RE: Incoming! (Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945



Message


Distiller -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 8:15:09 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Personally I think their doctrine relied a bit too much on the enemy being dumb BUT if the USN had done what the Japanese expected I really don't have any problem imagining that 30 IJN DD ( 16 torpedoes each ) + 6 or so CLs ( another 16 torps each ) + the 2 Kitakamis ( about 80 torps each ) could have fired the guts of 750 torpedoes at ranges of 10km or so from the US battleline with a reasonable prospect of surprise on at least some of those occasions such that the mean hit % would have been about 6% - resulting in about 45 Long Lance hits on BBs and CAs. That's a lot of the battleline sunk there.


i share the view, more or less, even though i would have gamed a lot in the IJN admirality's position.

the real and unimaginable blunder of IJ was to plan for literally decades for the deceisive battle only to trash all hopes to actually pull it of by a sneak attack (PH of course), which can only induce caution and a rethinking of doctrine among the USN while understanding said doctrine was the only real chance at suckering a superior force into the planned ambush. iow, they never believed in the deceisve battle and therefore, the range of the Type 93, the extra knots of speed for their BBs achieved through expensive refits, their sub doctrine, pretty much everything they did was a waste of time, to an extent.

what i would have tried:

If it's deceisive, commit all your available forces, everything, if you lose, you're dead anyway, so KB and all batdivs sortie, along with all DDs and CLs you can bring. subs will sortie or be vectored to the expected location of battle (or bases for refueling to gain options, especially high speed transit).

upon locating the enemy fleet, go to great lengths to make it a night engagement. sprinting is one option but it's treacherous as it reveals a desire for battle, better to make it look like a surprise skirmish against a scout force. you can sprint as long as you remain undetected, though. before the meeting, clandestinely detach all DDs with type 93 and all CLs you can spare, and of course bring Oi and Kitakami. approach the enemy line in two divisions, pretend not to notice their presence and let all ships with reloads launch their first salvo with max range setting when in range and once reasonable firing solution has been achieved. next, hope their hydrophones are drowned out by the fleet's own noise and the T93 isn't too loud at slower settings for max range. (iirc 35kts, 20nm)

continue to close until you're either too close for the TF leaders' comfort or you're engaged and launch all the rest, preferably at the high speed setting, if within range at that setting. (10nm at 50kts)

finally feign terror and scatter in seemingly disorganized fashion, a lot depends on conveying that image, even more on concealing your true numbers - it should be noted that close formation keeping and at least some understanding of radar might be required in order to do that. collisions would suck, but it's showtime, use it or lose it. if you score a lot of hits, a carrier strike at dawn will be just what the doctor prescribed, followed by a battle line engagement, maybe at afternoon. a lot would depend on the location of this carnage, if a decent airbase is near, hundred Betties and Nells could provide more torps and may even return and rearm once or twice if the carriers and therefore CAP had been neutralized before.

the most essential component (surprise) could only be achieved by restraint during the opening battles in the DEI, this means no Betties against Force Z and no LLs against ABDA under any circumstance - quite a downside. the worst objection would have to be that such a plan leaves initiative to the enemy. no sortie of the fleet, no deceisive battle and you're stuck with your self imposed rules of engagement.


the historic plan included sacrificing the Kongos to break through the screen - i wonder if that would have even been necessary given the LL's range, it wouldn't have been conducive to surprise, that much is certain. i wonder whether gambling entire nations is acceptable conduct, but suppose great risk is a cheap substitute for great power.




Terminus -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 10:09:11 PM)

And the IJN would have been able to utilize the full range of the Long Lance in a night battle, and the USN would have placidly steamed into all those fine torpedoes, suspecting nothing... Suuuuuure...[8|]




mdiehl -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 10:26:21 PM)

Tread carefully there Terminus, you're starting to sound like.... me. [;)]




pasternakski -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 10:59:01 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Distiller
feign terror and scatter in seemingly disorganized fashion

This post is ironclad evidence you would have excelled at that.




mdiehl -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 11:01:34 PM)

BIG Liopleurodon.




Distiller -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 11:15:32 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

And the IJN would have been able to utilize the full range of the Long Lance in a night battle, and the USN would have placidly steamed into all those fine torpedoes, suspecting nothing... Suuuuuure...[8|]


heck, i never said it was a good plan (just one which revolves around that particular torpedo) it just happens to be the kind of engagement it was apparently designed for. what is the long range for if not salvo launch at formations at absurd ranges? if you can't make it happen, you lose and realisitcally chances are slim. day launch is out of the question, everyone would know, if you can't avoid an ambush yourself you lose, if you miss, same, etc.

we already knew that.




pasternakski -> RE: Incoming! (6/4/2009 11:32:45 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Distiller
it just happens to be the kind of engagement it was apparently designed for. what is the long range for if not salvo launch at formations at absurd ranges?

This is exactly the conceptual trap that often made the Japanese slaves to their own technology. Just because the danged thing will zip along for miles and miles doesn't mean that you need to abandon study of tactical doctrine that will result in your wonderful weapon being applied to maximum effect.

What the Japanese failed to do was concentrate on command, control, communications and task force maneuver discipline. They often showed themselves to be just as disorganized and incompetent in night actions as their American adversaries. In the end, they were just as hide-bound to obsolete ideas as anyone else.

Thank he-who-has-no-name for the mistakes the Japanese made that cost them the war, or we might have wound up with control of aircraft engine production in WitP and midget submarines and hordes of sea trucks in AE...




Terminus -> RE: Incoming! (6/5/2009 12:14:45 AM)

At 20 miles range/35 knots speed (your figures, not mine), the torpedoes would take around half an hour to reach their designated targets. Do you perhaps want to consider if said targets might be in an ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ZIP CODE by then?????




Mynok -> RE: Incoming! (6/5/2009 2:02:21 AM)


Heck, that's enough time to invent the Enterprise and raise Scotty from a child so you can get beamed up.




mikemike -> RE: Incoming! (6/5/2009 2:44:34 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

At 20 miles range/35 knots speed (your figures, not mine), the torpedoes would take around half an hour to reach their designated targets. Do you perhaps want to consider if said targets might be in an ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ZIP CODE by then?????


If you go by the well-known quip that states that military organizations always plan, equip and organize to win the previous war, it is reasonable to assume that the IJN started off with a concept to win Jutland (although, after all the naval treaties, nobody would have expected to meet quite that target-rich an environment again). The point is that at Jutland, the battle squadrons held fairly close formations, the distance between ships of a squadron being 400 metres or less, and that course changes were avoided as much as possible, except when indispensable tactically, or if a torpedo attack was recognized. Particularly at night, the risk of collisions was too high to start zig-zagging without a very strong reason. During combat, the doctrine called for holding course and speed as constantly as possible to maximize rate and accuracy of gunfire. Given this expected enemy behaviour, it does not seem so fantastic that the IJN could be confident of predicting enemy position half an hour or more into the future with enough precision to make a mass torpedo attack using torpedoes with unprecedented range and trackless running (the enemy therefore not interpreting the behaviour of the Japanese light forces as a torpedo attack because they would have seemed to be wildly out of range) a viable proposition. At Jutland, shooting several hundred Type 93s at the Grand Fleet's battle line in such a manner would have resulted in a blood bath. Under the altered conditions prevailing in WWII, the IJN would have been better served by having torpedoes that ran at 60 knots over a range of 12k to 16k metres than by the Type 93s with their range of 49k metres at 35 knots.




TOMLABEL -> RE: Incoming! (6/5/2009 3:39:05 AM)

I'm always encouraged when you guys find something to keep you occupied and it's contained in one thead (for now anyways). [:D]


Hey look! There launching another space shuttle tonight - unannounced!

[;)]


TOMLABEL




Distiller -> RE: Incoming! (6/5/2009 9:03:07 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Terminus

At 20 miles range/35 knots speed (your figures, not mine), the torpedoes would take around half an hour to reach their designated targets. Do you perhaps want to consider if said targets might be in an ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ZIP CODE by then?????


for speed/range figures:

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTJAP_WWII.htm


it's like laying a minefield lasting only a few minutes, the advantage is that you don't need to get very close, but the window of opportunity is narrow to say the least. they had that weapon, all that would have been truely risked in such an encounter would have been the loss a dozen DDs and a couple of CLs (CAs can't be sent, they would probably be viewed as capital ships on radar and trigger a reaction and unpredictable change of course). the potential gain is huge, but it's as unreliable as it can get.




quote:

ORIGINAL: pasternakski
This is exactly the conceptual trap that often made the Japanese slaves to their own technology. Just because the danged thing will zip along for miles and miles doesn't mean that you need to abandon study of tactical doctrine that will result in your wonderful weapon being applied to maximum effect.



i don't know if they stopped refining tactics after they had fielded that XXL torpedo. their planning turned out to be completely misguided, though, because the battle they had planned for simply didn't materialize. i hope they designed a weapon for an existing doctrine and not the other way around.

i severely doubt the USN would have played into their hands in any shape or form, the historical campaign was hamstrung by a lack of ships, which would still have been afloat in this scenario. no suicide run to the phillipines, i'm sure. the only real opportunity i can think of would be attacking an invasion task force that way, but these aren't likely to materialize anytime soon after the start of hostilities.

under these cirumstances, fielding type 95 21" torpedos would have been more than sufficient for IJN purposes, obviously. either that or giving the LL a range of 10k yards and a warhead of 2000lbs....




Page: <<   < prev  1 2 3 [4]

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
0.7109375