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dgaad -> (5/31/2002 10:34:07 PM)
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And, prior to that, the largest man made explosion was the detonation of the Petersburg Mine in 1864.
"In Potter's division of the 9th corps was the 48th Pa., a
Regiment made up chiefly of miners from Schuylkill county and
commanded by Lieut.-Col. Henry Pleasants, who was a practical
mining engineer. After the assault of the 18th the men of
this regiment began discussing the feasibility of running a
mine under the enemy's works, and the plan was finally
proposed by Pleasants to Burnside, who gave the project his
unqualified approval and gained Meade's consent to it. The
portion of the works to be mined was known as Elliott's
salient, being occupied by Elliott's brigade of Bushrod
Johnson's division and was near the center of the line on the
east side of the city. With no tools but the pick and shovel
the Pennsylvanians excavated a main gallery 522 feet in length
with lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long running under and
nearly parallel to the enemy's works, the earth taken from the
tunnel being carried out in cracker boxes. The work was
commenced on June 25, and on July 27 the mine was charged with
8,000 pounds of powder which was placed in eight magazines of
1,000 pounds each. On the 26th Burnside reported his plan for
an assault to follow immediately upon the explosion of the
mine. This plan contemplated the placing of Ferrero's
division in the advance, because his other divisions had been
under a heavy fire, day and night, for more than a month,
while the colored troops had been held as a reserve. This
selection was not approved by Meade and Grant, partly for the
reason that it might be charged they were willing to sacrifice
the negro soldiers by pushing them forward and partly because
Ferrero's division had never been in close contact with the
enemy and it was not known how they would conduct themselves
in such an emergency, though the men had been drilling for
several weeks for the work, and were not only willing but
anxious for the undertaking. A division was then selected by
lot, and it fell to Gen. Ledlie to lead the assault. This was
Burnside's weakest division and was commanded by a man whom
Gen. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, characterizes as "an
officer whose total unfitness for such a duty ought to have
been known to Gen. Burnside, though it is not possible that it
could have been. It was not known to Gen. Meade."
On the 29th an order was issued from headquarters
providing that "At half past three in the morning of the 30th,
Maj.-Gen. Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting
columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize
the crest in the rear and effect a lodgment there. He will be
followed by Maj.-Gen. Ord (now in command of the 18th corps),
who will support him on the right, directing his movement to
the crest indicated, and by Maj.-Gen. Warren who will support
him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery
of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the
enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our
columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the
progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the
direction of the fire will be issued through the Chief of
Artillery."
At the appointed time Ledlie's division was in position
in two lines, Marshall's brigade in front and Bartlett's in
the rear, ready to charge into the breach the moment the mine
was sprung. Four o'clock came and still no explosion.
Officers and men who had been in a state of feverish
expectancy since shortly after midnight, began to grow
restless. An officer was sent to Burnside to inquire the
cause of the delay, and it was learned that the fuse had died
out Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees volunteered to
enter the gallery and reignite the fuse. Their efforts were
crowned with success though they had barely emerged from the
mouth of the mine at 4:45 when the explosion took place. A
solid mass of earth, mingled with timbers, dismantled cannon
and human beings, rose 200 feet in the air, and where
Elliott's salient had stood was a ragged crater 170 feet long,
60 wide and 30 feet deep, filled with dust and debris.
Immediately the Federal artillery-about 160 guns and mortars-
opened fire and as soon as the dust had cleared away
Marshall's line advanced closely followed by Bartlett's, but
the men could not resist the temptation to crowd forward to
look into the hole, and the two brigades became hopelessly
mixed. When the explosion occurred the Confederates hurried
away from the intrenchments for 200 or 300 yards on either
side of the mine, but the confusion of Ledlie's men and the
delay in restoring something like order gave the enemy time to
recover from his bewilderment, so that when the Union troops
attempted to cross the crater they were met by a fire of
musketry, straggling at first but increasing in effectiveness
until at the end of half an hour the two brigades were huddled
in a confused mass in the hole, unable to advance or withdraw.
Gen. Humphreys says: "Gen. Ledlie did not accompany, much less
lead, his division. He remained, according to the testimony
before the Court of Inquiry that followed, in a bomb-proof
about 50 yards inside our intrenchments, from which he could
see nothing that was going on. He could not have given the
instructions he received to his brigade commanders. Had the
division advanced in column of attack, led by a resolute,
intelligent commander, it would have gained the crest in
fifteen minutes after the explosion, and before any serious
opposition could have been made to it."
Willcox sent in part of a brigade on the left of the
mine, halting the remainder of his command until Ledlie's men
should advance. He was criticized by the court of inquiry for
not making efforts "commensurate with the occasion to carry
out Gen. Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery Hill."
Ferrero moved in the rear of Willcox and upon reaching the
most advanced line of the Federal works was compelled to halt
on account of other troops occupying the position assigned to
him. After some delay he was ordered to advance and carry the
crest beyond the crater and was moving forward for that
purpose when he was directed to halt. All seemed to be
confusion, for in a little while the order to advance was
renewed. By this time the enemy had strengthened his position
on the hill and when Ferrero tried to carry it he failed. His
colored troops established their valor, however, as in his
report Ferrero says : "They were repulsed, but veterans could
hardly have stood the fire to which they were exposed." At
6:30 orders were again sent to the division commanders not to
halt at the works, but to advance at once to the crest without
waiting for mutual support. Potter had moved his division
forward by the flank soon after Ledlie began his advance.
Upon reaching the vicinity of the mine Griffin's brigade
turned to the right, took possession of the intrenchments
which the Confederates had abandoned and began an attack upon
Elliott's troops which were forced back after a long and
severe contest. The other brigade attacked on the right of
Griffin but was repulsed. The support of Ord and Warren did
not come up to the expectations and at 9:15, after four hours
of desultory fighting, Burnside received a peremptory order to
withdraw his troops from the enemy's lines and cease offensive
operations. This order was sent into the crater with
instructions to the brigade commanders to consult and
determine as to the time and manner of retiring. They sent
back a request that a heavy fire of artillery and infantry
should be opened to cover the withdrawal, but before the
messenger reached Burnside the enemy made another attack and
the men fell back in some disorder,.leaving the wounded to
fall into the hands of the Confederates. The Union loss on
the 30th was 419 killed, 1,679 wounded and 1,910 missing.
Marshall and Bartlett were both captured and 23 regimental
commanders were reported either killed, wounded or missing.
On the Confederate side the loss in Elliott's brigade was 677,
and as Weisinger's brigade lost about as heavily the total
casualties among the enemy numbered probably not far from
1,000, most of whom were killed or wounded, as but few
prisoners were taken by the Federals."
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