being not necessarily an improvement. After all, if I.R. 381 fought twelve engagements, and the rear-echelon elements only participated in three of those engagements, it would seem that we represent it less rather than more accurately if we include the rear-echelon elements.

So whether adding the rear echelon elements would improve matters would depend on the answers to several questions:

1. In the decisive engagements, did the rear-echelon elements participate frequently enough to have a significant effect? It's much less important if they only joined in when the cause was already lost. In general, is the average combat power of the unit best represented with or without the rear-echelon units? The mapping section of the US 34th Infantry division may have once taken up arms -- but on the 383 other occasions when the division entered battle it did not. We're not going to improve our representation of the division if we put in two light rifles to represent the mapping section -- we'll make it worse.

2. Will the added fidelity -- if any -- of modeling these elements outweigh the distortion to the density paradigms induced by dumping in so much extra equipment?

3. Did the rear-echelon elements fight well enough to make a big difference? My three year old son might well help me unload the truck; how much help he's providing is another matter.

Before you fly off the handle, note that I am not pre-judging the answers to any of these questions (there are probably some others I haven't thought of). It's just that whether adding in the rear echelon elements is a good idea will depend on the answers to them -- and the answers in turn will depend on the specific case being considered.



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