Berkut -> RE: struggling with being spotted (6/12/2009 3:59:51 PM)
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We are not talking about withdrawing units from the front to form a strategic reserve or relieve supply issues, we are talking about moving the army back and forth to game the spotting mechanics. And no, that was NOT done. It is historically inaccurate, and from a gameplay perspective is annoying and tedious, and for the Union, largely unworkable in a practical sense, with how the activation system works (units pulled back to spoof the spotting routines are not going to activate, and even if they do, will likely not be able to join an offensive, or will arrive late to the battle and not participate). I am actually trying to think of a time when either side, at the strategic scale, removed troops from a frontline location to form a "strategic reserve". I don't recall it happening. Both sides certainly redeployed units strategically, and both sides certainly understood the importance of operational and tactical reserves, but I cannot recall them really forming strategic reserves to the extent of withdrawing troops from the frontline locations to keep them "out of site", so to speak. Moving troops up to fight was generally too time consuming and difficult to make that workable, I suspect. Your strategic reserve would never get to the point it was needed in time, and it was usually just as easy to simply pull what you need from a front line location and sent it where it was needed anyway, when you had time to do so. The more I think about cavalry in teh civil war, the more I think it had no roll in the strategic sense it is portrayed. Like artillery, it was in almost all cases strictly a operational or tactical asset. Which isn't to say it was not important, of course it was, but I cannot think of many (any?) examples of it being used as a strategic tool at the scales you commonly see in the game. Even Stuarts deep raid prior to GB was in direct support of that operation, not seperate from it.
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