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miral -> Germans were good Strategists - Devil's Advocate (6/2/2009 12:59:28 AM)
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As a gesture of reconciliation for some bad feelings I inadvertently caused with a post on this I would like to play Devil's advocate and argue the opposite position. I readily admit that my writing style can come across as abrasive and arrogant, but this arises from an enthusiasm for this historical matter rather than any desire to offend, and I certainly don't claim vast expertise or that those with contrary opinions may not well be right and I wrong.
The counter arguement. The best book that I am aware of that argues, albeit this is infered from the main point of the book, is R.H. Stolfi's Hitlers Panzers East. His thesis, very simplied, as any book review must of necessity be, is that if Hitler had listened to his generals and pushed on to Moscow with full emphasis there and no where else, especially if he had not turned Guderian south into the Ukraine, Moscow would have been taken, probably well before the worst weather hit and, though this would not have led to the immediate surrender of the Soviets, it would have been a victory so huge in consequences that he calls Hitler's decision to turn south the single most important decision made by a political leader in the 20th century.
Were Moscow taken the prestige and psychological effects, on both Germans and Allies, would have been vast. In additon, a good chunk of the Soviet industrial plant would have been destroyed or captured. Also, even if the Soviets burned or otherwise wasted large parts of the city whatever was left would surely have offered better protection from the winter than the open country and small villages that the Germans ended up trying to shelter in, with many fewer casualties from frostbite ect.
Finally, when spring came the Germans would have been in very good position to push on further east of Moscow into another considerable chunk of Soviet industry.
There are several interesting things about the Hitler vs Generals argument here. First, this is a clear case, unlike the original decision to invade Russia, of Hitler forcing his views on a most unwilling General corps. Second, it is an excellent example of what Clauswitz thought was among the most important questions for a stateman and his people to decide at the beginning of a war. First, recognize the war for what it is and don't try to make something else you might prefer it to be out of it. Second, determine the enemies center of gravity, that is, the thing whose capture or destruction is most likely to bring the enemy to collapse, or at least, the bargaining table. While Clauswitz thought that the enemies armed forces were more often than not the appropriate target, he allowed that sometimes other targets, such as the enemy's capital city, were more important. Thus we see Hitler and his generals in a classic argument over the center of gravity of the war.
And it is interesting that the generals were so united; the field commanders such as Guderian and the General Staff officers like Halder, who often disagreed and did not get along very well, were pretty much unanimous on this.
Given how close the Germans came to Moscow anyhow, starting their offensive later, with more worn out troops, the odds are that they could have taken the city in 1941, with enormous consequences for that war and world history.
This is certainly a reasonably position, which Stolfi argues with verve and detail
I would like to hear of other titles that support his position.
Thanks
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